Abstract
This article examines the concept of prakṛti in Sāṃkhya philosophy, comparing it with the notion of nature in Heraclitus’ thought. The analysis focuses on Heraclitus’ famous fragment DK B123 which is interpreted as an expression of the continual becoming of nature, whose essence remains concealed within a process of perpetual transformation. This idea finds a parallel in the conception of prakṛti as ‘subtle’ or ‘modest’ in Sāṃkhya, understood as a dynamic principle in a state of constant evolution. By drawing a comparison with Heraclitus, the article underscores the intrinsic dynamism of prakṛti and its relationship with puruṣa, the conscious principle. Furthermore, the article offers a new interpretation of Heraclitus’ fragment, suggesting that the verb φιλεῖ does not imply an intentional action on the part of nature, but rather denotes a tendency or a spontaneous process. The comparison between Sāṃkhya and Heraclitus ultimately opens new perspectives on possible connections between Greek and Indian thought, paving the way for future studies and debates.
1. Introduction
The Sāṃkhya philosophy has always fascinated scholars and presents numerous interpretative difficulties. In particular, the relationship between the two fundamental elements that sustain the entire universe—puruṣa on the one hand and prakṛti on the other—raises several questions that remain unresolved.
The purpose of this paper is to propose a reflection based on a comparative insight with the thought of Heraclitus. It is not intended here to suggest that Sāṃkhya philosophy shares a common genesis with Greek thought; rather, the intention is simply to interpret a passage from the Sāṃkhyakārikā [SK] of Īśvarakṛṣṇa in light of a fragment of Heraclitus which, thanks to the studies of Pierre Hadot [1], has shown how the Greek conception of “nature” has nothing to do with the modern meanings attributed to it by contemporary thought, but was originally a way of understanding the progression of phenomena within a particular network of relations.
Independently of the more or less valid hypotheses of a common lineage, both traditions essentially describe a type of phenomenological reasoning, and in particular Sāṃkhya grounds its phenomenology on the interaction between the observer and the observed, here to be understood, however, in the newly proposed framework of the manifesting and the manifested.
What Sāṃkhya philosophy calls prakṛti should here be understood in the same sense that Hadot identifies for the archaic Greek φύσις, and not in the modern conception of “nature”. Prakṛti would be everything that “appears” to an observer, configuring itself as a network of relations that gradually unveil themselves, in sequence. The basic model of appearing proceeds from an antecedent (A) to a consequent (B), but in doing so, what appears is considered in some way “active”, configured, manifest, “alive”, whereas what disappears, concealing itself from the witness, passes into inactivity and thus metaphorically “dies”.
In Sāṃkhya, the alternation of the manifest and the unmanifest is described through the relationship between vyakta and avyakta, where the latter is a state of concealment (anudbhāva, literally: “folding”), whereas what is manifest is “unveiled” or “unfolded” (udbhāva); that is, it appears not because it is created, but because it is in some way “made known”. What is now manifest was previously unmanifest, and will return to being unmanifest when the subsequent phenomenon manifests itself in appearing. In this sense, there is a return to an original condition of the manifest in the unmanifest. This idea of return to the originary (punar in Sanskrit) is equally important, and should be kept in mind.
It is therefore not a matter of a true coming into being in life, nor of a true death of the phenomenon, also because the Sāṃkhya system conceives everything that appears as a simple formal reconfiguration of manifestative possibilities already inherent in prakṛti, which are “activated”, rendered “alive” by the descent of puruṣa into it.
A distinction is necessary here. Avyakta should not be understood as a state into which prakṛti as a whole repeatedly returns whenever one particular phenomenal configuration is replaced by another. The manifest and unmanifest dimensions cannot be reduced to two merely successive phases. Burley, for example, reads SK 2 as implying that the manifest and unmanifest aspects of prakṛti coexist, so that prakṛti does not cease to be unmanifest simply by becoming manifest [2] (p. 113–114). The withdrawal described at the end of the Sāṃkhyakārikā should instead be considered in relation to kaivalya and to the cessation of prakṛti’s activity for a particular puruṣa [SK] (vv. 65–66). Accordingly, I will use “concealment” in two related but distinct senses: in the stricter Sāṃkhyan sense, with reference to avyakta and the cessation of manifestation; and, comparatively, to indicate the disappearance from view of a determinate phenomenal configuration without thereby implying the annihilation of prakṛti itself.
The comparative reading of these two traditions ultimately aims to bring to light new possible interpretative keys for Sāṃkhya, revitalizing the debate in comparative philosophy by showing how forms of thought developed in geographically distant contexts can reflect on the same issues in surprising ways.
The relevant maxim appears in SK 61. Since, as mentioned earlier, the translation of the term prakṛti is highly contested, I will refrain from translating this term for now.
prakṛteḥ sukumārataraṃ na kiñcit asti iti me matiḥ bhavati |
yā dṛṣṭā asmi iti punaḥ na darśanam upaiti puruṣasya ||
- This passage can be translated as follows:
There is nothing more subtle than prakṛti, which, as soon as it knows “I have been seen”, immediately hides from the vision of puruṣa.
I have also chosen not to translate the term puruṣa for now, which is perhaps even more controversial than prakṛti. We must draw meaning from the context and usage of these terms before risking a terminological choice in translation that might obscure our understanding.
Compare Ashton’s translation of the same passage: “Nobody is more tender than nature. When she realizes, ‘I have been seen,’ she never again comes into the sight of the witness-self” [3] (p. 1). My rendering leaves prakṛti and puruṣa untranslated and renders sukumāratara in relation to subtlety rather than exclusively as “tenderness”. This choice does not exclude the latter semantic possibility, but is intended to preserve the connection developed below between perceptibility, concealment, and the dṛṣṭa/darśana axis of the verse.
From this verse, we learn several things: prakṛti, which in the Sāṃkhyakārikā system serves various functions, including being the material substrate of the phenomenal world and its processes, is described here with the term sukumāratara. Its root, su-kumāra, literally means “tender” or “delicate”. Another noteworthy term in this verse is bhava, which in this context refers to emergence, appearing, production, or birth. Some translate it as “coming into being”, though this ontological connotation is problematic, and I will set this translation aside for now.
The expression “material” requires some qualification in this context. I do not use it to identify prakṛti with matter in the narrower Cartesian or physicalist sense of an extended and inert substance. Burley has rightly observed that prakṛti can be called “material” only in an unusually broad sense, encompassing everything other than the pure subject, including formal structures and acts of experience as well as experiential contents [2] (pp. 99–100). Ashton similarly emphasizes that the field of prakṛti cannot be reduced to inert matter, since several of its manifestations—buddhi and ahaṃkāra most obviously—are not “material” in any straightforward modern sense [3] (pp. 11–12). In what follows, therefore, “material” is employed primarily to mark the contrast with puruṣa and should not be taken as a commitment to a reductive materialist ontology.
Having raised several philological issues, I will now proceed with the translation of this passage before turning to Heraclitus. The verse presents a specific agent. The core of the action is determined by the axis dṛṣṭa/darśana. The former, the past participle dṛṣṭa, refers to prakṛti (prakṛteḥ), the recipient of the gaze (darśana) of puruṣa (puruṣasya). The consequence of being seen is withdrawal (yā dṛṣṭā asmi iti punaḥ na). The term punar indicates a return to the origin, to a home, or simply “going back”, taking the opposite direction. Other meanings suggest repetition.
Let us now turn to the fragment from Heraclitus. It is a brief phrase, but one that has been the subject of extensive interpretation by philologists and remains a source of ongoing debate:
φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ[DK] (B123)
Compared to SK 61, here we have what appears to be a nominal sentence. The subject is φύσις, which I will not translate, and the verb is φιλέω, meaning “to love” or “to be fond of”. The object of this love is κρύπτεσθαι, which is itself a verb, specifically the mediopassive infinitive of κρύπτω (“to hide”). The now well-known translation of this passage is “nature loves to hide”.
The phenomenological framework adopted here should not, however, be understood as a claim to methodological priority. Burley has already proposed that the metaphysical structure of classical Sāṃkhya may be read not simply as a diachronic account of the production of an external world, but as an analysis of experience and of the conditions that make experience possible [2] (pp. 5–7, 156–157). More recently, Ashton has developed this line of inquiry in a direction more explicitly concerned with nature itself, first interpreting prakṛti as a living and self-transforming principle and directly placing SK 61 in dialogue with Heraclitus’ DK B123 [3] (pp. 1, 20–21, 24–26), and subsequently interpreting vyaktaprakṛti through an existential phenomenology of saṃyoga [3] (pp. 25–26, 36–37). The argument proposed here is therefore more restricted. I do not intend to establish a general phenomenology of Sāṃkhya, nor to claim priority for the comparison between SK 61 and B123. Rather, I ask whether the particular philological structure of the Heraclitean fragment—and especially the non-volitional meaning of φιλεῖ and the relation established between φύσις and κρύπτεσθαι—may clarify the language of seeing and withdrawal employed in SK 61. In this sense, the contribution of the present analysis lies primarily in the philological route through which this comparison is developed.
Ashton himself cites SK 61 and immediately thereafter Heraclitus’ fragment at the beginning of an important article published in 2020 [3] (pp. 1–2, epigraph). This similarity had therefore already been noticed by other scholars, and my interest has focused instead on the possible explanations for how two traditions so geographically distant from one another came to formulate two such remarkably similar statements.
2. The Problem of “Nature”: Translating Prakṛti, Bhavati and φύσις, φύω
As we will see, the issue is primarily philological in nature. The theory I intend to propose is that, regardless of whether these two statements share a common origin or not, we can glean much more from SK 61 if we compare it to the translation challenges posed by DK B123.
Pierre Hadot approaches the problem of translating Heraclitus’ DK B123 with the awareness that the classical interpretation of “nature loves to hide” carries with it long-standing philosophical interpretations. There is no need here to recount the countless implications that this interpretation has within the Heideggerian tradition [1] (p. 393), and how it fits into the idea of an archaic philosophy, preceding the forgetfulness (λήθη) of the authentic meaning of Being, which in turn leads to a series of other interpretations. In this sense we have, for instance, the interpretation of “truth” (ἀλήθεια) as something that is un-veiled (ἀ-λήθω), and that otherwise would escape (λανθάνω) our notice.
To better understand the behavior of φύσις, Hadot focuses on the verb φιλεῖ. What does it mean that φύσις “loves” (φιλέω) something? The meaning of Heraclitus’ phrase becomes more obscure the more we try to impose upon it a presumed esoteric meaning, associated with a system of thought ‘prior’ to our current one, suggesting a different anthropology for Greek (or Indian) thinkers.
However, the philological context provides greater clarity. For example, in Herodotus’ The Histories 2.27.1:
τῆς αὔρης δὲ πέρι, ὅτι οὐκ ἀποπνέει, τήνδε ἔχω γνώμην, ὡς κάρτα ἀπὸ θερμέων χωρέων οὐκ οἰκός ἐστι οὐδὲν ἀποπνέειν, αὔρη δὲ ἀπὸ ψυχροῦ τινος φιλέει πνέειν.
And regarding the breeze, why it does not blow, this is my opinion: it is not normal for a breeze to blow from very hot places, since the breeze always loves to blow from what is very cold.
This passage from Herodotus already helps us to better understand the meaning of φιλέω. Here, it describes the behavior of the breeze (αὔρα), and quite simply, when one needs to indicate the usual behavior of the subject in question, the term φιλέει is used as a metaphor for habitual behavior: “the breeze always loves to blow from what is very cold” (αὔρη δὲ ἀπὸ ψυχροῦ τινος φιλέει πνέειν) is nothing more than another way of saying that it is usual, or normal, to see it blowing from cold places.
Democritus’ fragment 179 seems to confirm this hypothesis:
ἐξωτικῶς μὴ πονεῖν παῖδες ἀνιέντες οὔτε γράμματ᾿ ἂν μάθοιεν οὔτε μουσικὴν οὔτε ἀγωνίην οὐδ᾿ ὅπερ μάλιστα τὴν ἀρετὴν συνέχει, τὸ αἰδεῖσθαι· μάλα γὰρ ἐκ τούτων φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι ἡ αἰδώς.
Children who do not work diligently will neither learn letters nor music nor participate in athletic contests, nor will they acquire what best sustains virtue, the sense of honor; for it is through these disciplines that the sense of honor loves to arise.
As in Herodotus and Heraclitus, here too the verb φιλέω is used to indicate something normal, habitual (we can translate μάλα γὰρ ἐκ τούτων φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι ἡ αἰδώς as “through these things, the sense of honor tends to arise”).
To summarize Hadot’s thesis using his own words: “Le mot « aime » (philei) ne signifie pas ici un sentiment, mais une tendance naturelle ou habituelle, un processus qui se produit nécessairement ou fréquemment” [1] (p. 27).
This naturally raises the issue of understanding the meaning of φύσις. In fact, Hadot doubts that the Greeks understood it in the same way as modern science does; instead, they likely conceived of it as a process of interaction, mixture, and differentiation of things. In other words, φύσις is linked to the dynamics of phenomena, or rather to “le processus par lequel les choses apparaissent” [1] (p. 29).
From this perspective, its conception is very similar to that of prakṛti. Giuseppe Tucci [4] (pp. 69–81) has no reservations in translating prakṛti as “nature”, or even “natura naturans” (nātūra nātūrāns), but this interpretation, imbued with the more modern conception of nature, risks being misleading. From the SK, it is evident that prakṛti is something that changes in appearance when it manifests (udbhāva), and in this transformation it is constantly undergoing change (pariṇāma), but no part of its substance can be destroyed or lost. The substance (prakṛti) is eternal [SK] (v. 3); what changes is its appearance. However, such change is not inherent in prakṛti itself, as it requires an “animation”, a bringing to life, which happens through the soul (puruṣa).
I use “soul” here only as a convenient shorthand and not in the Aristotelian, Christian, or Cartesian sense of an embodied, cognizing, or individually structured psychic substance [5] (p. 267). In the SK, puruṣa is characterized as witness (sākṣitva), seer (draṣṭṛtva), indifferent (mādhyasthya), isolated (kaivalya), and inactive (akartṛbhāva) [SK] (v. 19). For this reason, “consciousness” or “witness-consciousness” will generally be preferable in the discussion that follows. Ashton likewise stresses that puruṣa is neither a cognizing ego nor a proto-rational “soul” [3] (p. 11), [6] (p. 27).
Sāṃkhya metaphysics is a complex phenomenological system reflecting on the nature of what appears and is “perceived” (literally, Sāṃkhya employs the term “seen”: dṛṣṭa, which is worth noting). The seen (dṛṣṭaṃ) is defined in SK 5 as the perceptual outcome of what stands before one (prativiṣayādhyavasāyaḥ): the adherence of the sense organ to its respective object. Also important for later commentarial tradition is the definition of perception as pratyakṣa, literally “what stands before (pra-) the eyes (akṣa)”, a term formed similarly to another key technical term: “direct perception” (paro-kṣa). Inference (anumāna) is a logical process by which one derives a proposition from premises. For this reason, Sāṃkhya philosophy views it as related to two elements: a characteristic sign (specific to inference) and that which is characterized. The inclusion of reliable testimony as a means of knowledge is a curious fact, possibly attributable to Vedic influences, reflecting a need to account for tradition and the authority that held it as indisputable. On this, Łucyszyna agrees, stating that “establishing an independent object sphere for reliable verbal testimony might have been the desire to demonstrate that reliable verbal testimony had an important role in Sāṃkhya, so as to counter the attacks of opponents accusing Sāṃkhya of not being a Vedic doctrine. The fact that reliable verbal testimony had an independent object sphere implied, first, that it was irreplaceable by any other pramāṇa (because no other pramāṇa could be applied to its objects), and second, that it was irrefutable by other pramāṇas” [7] (p. 38).
Let us return for a moment to Hadot’s interpretation. As previously mentioned, he identifies at least two conceptions of the idea of φύσις, both of which are implicit in the term itself. On the one hand, it does not refer to a dimension or a state of affairs describable by laws in opposition to artificiality; rather, it indicates the spontaneous tendency of all things, which characterizes the behavior of observable entities in everyday life. This behavior is φύσις and can be described through the relationships the object maintains with others.
The example of the wind is significant: a breeze tends to come from cool environments, not warm ones. Thus, we understand that the φύσις of the breeze is related to the φύσις of the cool environment. In other words, the phenomenon known as αὔρα has its οἰκός; it is not evident in warm places (θερμέων χωρέων), but rather in cool ones (ψυχροῦ). This exercise in associations is not at all unproductive, as it helps us immerse ourselves in the thought process of these authors. The first characteristic of φύσις, then, is that it describes a system of relations, which indicate a “processus qui se produit nécessairement ou fréquemment”.
The second aspect of φύσις is embedded in its root φύω, which denotes growth. It is often understood as becoming, but if we keep in mind the relational meaning discussed above, we see that it is not so much the abstract concept of becoming, but rather the transformative principle inherent in things that is invoked. The Sanskrit cognates bhūti and bhavati, referring respectively to power, existence, becoming, or happening, have a very similar meaning. Sāṃkhya philosophy is almost entirely centered on the transformative processes of prakṛti, and it is interesting to note how the connection with the philosophy of concealment present in both SK 61 and DK B123 could describe a similar phenomenon in both texts. Relation and process are key elements in this understanding. According to Hadot, the resulting interpretation of Heraclitus is that a precise relationship exists between φύσις and κρύπτω, and it is not a relationship of love in a romantic sense. In DK B123, φιλεῖ does not indicate affection but rather an interactive, processual, and consequential connection between φύσις and κρύπτω, meaning that φύσις tends toward κρύπτω.
Once we understand that this is a relationship of A → B, we turn to decode κρύπτω. The event of disappearing remains one of the most common metaphors for death. In this case, concealment (καλύπτω) is a metaphor for the B phase of our process. It follows that A (φύσις) is most likely birth [1] (p. 29). This requires a radical reinterpretation of the Heraclitean fragment, as what is being described appears to be a worldview in which everything is governed by dynamic processes of interaction and transformation. The formula that encapsulates all transformations we witness is A → B, summarized as φύσις → κρύπτω.
We can also interpret this as appearing → disappearing, since the root of φύω contains the idea of “appearing”, while κρύπτω clearly refers to something that has disappeared because it is hidden. This transformative idea is not a process of creation ex nihilō or destruction, but a process of transformation, in which things assume certain appearances only to lose those appearances. Yet each disappearing is followed by a new appearing—a continuous process, an A1 → B1 → A2 → B2 → A3 → B3, and so on. This also seems to be the meaning implied in another famous fragment which states: “For those stepping into the same rivers, other and other waters flow” (ποταμοῖσι τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν ἐμβαίνουσιν ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα ὕδατα ἐπιρρεῖ) [DK] (B12). Indeed, it is impossible to step into the same river twice, because the flow of water implies a dynamism that always presents us with a different river. This, in other words, is the φύσις of the river (ποταμός).
The philosophy expressed in the text that describes the transformative process of all things should not, therefore, be interpreted as φύσις → κρύπτω equating to a simple life → death or birth → death. Among the most plausible translations of the Heraclitean fragment, Hadot considers at least two valid: “Ce qui fait apparaître tend à faire disparaître” and “La forme (l’apparence) tend à disparaître” [1] (p. 30).
However, the interpretation that “what is born is destined to die” seems reductive, especially because this is a transformative process that implies that when phenomenon A no longer appears as itself and thus conceals its form, it does not mean that nothing remains in its place. Rather, a new form, B, replaces the previous form, which is now hidden (καλύπτω). This interpretation seems to be supported by other fragments [1] (p. 31), such as: “The name of the bow is life, its work is death” (βιός τῷ τόξῳ ὄνομα βίος ἔργον δὲ θάνατος) [DK] (B48). This aphorism also plays on the phonetic similarity between βιός (“bow”) and βίος (“life”).
We can trace a genuine equation between the two Heraclitean fragments examined, as follows:
| φύσις → κρύπτω | = | βίος → θάνατος |
| (B123) | = | (B48) |
Can these fragments help us better understand the aphorism in SK 61? From this analysis, it emerges that Sāṃkhya philosophy might share remarkable similarities with Heraclitean thought, which can be summarized as follows. The core of SK 61 is prakṛti, understood in a manner very similar to the Greek φύσις, though not identical. While we have seen that φύσις can refer both to the process that describes relational dynamics and to the element A of that process, in Sāṃkhya, prakṛti undoubtedly refers to the transformative potential of the process. However, the two fundamental phases of this process, our A → B, are called vyakta and avyakta, literally “manifest” and “unmanifest,” though it should be better understood as “appearing” and “disappearing”.
Such a processual interpretation of prakṛti is not without precedent. Ashton has argued that prakṛti should be approached in terms of an active “procreativity” rather than as inert matter, and understands vyaktaprakṛti as preserving the continuity of living nature throughout its transformations [3] (pp. 19–21, 24–26). His interpretation develops this point through Goethean organics, presenting prakṛti as a form of “naturing” whose manifestations retain their continuity through change. The sense of “process” intended here is somewhat narrower. I do not make the argument depend upon an organicist account of prakṛti, nor upon an etymological identity between prakṛti and the Latin vocabulary of procreation. Rather, “process” indicates here the relational sequence through which a determinate configuration becomes manifest and subsequently disappears from manifestation. Prakṛti should therefore not be identified simply with the process itself; it is, in the present interpretation, the productive condition whose transformations become accessible through that process.
In the Sāṃkhya system, “Nothing really arises and nothing really disappears” [8] (p. 36). Phenomena are instead limited to manifesting (vyakta) or concealing themselves (avyakta). In contrast, the Vaiśeṣika system presents a form of true nihilism, as it allows for the possibility of something entirely new, “not existent before”, to come into being. The theme of the concealment of nature or the world, also known as tirobhāva, is a recurring concept in Indian philosophy and can be found, for instance, in the Śivapurāna 1.10.1-5.
While all aspects of mundane existence (the appearance of things and their becoming, the emergence of the psyche and thought, pain and suffering, and so forth) pertain to the internal transformations of prakṛti, puruṣa is merely an enlivener, which, in itself, is neither a producer nor a product of anything (na prakṛtiḥ na vikṛtiḥ puruṣaḥ). In material reality, things are not destroyed; rather, their effects become concealed (anudbhāva).
We can outline three distinctive characteristics related to physicality (avyakta). The first concerns the phenomenal chain (tattvikāra): this refers to a systemic co-determination of phenomena, a principle that establishes mutual reciprocity—one phenomenon determines another and is itself determined by something else, to the point that no phenomenon is entirely independent.
mūla-prakṛtiḥ avikṛtiḥ maha-ādādyāḥ prakṛti-vikṛtayaḥ sapta |
ṣoḍaśakaḥ tu vikāraḥ na prakṛtiḥ na vikṛtiḥ puruṣaḥ ||
The primordial matter is involuted; nonetheless, it evolves through the seven phases that begin with the great principle and continues with the evolving and the evolved. However, the sixteen elements are merely evolved. Consciousness is neither of these.[SK] (v. 3)
The second characteristic concerns the organization of beings (guṇapariṇāma) and establishes that all things are composed of minimal units (guṇas), whose variation in proportions or configurations directly determines the variation in phenomena. Finally, pre-effect theory (satkārya) posits that the effect precedes the cause in that it is already implicit within it before its manifestation. In this sense, the phenomenon is an immanent prefiguration, a series of effects implicit within causes. This theory, perhaps the most controversial and potent of the entire Sāṃkhya system, may arise from simple observations.
asat-akaraṇāt-upādāna-grahaṇāt sarva-saṃbhavā-abhāvāt |
śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt kāraṇa-bhāvāt-ca sat-kāryam ||
The effect is eternal [eternally existent], since that which does not exist cannot in any way come to be; moreover, the effect requires a specific material cause, but not all effects are producible from all causes, since an efficient cause can produce only that for which it is efficient; therefore, the effect is of the same essence as the cause.[SK] (v. 9)
The phenomena of the world are configured as appearances. What appears is defined as vyakta, but vyakta is not necessarily all that exists, as anumāna might reveal the existence of something unmanifested (avyakta). Therefore, vyakta is specifically what can be experienced through parokṣa. Gauḍapāda’s commentary on SK 6 attributes to reliable testimony (i.e., “authoritative”) the authority to determine the existence or non-existence of the Devas or other entities that cannot be verified either through parokṣa or anumāna. However, there are cases, as recognized in SK 7, where even these methods fail to recognize the existence of a phenomenon. This is the case, for instance, when the sense organs are faulty or impaired, or other factors compromise their functioning.
Now, matter, as such, is subtle (sūkṣma). While we see its manifestations, we cannot directly perceive (anupalabdhi) matter itself due to its subtlety, giving the impression that it does not exist (abhāva). This is an exemplary case of inference made from the effects of a phenomenon [SK] (v. 8). In other words, Sāṃkhya recognizes prakṛti through its effects (kārya), working backward through logic and reconstructing the phenomena. This makes prakṛti the ultimate cause (kāraṇa).
3. What Is a “Phenomenon” and How Is It Conceived in Sāṃkhya Philosophy
We have seen that in the archaic Greek world the idea of phenomenal unveiling, or the process of appearing and disappearing, is rendered through the relationship φύσις → κρύπτω. However, in English we have the term “phenomenon”, and we of course speak of “phenomenology” insofar as we refer back to the term φαινόμενον. Since this term indicates “that which appears”, phenomenology should be configured as the study of appearings. I will in fact speak of appearings and not of appearances, since the latter term implicitly entails an idea of illusoriness: that which is appearance, although it too appears, is not necessarily faithful to reality, but only to a part of it—namely that apprehended by our perceptual system.
As we shall see, especially in the case of Sāṃkhya, the aim of phenomenological inquiry is directed precisely toward that which appears and shows itself. The φαινόμενον is etymologically connected to φαίνω, which means both “to appear” and “to bring to light”, as it derives from the PIE (Proto-Indo-European) root *bʰeh2-, whose originary meaning was precisely “to shine” [9] (pp. 68–70) [10] (pp. 105–106). As we shall see, there is a central importance in that which links appearing to light.
It is necessary to return once again to the idea of ἀλήθεια. If this particular Greek conception of “truth” is explained, in its being an “unveiling” (ἀ-λήθω), in light of the proto-phenomenological conception whereby that which appears (effect) arises from a prior configuration (cause) and then metaphorically “dies” in its disappearing (being placed once again behind the veil), it must be said that in Sāṃkhya we also observe analogous reflections, connected to the Heideggerian pairing that places ἀλήθεια in relation to λόγος.
In Heidegger’s system, logos implies “discourse,” “a making manifest,” “unconcealment” (aletheia), or “letting some thing be seen” in its togetherness with something else. Instead, Larson’s usage of logos appears to invoke the rational order of a cosmos-in-itself, independent of the witnessing Puruṣa, and more along the lines of some ancient Greek usages of logos. I argue that the SK anticipates something more like this Heideggerian insight.[6] (p. 36)
That the SK essentially describes a phenomenological philosophy is accepted by many authors. Ashton, for example, finds the comparison with the phenomenology of Ortega y Gasset [6] (p. 34) instructive, considering it the most suitable for dialogue with the SK, unlike, for instance, that of Heidegger. This affords several advantages. First of all, it “helps to reveal that the SK is not so concerned with the cosmological origins of a world in-itself or the abstract structure of mental experience” [6] (p. 26).
The application of the term “phenomenology” to the SK requires some qualification. Burley understands the Sāṃkhya metaphysical schema as a synchronic analysis of experience and of its conditions of possibility, rather than as a merely diachronic description of the production of an independently existing cosmos [2] (pp. 5–7, 69–70, 156–157). Ashton accepts the force of Burley’s critique of external realism while questioning its idealist implications. In his later interpretation, vyaktaprakṛti is instead understood as lived reality emerging through the dynamic compresence (saṃyoga) of puruṣa and mūlaprakṛti [3] (pp. 25–29, 36–37). My use of “phenomenology” does not require us to decide between these two interpretations. In the more limited sense adopted here, it refers to an inquiry into the conditions under which something becomes manifest, enters a field of relations, and subsequently withdraws from appearance.
Surprisingly, the term prakṛti is etymologically similar to that of “procreation”, insofar as the Latin prōcreātiō is built upon the same etymological roots: prō- is equivalent to the Sanskrit prá- (< *preh3-, *pro- “toward”), while the verb creō, as well as the construction with the iterative crēscō (cf. -sḱéti), was in the past considered equivalent to the Sanskrit root kṛ [11] (p. 300). Today, however, it is held that the two terms derive from two different PIE roots: creō < *ḱer-, “to grow” [12] (pp. 142–143), whereas kṛ < *kʷer-, “to make”, like Lithuanian kùrti (probably from a more archaic “to carve”, as may be hypothesized from the comparison with Hittite terms such as kur-ša-a-i and ku-gur-ša-an-t-, respectively “to cut off” and “to mutilate”) [13] (p. 487).
We are thus dealing with two very different ideas of activity: whereas *ḱer- conveys an idea that is more properly phenomenological and processual—of a phenomenon that is given insofar as it “appears” in a gradual process (it “grows” like a tree that first sprouts from a seed and progressively develops)—the root *kʷer- instead conveys the sense of a technical process, like that of a sculptor or a carpenter, who precisely “remove the excess” or, more generally, “act” upon matter in order to shape it in a certain way. In both cases, however, it is something pre-existing (the tree is already implicit in the seed from which it “grows”, just as the table is, in potency, already possible in the wood of the tree from which the carpenter carves it) that enables the creative process, and it is not a becoming out of nothing.
In this sense, the Greek idea of φύσις, also linked to the idea of “growth” (φύω), belongs to the same type of reflection on the processes of appearing.
Although it is thus similar from the point of view of meaning, the relationship prakṛti/prōcreātiō does not describe a perfect etymological correspondence, as is the case with other terms in the philosophical lexicons of different Indo-European cultures. For example, the Sanskrit prajñā and the Greek πρόγνωσις are etymologically identical constructions (cf. PIE *pro- + *ǵneh3), although, as is well known, their use within different technical lexicons has slightly modified their meaning.
The equivalence of Sanskrit kṛ- and Latin creō is something frequently encountered in philosophical and philological texts, insofar as a common Indo-European origin was previously hypothesized. Ashton, too, is in part influenced by this, proposing the term “procreativity” as a good translation of prakṛti, insofar as they are “cognate” [6] (p. 31). Another example is Agamben who, quoting an old interpretation from Pictet, relates karman not only to Latin creō, but even to crimen [14] (pp. 47–48). This last term is connected to cernō, thus to the root *krey- (“to separate, divide”). Neither of them is therefore connected to karman (< *kʷer-).
Despite the fact that speaking of an etymological equivalence is misleading (the two terms are not technically “cognates”), I will adopt Ashton’s translational choice in speaking of “procreativity” (for prakṛti) and “consciousness” (for puruṣa), as I consider it sufficiently effective, albeit with a necessary clarification: one must not understand creation in a Christian sense, as a possibility “out of nothing” (ex nihilō), such as a certain idea of creation attributed to the omnipotent God [15]. These terms, prior to Christian interpretation, did not indicate a “coming into being” from a previous state of non-existence or nothingness; rather, one speaks of “creation”, even in Latin, as an act that produces something by manipulating an already existing substance, simply acting upon its form. It is therefore more a “shaping” than a creation out of nothing.
4. Does Prakṛti “Love” Being Avyakta?
There are even more similarities with the Heraclitean DK B123 fragment. In fact, the term prakṛti indicates something that “loves to hide”; that is, prakṛti is also a synonym for avyakta. This is apparently the opposite of φύσις, which in our scheme is both the process and its first phase A. In Sāṃkhya this is apparently inverted, though we must keep in mind that avyakta also means “concealed”. In B123 we apprehend that φύσις implies κρύπτω, loves “hiding” (κρύπτεσθαι).
The use of the term prakṛti to indicate the avyakta is well-known but relatively recent [16] (p. 28). Indeed, the further back in time one goes, the clearer it becomes that prakṛti indicated a plurality. The lack of distinction in early Sāṃkhya between physical and psychological dimensions makes the issue even more complex. However, we cannot conclude that everything is explainable through materialist reductionism or simple panpsychism. For instance, it has been suggested that the Maitrī Upaniṣad presents embryonic notions of the metaphysics later presented in the Mahābhārata [17] (p. 33).
This, in addition to the well-known similarities between Sāṃkhya and the doctrine presented in the Mahābhārata, has led many scholars to look at these works in order to reconstruct a hypothetical early Sāṃkhya. For Welden, there is no doubt that the Sāṃkhya of the SK is a formalization of a much older system, elaborated “long time before” [17] (p. 34). He turns his attention to the Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad, seeking elements of the early Sāṃkhya, and finds some fundamental aspects. Firstly, the concept of a body that would be inert without its own soul, like a chariot without a charioteer. Secondly, the figure of the ascetic is seen as positive because they are closer to the essence of the soul than to the materiality of the world [17] (p. 35).
Prakṛti is explicitly identified as originally “unproduced” (mūlaprakṛtiḥ avikṛtiḥ maha-ādādyāḥ, SK 3), which naturally serves to underscore its peculiar status in a system that insists on the interdependence of beings. Everything that appears does so by “leaning” on something else, like a house of cards [SK] (v. 17). An entity exists because it depends on another, and so on, but the only unproduced entity (avikṛtiḥ) is matter. However, its condition is still different from that of puruṣa, which, in addition to being unproduced, is also non-productive. Nevertheless, the phenomena that appear are made possible by the interaction of the soul with matter. This means that Sāṃkhya considers “production” as an apparent fact, involving internal modifications of matter, which is the “producer” of the phenomena that appear, in a system where everything can ultimately be traced back to materiality. The animation by the soul does not make the soul a “producer”. Furthermore, matter is defined by seven essences (tattvas) [18], which are, so to speak, the higher-order modalities of its phenomenal manifestations. These essences are substantiated by prakṛti and constitute the fundamental units whose configurations allow the appearance of all other phenomena. This makes them both producers (vikṛti) and products (of prakṛti).
The importance of vision (dṛṣṭi) is akin to that of θεωρέω in Greek. Although the two terms derive from different Indo-European roots (*derḱ- for the former, *dheh2- for the latter), both develop around the shared idea of “observing” or “witnessing”. In Greek, θεωρός also refers to a spectator, and we know how a similar figure in Sāṃkhya (the “witness”, draṣṭṛ) holds significant philosophical value. Similar formations appear in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (2.4.5) but in relation to the self (draṣṭavyaḥ, śrotavyaḥ, and mantavyaḥ, that is, the self as something that must be “seen, heard, and reflected upon”).
We know that the avyakta characteristic of prakṛti is somewhat implicit in the SK and appears to be a later addition. Nevertheless, there are repeated allusions to the fact that prakṛti is subtle, discrete, and difficult to grasp, which relate precisely to its more concealed, or rather, its fundamental nature. From this perspective, the characteristics with which the SK describe prakṛti bear strong resemblance to behavior that hints at being κρύπτω (hidden), as is the case, for instance, with its subtlety as affirmed in SK 8. I also recall that SK 61 describes it as sukumāratara, which can be rendered as either “most subtle”, “more modest”, or even “delicate”.
saukṣmyāt-tat-anupalabdhiḥ nā-abhāvāt kāryataḥ tat-upalabdheḥ |
mahat-ādi tat-ca kāryaṃ prakṛtisarūpaṃ virūpaṃ ca ||
The imperceptibility of matter does not stem from its non-existence but rather from its subtlety. Nature is perceived through its effects, which include intelligence and other manifestations.[SK] (v. 8)
This idea is reaffirmed in SK 10, where the vyakta is described as a “caused” entity, impermanent, non-pervasive, multiple, and dependent on the unmanifested, to which it is destined to return. The “phenomenon” (vyakta), therefore, is merely the unfolding of the eternal (nitya), which, in contrast, is “unmanifested” (avyakta) because it is “total.” In other words, the infinite totality cannot manifest itself except through multiplicity and partiality. However, this partiality, being only a series of innumerable (aneka) aspects of the totality, cannot be reduced to the totality itself and is destined to return to being “total,” as it contains within itself the inexpressible totality that “caused” it (hetumat). Another key aspect of totality (pradhāna) is its pervasiveness (vyāpi): that which is everything must necessarily also be everywhere.
Finally, we turn to puruṣa. In SK 11, the discussion of manifest matter is temporarily concluded by describing it as being constituted by three fundamental qualities (guṇa). These qualities, present in everything manifest, also define the pradhāna but are devoid of self-awareness (acetana). The puruṣa (referred to here as pumān), on the other hand, is both opposed to and akin to the totality (…tathā pradhānaṃ tat-viparitaḥ tathā ca pumān). At this point, we encounter some confusion. How can the soul be both similar to and different from matter? It is possible that this passage reflects an earlier form of this doctrine, and we may explain this apparent contradiction as follows: the soul is devoid of guṇa because it is pure consciousness, while the guṇa are “unaware” and are simple, fundamental units common to all (sāmānya), which enable the manifestation of phenomena.
In SK 65 we read that “puruṣa sees prakṛti (i.e., witnesses all phenomena as emanating from a single unmanifested source, pradhāna), who, because her purpose has been completed, returns to inactivity (i.e., becomes unmanifest). SK 66 then states that “Even though conjunction (saṃyoga) of the two [puruṣa and prakṛti] still exists, there is not the occasion for creation” (sati saṃyoge’ pi tayoḥ prayojanaṃ nāsti sargasya). This is because the gnosis attained by buddhi prevents the other dispositions from exerting any causal force” [19] (p. 208).
In SK 12, the qualities are identified as responsible for both activity and limitations, and are therefore the cause of pleasure, pain, and confusion. In SK 13, it is stated that their function is analogous to that of a lamp (pradīpavat), and several light-related metaphors are used (laghu, prakāśa) to contrast the idea of “concealment” (varaṇaka).
sattvaṃ laghu prakāśakam-iṣṭam-upaṣṭambhakaṃ calaṃ ca rajaḥ |
guru varaṇakam-eva tamaḥ pradīpavat-ca-arthataḥ vṛttiḥ ||
We may assume that this metaphor refers to the revealing capacity of matter, in which the phenomenon (a term that, in Greek, is also connected to illumination) is nothing more than the making visible [manifest] of what was previously invisible (cf. φαινόμενον from φαίνω, as well as φαίνεσθαι, “appear”, φαντός, φαντάζω, “visible”, “to make visible”, and φαντασία “apparition”, all related to the root φάος meaning “light”, see also Sanskrit bhāsa). However, manifestation is merely a focus on a part of the totality: the absolute is clearly shown in some of its parts, but not in its entirety. For this reason, in SK 15 it is also stated that pradhāna can be conceived as the primary cause only because the entities that manifest are limited, and more specifically, are made manifest within limited distinctions (parimāṇa).
bhedānāṃ parimāṇāt samanvayāt śaktitaḥ pravṛtteḥ ca |
kāraṇa-kārya-vibhāgāt-avibhāgāt-vaiśvarūpyasya ||
Prakṛti is dynamic, in constant flux and in a state of unstable equilibrium, generating an evolutionary process (parināma) that leads to the emergence of an appearance of intellectual consciousness (buddhi) and psychological identity (ahaṃkāra, asmitā) [20,21]. In this system, the image of a bubble may be useful in illustrating the relationship between the two principles [22] (p. 76). In a binary universe composed solely of two principles, such as water and air, the absence or contradiction of one of them seems to imply the presence of the other. The interaction between these two principles generates a kind of “foam”, a saṃyoga, which appears as a mixture of the two, but is only temporary. The foam appears conscious and experiences suffering, forming, dissolving, and reappearing continuously.
SK 68 describes how prakṛti acts as a benefactor towards puruṣa, without receiving any favor in return. Prakṛti is endowed with qualitative principles and acts not for its own purpose, but for the benefit of that which is, in itself, devoid of qualitative principles. In this way, prakṛti serves as a means for the liberation of puruṣa. This description of the relationship between puruṣa and prakṛti shows how Sāṃkhya may be seen as less dualistic than it first appears [5] (p. 267). Matter (prakṛti) exists solely for the purpose of a play, a simulation of the bondage and liberation of puruṣa [22] (p. 78). This perspective reveals that, in reality, prakṛti is not in conflict with puruṣa; rather, it serves as a means for its liberation. Despite the apparent duality between puruṣa and prakṛti, Sāṃkhya presents a more nuanced and less dualistic view than it may seem at first glance. Prakṛti is not regarded as an adversary of puruṣa, but as a vehicle for its liberation. In this way, Sāṃkhya offers a more integrated and harmonious vision of the relationship between the soul and nature.
Prakṛti is itself governed by forces and tendencies which, when in balance (sāmyāvastha), ensure stability and non-action. Sāṃkhya philosophy perceives in every phenomenon an underlying principle of opposition between elements that must achieve equilibrium. However, the center of the universe in which we exist revolves around the play of prakṛti, while puruṣa remains completely overshadowed. It is from prakṛti that mahat, the “great” principle, is generated—this is the first evolutionary stage of matter and the origin of the entire universe. The intellect (buddhi) is the psychological aspect that results from this, and it is what carries with it experience and memory. Meanwhile, the other psychic aspects that emerge later, such as the identity-bearing ego (ahaṃkāra) or thought (manas), dissolve without retaining any memory. It is important to note that SK 31 clearly states that the sole cause and ultimate purpose (artha) of buddhi is precisely puruṣa (cf. svāṃ svāṃ pratipadyante paraspara-ākūta-hetukāṃ vṛttim; puruṣa-artha eva hetuḥ na kenacit kāryate karaṇam).
Johnston views the cosmological organization of Sāṃkhya with skepticism. Of the twenty-four cosmic principles, he finds it evident that thirteen (three mental and ten sensory faculties) are conceived in relation to the human individual, while the remaining ten, material principles, pertain instead to the cosmic essence [16] (p. 17). This complex structure, according to Johnston, represents a development over time and does not reflect the original doctrine. The universal natura naturans, prakṛti, would similarly be a sophistication of the very corporeality of subjects. Johnston speaks of “multiple” prakṛtis, much like there are multiple persons, multiple “constituted beings”. Moreover, the etymology of the term prakṛti itself points to something that is “made,” derived from the root of the verb “to make” (kṛ). Just as the Sanskrit language is deemed perfect because it is “put together”, “crafted” (saṃ-skṛ-tá), prakṛti, although also “made”, owes its formation to something superior that appears “before” you (pra-), as it is. This notion of pra-kṛ, or matter as “that which stands before”, closely resembles the concept of “object” in Western philosophy, where the object is conceptually formed to designate what appears to perception by being “thrown-against” (ἀντικείμενον). This Greek term is paralleled in Latin by ob-iacēre, meaning “to lie toward”, from which our term “object” is derived.
It is important, however, not to turn this correspondence into a simple terminological identity. Prakṛti and avyakta are not straightforward synonyms. Mūlaprakṛti is characterized as unmanifest, while the term prakṛti also expresses the productive character that continues through the manifest principles themselves [SK] (vv. 3, 8). The parallel with κρύπτεσθαι therefore concerns a mode of manifestation rather than the equivalence of two terms: that which remains productive need not itself be given as a present object. Ashton has already developed this aspect of the problem by interpreting prakṛti as a living nature that preserves itself through changing manifestations and by explicitly connecting its movements of manifestation and concealment with the Heraclitean motif of nature’s hiding [3] (pp. 24–26, 35). The point pursued here is consequently not that prakṛti simply “means” avyakta, but that concealment belongs to the manner in which its manifestations can be given and withdrawn.
5. Sāṃkhya’s Phenomenology and the Role of Consciousness
From the SK it clearly emerges that the intent of these thinkers is eminently phenomenological, and we must understand phenomenology as a science of the (apparent) modifications of prakṛti, which is thus the core of the inquiry into the processes of appearing and disappearing, insofar as it is the element subject to change.
This process is indicated in the texts as vyaktaprakṛti (“phenomenal appearing”, “appearing of nature”, “manifestation of nature”). Ashton translates it as “manifest reality” [6] (p. 25), and maintains that the phenomenological process described in vyaktaprakṛti is not reducible to the simple codependent interaction (saṃyoga) of mūlaprakṛti and puruṣa [6] (p. 26).
The ultimate aim of all this reflection, however, is not merely intellectual, but eminently practical and directed toward liberation (prakāśa-karam).
autsukyanivṛttyarthaṃ yathā kriyāsu pravartate lokaḥ |
puruṣasya vimokṣārthaṃ pravartate tadvadavyaktam ||
raṅgasya darśayitvā nivartate nartakī yathā nṛtyāt |
puruṣasya tathātmānaṃ prakāśya vinivartate prakṛtiḥ ||
Just as anyone in the world engages in action in order to bring about the cessation (nivṛtti) of desire (autsukya), so the unmanifest (avyaktam) engages in activity for the sake of the liberation of the Soul (puruṣasya).
Just as a dancer (nartakī), after having performed (darśayitvā) on the stage (raṅgasya), ceases (nivartate) her dance, so (tathā) nature, having revealed itself to the light (prakāśye) of the Soul (puruṣasya), ceases its activity.[SK] (vv. 58–59)
The activity of procreativity is “ceased” with the full revelation of consciousness. The sixtieth verse of SK describes how prakṛti acts as a benefactor toward puruṣa, who, however, does not return the favor. Prakṛti is endowed with qualitative principles and acts not for its own sake, but for the benefit of that which is in itself devoid of such principles. In this way, prakṛti serves as a means for the liberation of puruṣa. This description of the relationship between puruṣa and prakṛti shows how Sāṃkhya may be seen as less dualistic than it might appear at first glance.
Matter or nature (prakṛti) exists only for the purpose of a play, a simulation of the bondage and liberation of puruṣa [22] (p. 78). This shows us how, in reality, prakṛti is not in conflict with puruṣa, but rather serves as a means for its liberation. Sāṃkhya, despite its apparent duality between puruṣa and prakṛti, presents a more complex and less dualistic vision than it might initially seem. Prakṛti is not seen as an enemy of puruṣa, but as a means for its liberation. In this way, Sāṃkhya offers a more integral and harmonious vision of the relationship between the soul and nature.
In summary, the “phenomenology” of the SK is nothing other than a particular application of contemplative practice consisting in the analytical observation of the processes of appearing and disappearing of phenomena and of their correlation in causal and effectual relations, that is, of simple antecedence and consequence, since, ultimately, the effect was already contained in the cause. Such study is part of meditative practice because it is aimed at mastering the principles that govern the arising of phenomena.
The role of the “knower” is equally central. Liberation is in fact defined as the attainment of discernment (… vijñānāt) between the process of manifestation (appearing and disappearing: vyaktāvyakta) and the “knower” (vyaktāvyaktajñavijñānāt) [SK] (v. 2). The knower (jña) is, of course, puruṣa.
Since consciousness is (functionally) “trapped” by phenomenal processes, or processes of procreativity, understanding their causal–effectual implications means attaining omniscience, and with it also the capacity to free oneself from the yoke of such processes.
Let us now briefly examine how the foundational principles that drive these processes are described. Sāṃkhya shows, in truth, a great confidence in reason: the suffering caused by erroneous perception, or by blindly believing in what appears, can be overcome through the means of knowledge, composed as follows: “perception, inference, reliable testimony” (dṛṣṭam-anumānam-āpta-vacanaṃ) [SK] (v. 4). These, which are the “valid” means of knowledge, seem to echo in a striking way a famous tetrad, this time Buddhist, remembered in the form diṭṭha-suta-muta-viññāta, “seen, heard, sensed, discerned” [23] (p. 28). But “vision” is also central in the Noble Eightfold Path, where it takes first place as “right view” (sammā diṭṭhi).
Now, matter, as such, is subtle (sūkṣma). Although we perceive its manifestations, we cannot apprehend (anupalabdhi) matter as such, precisely because of its subtlety, giving the impression that it does not exist (abhāva). This is the exemplary case of inference drawn from the effects of a phenomenon [SK] (v. 8). In other words, Sāṃkhya recognizes prakṛti through its effects (kārya), reasoning backward and performing a true phenomenal reconstruction. This makes prakṛti the ultimate cause (kāraṇa).
asat-akaraṇāt-upādāna-grahaṇāt sarva-saṃbhavā-abhāvāt |
śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt kāraṇa-bhāvāt-ca sat-kāryam ||
Non-being is unproducible [it cannot exist]. The effect requires a material cause, but the totality of effects cannot arise from everything: an efficient cause can produce only that of which it is capable. Therefore, the effect is of the same essence as the cause.[SK] (v. 9)
This is reiterated in SK 10, where the vyakta is described as “caused”, impermanent, non-pervasive, multiple, dependent on the unmanifest, to which it is destined to return. The “appearing” (vyakta) is thus simply the unfolding of the eternal (nitya), which is instead “unmanifest” (avyakta) insofar as it is “total”. In other words, the infinite totality cannot manifest itself except through multiple partiality. Such partiality, however, being only a series of innumerable (aneka) aspects of the totality, cannot be reduced to the totality itself, and is destined to return to being “total”, insofar as it contains within itself that inexpressible totality which has “caused” it (hetumat). Another central aspect of totality (pradhāna) is its pervasiveness (vyāpi): that which is everything is, necessarily, also every place—thus, everywhere.
In SK 11, the discussion of manifest matter is provisionally brought to a close, describing it as constituted by three fundamental qualities (guṇa). These qualities, present in everything manifest, also define the pradhāna, yet they are devoid of their own awareness (acetana). The soul (here called pumān), by contrast, is both opposed and akin to the totality (… tathā pradhānaṃ tat-viparitaḥ tathā ca pumān). At this point, we are somewhat perplexed. How can the soul be both similar to and different from matter? It is possible that this passage is another reminiscence of a more ancient form of this doctrine, and we may explain this apparent contradiction as follows: the soul is devoid of guṇa, insofar as it is pure consciousness, whereas the guṇa are “unconscious” and are simply fundamental units identical for all (sāmānya) that make the manifestation of phenomena possible.
The consensus among scholars regarding how to understand the role of puruṣa in Sāṃkhya is rather troubled. As can be read in Osto’s work [19] (pp. 203–204), which offers an overview of the translational issue, philologists oscillate between understanding puruṣa as a “conscious principle” and as “pure presence”, but they also seem to show a certain sympathy for the idea of a “transcendental subject” of experience. In general, almost all consider the term “soul” inadequate, largely because of the meaning that the soul has taken on in Western Christian thought. Indeed, puruṣa has very little in common with the Christian soul. As already stated in Section 3, I share Ashton’s choice of speaking of “consciousness” as a more than valid compromise.
Another important issue concerns the relationship between consciousness and the appearing of phenomena. What is the actual role of consciousness in the phenomenal process? On the one hand, it seems to be accepted that consciousness has some form of direct influence, but on the other, it is also true that the SK do not recognize any active role for consciousness. It is said, for example, that “in Sāṃkhya, it is precisely the awareness at the level of our capacity to act which can modify the performance of an action” [24] (p. 68). Or again, “Every individual puruṣa co-creates its own universe with prakṛti and while we participate in a shared reality, we also each have our own unique view of it” [25] (p. 394).
However, according to the satkāryavāda, it is nevertheless mūlaprakṛti that is the productive cause of the process of vyaktaprakṛti [6] (p. 25). This fundamental doctrine underscores that the spectator of the unveiling of phenomena is totally passive (to use Burley’s expression, it is a “nonintentional consciousness” [26] (p. 82), insofar as their appearing does not depend on any will of the spectator, but on a predetermination inherent in matter itself: vyaktaprakṛti, in all the configurations it will assume, is already implicit in mūlaprakṛti [SK] (9), and the spectator who observes its unfolding is like the reader of a book written by others: they initiate its unveiling by opening the text and turning its pages, but the unfolding of events is already fully written in the text, and the conclusions are already present, merely awaiting to be read. It is not, to use a literary metaphor, a model similar to that of Die unendliche Geschichte, in which the reader, precisely by reading the book, co-determines its events as they proceed. In the system of the SK, everything is already determined in the book (prakṛti). As Ashton says: “That manifest reality (vyaktaprakṛti) actually exists as reflected in the SK’s formulation of the inner instrument (antaḥkaraṇa), which is not strictly psychological” [6] (p. 29).
Consciousness in no way entails an active process. Its sole capacity to “illuminate”, to render evident the phenomenal processes, does not imply that it takes part in them, insofar as it is “inactive” (akārtṛbhāva) [SK] (19). In an analogous way, it is as if the soul were the light that powers a solar panel or the wind that drives a wind turbine. In itself, it possesses no intention toward the mechanism it powers, nor is it involved in what that energy will be used for: it is indifferent (mādhyasthya) and completely detached (kaivalya).
Unmanifested prakṛti is uncaused, infinite, pervasive, inactive, singular, and unconscious (SK 10). Its imperceptibility is due to its subtle nature, but it exists and may be inferred from the objects around us (SK 8). Within unmanifest prakṛti the guṇas are in perfect state of equilibrium. Prakṛti becomes manifest when it is associated with a particular puruṣa. This causes the guṇas to fall out of equilibrium and prakṛti to become manifested. Manifest prakṛti is constituted of the three guṇas in various arrangements. Note that unlike the Advaita system, manifest prakṛti in Sāṃkhya is real, and its association with a puruṣa, although due to ignorance, is a real connection (saṃyoga).[19] (p. 204)
The key element here is the oscillation between manifestation (vyakta) and stasis (avyakta). For this reason, if the soul is a transcendental subject, matter is “transcendental objectivity” [19] (p. 205), at least according to the interpretations reported by Osto. With respect to phenomena, their ontological status is granted by the soul, whereas matter would seem to lie outside the phenomenal realm, despite the fact that this realm unfolds through its becoming.
A qualification is necessary here. I do not intend to attribute prakāśa to puruṣa as an active faculty. Ashton is explicit on this point: puruṣa is not itself an illuminating light, while cognition and illumination (prakāśa-karam) are accounted for on the side of prakṛti, through the tattvas of the antaḥkaraṇa and especially through the functions associated with buddhi [SK] (vv. 12, 32) [6] (p. 27) [3] (p. 11). Puruṣa should therefore be understood here as the necessary witnessing presence before which manifestation occurs while remaining itself inactive (akartṛbhāva [SK], v. 19). Whenever the language of “light” or “illumination” is employed below in relation to puruṣa, it is consequently intended as a metaphor for phenomenal disclosure, not as the attribution of a productive or cognitive operation to puruṣa.
Osto also helps us to demonstrate that the Sāṃkhyadarśana shares numerous points in common with early Buddhism. One of these is the centrality of gnosis, of knowledge (jñāna), as a valid means of liberation. In both philosophies, cosmogony has as its triggering element ignorance (avidyā or ajñāna in Sāṃkhya, avijjā in Buddhism), and in both, knowledge is the liberation from the imprisonment generated by the machinery of ignorance. Sāṃkhya presents evident contradictions due to its transition into a rigidly dualistic system. For example, buddhi (intellect) is the only element that can experience knowledge, and thus bring about liberation. Yet, as Osto points out, since buddhi is in fact a product of prakṛti, it should be incapable of such an undertaking, insofar as prakṛti is by nature unconscious. On the other hand, puruṣa is a mere “passive witness” of events, and thus should not be able to acquire knowledge [19] (p. 206).
The fundamental inertia (paṅgu) [SK] (21) and inactivity (akārtṛ) of consciousness are perhaps a partial contradiction of the overly rigid dualism of the SK, but they are also explained by the condition of equiprimordiality that it shares with the phenomenal element. Matter, or nature, is itself likewise an unproduced principle (avikṛti) [SK] (3, 10), just like consciousness. Moreover, “matter” and consciousness are necessary to one another: “neither mūlaprakṛti nor Puruṣa can stand as the sole basis for actual creation because mūlaprakṛti is blind (andha), and hence cannot intend or procreate anything on its own (not even teleologically), while Puruṣa is lame (paṅgu)” [6] (p. 30).
The condition of equiprimordiality of the two principles allows that, although they are indispensable to one another—since in one case they guarantee manifestation and in the other they enable liberation—neither of the two is annihilated when this necessity of interaction ceases.
Puruṣa endures by virtue of its utter solitude (kaivalya), and mūlaprakṛti continues by virtue of its infinite creative potency. But this is not the case with respect to the saṃyoga of mūlaprakṛti and a given Puruṣa. Just as the approximation of this witness consciousness (let us say, Puruṣa “A”) to mūlaprakṛti is a necessary condition for the emergence of this manifest reality (let us say, vyaktaprakṛti “A”), but not that one (vyaktaprakṛti “B”), so too is the a-samyoga (disjoining) of this Puruṣa (Puruṣa “A”) apart from mūlaprakṛti consonant with the passing away of just this vyaktaprakṛti (vyaktaprakṛti “A”), but not that one (vyaktaprakṛti “B,” which persists even while vyaktaprakṛti “A” dissolves).[6] (p. 32)
Moreover, the process of liberation that proceeds through the disidentification of the self from material phenomena (tattvābhyāsa) is virtually identical to a well-known Buddhist formula. We read, in fact: “thus from this arises absolute knowledge: ‘I am not’, ‘it is not mine’, ‘there is no I’” (tattvābhyāsa evaṃ tattvābhyāsānnāsmi na me nāham ity apariśeṣam; aviparyayādviśuddhaṃ kevalam utpadyate jñānam) [SK] (v. 64). This formula is found practically verbatim in the famous formula etaṃ mama, eso ahaṃ asmi, eso me attā, “this is mine, this is I, this is my Self”, what is negated in all three instances by the Buddhists [27]. The result is a threefold negation: taṃ n’ etaṃ mama, n’ eso ’ham asmi, na meso attā ti, evam etaṃ yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya daṭṭhabbaṃ, “this is not mine, this is not me, this is not my Self” (cf. Mahāhatthipadopamasutta, Majjhima Nikāya 28).
What ceases with liberation is precisely psychological identity, as in the case of Buddhist nibbāna: the mechanisms of clinging to “I” and “mine”, which in Buddhism are summarized in the formula “this is mine” (etaṃ mama), “this I am” (eso’ ham asmi), and finally “this is my self” (eso me attā).
In the Sāṃkhyadarśana, it occurs that the buddhi’s knowledge of no-self (“not I” and “not mine”) means the game is up: the true and ultimate distinction between puruṣa and prakṛti has been realized. The Sāṃkhyan sage is now jīvanmukti, liberated while living. Upon the death of the body, the entire phenomenal world dissolves into a state of perfect equilibrium in total isolation (kaivalya), while puruṣa remains alone, eternally free and no longer conscious (cetana) of a phenomenal (vyakta) world [19] (p. 209).
Osto finally notes the points of contact between early Buddhism and Sāṃkhya. Nibbāna could be a valid indicator of the soul, were it not that it denotes a state, which may be the recognition of one’s own universality, though this is difficult to assert with certainty. It is identified as the only unconditioned existent (ibid.: 211), that is, one which does not need to depend on another existent in order to be said to be an entity.
6. On the Origin of Sāṃkhya’s Phenomenological Thought
In this section I intend to reflect on the origins of Sāṃkhya phenomenological thought by analyzing certain aspects of its philosophy present in texts prior to the SK, and which may therefore serve as indicators of the developmental process of this thought, thereby helping to account for some of the particular characteristics we have examined. In some cases, these investigations may also argue in favor of a development from certain Indo-European conceptions, which would thus explain the similarities with the fragment of Heraclitus analyzed at the beginning.
In particular, the idea I propose is that in the Indo-European world there existed a pre-existing and distinctive phenomenological conception concerning the power of fire, viewed as a “revealing” agent of reality, that is, as capable of “making known” something to the observer by virtue of its capacity to cast light upon it. For convenience, we shall call this capacity to “make known” a phenomenon, with the consequent acquisition of cognition, linked to luminous activity, a φάνεια (used in terms such as ἐπιφάνεια and θεοφάνεια), derived from φαίνειν, “to show”, “to appear”, cf. φαίνω, which indicates both “to shine” and “to appear” [28] (pp. 1545–1546).
This archetype gives rise to a specific development linked to the idea of igneous power. Fire becomes an agent of a cognitive kind, and ancient thinkers establish a symbolic correlation between fire and cognitions, as well as one between the dominion of fire, the possession of or ability to evoke and handle fire, and certain magical or technical-practical powers, thus likening the master of fire to one who is also master of his own cognitions and who, through fire, “knows”.
This interpretative key has been pursued, for example, by Jurewicz, who has demonstrated for us the connection, in the Vedic world, between Agni and cognitive capacities [29].
Now, it must be said that in the Sāṃkhya system there is no particular explicit reference to fire, and there are mentions relating to the metaphor of light only in relation to the quality sattva [30,31,32]. Nevertheless, it is the practical aspect, connected to cognitive capacity, that must be placed under examination. From this point of view, it appears evident that puruṣa has an explicit phenomenal, luminous-revelatory function, comparable to that of Agni, hence the comparability between the two. In particular, after analyzing some examples of Agni’s phenomenal capacities, we shall examine certain specific metaphors linked to the activity of puruṣa, such as that of the man led by a blind person.
In our analysis of Sāṃkhya’s phenomenological development, we shall therefore take into consideration two texts in particular: the Ṛgveda [ṚV], which presents evident traces of proto-Sāṃkhya, and the Mahābhārata [MBh], which we might consider pre-Sāṃkhya. I therefore do not agree with Fitzgerald’s assertion, according to which:
It has often been shown that many concepts and terms that came to be characteristic of the developed Sāṃkhya philosophy have their roots in ancient Brahminic texts, leading some scholars all the way back to the Ṛgveda. But those concepts and those themes were only strands of a general intellectual discourse, from which there emerged eventually a philosophical idea or argument with a kernel that was sufficiently defined and stable to occasion a name.[33] (p. 219)
Although these are not references to distinctly Sāṃkhya doctrines, we cannot fail to consider the tendencies toward contemplation of the phenomenological dimension of the ṚV as something that was necessary to trigger the phenomenological inquiry of Sāṃkhya, and without such an imprinting it would never have developed.
A first example of this phenomenological correlation (that is, “manifestative” power) between fire, light, and (implicitly) cognition can be found in an interesting passage in which Agni, through his radiance, his luminous powers, allows the manifestation of things in the world: “Agni shines with powerful light; from his powers, he makes things manifest”. Let us dwell on the fundamental passage “renders things manifest” (vi jyotiṣā bṛhatā bhāty agnir āvir viśvāni) [ṚV] (5.2.9).
All the relationships between light and manifestation are, of course, also carried by deities analogous to Agni, such as the Sun or the Dawn.
ud u śriya uṣaso rocamānā asthur apāṃ normayo ruśantaḥ |
kṛṇoti viśvā supathā sugāny abhūd u vasvī dakṣiṇā maghonī ||
bhadrā dadṛkṣa urviyā vi bhāsy ut te śocir bhānavo dyām apaptan |
āvir vakṣaḥ kṛṇuṣe śumbhamānoṣo devi rocamānā mahobhiḥ ||
The resplendent Dawn has arisen for the sake of brilliance, shimmering like the undulating waves of waters. She renders all paths, all passages easy to traverse. She has manifested: the auspicious bestowal, the generous one. In good omen, you have become manifest; you radiate expansively. Your brilliance, your radiant beams have ascended to the heavens. You reveal your bosoms as you advance in beauty, goddess Dawn, shining with all your might.[ṚV] (vv. 6.64.1–2)
To be more precise, before Agni there was neither night nor day, for both depend on the power of Agni and its partition (and diffusion). The division of the primeval flame led to the first sunrise, after which the Sun founded the day. But Agni, in the form of partitioned flame, remained as master of the night. Together, “Agni and the Sun illuminate the world. The Sun does it during the day and Agni during the night” [34] (p. 5). The real creation of the world is not a creātiō ex nihilō, but rather the establishment, within specific and delimited boundaries reached by the lighting power of Agni, of a dominion of fire surrounded by the eternal Abyss. The cosmic order (ṛta) as well as truth itself (satya) were also born from this heating power [ṚV] (v. 10.190.1).
Rubbed sticks are enough to evoke him, yet Agni is so powerful, since he is the primordial technical power, that his perpetual production has a crucial value in antiquity: “The gods are born of Agni”, to the point that “The entire concept of the divinity has its origin in Agni. The gods become the divine beings due to Agni only. At the same time, the gods produce Agni. Agni is their visible form” [34] (p. 2). Hence, Agni is pure power connected to the act of making things visible (phenomenon); he is a divine power born “between the heaven and earth”, that is, precisely where the new celestial dimension of the Sun and the Devas is established after the “capture” of Agni.
In ṚV (v. 3.5.7) we read: “even from the sky your radiant lights have shone here; even today you have shone in many resplendent dawns, when you, O Fire (agni), dwell in the woods, consuming the waters, you are praised by the gods as their joyous herald who burns impetuously” (divaścidā te rucayanta rokā uṣo vibhātīranu bhāsi pūrvīḥ; apo yad agna uśadhag vaneṣu hotur mandrasya panayanta devāḥ).
How could we not finally return to Heraclitus, recalling the importance he assigns to fire as a cosmological archetype in an interpretation of the world (πυρὸς θάνατος ἀέρι γένεσις, καὶ ἀέρος θάνατος ὕδατι γένεσις) [DK] (B76), which seems to stand in opposition to that of Thales and Parmenides. In fragment DK B30 of Heraclitus it is explicitly stated that the order of the world is to be attributed to fire which, in due measure, kindles and extinguishes. Not a fully eternalistic conception, therefore, but an intermittent capacity of being-fire to be (lit) and not-be (extinguished): κόσμον τόνδε, τὸν αὐτὸν ἁπάντων, οὔτε τις θεῶν οὐτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ’ ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται πῦρ ἀείζωον, ἁπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα. We may understand this passage as a further phenomenological articulation of what is stated in his other fragments: to be-fire means to be “illuminated”, thus manifest, conceivable by consciousness, just as the extinguishing of fire is also the disappearance of the phenomenon. For this reason it is said that “everything is in proportion to its being fire lit or extinguished” (… ἁπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα). But in the end, Heraclitus also affirms that fire will rule, overtaking all and everything (πάντα γάρ τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθὸν κρινεῖ καὶ καταλήψεται) [DK] (B66). Finally, all things are nothing but fire in their ultimate essence, and phenomena are thus interactions of fire (πυρὸς τε ἀνταμοιβὴ τὰ πάντα καὶ πῦρ ἁπάντων ὅκωσπερ χρυσοῦ χρήματα καὶ χρημάτων χρυσός) [DK] (B90).
The comparison with the Ṛgveda should not be understood as an attempt to derive the classical Sāṃkhya system directly from Vedic doctrine, nor as evidence that the categories subsequently systematized in the SK are already present in the hymns in a coherent doctrinal form. The comparison is intended in a more limited, heuristic sense. It concerns the recurrence of certain problems and metaphors—visibility, luminosity, manifestation, concealment, and the cognitive function attributed to light—within an intellectual environment that considerably precedes the classical formulation of Sāṃkhya. The expression “proto-Sāṃkhya” will therefore indicate possible antecedent motifs and conceptual tendencies, rather than an already constituted Sāṃkhya philosophy or an uninterrupted historical transmission.
7. On the Origin of Sāṃkhya’s Dualist Phenomenology
According to a well-known Ṛgvedic hymn, “this puruṣa is everything that has been and that will ever be” (puruṣa evedagṃ sarvaṃ yadbhūtaṃ yacca bhavyam) [ṚV] (v. 10.90).
Focusing on the term puruṣa in order to better understand its implications within the Sāṃkhya system of thought, it is appropriate to pay attention to its etymological history. Initially, this term undoubtedly indicated the “person”, a generic “man”, and this is still true in modern languages such as puruṣ in Urdu and Hindi. In Vedic usage, this “person” (púruṣa) acquires a meaning distinct from the generic human only in the case of the Puruṣa-sūkta, an important hymn that lies at the foundation of the myth of creation. In this context, the human is presented as a divine entity (devatā). In ṚV (vv. 10.90.2–5) we observe that this divine púruṣa, pre-existing both individual beings and the universe itself, pervades everything conscious and unconscious, as if endowed with thousands of heads, eyes, and limbs. Every manifestation of the universe—not only the earth we observe in our ordinary experience—is a manifestation of púruṣa.
In these verses we may perhaps observe one of the most prototypical forms of Sāṃkhya philosophy. However, the purpose of ṚV (v. 10.90) is to justify sacrifice (yajña). Let us suppose that, as some evidence suggests, human sacrifice was a reality in the Vedic age. We do not know to what extent it was practiced—whether it was only an exceptional case accompanying the much more frequent sacrifice of sacred animals (bovines and equines in particular), or whether it instead preceded even the formulation of animal sacrifice. Perhaps it was a particular case involving the figure of the sovereign, which was later progressively replaced first by another human, in substitution for the sovereign, and then by animals. These are hypotheses that we will analyze separately and later, but for now it is important to keep them in view. The verses of ṚV 10.90 are an ode to human sacrifice, insofar as it was precisely the sacrifice of this primordial human that, through his dismemberment, allowed the various parts of the universe to come into being. In the interpretation of this sacrifice found in the treatises of Indian law (Dharmaśāstra), and in particular the Mānavadharmaśāstra, this myth is bent to the needs of constructing a particular social hierarchy in which, of course, priests and nobles occupy the highest position. From an anthropological point of view, this hypothesis of human sacrifice is nothing other than a residue of the great choice that, at the dawn of the definition of human presence, developing culture had to make, dividing the world into sacred and profane.
But why did these proto-Sāṃkhya thinkers adopt precisely the term púruṣa to describe the idea of anima mundī? There may be several explanations. First of all, Sanskrit clearly preserved the archetypal meaning of this word, inherent in its Proto-Indo-European root *perh3- [35] (pp. 149–150), which denotes “production”, “generation” (as in Latin pariō).
Púruṣa thus appears to be linked to development, which would explain why, in Sāṃkhya cosmology, it is that which vivifies matter, without which matter would be inert and could not serve as the stage and substance of the phenomena that appear.
The multiple, “plural” nature of puruṣa is justified in SK (v. 18): the many puruṣas correspond to multiple births and deaths, numerous faculties, and the possibilities of actions and their occurrence at different times. In short, the world is plural because this plurality—represented by innumerable possibilities—is given by puruṣa. This also contributes to the different proportions of the guṇa, the elementary and fundamental qualities of the entire manifest universe. The most significant aspects of puruṣa, set forth in SK 19, are certainly its being a witness (sākṣitva), isolated (kaivalya), and indifferent (mādhyasthya) to worldly events. A spectator (draṣṭṛtva), passive (akartṛbhāva), of that which it has nevertheless allowed to appear on the stage of creation. This passage is one of the most important, and I also believe that it reveals more archaic aspects of Sāṃkhya doctrine, which have remained partly unchanged with respect to the reform of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.
The issue is delicate: the soul allows the motion of the world and all its phenomenology. Nothing that appears or occurs would be possible without the soul. Yet this soul observes, as a powerless spectator, the events that unfold before it. Such a position is difficult to justify within the radical dualism of Sāṃkhyadarśana, which insists on the extraneity of the two universal principles. However, if this element of “monasticity” (the Greek μοναχός, “that which stands alone”, aptly renders the condition of kaivalya) of the soul is considered an archaic residue—and therefore contradictory with the system as refined by Īśvarakṛṣṇa—then its explanation becomes simpler.
One of the reasons why pradhāna cannot unveil the process of vyaktaprakṛti autonomously is because, as it is literally described, it is “blind” (andha) [SK] (v. 21). This blindness entails an incapacity to manifest itself, but the term chosen to indicate this incapacity is noteworthy. If it is thus puruṣa that brings clarity into this process, its function is analogous to that of a light kindled in darkness. Here too it is not a creative process ex nihilō, but rather a “revealing” capacity: just as fire, by bringing light, compensates for a prior condition of blindness (darkness). As Burley explains, the metaphor of blindness is to be interpreted in relation to the unconscious nature (acetana) [SK] (v. 20) of prakṛti, which, despite being blind, that is unconscious, leads an inert and inactive, yet conscious person [SK] (v. 21): puruṣa [26] (p. 84).
The MBh certainly presents noteworthy elements [36]. First of all, the conception of the relationship between being and its manifestation, the symbolic correlation between the ocean and the waves. The former is modified by wave motion, but insofar as it is an ocean (insofar as it is “being-ocean”), it transcends the waves—its manifestations—while at the same time encompassing them [30] (p. 154).
puruṣādhiṣṭhitā buddhis triṣu bhāveṣu vartate
seyaṃ bhāvātmikā bhāvāṃs trīn etān ativartate
saritāṃ sāgaro bhartā mahavelām ivormimān
atibhāvagatā buddhir bhāve mānasi vartate
The intellect, seated beside the soul, exists in three evolved forms of becoming; characterized by these three forms, it surpasses them, just as the wavy ocean, lord of the rivers, surpasses the waves of the current. Although truly beyond every form of becoming, the intellect comes to exist in the form of thought: when the intellect modifies its form of becoming, it becomes thought.[MBh] (vv. 12.187.21–24)
In these passages, van Buitenen sees indications of a primitive Sāṃkhya [30] (p. 156). Johnston also investigates the lost Sāṃkhya and potentially sees, in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, residues of the “circle of ideas out of which the Sāṃkhya system evolved” [16] (p. 3). Affinities with this system of thought may also be found in passages of other Upaniṣads.
In the MBh we read a developed glorification of the pneumatic principle as the soul of the world. In several passages, breath is exalted as a vital principle, along with the importance of the more “pneumatic” functions of experience: thought, intellect, discernment. All this is already anticipated in the Chāndogyopaniṣad (v. 8.7.1): “Prajāpati said: ‘the soul (ātmā), which is untouched by error, does not suffer old age, is beyond death, is without pain, free from hunger or thirst, but truly desires and discerns’” (ya ātmāpahatapāpmā vijaro vimṛtyurviśoko vijighatso’ pipāsaḥ satyakāmaḥ satyasaṃkalpaḥ so’ nveṣṭavyaḥ sa vijijñāsitavyaḥ sa sarvāṃśca lokānāpnoti sarvāṃśca kāmānyastamātmānamanuvidya vijānātīti ha prajāpatiruvāca).
As Fitzgerald shows [33], in some fundamental passages of the MBh there already exists a coherent (though not yet systematized) form of Sāṃkhya philosophy. It should be specified that what he defines as Sāṃkhya is rather a set of fundamental principles within which many variations may exist, and he does not expect to find it coherently delineated in the MBh. Moreover, the SK that have come down to us today are most likely not the first systematization of the Sāṃkhya system, nor the only one. Thus, while on the one hand the MBh does not yet attest a full systematization of Sāṃkhya philosophy, it constitutes a point of conjunction between the later systematization of the SK and earlier phases that must have existed but have not been preserved.
The analysis conducted by Fitzgerald of the first three texts of the Mokṣadharmaparvan proceeds according to a rigorously exegetical method, whose aim is not merely descriptive but demonstrative: according to his view, each text, despite its irreducible individuality, manifests in a recognizable way the essential traits of Sāṃkhya philosophy. It is important to note, first of all, that Fitzgerald does not assume doctrinal unity as a given. On the contrary, he rightly insists that these texts are heterogeneous products, sometimes marked by discontinuities and a certain terminological fluidity. We must therefore take his analysis with a grain of salt. Nevertheless, precisely from this variety, he identifies a recurring tripartite structure that serves as an interpretative criterion: the promise of a definitive cessation of suffering, the presentation of a systematic description of reality, and finally the affirmation of the ontological separation between the Self and the psychophysical apparatus.
In the case of the first text, the Adhyātma [MBh] (v. 12.187), Fitzgerald [33] (pp. 224–225) highlights how the exposition opens with a programmatic affirmation of the salvific value of knowledge. The teaching concerning adhyātma is defined as that which produces universal benefit and immediate happiness; yet this statement, far from being a mere rhetorical prologue, establishes the ethical framework within which the subsequent cosmological analysis must be read. When Bhīṣma proceeds to describe the “coming and passing” of beings, he does not intend to offer a neutral cosmology: the understanding of this process, the text explicitly states, gradually leads to śama uttama, the “supreme quiescence”. Fitzgerald interprets this passage as indicative of a transformative function of knowledge: the analysis of the world is already, in itself, a means of detachment.
This function emerges even more clearly in the Pañcaśikhavākya [MBh] (vv. 12.211–212) [33] (pp. 225–228), where the dialogical structure allows the problem of error to be explicitly thematized. Fitzgerald observes that, after dismantling opposing positions, Pañcaśikha introduces a positive teaching that redefines the identity of the individual: what is commonly regarded as the Self is nothing but an aggregation of body, senses, and mind. The formulation is significant: it is not a matter of denying the existence of experience, but of redefining its ontological structure. It is precisely here that Fitzgerald identifies the crucial step: when this aggregate is “seen as the Self” (ātmabhāvena paśyataḥ) [33] (p. 227), an endless suffering arises. Cognitive error thus becomes the basis for the continuity of suffering, and the correction of this error—through discriminative knowledge—constitutes the condition for liberation. The insistence on tyāga, total renunciation, is therefore not an ascetic addition, but the practical consequence of an ontological diagnosis.
In the third text, the Nāradāsitasaṃvāda [MBh] (v. 12.267) [33] (pp. 228–229), Fitzgerald notes a more concise but no less significant presentation. Here, the description of the world as a combination of elements, governed by time and karma, leads directly to the thematization of transmigration and its overcoming. The decisive aspect, however, is the final statement according to which Sāṃkhya has been “established” (vidhīyate) for “exhausting good and bad karma”. Fitzgerald interprets this as a kind of retrospective clarification of the function of the entire teaching: knowledge is not an end in itself, but operates as a device that dissolves the very conditions of rebirth. The soul passes through various existences until it exhausts karma. In this context, Sāṃkhya is explicitly defined as the knowledge that serves to consume karma and attain the final state, identified with a form of liberation similar to brahman.
If these three texts are considered together, it becomes evident, according to Fitzgerald, that cosmological and psychological enumerations—the so-called saṃkhyānas—are not mere classificatory exercises. They perform a dual function: on the one hand, they describe the impersonal functioning of the world; on the other, they produce an effect of estrangement from individual experience. It is precisely this effect that prepares the understanding of the fundamental difference between the complex of elements and the principle that observes them. The distinction (antara) between the Self and the world is therefore not introduced as an abstract thesis, but emerges as the necessary result of a process of analysis.
In the continuation of his essay, Fitzgerald analyzes two later texts: the Sāṃkhya [MBh] (v. 12.290) and the Sulabhā–Janaka-saṃvāda [MBh] (12.308). In these later texts, Fitzgerald observes that the teaching is no longer directly expounded, but mediated “at one remove” [37] (p. 361), and this shift is not accidental. In chapter 290, Sāṃkhya is placed within a dyad with Yoga and, above all, within a theological framework that reconnects it to Nārāyaṇa. Already the prologue insists on the distinction between the two methods: the yogins raise a polemical objection (anīśvaraḥ kathaṃ mucyed) “How can anyone who is not a powerful Lord become Absolutely Free?” [37] (p. 354), while the Sāṃkhya respond with an epistemic principle: vijñāyeha gatīḥ sarvā virakto viṣayeṣu yaḥ [37] (p. 365); that is, liberation depends on knowing all the “paths” of existence and on the detachment that follows.
The two texts are thus arranged according to a precise tension. In the first, knowledge expands to become almost unlimited, encompassing the world and leading to a theological principle; in the second, it is reduced to the test of its efficacy, and judged insufficient if it does not produce detachment.
8. Death and Disappearing
In this section I intend to briefly develop the theme of death from the phenomenological perspective proposed by Hadot. As seen at the beginning, the schema of life and death in archaic Greek thought is, for Hadot, interpretable as a metaphor for phenomenological unconcealment. That which appears becomes alive, thus manifest, whereas its disappearing is symbolically described as a death, insofar as the configurations that allow something to give itself as phenomenon cease to be present. At this stage, this is not yet a nihilistic elaboration of the idea of death—an absolute annihilation of the being of the phenomenon—but rather its vanishing.
This idea of death as disappearance is perhaps an archaic legacy of Indo-European thought. In Sāṃkhya philosophy the phenomenon is likewise at the center of these thinkers’ reflection, and the emphasis is placed on the difficulty of understanding the multifaceted and multiform possibilities of prakṛti, which is rendered “manifest,” in its possible configurations, through interaction with the conscious yet passive component of puruṣa. In this sense, we have compared the idea of prakṛti to that of phenomenon in potency, something that inherently possesses within itself a whole series of possibilities, just as a seed is destined to become a sprout and then a tree. In this sense prakṛti is φύσις in the meaning conferred upon it by archaic Greek thought, namely something that grows (φύω), that becomes, but also, as Hadot notes, something that does not immediately render all these possibilities evident: although the tree is already implicit in the seed, it is unknown, veiled, hidden, when the form of the seed is still manifest. The tree “unveils” itself at a certain point, emerging from the condition of hiddenness, only then to return to being unmanifest, disappearing, hidden (κρύπτω) when the subsequent phenomenal configuration arises.
This does not mean that the tree is annihilated, nor that it came into being from nothing. In a certain sense, the tree is eternal, insofar as it always exists, even when unmanifest: it was implicit in the seed. Nevertheless, Greek thought configures this return to concealment, this vanishing, as a “death”.
The doctrine of the effect already implicit in the cause (satkārya) is well articulated in Sāṃkhya, which describes prakṛti in terms very similar to how archaic Greek philosophy describes φύσις. The connection between the alternation of appearance and disappearance of certain specific phenomenal configurations and the idea of life (appearing) and death (disappearing) is perhaps not an innovation of Greek thought, but rather a legacy of Indo-European culture, and therefore something potentially shared among Greek and Indian thought, among others.
The idea of “death”, traceable to the Proto-Indo-European root *mértis, does not initially possess the character of annihilation of being. Death was anciently viewed as a passage to another mode of being, not to its annihilation. If being was therefore preserved, explaining the fact that the beloved person no longer “appeared” to us, in our world, after death, probably depended on the fact that their being had once again become veiled. Just as the seed does not cease to exist when the tree appears, the deceased person also continues to exist in some way. They simply “no longer appear”. This interpretation would also seem to be confirmed by the reconstruction that Kloekhorst makes of the Indo-European root *mer- on the basis of Hittite, which according to him would preserve the original meaning of this term as “disappear.”
Kloekhorst writes in the etymological dictionary of Hittite [13] (p. 8).
The Hitt. verb mer-zi/mar- ‘to disappear’ is generally considered cognate with the PIE root *mer- that means ‘to die’ in the other IE languages (Skt. mar- ‘to die’, Av. mar- ‘to die’, Gr. ἄμβροτος ‘immortal’, (Hes.) ἔμορτεν ‘has died’, Lat. morior ‘to die’, OCS mreti ‘to die’, Lith. ‘to die’, Goth. maurþr ‘murder’, Arm. ‘to die’). Since typologically it is improbable that an original meaning ‘to die’ would develop into ‘to disappear’, whereas a development of ‘to disappear’ to ‘to die’ is very common,’ we must assume that the original meaning of the root *mer- is ‘to disappear’, as is still attested in Anatolian, and that the semantic development to ‘to die’ must be regarded as a common innovation of the other Indo-European languages.[13] (p. 8)
Kloekhorst describes this original meaning of *mer in terms of euphemistic reasons [13] (p. 578), identifying a “true” term for death in the Hittite root āk-i/akk-, but this should not lead us to presume that the conception of mortality in the archaic Indo-European world was linked to annihilation. No archaic Indo-European culture conceives of death as a nullification of being, but rather as a disappearance. That which no longer appears does not cease to exist, but is simply carried beyond our capacity to see it. This is true both in the Greek world and in the Indian one: “That death was but the crossing from one level of existence to another is all too obvious from the Ṛgveda itself: The question of survival does not seem to have aroused the slightest doubt” [38] (p. 131).
Finally, returning to how all this connects to the phenomenological vision of Sāṃkhya, we note that here too death is nothing other than a passage from one phenomenal configuration to another. These considerations will also be useful in contextualizing a peculiar choice of Sāṃkhya philosophy, namely that of adopting the term puruṣa—rather unusual within the Indian philosophical landscape—to indicate consciousness or the spectator that observes the transformations of prakṛti while also serving as its vivifying factor.
The phenomenological pair of birth and death, corresponding to the process of unveiling and re-concealment (appearing and disappearing, or manifest and unmanifest, corresponding to the various udbhāva → anudbhāva and vyakta → avyakta), obviously also pertains to the problems concerning the nature of the spectator of this process of phenomenal unveiling. Death is not a fact pertaining to the annihilation of being, but rather to the processual modifications of prakṛti that are progressively unconcealed precisely through the witnessing of puruṣa. If therefore it is matter that, metaphorically, is born and dies, what then is the destiny of consciousness?
The metaphor of death must therefore be restricted to the disappearance of a determinate manifest configuration. It cannot be predicated of mūlaprakṛti itself. As Burley emphasizes, manifest and unmanifest prakṛti are not simply two temporally successive substances, since the unmanifest aspect does not cease to be unmanifest while manifestation occurs [2] (p. 113). Ashton makes a related distinction when he associates the dissolution of a particular vyaktaprakṛti with the disjunction of its corresponding saṃyoga, while both mūlaprakṛti and puruṣa themselves persist [6] (p. 33). In the vocabulary adopted here, then, “death” indicates the withdrawal of a determinate vyakta configuration from the field of appearance, not the destruction, temporal cessation, or death of avyakta prakṛti.
Technically, it is deathless, and yet it experiences the cycle of birth and death (and rebirth) insofar as it is trapped within material dynamics. As O’Brien-Kop writes:
While material being is subject to death, consciousness does not change, decay or die and is therefore immortal. The unique perspective associated with each individual puruṣa remains unchanged before and after the death of the material body–mind (the subject).[39] (p. S6)
Here, there is another unsuspected parallel with Heraclitus that it is appropriate to analyze. SK 10 presents an illuminating vision of life and death: “the ‘manifest’ is life, described as conditioned forms that are spatially and temporally bound (such as bodies), and death is the opposite in material terms” [39] (p. S7). Whereas the aspect of becoming pertains to matter, the conscious principle, puruṣa, is technically placed outside the alternation between life and death, while nevertheless experiencing it insofar as it is embodied in matter. Put differently, Sāṃkhya conceives death not as the end of consciousness, but as the dissolution of the material complex formed by body and mind. Mind and body both belong to matter, whereas consciousness is completely other. Consciousness does not act, does not change, and does not produce effects; it merely observes.
For this reason it is described as “pure”, devoid of contents and free from suffering. Physical death, therefore, does not destroy the authentic subject, but concerns only the material dimension of existence: “consciousness and death (as a material event) are strictly separated in the dualist ontology, consciousness, like death, is somewhat apophatic, that is, it is difficult to describe from a materially subjective standpoint” [39] (p. S9).
The nature of consciousness (puruṣa) as at once the unconcealer of material phenomena—that is, that which allows them to “occur,” to be visible, known, and knowable—but also as the vitalistic element that, precisely by witnessing such unconcealment, experiences its effects, is a role that probably derives from the archaic and animistic conception of fire in Indo-European culture.
Fire in relation to light and knowledge is also mentioned in the cosmogonic conception of Parmenides (fr. 8 and 12), and in reference to that light which in his philosophy he opposes to the darkness of night (τἀντία δ′ ἐκρίναντο δέμας καὶ σήματ′ ἔθεντο χωρὶς ἀπ′ ἀλλήλων, τῇ μὲν φλογὸς αἰθέριον πῦρ…, On Nature, fr. 8.55). Nor can one forget the importance that Heraclitus attributes to fire as a cosmological archetype in an interpretation of the world (ζῇ πῦρ τὸν ἀέρος θάνατον καὶ ἀὴρ ζῇ τὸν πυρὸς θάνατον, ὕδωρ ζῇ τὸν γῆς θάνατον, γῆ τὸν ὕδατος) [DK] (B76) that seems to oppose that of Thales and Parmenides. In Heraclitus fr. 30 it is explicitly affirmed that the order of the world is attributable to fire, which in due time ignites and extinguishes itself. This is therefore not a fully eternalistic conception, but rather an intermittent capacity of fire-being to be (lit) and not-be (extinguished). Yet in the end Heraclitus also affirms that fire will reign, overtaking everything and everyone, for fire will devour every thing (πάντα γάρ, φησί, τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθὸν κρινεῖ καὶ καταλήψεται) [DK] (B66). Finally, all things are nothing other than fire in their ultimate essence, and phenomena are therefore interactions of fire [DK] (B90).
As mentioned, the relation between fire and consciousness probably derives from the illuminating function of fire. Fire casts light upon things hidden by darkness, rendering them visible [ṚV] (vv. 3.39.5; 5.40.6). Visibility renders things known, thus knowable, and what is knowable is also subjected to the will of the one who learns its secrets.
The sun is nothing other than a great fire for the benefit of humanity, but even when it is apparently dead, veiled, mastery over individual flames allows this illuminating power to be re-evoked for the benefit of whoever masters the proper technique.
Since discernment is characteristic of the human being, these cultures fairly early developed the conception that that which vivifies the human being—distinguished from corpses precisely because its body is “warm” (tapas)—[ṚV] (v. 10.129.3) is in every respect a kind of inner fire [40]. Fire therefore represents both life, the animating agent, and also the conscious characteristic of sentient beings: it is consciousness because it witnesses the world from a cognitive perspective [ṚV] (v. 6.17.3).
Fire is something that descends upon inert matter, animating it, and is “released” from bodies at their death, though for this reason it is not annihilated. In some way, it simply “returns” to the one original flame. In the Vedic world, it is the sun that recalls its various aspects at death, and the solar nature of the human soul is represented by the eye, often compared to a small sun. Having a sun for an eye (sūracakṣaso) is a quality of both gods and good seers [ṚV] (vv. 1.16.1; 7.66.10).
We read of this, for example, in ṚV (v. 10.16.3), sūryaṃ cakṣur gacchatu. This passage is important not only because it connects the eye to the sun, and both to the psychic or conscious aspect, but because in general it alludes to a “composition” of the human being from parts each deriving from a different aspect of the natural order, and which will return to it at the moment of death in order, presumably, to be reassembled once again in the formation of a new body. If the eye is a representation of the sun, and the latter of fire, thus of consciousness, there are other vitalistic components that reunite with other elements of nature: breath returns to the wind, and the rest rejoins heaven or earth according to its own property (vātam ātmā dyāṃ ca gaccha pṛthivīṃ ca dharmaṇā). In this context, the concept of dharmaṇā, “in accordance” with a specific law or property, is fundamental. It is not clear whether already at this stage the reference to dharma alludes to karmic retribution, but it is more plausible that in this context the term is employed only in relation to a cosmic order: that which comes from fire returns to fire, that which comes from wind returns to wind, and so forth. Thus, “if it is the waters that suit you, then return to them, or dwell with thy body among the plants” (apo vā gaccha yadi tatra te hitam oṣadhīṣu prati tiṣṭhā śarīraiḥ).
Miller points out that, in order to interpret this passage, it may also be illuminating to consider the older ṚV (v. 1.115.1), which compares the sun to the soul of the world: “the ātmā of what moves and what moves not” [38] (p. 135). Miller sees in the sun an ancient representation of the anima mundi that descends into the world and manifests itself within individuals, just as the manifestation of fire evoked by the seers is nothing other than a partitioning of the one Agni. The sun, therefore, “is the universal soul manifesting through all things”. The seers who have access to the true nature of the soul also have access to the full manifestative power of fiery light. For this reason they are called “sun-eyed,” and are thereby capable of perceiving the true nature of things in a clear and transcendent manner.
As the sun is the light and life-giver of all things on earth—the ātman of the world—so the eye is the organ through which the light and life-giver, ātman (the aja or unborn of the Ṛgveda) looks out upon the physical world, as well as that into which the light of the world is received.[38] (p. 135)
Another interesting aspect of this Indo-European culture of fire is precisely the conception that the individual flames which may be lit or invoked are nothing other than partitions of a single primordial flame, which in the Vedic world was represented by Agni: “In whatever other fires there may exist, these are merely partitions of you, Agni. In you, all the immortals rejoice” (vayā id agne agnayas te anye tve viśve amṛtā mādayante) [ṚV] (v. 1.59.1).
I addressed these relations in particular between light and partition, as well as the relation between light–fire and cognition, in a previous study to which I refer [41].
The idea that individual flames are partitions of the one fire is reflected in the Sāṃkhya conception of puruṣa as a multiplicity of corpuscular entities that “permeate” matter. Jainism as well, which possesses a similar dualism, called simply jīva and ajīva, conceives the vital element (jīva) as multiple and particulate, while inert matter is porous, capable of absorbing these corpuscles that are taken in. In Sāṃkhya, puruṣa is consciousness exactly like the principal property of Agni.
hṛṇīyamāno apa hi mad aiyeḥ pra me devānāṃ vratapā uvāca |
indro vidvāṃ anu hi tvā cacakṣa tenāham agne anuśiṣṭa āgām ||
vi jyotiṣā bṛhatā bhāty agnir āvir viśvāni kṛṇute mahitvā |
prādevīr māyāḥ sahate durevāḥ śiśīte śṛṅge rakṣase vinikṣe ||
For when you grow in your anger, you move away from me; the guardian of the law has revealed it to me. Indra has discovered you, for he knows; he has made it known to me, and thus I have come, O Agni! Agni shines with powerful light; from his powers, he makes things manifest. He supersedes the godless forces of dark magic; he sharpens his two horns to pierce the demons.[ṚV] (vv. 5.2.8–9)
Finally, vivifying fire is not only the observing or conscious aspect, but is also an “eternal” component insofar as it is unborn. In ṚV (v. 10.16.4), the section following that concerning the return of every part of the human being to the element to which it belongs, confirms that among all these parts there is one that is “unborn” (aja), whose proper place is the heavens or the world of the righteous.
Again, regarding the “partition-based” conception of the human being, it is interesting to note how, centuries later, a similar principle is nevertheless preserved almost intact even in philosophies apparently opposed to Vedic doctrine. The theory of the five aggregates in early Buddhism is nothing other than a re-elaboration, in more analytical form, of this same principle: that which “appears” as a unitary phenomenon is a composite of different, more elementary phenomena that aggregate together, but also disaggregate.
The reason why Sāṃkhya philosophy may have chosen to adopt the term puruṣa to indicate this consciousness, rather than referring to fire or light, may partly be attributed to a desire to abandon the excessively symbolic and poetic language of the more archaic Vedic tradition. Yet it is also true that in this same Vedic text—although in the more recent tenth book—we witness another partition. The connection between these two myths of partitioning of an original soul may be the trait d’union explaining the terminological reasons behind Sāṃkhya. Whereas in v. 1.59.1 it is Agni that is partitioned, in v. 10.90 the creation of the world is attributed to the dismemberment of an original giant. This giant is simply called “man”, Puruṣa.
The myth appears intended to explain how different components, especially cultural ones, of society derive from different parts of the giant. Those who derive from the head—notoriously the priestly caste—are implicitly superior to those descending from the lower parts of the giant. Beyond the political implications that this text seeks to justify, however, it presents important clues for investigating the beginnings of Sāṃkhya philosophical vocabulary.
In this context, the human is indicated as a divine entity (devatā). In ṚV (vv. 10.90.2–5) we observe that this divine púruṣa, pre-existing individual beings and the universe itself, pervades all things conscious and unconscious, as though it possessed thousands of heads, eyes, and limbs. Every manifestation of the universe, not only the earth that we observe in ordinary experience, is a manifestation of púruṣa. In these verses we may perhaps observe one of the most prototypical forms of Sāṃkhya philosophy. Nevertheless, the purpose of ṚV 10.90 is also to justify sacrifice (yajña).
Some scholars have questioned the authenticity of the Puruṣa-sūkta [42,43]. It therefore seems possible that this hymn is a later elaboration, certainly preserving elements of archaic spirituality traceable to Sāṃkhya—in particular the very use of the term puruṣa to indicate nothing less than an anima mundi—but that it was, so to speak, “inserted” into the ṚV precisely for political purposes. In this sense, ṚV 10.90 is certainly a prototype of later Indian normative literature insofar as it anticipates its intentions in a more archaic form, but it is not as ancient as one might think.
We may conclude that the idea of puruṣa as observing consciousness undoubtedly has a very ancient origin, going back to Vedic ideas continuous with Indo-European conceptions and therefore also shared with the Greek world. In the specific case of puruṣa, two fundamental ideas mediate its characteristics: the idea of consciousness, namely that of the observing subject, is a direct derivation of the cognitive power of fire, which also confers upon puruṣa the same vivifying characteristics. Secondly, puruṣa is something at once plural and yet singular in its nature: it permeates that which it vivifies like particles absorbed by the porosity of matter, yet it is describable more as an energy than as a series of distinct souls. The simultaneously pluralistic and unitary nature of puruṣa is recalled by the myth of the dismemberment of the primordial giant, where different parts of the same puruṣa go on effectively to create different individuals. The connection between this myth of dismemberment and Agni is evident in the fact that already in antiquity the divinity of fire was perceived as manifesting itself, in every distinct hearth that could be kindled, as a partition of a single Agni. The sun itself is nothing other than offspring of Agni (… śunaṃ naraḥ pari ṣadann uṣāsam āviḥ svar abhavaj jāte agnau) [ṚV] (v. 4.3.11).
9. Concluding Remarks
Sāṃkhya radically separates consciousness from the phenomenon, conceiving the latter as matter, and affirming that the two are distinct and independent from one another—only then to tell us that matter would be inert and unmanifest without the intervention of the soul, which allows its processes to take place. This divorce between soul and matter is carried out surreptitiously, in order to transform Sāṃkhya from a monistic into a dualistic system, since only in dualism could it be acceptable to the emerging Vedic orthodoxy. This idea of a monistic and all-pervasive soul is substituted by other definitions associated with it, such as “indifferent” (śūnya, a term used by Buddhists to indicate the “emptiness” of all phenomena, a characteristic likewise inherent in everything), neutral (mādhyasthya), and “alone” (kaivalya). But that which is alone is so because it has no second. How, then, is the dualism between soul and matter to be justified? If there are two, there is no longer one that is “alone”, as the SK repeatedly asserts with reference to the soul—thus contradicting itself, or rather revealing more archaic layers of its thought that re-emerge through such contradictions.
If the term puruṣa in Sāṃkhya was adopted to designate the soul primarily in order to stand out in a context in which this word was already widely used and involved in a process of mythologization, it is very likely that its more ancient antecedent is to be found in another term, namely jīva.
From the Proto-Indo-European root *ǵih3u̯-, “life”, derive several terms with which we are also somewhat familiar in Italian: the Greek ζῶ “to live”, ζώο “alive”, and the well-known ζωή are outcomes of this root [28] (p. 505), along with other ancient terms such as ζῷον, indicating both animal and image, and ζῳδιακός.
However, labiovelar consonants, which reproduce sounds such as [kw] and [gw], can yield different outcomes, and in Greek itself, for phonetic reasons, we also have from this root another series of terms, linked to the development /gw/ > /b/, namely the series related to βίος, “life” [28] (pp. 216–217).
The Latin adjective vīvus and the Gothic qius are another outcome of this same root, as are the Old Persian jīva and its Sanskrit equivalent. The instances in which Sanskrit jīva is used to indicate a generalized vitalistic principle are indeed numerous. I consider it highly probable that this is the original concept from which Sāṃkhya constructed its idea of puruṣa. However, with this substitution, jīva is not simply discarded in favor of puruṣa, but rather reused for derived concepts. In Sāṃkhya itself, jīva indicates the condition of a subject in which puruṣa is present; more specifically, it denotes the state of linkage between prakṛti and puruṣa. In other philosophies, jīva is employed in various ways, some of which, according to Johnston, would reveal ancient conceptions concerning the Sāṃkhya soul. Such uses are accompanied by those of other compound terms such as sarvabhūtātmabhūta or the simpler bhūtātman, “elemental self, self of all beings”, analogous though perhaps not identical to mahān ātmā, “great self”.
Another long-standing issue, beyond the emergence of ātman as a “soul” candidate that rapidly comes into conflict with jīva (at times even assimilating it in the form jīva-ātman), concerns the ambiguous inclusion of the sensory sphere within the discourse on the soul, as is the case with jñānātmavat. Analyzing these problems as presented by Johnston [16] (pp. 49–50), I have become convinced that jīva can be recognized with a fair degree of certainty as the primordial soul principle. At a certain point in ancient history, this begins gradually to be replaced by the sudden emergence of ātman, which comes into conflict with the idea of “mere life”, insofar as it begins to indicate a sort of ethereal body coinciding with the presence of “breath” in the physical body.
For such an archaic proto-philosophical thought, the two ideas are too close to coexist peacefully, and indeed ātman begins to expand, foreshadowing its absorption of the functions of jīva. The first symptom of this expansion is, in my view, the expression bhūtātman, referring to the self present in all elements or basic entities. At this point, this “pneumatic self” has already appropriated panpsychic functions in the etymological sense of the term. Sāṃkhya is in a phase of determination and fixation of its own prototypical doctrine precisely during this conflict, and it is perhaps for this reason that it chooses not to align with either of the two sides, adopting instead the term puruṣa for its dual reference: on the one hand, to the myth-ritual of human sacrifice, and on the other, to the idea of the “observing subject”. As Johnston rightly notes, the term puruṣa “survives” in classical Sāṃkhya and can also be found in ancient texts such as the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, where it is described in a way that “corresponds closely to the psyche, it is not the principle that animates the body, that being the mahān ātmā or jīva as has already been shown, nor has it any of the mental or psychological functions of the individual, these being included in the subordinate tattvas” [16] (p. 52). We may therefore conclude that the term puruṣa emerges from an original condition of marginality, emerging victorious from the conflict between two animic archetypes understood as vitalistic principles permeating bodies or elements: on the one hand, mere life as such, that is, jīva, a possible outcome of an animistic conception of the world; and on the other, the emerging “breath of life” (ātman).
As a breath of life, it enters the body to animate it and abandons it when the latter disintegrates, without however disappearing entirely, thus allowing possible transmigration into another body, another life. The question of personal identity is under debate precisely because of these functions of the self, and it is not clear how many and which of these are actually attributable to psychological identity as ātman. Indian thinkers in fact recognize that personality is ultimately the product of the contingencies of life, and that it would be more appropriate to attribute its functions to the body. This is a further reason for the oscillation of the idea of the Self between a generalized vitalistic principle and an identity-based soul similar to the modern and post-Christian conception—almost as if it were a kind of “ghost” that persists after the death of the body, yet remains linked to its previous life, carrying this legacy into its subsequent phases, whether these are located in a realm of the dead or in another body. This fact, which leads to the association of ātman with the role of kṣetrajña, actually distances it from the merely vitalistic soul. The latter association seems instead to be that suggested in classical Sāṃkhya, which therefore prefers to relegate ātman to a psychological principle, not participating in the Upaniṣadic effort to construct an idea of a pneumatic and universalistic soul.
The emergence of a universalistic puruṣa is, however, also recalled in the Upaniṣads. For example, in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, puruṣa is mentioned “in the cosmic sense of the supreme deity, in whom all creation has its being” [16] (p. 53). If, on the other hand, we turn to a much later text, namely the MBh, this function of “cosmic soul” is carried out by ātman [16] (p. 54). Moreover, the conception of kṣetrajña is also adopted, which “is not merely a synonym for puruṣa, [but] denotes not so much the individual soul as that portion of the cosmic soul which is attached to the individual” [16] (pp. 54–55).
In SK 42, we finally encounter the grand theatrical metaphor: since the puruṣa must remember “who it is”, it utilizes the majestic theatrical representation that takes place through its mystical union with prakṛti: “Due to its union with material power, it exists, appearing in various forms, like an actor [in the theater]” (prakṛteḥ vibhutva yogat naṭavat vyavatiṣṭhate liṅgam). In SK 43, the theory of the existence of the effect within the cause is presented, invoking the metaphor of the embryo (kalala), which recalls the idea of a seed that already contains within itself the entire tree.
asat-akaraṇāt-upādāna-grahaṇāt sarva-saṃbhavā-abhāvāt |
śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt kāraṇa-bhāvāt-ca sat-kāryam ||
The effect is eternal [eternally existent], as that which does not exist cannot, under any circumstances, become existent. Moreover, an effect necessitates a specific material cause, yet not all effects can be produced by all causes, for an efficient cause can produce only what it is efficient for; thus, the effect shares the same essence as the cause.[SK] (v. 9)
It is the individuals who must strive to bring an end to ephemeral activities and attachment to impermanent things [SK] (v. 45), as well as to desire [SK] (v. 58), in order to free the puruṣa. Within the orthodoxy of the SK, prakṛti is relegated to a mere instrument of the soul: like a dancer who performs for the benefit of her audience [25] (p. 401) but, once her task is completed, withdraws from the stage [SK] (v. 59). Nonetheless, this does not deny the central importance of prakṛti, regarded as the greatest benefactor of the puruṣa, even though the puruṣa does not reciprocate the favor [SK] (v. 60). For this reason, prakṛti is elusive and self-concealing. It hides from the soul as soon as it is “discovered,” as soon as its “deception” is revealed [SK] (v. 61).
The Sāṃkhya philosophy steadfastly maintains the notion of elements as essences that are “not separate, discrete, distinct entities; there are no impassable barriers separating them from one another, as they all represent different conditions or different phases in the development of one and the same principle” [8] (p. 35). The “first principle”, or manifest entity (pradhāna), is that to which all appearances ultimately return, suggesting an ontological identity between the elements and materiality itself. As the reader may have already inferred, I argue that essence (puruṣa) and the first entity (prakṛti) are merely two names for the same reality, differing only in function and appearance. The evolution of prakṛti is entirely internal; it does not represent a nihilistic transformation from A to B, or from one entity to another. What occurs when prakṛti “becomes”, seemingly, is nothing more than the manifestation of all its potential forms, which are already encompassed within the possibilities inherent to prakṛti itself.
In conclusion, in this article we have explored the similarities between the Indian Sāṃkhya philosophy and the thought of the Greek philosopher Heraclitus, particularly with regard to the understanding of the concept of prakṛti/φύσις, often translated as “nature.” However, from this analysis emerges a more profound understanding of the conception of nature in question.
Both philosophical systems conceive of nature as a process in constant flux, an incessant flow of transformation. This idea is epitomized in Heraclitus’ famous fragment φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ. Drawing upon Hadot’s interpretation, I suggest that the verb φιλεῖ should not be understood as an intentional action on the part of nature, but rather as an inherent tendency, a spontaneous and continuous process of change. This notion finds a parallel in Sāṃkhya, where prakṛti represents the dynamic principle at the origin of the multiplicity of the phenomenal world, characterized by ongoing evolution and transformation.
Both Heraclitus and the Sāṃkhya tradition employ metaphors to illustrate the nature of reality and its becoming. Heraclitus uses the image of the river, in which one cannot step into the same waters twice, symbolizing the constant flow of reality. In contrast, Sāṃkhya compares the manifestation of the world to a theatrical performance, where prakṛti plays the role of both the stage and the actors, while puruṣa, the conscious principle, acts as the spectator.
As we have seen, SK 61 states that prakṛti “no longer appears”, that is, literally “withdraws from sight” (na darśanam upaiti), an expression composed of na, “not”, and darśanam, “vision”, “perception”, “appearance”, “manifestation”, together with the verb upaiti (from upa + i), “to come toward”, “to reach”, “to present itself”, “to approach”.
The verse plays on the opposition between what is observed and what is not observed, or rather between what is observable (because it appears, manifests itself) and the condition of no longer being observable, no longer appearing, no longer being manifest.
The observing subject is the soul, and it is indeed to the soul (puruṣasya) that matter conceals itself: as soon as it realizes “I have been seen” (yā dṛṣṭā asmi iti…), it then “withdraws from sight” (… na darśanam upaiti).
It is clear that this passage cannot be interpreted strictly as a perfect equivalent of κρύπτω, yet no such claim is intended, insofar as Heraclitus himself, as shown by Hadot, does not understand κρύπτω as “hiding” in the conventional sense of the term, but rather simply as a “no longer appearing”, a no longer being manifest.
In this respect, the comparability with the conception of na darśanam upaiti is further strengthened by other technical terms employed by this philosophical system to describe the process, such as udbhāva → anudbhāva and vyakta → avyakta.
This reinterpretation of the fragment could open the way for new interpretations of Heraclitus’ thought and stimulate further debate. Moreover, I propose the possibility of reciprocal influences between these two traditions, thereby paving the way for further studies and research in this field. These hypotheses, while not elaborated in detail due to space constraints, suggest that the similarities between SK 61 and DK B123 provide grounds for considering a possible common origin or shared elements inherited by both the Indian and Greek philosophical traditions, thus offering new avenues for reflection.
For both Heraclitus and Sāṃkhya, nature is not a static and immutable reality, but a dynamic process of continuous transformation. For Heraclitus, fire symbolizes the perpetual becoming of reality, while in Sāṃkhya, prakṛti, with its incessant activity, serves as the origin of the multiplicity and change in the phenomenal world.
Both philosophies emphasize the distinction between phenomenal appearance and underlying reality. For Heraclitus, the constant flux conceals the fundamental unity of being. In Sāṃkhya, the multiplicity of the phenomenal world is merely a transitory manifestation of prakṛti, which, in its essence, remains unchanged.
The comparison with Heraclitus’ thought highlights the intrinsic dynamism of prakṛti. Just as Heraclitus’ fire represents a constant process of combustion and transformation, so too prakṛti is a principle in perpetual motion and change, manifesting in a multiplicity of forms.
The comparison developed here should consequently be understood as a contribution to an already existing line of interpretation rather than as its point of origin. Ashton had already placed SK 61 alongside Heraclitus’ B123 and approached prakṛti through the themes of living nature, manifestation, transformation, and concealment [3] (pp. 1, 24–26, 35). The present argument differs principally in its philological emphasis: its purpose has been to examine the behavior of φιλεῖ and κρύπτεσθαι in B123 and to ask to what extent the structure disclosed by this analysis may illuminate the dṛṣṭa/darśana relation and the language of withdrawal in SK 61. The comparison is thus not proposed as unprecedented, but as a different route through a philosophical problem that remains open.
Ultimately, this article offers a new perspective on Sāṃkhya philosophy and the concept of prakṛti, demonstrating how a comparative analysis with Heraclitus’ thought can contribute to a deeper understanding of this significant Indian philosophical school.
The translations of the SK presented in this paper are the author’s own, prepared in comparison with the critical edition cited in the bibliography [44].
Funding
This research has received no external funding.
Institutional Review Board Statement
Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement
Not applicable.
Data Availability Statement
No new data were created or analyzed in this study. Data sharing is not applicable to this article.
Conflicts of Interest
The author has no conflict of interest to disclose.
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