Abstract
Amartya Sen’s capability approach has been very influential in reframing development as the expansion of people’s substantive freedoms rather than mere growth, and in tying evaluation to what individuals are actually able to be and do. Building on this insight, I argue that a relational capabilities approach grounded in Kwame Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism should guide African development ethics because it retains Sen’s focus on expanding substantive freedoms while grounding those freedoms in the just, caring, and participatory relationships through which people in African societies actually come to flourish. Drawing on Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism, I distinguish a relational capabilities approach from Sen’s predominantly individual-focused framework by grounding capabilities in persons’ partial social constitution through community and showing how this insight can inform development practice in Africa. This article contributes to the existing knowledge by extending scholarship on relational capabilities through a critical application of Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism, arguing that development ethics should attend to both social embeddedness and individual agency. I use critical philosophical analysis to examine Sen’s capability approach, Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism, and an ubuntu-based approach, arguing that Gyekye’s account offers a plausible foundation for relational capabilities in African development.
1. Introduction
As Amartya Sen [1] (pp. xi–xiii) has pointed out, we live in a world of opulence, yet also in one of remarkable deprivation, destitution, and oppression. Such deprivations manifest in various ways across wealthy and poor nations alike. Central to development is overcoming these challenges. Development theories have taken different approaches, including prioritization of economic growth, maximization of population utility, and expansion of capabilities. Two of the most outstanding figures of the capability approach to development are Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. Sen was the first to develop the capability approach to development, beginning in the 1980s. Nussbaum later co-developed and expanded the capability approach. Sen’s capabilities approach recognizes the role of different kinds of freedoms in countering the aforementioned afflictions on humankind. Sen wrote: “Development can be seen … as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy” [1] (p. 3). This freedom is to be evaluated in terms of what individuals are actually able to be and do. Sen, therefore, focuses on individual agency, treating persons as autonomous choosers whose capabilities are assessed independently rather than as beings constituted by their communal relationships. But as numerous African socio-political and moral thinkers, such as Gyekye [2] (pp. 29–34), have pointed out, an individualistic ethic that centers on the individual’s welfare and interests finds little place in African moral thought. We need a framework that balances individual autonomy with communal embeddedness, providing the philosophical foundation for conceiving capabilities as fundamentally relational rather than individualistic. I therefore argue in this paper that African development ethics should be guided by a relational capabilities approach, which retains the emphasis on broadening substantive freedoms as articulated by Sen but roots them in the just, caring, and participatory communal bonds through which people in African societies genuinely flourish. I will present the argument through the following steps:
First, I will expound on Sen’s capabilities approach and highlight his position, reinforcing his view that it fares better than economic growth and utilitarian approaches to development, which fall short; second, I will address Nussbaum’s criticism of Sen to clarify further Sen’s position; third, I will draw on Kwame Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism to argue that a relational capabilities approach should guide African development ethics because it retains Sen’s emphasis on broadening substantive freedoms yet is rooted in African communitarian values—I will use health to demonstrate the relevance of this approach. I will then consider an objection to Gyekye and a reply to the objection, and examine some ubuntu-based accounts of development that present a range of positions against which to assess the approach defended here. Finally, I will highlight the policy implications of a relational capability approach.
2. Sen’s Capabilities Approach
In his book titled Development as Freedom, Sen argues that development can be seen “as a process of expanding real freedoms that people enjoy” [1] (p. 3). So, for Sen, development and capabilities are two sides of the same coin: development just is the expansion of people’s substantive freedoms, understood as their capabilities. Sen is against the dominant emphasis on economic growth as an indicator of development as well as utilitarian framework. In Sen’s view, growth is a bad indicator of life quality because it fails to tell us how deprived people are doing. Sen argues that rising GNP or personal income can certainly help expand people’s freedoms, but it is only one factor; real freedom also depends on social and economic institutions (like education and health systems) and on political and civil liberties, such as the ability to take part in open public discussion and scrutiny. As Henry Odera Oruka noted, “per capita income does not necessarily reflect the quality of life of a nation” [3] (p. 110). Thinking about development’s goal as increase in GNP per capita has failed to disaggregate and separately consider important aspects of development, such as health and education, that are domestically not very well correlated with GNP [1] (pp. 5–6). On the other hand, “Viewing development in terms of expanding substantive freedoms directs attention to the ends that make development important, rather than merely to some of the means that, inter alia, play a prominent part in the process” [1] (p. 3). Or again, as Oruka puts it, “underdeveloped must be that which lacks the ability or opportunity (i.e., lacks the freedom) to fulfil for itself its economic and socio-cultural needs” [3] (p. 112).
Sen also criticizes a utilitarian approach that asks total average utility of populations. The classic utilitarian formula judges every choice by the sum total of utilities generated through that choice. The problem with utilitarianism, as has been pointed out by Sen, is that the approach “requires that the utilities of different people be simply summed up to get their aggregate merit, without paying attention to the distribution of that total over individuals.” [1] (p. 59).
I agree with Sen’s fundamental argument that the assessment of development must transcend purely economic metrics such as GDP growth and utilitarian frameworks that rely on aggregate measures, as these approaches fail to account for the actual well-being of individual persons. Martha Nussbaum, a leading capability theorist and Sen’s contemporary, has advanced significant criticisms of Sen’s approach, notably his refusal to specify a definitive list of central capabilities. In what follows, I examine Nussbaum’s critique of Sen’s framework with two objectives: first, to further elucidate the distinctive features of Sen’s approach and, second, to explore potential defenses of Sen against Nussbaum’s objections.
3. Sen Versus Nussbaum
Martha Nussbaum adopts a broadly sympathetic stance toward Sen’s capabilities approach, sharing his rejection of both economic growth as the primary indicator of development and the utilitarian framework that prioritizes aggregate welfare measures. Despite this common ground, Nussbaum argues that her version of the capabilities approach differs fundamentally from Sen’s, particularly in her willingness to specify a substantive list of central capabilities that should serve as normative benchmarks for evaluating development [4] (p. 70). Nussbaum notes that Sen employs the capability framework primarily as an evaluative space for comparing quality of life and assessing social equality and inequality. While she endorses Sen’s methodological choice of the capability space, Nussbaum argues that her approach moves beyond Sen’s comparative use by specifying a substantive list of central capabilities that provides a universally valid conception of human flourishing that governments should embody in its constitution and implement in its laws and policies [4] (p. 12). The list, Nussbaum says, formulates “an intuitive idea of good life that is worthy of the dignity of the human being” [5] (p. 70) or put in another way, “an intuitive conception of truly human functioning and what is entailed by it” [4] (p. 76).
So, Nussbaum maintains that she has made a commitment to substance by endorsing a list and that Sen’s guidance remains just but an outline. She points out that Sen is reluctant to make a commitment about substance (which capabilities the society ought to centrally pursue [6] (p. 35)) and that Sen’s approach gives us no sense of what human level of capability might be [4] (p. 34). Nussbaum has provided a list composed of the following ten categories: (1) life; (2) bodily health; (3) bodily integrity; (4) senses, imagination and thought; (5) emotions; (6) practical reason; (7) affiliation; (8) other species; (9) paly; and (10) control over one’s environment [4] (pp. 78–80). Nussbaum wrote:
Sen has never made a list of central human capabilities. He gives lots of examples, and the Human Development Reports organize things in ways that correspond to at least some of the items on my list. But the idea of making a list and describing its use in generating political principles is not his, and he should not be taken as endorsing either the project or its specific content [4] (pp. 12–13).
First, Sen might respond that the issue is not whether to list capabilities, but what type of list is appropriate and for what purpose. While Sen affirms the capability space as the proper evaluative framework and offers examples of valuable capabilities and functionings, he deliberately avoids prescribing a “predetermined, canonical list” [7] (p. 158) of (universally) valid capabilities or functionings. He is also against a list chosen by theorists without any general social discussion or public reasoning [8] (p. 77). And so, Nussbaum is certainly right that Sen has never sought a fixed, universally correct and all-purpose list. But Nussbaum fails to capture Sen’s stance on lists. Sen is willing to accept some lists, for example, the Human Development Index (HDI), as one among many specific evaluative routes. Sen himself frequently offers similar examples of capabilities or functionings that, he argues, people have reason to value and that can serve as good candidates for assessing standards of living, poverty, and gender inequalities in different countries or at different times [1] (p. 20).
As Ingrid Robeyns has also noted, even if Sen has explicitly refrained from defending a well-defined list of capabilities, “this has not prevented him from using particular selections in his empirical work. He states that selection involves democratic process and democratic reasoning” [9] (p. 356). Sen assumes that any evaluation should be chosen and shaped in light of the individual’s or group’s purposes and contexts and that these purposes and contexts may vary widely. Robeyns seems to have captured Sen’s sense of a list when she points out that for Sen “a list of capabilities is context dependent, by which he means both a geographical site to which it applies and the type of evaluation that is done” [10] (p. 426). So, the capabilities Sen cites are only examples that a specific society agrees with at a minimum level. For Sen, decisions on the content of the list are pragmatic and depend on the purpose of the exercise. A predetermined list does not give room for public discussion and democratic deliberation. Sen wrote:
To insist on a fixed forever list of capabilities would deny the possibility of progress in social understanding and also go against the productive role of public discussion, social agitation and open debates. I have nothing against the listing of capabilities and take part in the activity often enough, but I have to stand up against any proposal of a grand mausoleum to one fixed and final list of capabilities [7] (p. 160).
In effect, the issue between Nussbaum and Sen is not that of to list or not to list. The issue seems to be what sort of list and for what purpose? For Sen, if the list is subject to additions and corrections as well as a tool for stimulating, advancing, expanding, or deepening public discussion and democratic deliberation, well and good. Having said that I think Sen would agree with Oruka that on the top of any list would be physical security, health and subsistence since they are everyone’s minimum reasonable demands upon the rest of the society, and indeed, the rest of humanity. As Oruka noted, “they are necessary basic requirements for human survival and development anywhere and for the exercise of functions of a person” [11] (p. 469).
The second way Sen might respond to Nussbaum is that Nussbaum does not give priority to room, order, or sequence in her list of central capabilities. She maintains that all capabilities are equally fundamental and does not announce a lexical ordering among them [4] (p. 12). This being Nussbaum’s position, what do we do if we find ourselves in a situation that demands we order or sequence priority? Situations may arise in which insufficient resources or opportunities make it impossible to promote all valuable capabilities equally.
For instance, a society facing resource constraints may lack the capacity to promote the capability for play but can instead prioritize available resources toward securing the capability of bodily integrity, which encompasses the ability to move freely from place to place, to have one’s bodily boundaries respected as inviolable, and to be protected from assault—including sexual assault, child abuse, sexual violence, and domestic violence. In such a scenario, by using Sen’s democratic and deliberative approach, the concerned community can give priority to a certain capability—in this case, bodily integrity. So, here Sen’s democratic and deliberative approach gives room for deliberation and a democratic approach to rank them if the situation demands.
So far, we have seen that, for Sen, development is the expansion of people’s real freedoms to live the kinds of lives they have reason to value. This definition centers on individual agency, treating persons as autonomous choosers whose capabilities are assessed independently rather than as beings constituted by their communal relationships. In what follows, I draw on Kwame Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism to argue that a relational capabilities approach should guide African development ethics. I argue that Gyekye’s framework, which balances individual autonomy with communal embeddedness, provides the philosophical foundation for reconceiving capabilities as fundamentally relational rather than purely individualistic.
4. Communitarianism, Relational Capabilities and Development in an African Context
Kwame Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism is formulated as a response to Menkiti’s approach, which Gyekye describes as “unrestricted or radical or excessive communitarianism” [12] (p. 306). He goes on to explain how unrestricted or radical communitarianism differs from his own view, which he refers to as “restricted or moderate communitarianism” [12] (p. 306).
According to Gyekye, “radical communitarianism is a view that gives an exaggerated conception of the community in which the community is understood as always prior to the individual, and this conception of the community fails to recognize the individuality of rights that naturally belong to a human person by virtue of their autonomy” [13] (p. 39). Moderate communitarianism corrects radical communitarianism’s overemphasis on the community by establishing a balance between the individual and the community. Gyekye wrote:
It seems to me that restricted communitarianism offers a more appropriate and adequate account of the self than the unrestricted or radical account, in that the former addresses the dual features of the self: as a communal being and as an autonomous, self-determining, self-assertive being with a capacity for evaluation and choice [12] (p. 306).
As Motsamai Molefe, quoting Gyekye, has noted about moderate or restricted communitarianism:
The view seems to represent a clear attempt to come to terms with the natural sociality as well as the individuality of the human person. It requires the recognition of communality and individuality … I think the most satisfactory way to recognize the claims of both communality and individuality is to ascribe to them the status of equal moral standing [14] (p. 186), [13] (p. 41).
From the preceding, it becomes clear that Gyekye understands human nature as comprising both individual and communal dimensions; this dual conception shapes his moral-political theory, which aims to honor both the relational aspects of human life and the inherent worth of each person. For Gyekye, the communal dimension of personhood provides the basis for valuing the common good, while the individual dimension establishes the worth of dignity, which consequently entitles persons to rights and freedoms. As Gyekye rightly pointed out, a person is by nature a social (communal or communitarian) being. But she is by nature other things as well including attributes like rationality, having a capacity for virtue, capacity for evaluating moral judgments, and capacity for choice. It is not the community that creates these attributes [12] (p. 305).
The conception of autonomy at work here is that of relational autonomy—the understanding that individual self-determination and freedom exist within, and are shaped by, communal relationships rather than in isolation from them. In his piece entitled “Replacing Development: An Afro-communal Approach to Global Justice,” Thaddues Metz [15] (p. 117) has quoted several sub-Saharan African thinkers who have advanced the relational idea:
Segun Gbadegesin: “Every member is expected to consider him/herself an integral part of the whole and to play an appropriate role towards achieving the good for all.”
Ynone Mokgoro: “Harmony is (to be) achieved through close and sympathetic social relations within the group.”
Kwame Gyekye: “The fundamental meaning of community is the sharing of overall way of life, inspired by the notion of common good.”
Pantaleon Iroegbu: “The purpose of life is community-service and community belongingness.”
Gessler Muxe Nkondo: “If you asked ubuntu (the Nguni word for personhood or virtue-ed.) advocates and philosophers: What principles inform or organize your life? …the answer would express commitment to the good of the community in which their identities were formed, and a need to experience their lives as bound up in that of their community.”
The above quotations matter for two reasons. First, they indicate that a certain kind of relationship should be sought as an end in itself, not merely as a means. Second, they characterize this relationship in terms of two logically distinct dimensions. On the one hand, there is what Metz calls “identifying with” the other, that is, seeing oneself as part of a whole, being close, belonging, and being bound up with others. On the other hand, there is exhibiting “solidarity” with them, i.e., securing the good of all, being sympathetic, promoting the common good, and being committed to others [15] (pp. 117–118). This implies that, simply by belonging to the human community, each person is by nature oriented toward others and required to enter relationships with them. Human beings’ inherent sociality or relationality should therefore ground a social ethic, rather than an ethic of individualism. As Gyekye has pointed out, “individualistic ethic that focuses on the welfare and interests of the individual is hardly regarded in African moral thought” [2] (p. 29). This African social ethic is articulated in numerous maxims and proverbs that highlight the centrality of mutual assistance, shared responsibility, cooperation, interdependence, and reciprocal duties. I will give a few proverbs to demonstrate this:
“Kidole Kimoja hakivunji chawa” is a Swahili proverb that translates to “One finger does not kill a louse”. It means that you cannot accomplish difficult tasks or overcome significant problems alone; it emphasizes the vital need for cooperation and community support.
Other proverbs that express African social ethic that I will highlight are drawn from the Akan ethnic group in Ghana:
“Man is not a palm-tree that should be complete (or self-sufficient).” This proverb underscores a social ethic that affirms the importance of mutual assistance, goodwill, and reciprocity as the very values that address human lack of self-sufficiency in talents and capacities and, in many respects, help secure basic needs [2] (p. 30).
The proverb “The well-being of man depends on his fellow man” conveys that there are times when another person’s (or other people’s) display of goodwill, sympathy, compassion, and readiness to assist can significantly strengthen someone’s efforts to reach their goals and to realize a fulfilling life [2] (p. 30).
From the foregoing, development from an African communitarian perspective should not be thought of as a matter of expanding an individual’s capability based on an individualistic conception of self as Sen does. Instead, the African communitarian understanding of persons as socially constituted advances capabilities through relational bonds such as solidarity, reciprocity, interdependence, compassion, and mutual care, which promote human welfare. In effect, the African communitarian perspective requires conceiving capabilities as relational rather than atomistic, as freedoms or capacities people acquire and exercise within a relational (communal) structure rather than as purely isolated individuals, without denying that individuals possess moral worth and are capable of moral deliberation. Again, as Gyekye noted, individuals are social beings whose flourishing depends on community, but they are not entirely dissolved into or determined by the collective [2] (p. 30).
5. Illustration of Relational Capability: Health as an Example
To illustrate the idea of relational capability, let us take health as an example. Sen’s capability for health refers to an individual’s opportunity to receive healthcare. However, this view does not consider that the capacity to be healthy also depends on networks of communal relationships, family members who provide daily care, community health workers, and the social environment. Therefore, the capability to receive care exists only within relationships of mutual dependence and interdependence, as well as within the broader social context that shapes health outcomes. It is a capability that is better realized if advanced through relational values such as solidarity, interdependence, compassion, and mutual care, which promote human welfare. I now proceed to highlight and analyze studies that illustrates this point.
O. Orjingene and J. Morgan in 2020 conducted a systematic review of six studies conducted between 2000 and 2019 evaluating community-based interventions aimed at addressing sub-Saharan Africa’s maternal mortality ratio, which was estimated at approximately 600 per 100,000 live births in 2010. Using the Critical Appraisal Skills Program (CASP) appraisal tool, the authors find that direct community-level interventions reduced maternal mortality rates by 64% in Ethiopia and 43.5% in Nigeria. Comparable interventions elsewhere proved similarly effective via addressing proximate causes of maternal death. Several of these interventions operated through explicitly relational mechanisms instead of purely infrastructural ones: In Malawi’s Mchinji District, women’s groups conducted 20 monthly meetings in which women collectively identified and prioritized maternal risks in their own communities and implemented collective strategies [16] (p. 12); in Nigeria’s Sokoto state, a trusted community Drug Keeper safeguarded misoprostol and dispensed it only upon notification “by a family member or the community-based health volunteer” that a woman was in labor [16] (p. 13); and in Zambia and Uganda, the Saving Mothers, Giving Life (SMGL) campaign mobilized chiefs, headmen, trained Safe Motherhood Action Group (SMAG) volunteers, clinicians and male partners jointly around safe delivery messaging, raising SMAGs active in communities from 47% to 70% [16] (pp. 12–14). The review concludes that “the interventions were effective in reducing maternal mortality in sub-Saharan Africa” [16] (p. 19) which is remarkable when it comes to development in terms of maternal health.
These mechanisms substantiate Gyekye’s relational ethics more directly than they do Sen’s capabilities framework. On Gyekye’s view, a person is partly constituted by their social relationships [13] (p. 38, 42, 53) and achieves moral personhood through the exercise of relational virtues—care, solidarity, mutual concern towards others [17] (p. 110,116). The evidence bears this out concretely: Malawi’s women’s groups demonstrate solidarity in Gyekye’s sense, since maternal risk was treated as a shared communal problem to be jointly diagnosed and solved rather than an individual woman’s private burden to be resolved with external support [16] (p. 12). Nigeria’s Community Drug Keeper system directly exhibits mutual concern, since a laboring woman’s access to life-saving medicine depended on a family member or volunteer actively watching over her and alerting others on her behalf [16] (p. 13). The SMGL campaign exhibited shared care, bringing together traditional leaders, trained volunteers, clinicians, and male partners into a shared web of responsibility for one woman’s delivery [16] (pp. 12–14). Here, Sen’s framework would treat these actors as merely instrumental to an individual’s capability, not part of it; Gyekye’s relational ethics sees them as constitutive of the outcome itself in that the reduction in maternal mortality was not merely enabled by community involvement but is partly produced through it since the relational fabric—trust, shared vigilance, collective care—is inseparable from what made these interventions succeed, where purely infrastructural fixes (for example, ambulances) alone did not.
Based on the above example, a relational capability approach (just like Sen’s capabilities approach) expands people’s freedoms. However, Sen’s capability approach focuses too narrowly on individual freedoms, choices, and opportunities without sufficient attention to the communal structures, shared goods, and relational conditions that make flourishing possible. Also, the relational capabilities approach affirms the community by expanding people’s power for solidarity and for caring, deliberating, and belonging, which are the group characteristics of African moral thought. Since the relational capability approach also honors the individual dimension of personhood, it would reject a community that becomes an instrument of coercion, exclusion, or silencing others. The implication of this for development policy is that policy assessments should map trust, care networks, solidarity, and inclusion (rather than alienation) alongside other indicators of how everyone is doing, including opportunities for health (such as lowering maternal mortality, as illustrated above), income, education, and so on. Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism, therefore, serves as a bridge between the individual and the community, and between individual freedom and the common good in the construction of African development ethics.
6. On Relationality: Nussbaum, Sen and Gyekye
In this section, I will consider how Nussbaum’s capability of affiliation relates to and differs from relationality in African ethics as articulated by Gyekye. I will then discuss some relational aspects of deliberative democracy as articulated by Sen, who argues that it is through a democratic and deliberative approach that a society can agree on a list of capabilities, and I will explain the difference between Gyekye’s relational capacity in African relational ethics and Sen’s “relational” capacity implied by his deliberative democratic approach. Finally, I will highlight and respond to the objection that even if Gyekye is right that persons are partly socially constituted as a matter of metaphysics, that fact alone does not establish his further moral-political claim about mutual care, solidarity, and other relational capacities.
6.1. Nussbaum Versus Gyekye
Martha Nussbaum states the capability of affiliation as follows:
- (A)
- Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction, to be able to imagine the situation of another. (Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of assembly and political speech.)
- (B)
- Having the social bases of self-respect and nonhumiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. This entails provisions of nondiscrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, national origin [18] (p. 34).
From the perspective stated above, Nussbaum considers sociality necessary for a flourishing human life. However, the bearer of the capability remains the individual. The state’s responsibility is to protect the institutional conditions (family, friendship, civic association, and nondiscrimination) that let each person exercise this capacity for connection.
Gyekye, on the other hand, centers relationality as a metaphysical and normative claim. Gyekye insists the individual retains innate, pre-communal characteristics—capacities for autonomy, evaluation, and choice—that the community does not create. Thus, Gyekye sees the individual as possessing some capacity for self-assertion as a result of which individuals can and do sometimes critique and reevaluate communal as well as inherited values and practices [13] (pp. 35–76). But personhood in the ethical sense also requires cultivating the dispositions the community recognizes as virtuous. To say one is a person normatively means that he has good character, is peaceful, is kind, has respect for others, et cetera [2] (pp. 10–15). In Gyekye’s view, personhood is relational because the community plays a real, non-optional role in constituting it—one becomes an ethically mature person by fulfilling duties, exercising virtues, and being recognized within a network of social relations and obligations. In this view, individual rights and communal duties carry equal moral standing, with the individual as both a communal being and an autonomous, self-determining agent.
Nussbaum’s capability of affiliation relates to Gyekye’s relational personhood in that both insist that human beings cannot flourish, or even become themselves fully, in isolation—sociality is necessary for flourishing. Where they diverge is that Nussbaum keeps the individual as the ultimate unit of moral concern, since affiliation is one capability among others that, as a rights-bearing individual, the community is instrumental in protecting. On the other hand, for Gyekye, while insisting on individual rights and autonomy, community is partially constitutive of personhood itself. So, whereas for Nussbaum, capability is an individual endowment to be protected, for Gyekye, personhood is partly co-created by the community. So, Gyekye’s stronger metaphysical claim that community partly constitutes personhood pushes further than Nussbaum’s more instrumental view of social institutions as protective scaffolding for an already-individuated capability-bearer.
6.2. Sen Versus Gyekye
Sen’s democratic deliberation in his capability approach, it can be argued, entails relational demands. For Sen, the list of capabilities should serve as a tool to stimulate, advance, expand, or deepen public discussion and democratic deliberation [7] (pp. 151–166). Instead of a list of capabilities being handed down from above, people are supposed to talk things through and reach decisions together based on that exchange. He contends that
…by and large, all of us are capable of being reasonable through being open-minded about welcoming information and through reflecting on arguments coming from different quarters along with undertaking interactive deliberations on how the underlying issues should be seen. I do not see this presumption to be fundamentally different from Rawls’ own idea of ‘free and equal persons who all have equal ‘moral powers [19] (p. 43).
On the above view, reasonableness is a capacity that only exists in relation to others. It involves looking beyond narrow self-interest and acting toward others with a willingness to engage in open, impartial reasoning. You cannot have this sort of discussion with only self-regarding isolated agents. Sen’s formula only makes sense if citizens possess capacities that necessarily involve other people. You need to be able to actually take in what someone else is saying and be willing to change your mind, which means your reasoning is not a solo activity but something that others’ input can change. Being open to persuasion requires someone to do the persuading, and your voice requires someone to listen. In brief, democratic deliberation requires relational capacities.
The difference between Gyekye’s relational capacity in African relational ethics and Sen’s relational capacity, explained above, is that Gyekye grounds relational capacity in a theory of what a person is. As I explained in the previous section, for Gyekye, relationality is partly constitutive of personhood itself. He works with two distinct senses of personhood, and his relational capacities operate specifically within the second one.
The first sense is ontological—every human has personhood by virtue of an inherent capacity for reason, capacity for virtue, and capacity for choice, among others, present from birth. And the person is partly socially constituted [12] (p. 305). The second sense is normative/moral personhood, which is something that is “achieved” through relational conduct [13] (p. 52). And “The pursuit or practice of moral virtue is held as intrinsic to the concept of a person” [17] (p. 109). The content of this virtue is explicitly relational: “excellences of character…include generosity, compassion, benevolence, respect and concern for others” [17] (p. 110).
Relational capacities—solidarity, common good orientation, interdependence, mutual care, among others—are not just tools an already formed person uses. They are partly the very substance of moral personhood: exercising them well is how one achieves normative personhood, and failing to exercise them can mean failing to fully be a person in the normative sense. This tracks directly to Gyekye’s view that ‘the community must be held as prior to the individual” because it is the platform around which the individual is to orient herself [13] (pp. 39–40). The relational capacities flow from this constitutive sociality, in which the self is genuinely shaped by, not merely acted upon by, its relations. In contrast, Sen’s relational capacities are add-ons to an independently specified self.
6.3. Objection to Gyekye and a Reply to the Objection
Gyekye contends that the person is at least partially socially constituted. He then concludes that people should be caring and act in solidarity with others. Thaddeus Metz argues that being socially constituted (formed by relationships) is just a fact about what we are—a fact alone never tells you what you should do. Here is a summary of Metz’s objection: “From purely ontological claim about what one is, one cannot derive any epistemic support for a moral conclusion about what one ought to be” [20] (p. 200). In other words, even if Gyekye is right that persons are partly socially constituted as a matter of metaphysics, that fact alone does not establish his further moral-political claim (e.g., about communal responsibility, or ethics of caring)—an is/ought gap remains between the social ontology and the ethics built in it.
To the above objection, one can respond that Metz assumes that saying “persons are socially constituted” is like saying “persons have ten toes,” which is just a plain fact about how humans are built, with no moral content in it at all. That is why he says nothing about right and wrong can follow from it. That is a weak assumption. Gyekye wrote: “Moral considerations may, in some sense, be said to be linked to, or engendered by, metaphysical conceptions of a person [13] (p. 36). So, “Socially constituted” is not a flat, morally empty fact the way “has ten toes” is. To say that a human being is constituted by relationships is already to say that a human being needs it to be a good, healthy, fully functioning example of its kind. It is already loaded with a standard of flourishing versus failing.
So, when Gyekye says persons are constituted by relationships with others, he is not just describing a mechanism. He is already saying: a human being who lacks care, solidarity, and mutual concern for others is not merely different—that person is stunted, incomplete, failing to become what a person is supposed to become. This follows from the fact that because (moral) personhood is tied to exercising virtue in relation to others, Gyekye treats personhood as something earned through conduct rather than automatically granted at birth [13] (p. 52). Other African philosophers like Ifeanyi Menkiti hold a similar view [21] (p. 176). In fact, the notion of personhood is so fundamental in African (moral) thought that Dismas Masolo describes personhood as “the pinnacle of an African difference in philosophical theory [22] (p. 135).
Based on the preceding African idea of personhood, a human being who does not promote the common good, is unsympathetic to others’ plight, and lives without giving mutual care and solidarity to others, is failing by cutting themselves off from the very relationships that make them a full person. Solidarity and mutual care, for example, are not extra rules bolted from outside. They are simply what it looks like, in practice, for socially constituted beings to succeed at what they are, rather than fail at it. So, Metz is right that a truly neutral fact cannot generate an “ought.” But socially constituted was never a neutral fact to begin with—it already carries a built-in standard of flourishing. And once you see that, solidarity and mutual care are not add-ons requiring a separate bridge—they are what it means for a relational being to be doing well rather than badly as a human being.
7. Ubuntu and Development
Having examined a development grounded in relational capabilities and Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism, we now turn to several ubuntu-based accounts of development. We examine the work of Raphael Sartorius, Motsamai Molefe, and Nimi Hoffman and Thaddeus Metz as alternative African perspectives, assessing the merits and limitations of their central claims and considering whether they complement or challenge the approach defended here. These thinkers represent three distinct ways of bringing ubuntu to bear on development: Sartorius’s decolonial analysis of development discourse, Molefe’s perfectionist ethic of self-realization, and Hoffman and Metz’s relational reform of the capabilities approach, which together offer a representative range of positions against which to assess the approach defended here.
7.1. Raphael Sartorius
In his piece titled “The Notion of ‘Development’ in Ubuntu”, Raphael Sartorius asks what development means in ubuntu. He notes that “Ubuntu is too abundant and heterogeneous to give a concise definition” [23] (p. 103). He draws on Ferdinand de Saussure, Michel Foucault, and Boaventura de Sousa Santos to show how development discourse is constructed and Eurocentric. Through analyzing the work of Mvume Dandala and Benezet Bujo, with shorter discussions of Motsamai Molefe, and Nimi Hoffmann and Thaddeus Metz, Sartorius offers a decolonial, discourse-analytic alternative to moral-theory accounts of ubuntu. His approach studies how development is spoken about rather than what it should be. He concludes that ubuntu has no single, “pure” notion of development; instead, there are many [23] (p. 110). Their common themes are dignity over money, relationships over the economy, solidarity and redistribution, democratic participation, and contextual rather than universal solutions [23] (p. 110).
From the preceding discussion, it is curious that, having argued that ubuntu has no single notion of development, Sartorius names common themes that function as general principles: dignity, participation, relations, and solidarity. In other words, he says there is no shared notion, but then he lists one. He also does not explain how his contextualism fits with these shared standards. Sartorius, however, takes the diversity of ubuntu seriously and asks whether to talk about ubuntu as an anthropology, a philosophy, a religious ethic, a cosmology, or a way of living [23] (p. 103).
Of the options Sartorius lists, Molefe, and Hoffman and Metz are worth choosing for a closer analysis because they treat Ubuntu as a philosophy: a normative moral theory. Treating it as a theory makes their claims arguable, comparable, and testable against established development frameworks such as development ethics and the capabilities approach. Moreover, Molefe, Hoffman and Metz differ on where value lies. As discussed in the following pages, Molefe reads ubuntu as self-realization, while Hoffman and Metz read Ubuntu as relationality.
7.2. Motsamai Molefe
Motsamai Molefe addresses the topic of ubuntu and development in his article titled “Ubuntu and Development: An African Conception of Development” [24] (pp. 97–115). For Molefe, development is a moral project rather than mainly an economic one. He relies on “the paradigm of development ethics, which construes development as an ethical or philosophical enterprise constituted of three questions: What is a good life? What is a just society? And what duties do we owe the environment? Answers to these questions constitute a conception of development” [24] (p. 97). So, development ethics rethinks the concept of development in the light of these questions [24] (p. 98). Molefe answers only the first two questions: “a good life is a function of having a virtuous character, and a just society is one that respects persons in their capacity for virtue and operates on the moral logic of common good” [24] (p. 97).
Molefe grounds his answers in ubuntu, which he does not formally define. He describes it as a moral worldview “salient largely among Bantu peoples” [24] (p. 97), summed up in the maxim “a person is person through other persons” [24] (p. 100). He interprets it as an ethic of self-realization, in which people turn their moral potential into a virtuous other-regarding character through relationships with others [24] (pp. 100–102). Development aims at this personhood: “Development as an ethical enterprise involves some basic or final value, in light of ubuntu, to achieve personhood” [24] (p. 109). A developed society therefore respects everyone’s equal capacity for virtue. It provides “material, social, and political resources for individuals to be able to pursue moral perfection” [24] (p. 111), through participatory, consensus-based means [24] (p. 110).
Molefe’s account has real strength. It treats development as a moral rather than merely economic project, and so “it repudiates the tendency in many parts of Africa to reduce development to modernization” [24] (p. 111). It grounds equality in everyone’s capacity for virtue: “It is not the actual exercise of virtue that makes one the object of equal respect” [24] (p. 106). It places the dignity of persons above wealth, as the Sotho maxim feta kgomo o tshware motho expresses [24] (p. 105). Its common-good condition explains why colonialism and apartheid were unjust: they systematically removed the common goods necessary for a robust human life [24] (pp. 107–108). Its insistence on participatory, consensus-based means [24] (p. 110) ties the ends of development to its methods and fills what Molefe identifies as a gap in development ethics [24] (p. 98).
These strengths, however, rest on a deliberately limited aim: to give “the moral picture of development in light of Ubuntu as a moral theory” [24] (p. 99). Molefe leaves the plausibility of this picture undefended, calling the task “beyond the scope of this article” [24] (p. 99), so several contested claims go unargued. He also holds that “rights are secondary; in fact, they are trumped by the social goals of providing basic needs” [24] (p. 108), without explaining what protects individuals when community or the state misjudges the common good. Molefe also rejects liberal neutrality. In his view, the state “has duty to create conditions and support the things that enable ubuntu” [24] (p. 111). Yet he does not say who decides what enables ubuntu, or how the state should treat citizens who hold other views of the good life. He also postpones any comparison with the capabilities approach, leaving it to “future research” [24] (p. 111). Without that comparison, the reader cannot judge whether his ubuntu-based account improves on existing theories of development.
I now proceed to Hoffman and Metz, who take up the comparison Molefe defers. Rather than setting ubuntu beside the capabilities approach as a rival, they bring the two into direct conversation. As we will see, where Molefe offers an ubuntu alternative to mainstream development theory, they reform that theory from within.
7.3. Nimi Hoffmann and Thaddeus Metz
In “What Can the Capabilities Approach Learn from an Ubuntu Ethics?” Nimi Hoffmann and Thaddeus Metz use ubuntu to revise Sen’s capabilities approach, developing an ubuntu account of development in which individual capabilities are understood as intrinsically connected to relationships of care, cooperation, identity, and fellowship. The capabilities approach evaluates development by people’s real opportunities to achieve “functionings” they have reason to value. On the other hand, ubuntu, so called after the southern African isiNguni word for humanness or virtue [25] (p. 153, p. 157), maintains that a person flourishes by cultivating friendly, caring, and cooperative relationships in which people identify with one another, share one another’s lives, and act for each other’s good. The ubuntu ethic thus accounts for human flourishing as the capacity to pursue communal relations of fellowship with others, where such relationships, or people’s capacities for them, have fundamental value [25] (p. 153). On this account, Sen’s capabilities and ubuntu can be combined by treating development as the expansion of each person’s real freedom and their ability to use those freedoms to form and sustain caring, cooperative, and mutually respectful relationships with others. They contend that “relationality is a salient feature of all ethically important capabilities and is worthy of consideration in all cases when thinking about development” [25] (p. 159) in the following ways.
First, they see “Lack of capability as being the lack of relation” [25] (p. 159). For Hoffman and Metz, poverty is a lack of capability that is also a failure of relationship: a parent without water, income, education, or healthcare may be unable to feed, protect, support, or share with children, relatives, and neighbors. The lack of relation lies not in the absence of other people, but in the parent’s reduced ability to provide care and participate with them. Without water, for instance, a parent may be unable to bathe a child, cook meals, or spend time playing because time is spent fetching water; without income, education, or healthcare, the parent may be less able to provide, guide, assist, or contribute to family or community life. Thus, poverty prevents relationships from being fully expressed as the practical care, sharing, reciprocity, and solidarity that Hoffman and Metz regard as central to ubuntu [25] (pp. 159–160). In other words, “capability deprivation does not merely detract from the quality of life for individuals considered in isolation; it also essentially inhibits the kinds of sharing and participative relationships between individuals that are central to an ubuntu ethic” [25] (p. 160).
Secondly, they see “lack of capability as being the disruption of relation” [25] (p. 160). For Hoffman and Metz, a lack of capability disrupts relationships when it results from others’ failure to show care, solidarity, and identification with those in need. For example, if a state has the resources to provide safe water or adequate housing but refuses to do so, it does not merely leave citizens without these capabilities; it treats them as separate or inferior rather than as people with whom it shares a cooperative social life. Likewise, when affluent groups retain abundant water or land by dispossessing poorer communities, the unequal distribution reflects a broken relationship of domination rather than reciprocity and fellowship [25] (pp. 160–161).
Third, Hoffman and Metz contend that a skewed distribution weakens a capability [25] (p. 161). It is their contention that a person’s capability is weakened or “marred” when it is obtained or maintained through the deprivation of others, because it rests on an unfriendly and unjust relationship rather than genuine fellowship. For example, a wealthy landowner or agricultural business may have plentiful water while nearby poor communities lack it because water infrastructure was historically diverted away from them; even though the landowner has physical access to water, that capability is ethically incomplete because it depends on or benefits from others’ exclusion [25] (p. 161).
Hoffman and Metz’s article, in brief, redefines poverty as a disruption of relationships in three ways: deprivation limits a person’s ability to care for others; it may reveal that institutions such as the state have failed to care for citizens; and it also argues that advantages gained through exploitation of others or benefiting from others’ deprivation are ethically “marred.” Development, then, must ask two questions: who lacks capabilities, and how others have come to have them. This adds something to Sen’s approach. Poverty is not only a matter of individuals lacking real opportunities. It also shows that care, sharing, and solidarity have broken down among people and between people and institutions. So, it is not enough to ask whether people have capabilities. We also need to ask whether they got them through relationships of respect or through neglect, exclusion, and exploitation.
Hoffman and Metz give a convincing account of structural injustice, and they make a strong case that relationships are built into the most important capabilities. Access to water, health, education, and income matters because it shapes what each person can do. It matters just as much because it lets people care for others, work with them, and take part in their lives. In other words, capability is partly an opportunity to enter relationships of friendship, solidarity, and mutual support—relationships that are themselves valuable, not simply useful. However, Gyekye goes one step further, which I will now explain.
Gyekye offers a potentially deeper philosophical grounding for solidarity, mutual support, and care than Hoffman and Metz because Gyekye roots them both in the relational value of capabilities and in a philosophical anthropology: Human beings are naturally social, rational, and socially responsible persons. For Gyekye, our social nature gives us a duty to care for others and to contribute to the common good. Our dignity and autonomy, though, limit what the community can demand of us [13] (pp. 45–51, 54–56, 63). Because his view rests on both sociality and autonomy, it stands on firmer philosophical ground than Hoffmann and Metz’s view, which treats only caring relationships as valuable in themselves.
Another issue concerns grounding ubuntu capabilities. Hoffmann and Metz largely take ubuntu for granted. The article does not fully answer objections to ubuntu, such as whether it could place excessive pressure on individuals to conform to communal expectations or adequately protect dissent and individual rights. The authors acknowledge this problem when they state that “A fair concern about ubuntu ethic is whether it can account for intuitive values of individuality, uniqueness and the like.” [25] (p. 158). As Pamela Enslin and Heikki Horsthemke [26] (pp. 550–556) and many other scholars have pointed out, ubuntu can become problematic when it treats the community as prior to the individual and communalism superior to individualism—in that scenario ubuntu risks weakening protections for autonomy, dissent, and individual rights. This is an issue that Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism has addressed, as we saw in Section 4 of this paper and in the preceding paragraph. Gyekye argues that the person is inherently communal and socially interdependent, but this does not make the individual an instrument of the group: moderate communitarianism recognizes the self as “autonomous”, self-assertive, and capable of evaluation and choice [17] (p. 113). Because each person possesses an inalienable dignity that communal membership cannot erase, the community must respect individual rights [17] (p. 114).
Hoffmann and Metz draw on ubuntu’s insight that people flourish through one another, but they treat caring relationships as the only thing valuable in itself. This leaves them open to common criticisms of Ubuntu: it can push people to conform, protect hierarchy, and give leaders cover to silence dissent. On their view, a person’s freedom to question or refuse matters only indirectly, yet development often depends on those who break with custom. Wangari Maathai, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2004, is a good example. Many people criticized her for behaving in ways they thought unfit for a woman and for standing up to Kenya’s government. Still, the Green Belt Movement she started planted millions of trees and gave rural women a source of income and a voice in public life. Gyekye’s view makes room for people like her since it holds that because we are social beings, we have a duty to care for one another. Because we have dignity and can make our own choices, there are limits to what the community can demand of us. Gyekye’s view protects both the solidarity and the freedom that development depends on.
8. Conclusions
This article argues that a relational capabilities approach grounded in Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism should guide African development ethics. I use critical philosophical analysis to examine Sen’s capability approach, Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism, and an ubuntu-based approach, arguing that Gyekye’s account offers a plausible foundation for relational capabilities in African development. I argue that Sen is not wrong to emphasize individual freedom. Rather, an African communitarian view suggests that the capabilities are better advanced through relational bonds. Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism is especially useful because it recognizes that individuals are social beings whose flourishing depends on community while maintaining a balance between the individual and the community. This is one of the main reasons why it fares better than ubuntu-based approaches that reject liberal neutrality (like Molefe’s approach) or that treat caring relationships as the only thing valuable in itself while admitting concerns about whether their approach can account for intuitive values of individuality, uniqueness, and the like (like Hoffmann and Metz’s approach). The policy implication is that development should expand people’s substantive freedoms, while strengthening relational conditions that make those freedoms meaningful. Any development policy, project, or intervention should therefore be assessed by whether it advances the common good—whether it meets everyone’s needs, strengthens social cohesion, and enables people to participate fully in communal life while respecting their individual agency.
Funding
This research received no external funding.
Institutional Review Board Statement
Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement
Not applicable.
Data Availability Statement
The original contributions presented in this study are included in the article. Further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding author.
Conflicts of Interest
The author declares no conflict of interest.
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