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Veterinary SciencesVeterinary Sciences
  • Editorial
  • Open Access

5 November 2026

5 Pages

Closing the One Health Loop on Antimicrobial Resistance: From Genomic Signals to Prevention Across the Human–Animal–Environment Interface

1
Department of Veterinary Medicine, College of Agriculture and Veterinary Medicine, United Arab Emirates University, Al Ain P.O. Box 15551, United Arab Emirates
2
ASPIRE Research Institute for Food Security in the Drylands (ARIFSID), United Arab Emirates University, Al Ain P.O. Box 15551, United Arab Emirates

1. The One Health Frame

Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is a systems problem. Antimicrobial exposure exerts selective pressure, while mobile genetic elements spread resistance determinants among microbial communities. The movement of people, animals, food, water, waste, and wildlife connects these communities. The Special Issue “One World, One Health: Combatting the Spread of Multidrug-Resistant Pathogens at the Human–Animal–Environment Interface” examines this interdependence through six contributions spanning zoonotic tuberculosis, camel-associated AMR, resistance and virulence in raptor-derived Escherichia coli, goat-derived Enterococcus with antipathogenic potential, the machine learning prediction of multidrug resistance in swine-derived Campylobacter, and structured global networking for One Health implementation. (Contribution 1–6) Together, they connect pathogens and animal interfaces, wildlife and livestock reservoirs, antimicrobial alternatives, predictive analytics, and the governance needed to turn knowledge into action. This emphasis is timely: the global burden of bacterial AMR remains substantial and is projected to increase without sustained prevention and access to effective care [1].
A One Health approach is more than the simultaneous collection of human, animal, and environmental data. It requires shared questions, compatible methods, participation by the people who will use the evidence, and a clear route from a finding to a coordinated decision. The inclusive definition developed by the One Health High-Level Expert Panel provides that broad frame [2,3]. Yet surveillance often overlooks the interfaces through which antimicrobial resistance enters, persists in, and returns from the environment. These include the discharge of wastewater and animal waste into soils and surface waters, the application of sewage sludge and manure to agricultural land, and transmission through runoff, irrigation, food production, drinking-water sources, and wildlife. At these interfaces, antimicrobial residues and resistant organisms may co-occur, promoting persistence and selection before resistance is transmitted back to human or animal populations [4]. The contributions to this Special Issue address several of these gaps by examining environmental reservoirs and transmission pathways within the broader One Health system.

2. What This Special Issue Adds

Hartady et al. review zoonotic tuberculosis as a persistent One Health challenge, combining global evidence with attention to transmission, surveillance, and policy gaps in Indonesia (Contribution 1). Zoonotic tuberculosis, most commonly associated with Mycobacterium bovis, can be acquired through unpasteurized dairy products, inadequately cooked animal products, direct contact, and occupational exposure. Its burden is easily underestimated when diagnostic systems identify the Mycobacterium tuberculosis complex without species-level confirmation, or when animal and human records are not linked. The review also notes the intrinsic resistance of M. bovis to pyrazinamide, making accurate identification clinically relevant as well as epidemiologically informative.
This contribution shows why control cannot rest on the health sector alone. Veterinary surveillance, livestock testing, abattoir inspection, dairy hygiene and pasteurization, occupational protection, laboratory capacity, and notification systems all shape whether transmission is detected and interrupted. Indonesia illustrates challenges that are also familiar elsewhere: uneven diagnostic access, fragmented responsibilities, and limited integration of animal and human data. The practical message is not that every setting requires the same program, but that surveillance should be designed to distinguish zoonotic infection and to trigger proportionate food safety, animal health, and public health action (Contribution 1).
Faizo and Alandijany examine camels as an overlooked AMR interface (Contribution 2). Camels support food security, livelihoods, trade, and cultural practices across arid and semi-arid regions, yet they are seldom represented consistently in AMR surveillance. The review brings together evidence on multidrug-resistant bacteria and clinically important resistance mechanisms in camel populations and camel-associated products. It also identifies plausible routes of exchange at farms, markets, slaughter points, and households. Pastoral mobility, cross-border trade, intensifying production, variable access to veterinary services, and antimicrobial use can combine to make this interface especially difficult to monitor.
Laaser et al. address a different but closely related challenge in AMR surveillance: how to organize One Health action across communities and institutions (Contribution 3). Their perspective proposes a structured, voluntary networking model that connects community-level action with interdisciplinary support, shared evaluation templates, thematic working groups, iterative learning, and policy dialogue. The model is explicitly presented as a framework ready for empirical testing rather than as a validated intervention. That distinction is valuable. Laaser et al. asserted that coordination mechanisms should be judged by feasibility, participation, data quality, learning, and measurable effects, not by the appeal of the One Health label alone (Contribution 3).
Cagnoli et al. extend the surveillance lens to wildlife by characterizing antimicrobial resistance and virulence genes in E. coli isolated from raptors in central Italy (Contribution 4). Raptors occupy high trophic levels and encounter heterogeneous environments through prey, carrion, water, and anthropogenic waste. Their bacterial isolates can therefore provide a sentinel view of environmental contamination and the circulation of resistance beyond farms and hospitals. The paper adds value by considering resistance together with virulence potential, two dimensions that jointly inform risk prioritization. Detection in wildlife should be interpreted as evidence of exposure and ecological connectivity rather than, by itself, proof of transmission to people. Linking wildlife findings with location, land use, source attribution, and genomic context would strengthen their value for targeted One Health action (Contribution 4).
Essa et al. move from surveillance toward prevention by evaluating goat-derived Enterococcus isolates as next-generation probiotic candidates (Contribution 5). Their broad-spectrum antipathogenic activity highlights a complementary AMR strategy: reducing infection pressure and, potentially, the need for therapeutic antimicrobials through well-characterized beneficial microbes. The study’s added value is translational, linking organisms adapted to a livestock host with functional screening against pathogens. At the same time, Enterococcus requires stringent strain-level safety assessment. Antimicrobial susceptibility, transferable resistance determinants, virulence factors, product stability, and in vivo efficacy must be evaluated before field use. This contribution therefore expands One Health AMR work from documenting resistant organisms to responsibly developing alternatives that may support prevention (Contribution 5).
Sodagari et al. demonstrate how routine surveillance data can be converted into an interpretable decision-support tool (Contribution 6). Using United States National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System phenotypic data from swine-derived Campylobacter isolates collected during 2013–2023, they trained models on earlier years and validated them temporally on later data. Random Forest performed best, and resistance to erythromycin, azithromycin, and clindamycin contributed most strongly to multidrug-resistance prediction. The paper adds a forward-looking surveillance layer: machine learning can help prioritize isolates, identify changing patterns, and extract more value from existing data. It should complement, not replace, standardized susceptibility testing, and requires continued recalibration and external validation before use in other hosts, countries, or sampling systems (Contribution 6).
Together, the six papers identify gaps in environmental AMR surveillance and opportunities to improve monitoring, source control, and cross-sector data integration. Zoonotic tuberculosis and camel-associated AMR may be missed by sectorally divided or unrepresentative surveillance. Raptor-derived E. coli makes wildlife and environmental circulation visible; goat-derived Enterococcus illustrates the potential of carefully screened non-antibiotic prevention; and the swine Campylobacter analysis shows how existing data can support the earlier recognition of multidrug resistance. Even when signals and tools are available, action may stall without durable structures for interpretation, coordination, and evaluation. An integrated system is therefore only as representative as the pathogens, hosts, places, and exposure pathways it is designed to see—and only as effective as the relationships through which it acts (Contribution 1–6).

3. From Evidence Gaps to Coordinated Action

The integrated monitoring of antimicrobial consumption and resistance demonstrates the value of connecting use and resistance indicators [4]. Five priorities emerge from this Special Issue.
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First, we should design surveillance around blind spots and decisions. Human tuberculosis laboratories need referral pathways for species-level identification where zoonotic exposure is plausible. Animal health systems need risk-based sampling at farms, markets, slaughter facilities, and points of sale. Camel systems should be incorporated where they are epidemiologically and economically important, wildlife sentinels should be used where ecology and exposure make them informative, and swine Campylobacter data should feed time-aware surveillance. Each program should define in advance what result will trigger an investigation, treatment review, food safety measure, or animal health response.
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Second, we should link the phenotype–genotype epidemiological context, and analytic contexts. Culture and antimicrobial susceptibility testing remain essential. Genomic methods can add species confirmation, strain relatedness, and the location and mobility of resistance determinants, but sequence data should be interpreted alongside time, place, host, antimicrobial exposure, animal movement, product flow, and contact information. Predictive algorithms can assist triage and early warning, but performance metrics do not substitute for laboratory confirmation or transportable validation. Likewise, the detection of a resistance or virulence gene is a signal, not by itself a measure of transmission or disease burden (Contribution 4, 6).
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Third, we should prevent exposure while reducing the need for antimicrobials. For zoonotic tuberculosis, priorities include animal disease control, safe milk, effective meat inspection, occupational protection, and diagnostic pathways that inform appropriate therapy. For camel-associated AMR, priorities include veterinary access, responsible prescribing and dispensing, infection prevention, husbandry and welfare measures, and hygienic handling of milk and meat. Probiotic candidates and other alternatives should be advanced through strain-level safety, mechanism, stability, and in vivo efficacy testing before implementation (Contribution 5). Interventions should be evaluated for animal health, livelihoods, food safety, and human health rather than by a single-sector outcome.
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Fourth, we should include environmental pathways and climate-sensitive risks. Manure, slaughter waste, wastewater, and contaminated water can connect animal production to wider microbial communities [4]. A recent longitudinal ecological and modelling study associated climate variables with changes in the abundance of AMR genes in Salmonella and projected greater pressure under higher-emission scenarios [5]. Such associations should guide prospective sampling and intervention studies while being interpreted cautiously; they do not establish deterministic outcomes for a particular place or host.
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Fifth, we should make equity, implementation, and governance part of study design. Pastoralists, livestock keepers, veterinarians, laboratory staff, physicians, food-chain workers, regulators, and communities hold different information and bear different costs. Co-designed interventions are more likely to be feasible and less likely to displace risk onto groups with limited resources. Shared data standards, clear institutional responsibilities, sustainable laboratory financing, locally meaningful indicators, and fair benefit sharing are therefore core technical requirements, consistent with the Quadripartite One Health priority research agenda for AMR [2].

4. Conclusions

The six contributions to this Special Issue do not present a complete map of AMR at the human–animal–environment interface; they show how the map can be made more representative and actionable. Zoonotic tuberculosis, camel-associated AMR, and resistant or virulent E. coli in raptors broaden the pathogens, hosts, and environments that surveillance must see. Goat-derived Enterococcus candidates add a prevention-oriented pathway, while the machine learning analysis of swine-derived Campylobacter demonstrates how routine data can support earlier interpretation. The networking perspective supplies the operational bridge: a testable way to connect local priorities, interdisciplinary expertise, evaluation, and policy dialogue (Contribution 1–6).
Progress should therefore be measured not only by the number of samples collected, organisms identified, or genomes sequenced, but by whether evidence changes prevention and care. A closed One Health loop connects detection to attribution, attribution to a feasible intervention, and intervention to transparent evaluation across sectors. Applying that discipline to neglected pathogens, species, production systems, and communities is essential to preserve effective treatment, protect animal health and welfare, strengthen food safety, and reduce avoidable exposure.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

List of Contributions

  • Hartady, T.; Satrio, F.A.; Maulana, S.; Wira, D.W.; Setyowati, E.Y.; Salleh, A. Zoonotic Tuberculosis as a One Health Challenge: Global Evidence, Transmission Dynamics, and Policy Gaps in Indonesia. Vet. Sci. 2026, 13, 237. https://doi.org/10.3390/vetsci13030237.
  • Faizo, A.A.; Alandijany, T.A. Camel-Associated Antimicrobial Resistance: An Overlooked One Health Interface. Vet. Sci. 2026, 13, 383. https://doi.org/10.3390/vetsci13040383.
  • Laaser, U.; Karabasil, N.; Wenzel, H.; Bjegović Mikanović, V. Dynamising One Health Through a Structured Global Networking Model. Vet. Sci. 2026, 13, 720. https://doi.org/10.3390/vetsci13070720.
  • Cagnoli, G.; Bertelloni, F.; Di Paolo, A.; Ceccherelli, R.; Ebani, V.V. Antimicrobial Resistance and Virulence Genes in Escherichia coli Isolated from Raptors in Central Italy. Vet. Sci. 2026, 13, 342. https://doi.org/10.3390/vetsci13040342.
  • Essa, M.O.A.; Basher, N.S.; Abdelhadi, L.A.M.; Ibrahim, N.A.; Rehman, S.U.; Husien, H.M.; Saleh, A.A.; Cheng, D. Robust Goat-Derived Enterococcus Isolates with Broad-Spectrum Antipathogenic Activity as Next-Generation Probiotic Candidates. Vet. Sci. 2026, 13, 120. https://doi.org/10.3390/vetsci13020120.
  • Sodagari, H.R.; Ghasemi, M.; Varga, C.; Habib, I. Machine Learning Prediction of Multidrug Resistance in Swine-Derived Campylobacter spp. Using United States Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Data (2013–2023). Vet. Sci. 2025, 12, 937. https://doi.org/10.3390/vetsci12100937.

References

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