Tajwīd as a Codified Discipline: An Analysis in Light of Avicenna’s Criteria for Science

Abstract

Tajwīd was recognized as an ʿilm in classical Islamic scholarship, yet its epistemic status as a codified discipline has received comparatively little systematic examination. This study investigates whether tajwīd exhibits Avicenna’s structural criteria for science: a determinate subject matter (mawḍūʿ), foundational principles (mabādiʾ), and organized problems (masāʾil). The analysis finds that tajwīd takes the letters of the Qurʾān, insofar as they are realized in recitation, as its subject matter; rests on self-evident, inductive, transmitted, and normative principles; and organizes its problems around articulation points (makhārij), phonetic attributes (ṣifāt), phonetic interactions, including idghām, elongation (madd), pausing and resumption (waqf and ibtidāʾ), and recitational error (laḥn). Its aim is to preserve the transmitted verbal and recitational form of the Qurʾān and maintain the integrity between wording and meaning. Methodologically, the study employs qualitative conceptual and textual analysis conducted through a structural and functional analogical framework. It shows that tajwīd combines theoretical systematization with supervised practice through transmission, listening, recitation before a qualified teacher, repetition, and correction. This analysis contributes to existing scholarship by shifting attention from the individual rules and pedagogical transmission of tajwīd to its internal disciplinary architecture, and by showing how a transmission-based and practice-centered Qurʾānic discipline can be analyzed through a classical Islamic framework of scientific organization without being reduced to demonstrative science. The study concludes that tajwīd is not identical to a demonstrative science but can be characterized as a codified, normative, transmission-grounded, and practice-centered Qurʾānic discipline within the broader classical Islamic conception of ʿilm.

1. Introduction

Within the Islamic intellectual tradition, the concept of ʿilm (knowledge/science) encompasses a broader epistemological horizon than that commonly associated with modern conceptions of science (Nasr 1989, p. 14; Izutsu 1965, pp. 103–35; Rosenthal 2007, pp. 1–4). Accordingly, a wide range of disciplines were historically recognized as sciences within the Islamic intellectual tradition. Among these was tajwīd—the discipline governing the proper recitation (tilāwa) of the Qurʾān—which came to be classified as a distinct field of knowledge under the designation ʿilm al-tajwīd (al-Dānī 2000, pp. 68–70; Ibn al-Jazarī 2001, pp. 59–60). Modern discussions of scientific legitimacy, however, frequently emphasize empirical investigation and explanatory theories (Sankey 2008, pp. 89–94). This tendency raises questions concerning the epistemic status of disciplines whose primary concern is the preservation and regulation of normative practices rather than the description of natural phenomena. Such questions invite a reconsideration of disciplines such as tajwīd, whose authority is grounded in oral transmission (naql), recitational performance, and the preservation of a transmitted linguistic form. Examining the status of tajwīd is therefore important not only for understanding its place among the Islamic sciences but also for broader discussions concerning the nature and diversity of scientific knowledge.

In this context, the present study examines whether tajwīd possesses the principal structural features that Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā) identifies as criteria of a scientific discipline: a determinate subject matter (mawḍūʿ), foundational principles (mabādiʾ) and problems or questions (masāʾil) capable of systematic treatment (Avicenna 1954, p. 98). To provide a more comprehensive account of tajwīd as a codified discipline, the study also considers its aim (gharaḍ), method (manhaj), and position within the broader classification of the Islamic sciences. These additional dimensions are not treated as elements equivalent to Avicenna’s threefold constitutive structure; rather, they function as supplementary analytical criteria that clarify the disciplinary identity, operation, and intellectual location of tajwīd. The study does not claim, however, that tajwīd is a demonstrative science in precisely the same sense as the theoretical sciences examined in Avicenna’s logical works. Accordingly, Avicenna’s criteria are applied analogically and structurally, not to identify tajwīd with the demonstrative sciences in every respect, but to assess whether it exhibits the formal organization of a codified discipline while retaining its distinctive epistemic character.

The selection of Avicenna as the principal analytical reference in this study is not based on the assumption that the tripartite structure of subject matter, principles, and problems is unique to him or was first formulated by him. Earlier philosophical works also contain similar formulations corresponding to this tripartite structure. Al-Fārābī, for instance, states that every theoretical discipline comprises subjects, problems, and principles (al-Fārābī 2012, p. 36). Avicenna is selected in this study not because of chronological priority, but because he formulates the functional relation among these elements in a particularly clear, systematic, and internally coherent manner. Furthermore, this study does not claim that early scholars of tajwīd were historically dependent on Avicennian epistemology. This framework is used solely to examine the disciplinary organization of tajwīd analytically.

Although classical and contemporary scholarship has devoted considerable attention to the rules of tajwīd, their pedagogical transmission, and their practical application, comparatively little attention has been given to the status of tajwīd as a codified discipline (for example, Çakır and Demirtaş Atış 2023). By contrast, other Islamic sciences, such as fiqh and tafsīr, have frequently been examined with respect to their methodological foundations, disciplinary boundaries, and positions within broader classifications of knowledge (al-Fanārī 1908, pp. 4–5, 79, 87–88; Abū Ḥayyān al-Andalusī 2000, vol. 1, pp. 15–16; Büyük 2020, pp. 1042–44). As a result, the question of whether tajwīd can be analyzed as a systematic science within a classical Islamic theoretical framework remains insufficiently explored. This gap constitutes the point of departure for the present study.

To address this gap, the article first examines the historical emergence and conceptual formation of tajwīd; second, it clarifies the structure of ʿilm and the distinction between knowledge in a general sense and systematically organized disciplinary knowledge; third, it sets out Avicenna’s criteria for a codified science; and finally, it applies those criteria to tajwīd’s subject matter, principles, problems, aim, method, and classificatory position. The comparison is structural and functional: it assesses whether the relevant elements perform analogous disciplinary functions without identifying tajwīd with demonstrative science or claiming direct historical dependence on Avicennian epistemology.

2. Materials and Methods

This study employs qualitative conceptual and textual analysis conducted through a structural and functional analogical framework. The analysis proceeds in four stages. First, it examines the transformation of the term tajwīd into the designation of a technical discipline, the gradual differentiation of the phonetic and recitational knowledge associated with tajwīd from Arabic linguistic scholarship and the science of qirāʾāt, the systematization of its rules and terminology, and the emergence of independent works devoted to the field. Second, it examines the structure of the concept of ʿilm and the distinction between knowledge in a general sense and systematically organized disciplinary knowledge. Third, Avicenna’s criteria of subject matter (mawḍūʿ), principles (mabādiʾ), and problems (masāʾil) are identified, while aim (gharaḍ), method (manhaj), and disciplinary classification are considered supplementary analytical dimensions. Fourth and finally, these criteria are applied to tajwīd by comparing the functions assigned to the elements of a science in Avicenna with the organization of knowledge in the tajwīd tradition. This comparison is structural and functional: without presupposing direct historical dependence on Avicenna or equating tajwīd with a demonstrative science in the strict sense, it examines whether the relevant elements perform analogous disciplinary functions. Accordingly, Avicenna functions here as an analytical reference rather than as a proposed historical source for the formation of tajwīd.

Different groups of sources are used at these stages of the analysis. To examine the historical emergence and conceptual formation of tajwīd, the study draws on the linguistic works of al-Khalīl ibn Aḥmad and Sībawayh, as well as, in particular, the works on qirāʾāt and tajwīd by al-ʿUmānī, Makkī ibn Abī Ṭālib, al-Dānī, and Ibn al-Jazarī. These sources are examined to clarify the historical development of the knowledge and practices associated with tajwīd, the gradual definition of the discipline’s terminological boundaries, the systematization of its rules, and the emergence of independent works devoted to the field. To clarify the concept of ʿilm and the conceptual structure of a systematically organized discipline, the study consults the lexicographical, terminological, and classificatory works of Ibn Manẓūr, al-Jurjānī, al-Tahānawī, and Kātib Çelebi. Avicenna’s al-Burhān, Dānish Nāma-i ʿAlāʾī, and Kitāb aqsām al-ḥikma wa-tafṣīlihā are used to identify the criteria of subject matter, principles, and problems that constitute the theoretical framework of the study. In applying these criteria to tajwīd, the study takes classical tajwīd texts, particularly those of al-Dānī and Ibn al-Jazarī, as its principal sources. The works of al-ʿUmānī, Makkī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Birgivī, and Şaʿbān Efendi are used to clarify the discipline’s definition, internal structure, modes of transmission, and practical character. The linguistic, qirāʾāt, and Qurʾānic sciences works of authors such as al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, Ibn Jinnī, al-Zarkashī, and al-Suyūṭī are used as supplementary sources. The works of al-Ghazālī and Taşköprülüzāde provide the basis for evaluating the position of tajwīd within the classification of the Islamic sciences. Modern secondary sources are used selectively for historical contextualization, conceptual clarification, and interpretive comparison.

The procedure is interpretive rather than statistical and involves no human participants, experiments, or newly generated datasets. The study does not seek to provide an exhaustive history of tajwīd literature; rather, it examines primary texts that are directly relevant to the subject and sufficiently representative to permit an evaluation of the discipline’s structure within the stated analytical framework.

The Avicennian framework also has explanatory limits when applied to tajwīd. It was developed primarily in relation to demonstrative sciences and therefore does not by itself fully account for disciplines whose epistemic authority depends substantially on transmission, embodied performance, teacher–student instruction, and normative religious practice. For this reason, the present study does not treat Avicenna’s subject–principles–problems structure as an exhaustive theory of tajwīd. Rather, it employs that structure to analyze the formal organization of the discipline, while supplementing it with considerations of aim, method, transmission, and practical competence. Questions concerning the social history of tajwīd, institutional authority, pedagogical practice, chains of transmission, embodied knowledge, and the broader theological foundations of Qurʾānic recitation remain beyond the principal scope of this framework and may be examined through other historical, sociological, pedagogical, or epistemological approaches.

3. Historical Emergence and Conceptual Formation of Tajwīd

The term tajwīd derives from the root j-w-d and is morphologically the verbal noun of the Form II verb jawwada (Wright 1896–1898, vol. 1, p. 31). Lexically, it denotes making something good, improving its quality, or performing it properly (Ibn Manẓūr n.d., vol. 1, pp. 720–21, s.v. “j-w-d”). Over time, tajwīd came to designate the discipline concerned with the correct and rule-governed recitation of the Qurʾān. The phonetic and recitational material later associated with tajwīd was initially transmitted orally within the broader frameworks of Arabic linguistic scholarship and ʿilm al-qirāʾāt. Within Arabic linguistic scholarship, some elements of this material were discussed in works such as al-Khalīl b. Aḥmad’s (d. 175/791) Kitāb al-ʿAyn and al-Kitāb by his student Sībawayh (d. 180/796) (al-Khalīl ibn Aḥmad n.d., vol. 1, pp. 47–48). These works examined the articulation points (makhārij) and phonetic characteristics (ṣifāt) of letters, as well as phonetic interactions such as idghām (Sībawayh 1988, vol. 4, pp. 431–36). The same body of material was also addressed in the literature of qirāʾāt in the context of discussions concerning correct pronunciation and recitational performance. At this stage, therefore, tajwīd had not yet become fully distinct from Arabic linguistic scholarship and qirāʾāt (al-Ḥamad 2008, pp. 179–80).

The fourth century AH/tenth century CE marks, according to al-Ḥamad, a formative period during which questions concerning pronunciation and refined recitational performance began to acquire a more distinct disciplinary identity (al-Ḥamad 2008, pp. 165, 192). Ibn al-Jazarī (d. 833/1429) states that al-Khāqānī (d. 325/936–37) was, as far as he knew, the first scholar to compose a work on tajwīd (Ibn al-Jazarī 1933, 2:321). Al-Ḥamad further notes that al-Khāqānī’s fifty-one-verse poem employs the expression ḥusn al-adāʾ rather than the term tajwīd (al-Ḥamad 2008, p. 193). Al-Ḥamad also identifies a statement attributed to Ibn Mujāhid (d. 324/936) and transmitted by al-Dānī (d. 444/1053) as the earliest occurrence known to him of the term tajwīd in connection with the refined articulation of Qurʾānic recitation (al-Dānī 2000, p. 116; al-Ḥamad 2008, p. 192). This formative process is also evident in the chapter entitled “Bāb fī al-Tajwīd wa-l-Ḥathth ʿAlayhi” in al-ʿUmānī’s al-Kitāb al-Awsaṭ fī ʿIlm al-Qirāʾāt, a work that he states he began dictating in 413 AH/1022–23 CE (al-ʿUmānī 2006, pp. 72, 80). Although the work as a whole belongs to the field of qirāʾāt, the inclusion of a separate chapter devoted to tajwīd indicates that questions specific to the field were beginning to be treated as a more clearly defined body of knowledge. The first comprehensive independent works devoted specifically to the discipline subsequently appeared in the fifth century AH/eleventh century CE with Makkī b. Abī Ṭālib’s (d. 437/1045) al-Riʿāya li-Tajwīd al-Qirāʾa and al-Dānī’s al-Taḥdīd fī al-Itqān wa-l-Tajwīd (Makkī 1996; al-Dānī 2000; al-Ḥamad 2008, pp. 164–65).

Taken together, these developments indicate that tajwīd did not emerge through a single act of foundation but took shape through a series of closely related processes. These included the gradual differentiation of its subject matter from Arabic linguistic scholarship and qirāʾāt, the systematization of rules concerning articulation, phonetic realization, and recitational performance, the stabilization of technical terminology relating to correct recitation, the establishment of tajwīd as a technical designation, and the production of independent works devoted specifically to the field. By the fifth century AH/eleventh century CE, these developments had contributed to the formation of tajwīd as an increasingly distinct field of knowledge within the Islamic scholarly tradition. Having outlined the historical and conceptual formation of tajwīd, the following section examines the structure of ʿilm with particular reference to Avicenna’s account of scientific disciplines, thereby establishing the analytical framework for evaluating tajwīd as a codified discipline.

4. The Structure of ʿIlm: Avicennian Criteria for a Codified Discipline

The Arabic term ʿilm derives from the root ʿ-l-m, which conveys the basic sense of knowing. Although the term is generally rendered as “knowledge” or “science,” neither word fully captures its conceptual range. To clarify the conceptual structure of the term, it is necessary to consider the grammatical use of the verb from which it derives. Since ʿalima, “to know,” is a transitive verb and therefore takes an object, knowing necessarily means knowing something; accordingly, ʿilm denotes knowledge of a determinate object (Ibn Manẓūr n.d., vol. 4, pp. 3082–84; al-Jurjānī n.d., pp. 199–200). The act of knowing thus presupposes both a knowing subject and a known object. Knowledge may therefore be understood as that which arises from the relation between the knower and the known, or as the representation of the known that occurs in the knower; in this respect, it may be characterized as a mental representation, a cognitive relation, or a mental quality (al-Jurjānī n.d., pp. 199–200; Kātib Çelebi n.d., pp. 5–6). Although knowledge exists as a mental representation, it continues to depend on its object—in other words, on something that exists in some manner. An existent may be understood as something about which an affirmative or negative judgment can be made and which can be considered in relation to other existents. On this basis, existents may be classified according to whether they are material or immaterial and whether they exist in the external world or only in the mind. Whereas human beings, horses, and stones exist in the external world independently of the mind, fictional figures in literature and mythology exist only as objects of thought or imagination (Öner 2005, p. 9).

Understanding knowledge as directed toward an object does not by itself explain when and how it acquires the internal organization of an independent discipline. It is therefore necessary to distinguish knowledge in a general sense from knowledge that has been systematically organized and codified. One of the fundamental criteria for this distinction is whether knowledge has been organized according to a determinate method. Human beings formulate generalizations about existence in response to their desire for knowledge and other practical needs; however, generalizations formed without reliance on a determinate method remain within the domain of ordinary knowledge (Reichenbach 1951, pp. 5–9). Systematic and disciplinary knowledge, by contrast, emerges when observations, judgments, and propositions are organized through methods capable of distinguishing relevant elements from irrelevant ones and producing objective, internally coherent, and reliable explanations (Reichenbach 1951, pp. 5–6; Yıldırım 1979, pp. 16–18). The purpose here is not to reduce the classical conception of ʿilm to the model of modern empirical science, but to distinguish general and methodologically unorganized knowledge from fields of inquiry that are systematically structured within themselves. This distinction provides a conceptual basis for examining the elements through which the classical Islamic tradition defined a systematic discipline.

Once systematic knowledge is distinguished from general or ordinary knowledge, another question arises: How are such organized fields of knowledge constituted and differentiated from one another? This question shifts the analysis from the general problem of knowledge to the classification and internal structure of the sciences. In the classical Islamic intellectual tradition, the classification of knowledge was closely associated with ontological distinctions concerning the nature of existence (Bakar 1998, pp. 263–64). One of the principal criteria was whether the object of knowledge existed independently of human volition or came into existence as a result of human action. Knowledge concerning realities whose existence is independent of human volition was classified as theoretical (naẓarī) philosophy or science, whereas knowledge concerning matters dependent on human action, choice, and moral conduct was classified as practical (ʿamalī) philosophy or science (Avicenna 2020, p. 26).

This distinction between the theoretical and the practical identifies the broad domains of knowledge, but it does not by itself explain through which internal elements each domain becomes an independent science. At this point, it is necessary to determine not only how the sciences are differentiated in terms of their subject areas, but also which common structural elements they possess as independent disciplines. Although the sciences differ from one another according to the respects (ḥaythiyyāt) under which they examine existence, they nevertheless share certain structural elements. For identifying these elements, Avicenna’s account of subject matter, principles, and problems provides a more precise analytical framework.

Avicenna states:

Every discipline or art, and especially every theoretical science, has principles, subjects, and problems. Principles are the premises from which that art is demonstrated, that is, the premises from which its demonstrations are composed. They are not demonstrated within that art, either because they are self-evident, because they are so elevated that they can be demonstrated only in a higher science, or because they are situated at such a lower level that they cannot be demonstrated within that science at all—although this final case is rare. In other words, they are propositions that are not explained within that science. Subjects are the things whose states and essential accidents are investigated by the science. Problems are propositions whose predicates are essential accidents of the subject, of the species of the subject, or of its accidents, and whose status, although initially doubtful, is clarified within that science. Demonstrations are composed from principles, established for problems, and constructed concerning subjects.

(Avicenna 1954, p. 98)

Avicenna’s account presents subject matter, principles, and problems as functionally interconnected elements. The subject matter determines the field under investigation, the principles provide the epistemic starting points of the inquiry, and the problems constitute the propositions that require justification. These three elements will be examined more closely below.

4.1. Subject Matter (Mawḍūʿ)

The subject matter (mawḍūʿ) is the existent or domain whose essential accidents are investigated within a particular science (Avicenna 2013, pp. 112, 114). Since every science examines a particular domain of existence under a specific aspect, its subject matter constitutes one of the principal criteria distinguishing it from other sciences. Natural science, for example, takes the natural body as its subject matter (Kātib Çelebi n.d., vol. 1, p. 8) and examines it with respect to qualities essentially belonging to it, such as motion and rest (al-Tahānawī 1996, vol. 1, p. 7).

Before explaining the concept of the “essential accident,” it is necessary to distinguish between the technical meaning of “subject” in formal logic and its meaning in the classification of the sciences. In the context of predication, the subject (mawḍūʿ) is that to which a predicate (maḥmūl) is attributed (Avicenna 1954, p. 163). In the classification of the sciences, by contrast, the subject matter denotes the domain examined by a particular discipline and the qualities investigated in relation to that domain (Avicenna 2013, pp. 112, 114). An essential accident is not simply any quality that may be predicated of a subject. Rather, it is a quality necessarily connected with the subject without constituting a part of its essence. Not every predicate, therefore, qualifies as an essential accident; only those qualities that belong to the subject with respect to the particular aspect under which it is examined fall into this category.

Identifying the subject matter reveals what a science investigates, but it does not yet explain the epistemic foundations from which that investigation proceeds. These foundations are supplied by the principles of the science.

4.2. Principle (Mabdaʾ)

A principle (mabdaʾ) is one of the three constitutive elements of a demonstrative science, together with its subject matter and problems. Avicenna defines principles as the premises that constitute the foundation of a science and must initially be accepted (Avicenna 2013, p. 112). In a more technical sense, a principle is a foundational premise from which the demonstrations of a particular science are constructed but which is not itself demonstrated within that science (Avicenna 1954, p. 98). Principles thus constitute the epistemic starting points that enable the problems of a discipline to be demonstrated.

Avicenna distinguishes between principles specific to a particular science and general principles employed in more than one discipline. The existence of motion, for example, functions as a principle specific to natural science, whereas certain general principles may be shared by several sciences (Avicenna 1954, pp. 98–99). Not all principles, however, possess the same epistemic status. Some are self-evident and are known without requiring demonstration. Others, although requiring explanation, may be provisionally accepted within a science as hypotheses or postulates (waḍʿ or muṣādara) (Avicenna 1954, p. 21).

As a general rule, a principle is not demonstrated within the same science in which it functions as a principle. A principle that is not self-evident may be established in another discipline, particularly in a higher science. A proposition that functions as a principle in one science may therefore constitute a problem requiring demonstration in another. Similarly, the principles of subordinate sciences may ultimately be established in a higher science (Avicenna 1954, pp. 98, 110, 135). If principles constitute the epistemic starting points of a science, problems identify the propositions that must be justified from those starting points.

4.3. Problem (Masʾala)

A problem (masʾala) is a proposition concerning an essential accident of the subject matter of a science, one of its species, or one of its accidents (Avicenna 1954, p. 98; Avicenna 2013, pp. 114, 116). Unlike a principle, which is accepted as the starting point of a demonstration, a problem is initially open to doubt and is subsequently demonstrated or clarified within the relevant science (Avicenna 1954, p. 98). Problems therefore constitute the propositions that a discipline seeks to demonstrate concerning its subject matter (Avicenna 1954, p. 98; Avicenna 2013, p. 114). Accordingly, whereas demonstrations are composed from principles, they are constructed for problems (Avicenna 1954, p. 98).

The relation between subject matter, principles, and problems clarifies the internal structure of a science. This structure, however, is also directed toward an epistemic or practical objective, which may be expressed as the aim of the discipline.

4.4. Aim (Gharaḍ)

The aim (gharaḍ) of a science is the epistemic result that the discipline seeks to attain by examining its subject matter and establishing the propositions that constitute its problems. This result may consist in attaining certain knowledge of the essential accidents belonging to the subject matter or in acquiring a correct conception of the realities investigated within the relevant discipline. Avicenna, for example, identifies the aim of the art of demonstration as providing the methods through which certain assent and correct conception may be attained (Avicenna 1954, p. 6).

The aim, however, should not be treated as a fourth constitutive element equivalent to subject matter, principles, and problems. Within the Avicennian demonstrative framework, these three elements constitute the internal structure of a science, whereas the aim denotes the epistemic objective toward which their coordinated operation is directed. The subject matter determines what is investigated, the principles provide the premises from which demonstrations proceed, and the problems identify the propositions to be demonstrated (Avicenna 1954, pp. 6, 98). The aim, by contrast, denotes the type of knowledge or practical result intended to be attained through this process. Whereas the aim determines the result a discipline seeks to attain, the method indicates the operations through which that result is pursued.

4.5. Method (Manhaj)

Method (manhaj) denotes the systematic set of procedures through which a discipline approaches its subject matter, evaluates its materials, applies its principles, and establishes the propositions that constitute its problems. A discipline is therefore expected to explain not only what it investigates, but also through which procedures it conducts its inquiry and how it reaches its conclusions (Yıldırım 1979, p. 59).

In Avicenna’s conception of science, method is not included among subject matter, principles, and problems as an element constituting the internal structure of a science. Nevertheless, method remains significant as a complementary criterion because it reveals how a science operates in practice, how it produces knowledge, and through which procedures it justifies claims relating to its field. In this context, whether all sciences share a common method or whether each science operates through methods specific to its own subject matter remains a matter of debate. Approaches defending the idea of a common method emphasize similarities among the sciences, whereas methodological pluralism stresses disciplinary differences and the diversity of methods arising from differences in subject matter (Yıldırım 1979, pp. 59, 68).

Accordingly, the present study treats method not as a constitutive element equivalent to subject matter, principles, and problems, but as an additional and complementary criterion of evaluation. Having identified the constitutive elements of subject matter, principles, and problems, together with the complementary dimensions of aim and method, the following section will apply this analytical framework to the internal organization of tajwīd and examine the processes through which tajwīd produces, transmits, verifies, organizes, and applies knowledge.

5. Results and Discussion: Tajwīd as a Codified Discipline

It has been argued above that knowledge acquires the character of a scientific discipline when it transcends scattered and unsystematic conceptions and assumes a codified structure. Within Avicenna’s framework, the principal structural features of such a discipline are its subject matter (mawḍūʿ), foundational principles (mabādiʾ), and problems (masāʾil). Its aim and method, while not constitutive elements in the same sense, further clarify its disciplinary orientation, operation, and place within a broader classification of the sciences. Once this analytical framework has been established, the status of tajwīd as a scientific discipline can be examined by applying these criteria to its internal structure and epistemic function.

Before doing so, however, the nature of the Qurʾān as the object to which tajwīd is directly related must be clarified. Since tajwīd concerns the pronunciation and recitation of the Qurʾān, it cannot be adequately conceptualized without considering the Qurʾān’s character as a recited divine address. An important point of departure for clarifying this character is the range of concepts and designations the Qurʾān employs in presenting its own nature. These include waḥy (revelation), tanzīl (sending down), kalām (speech), qurʾān (recitation/reading), kitāb (book), ʿilm (knowledge), ḥikmah (wisdom), hudā (guidance), shifāʾ (healing), raḥmah (mercy), nūr (light), rūḥ (spirit), tibyān (clarification), furqān (criterion), dhikr (remembrance), and nadhīr (warner).1 Each of these descriptions characterizes the Qurʾān from a different perspective and points to distinct dimensions of its meaning and effect. For the purposes of the present inquiry, however, the most relevant aspect is the Qurʾān’s character as meaningful and recited speech. In this context, the term qawl, understood as “speech” or “a meaningful verbal utterance,” is particularly significant as it is used in Sūrat al-Muzzammil: “For we shall charge thee with a word of weight” (Q 73:5).2 Other Qurʾānic passages likewise characterize revelation as qawl. In the Qurʾānic context, this designation presents revelation not merely as meaningful speech, but also as a verbal address directed to those who hear it. Thus, the Qurʾān states: “That this is in truth the word of an honoured messenger” (Q 81:19; see also Q 69:40–45).

Linguistic sources explain the primary sense of the term qawl as a verbally articulated expression composed of letters. Such an expression may consist of a single word, a sentence, or a more extended body of speech (al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī n.d., pp. 688–89). Although qawl is articulated through letters and phonetic forms, it cannot be reduced to a mere sequence of sounds; rather, it belongs to a system of meaningful signification grounded in linguistic convention (Ibn Jinnī 1952, vol. 1, pp. 34, 41–44). Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī likewise situates qawl within the sphere of meaningful verbal expression, relating maʿnā to what is intended through qawl and distinguishing kalām from sounds that do not constitute speech (al-ʿAskarī n.d., pp. 34, 38). Taken together, these accounts indicate that qawl is not an undifferentiated sequence of sounds, but a verbally articulated expression intended to communicate meaning. The Qurʾān’s designation as qawl is therefore significant both with respect to the verbally articulated form of divine revelation and to its function as an address directed to those who hear it. Indeed, the Qurʾān’s repeated self-description as an “Arabic Qurʾān” further reinforces the connection between revealed meaning and a determinate linguistic form (Q 12:2; 20:113; 39:28; 41:3; 42:7; 43:3; Izutsu 2002, pp. 199–201). In this context, the designation ʿarabī indicates that revelation was communicated to its first audience through a language they could understand (cf. Q 14:4; 16:103; 26:195). The Qurʾān is thus presented not as an abstract meaning independent of linguistic form, but as an intelligible verbal address expressed in a determinate linguistic and phonetic form and therefore capable of being recited and heard.

Reports transmitted by al-Bukhārī indicate that the Prophet’s recitation was audible to those praying behind him and record the Companions’ recollections of particular sūrahs that they heard him recite (al-Bukhārī 1997, nos. 761–69). Early reports concerning the scribes of revelation and the subsequent collection of the Qurʾān further indicate that this orally recited revelation was also recorded in writing and compiled from both written materials and the memories of the reciters (Ibn Abī Dāwūd n.d., pp. 7–16). For the purposes of the present study, the Qurʾān may therefore be understood as divine speech articulated in Arabic and transmitted through the mutually reinforcing practices of oral recitation, memorization, and written recording.

This characterization has direct implications for determining the epistemic function of tajwīd. The Qurʾān’s nature as recited and audible divine speech indicates that its transmission concerns not only the preservation of its semantic content or written form, but also its verbal, phonetic, and recitational realization. The function of tajwīd becomes evident at this point: the discipline takes the phonetic and articulatory features of Qurʾānic speech as its object and aims to ensure that its letters are articulated in accordance with their proper points of articulation, qualities, and relevant rules of recitation (al-Dānī 2000, pp. 68–69; Ibn al-Jazarī 2001, pp. 59–65, 75–78). Any examination of tajwīd as a scientific discipline must therefore begin with the nature of its subject matter, namely Qurʾānic speech as recited and transmitted according to determinate norms of pronunciation and performance.

This conceptual foundation makes it possible to examine tajwīd in terms of its subject matter, principles, and problems, together with its aim and method as complementary analytical criteria. The following sections apply these criteria to the internal structure of tajwīd in order to determine in what sense it may be regarded as a codified and systematic discipline within the Islamic intellectual tradition.

5.1. The Subject Matter of Tajwīd (Mawḍūʿ)

In examining whether tajwīd can be treated as a scientific discipline within the Avicennian analytical framework established above, the first criterion to be considered is its subject matter (al-mawḍūʿ). In Avicenna’s framework, the subject matter of a science is not merely a general topic, but a determinate domain whose states and essential accidents are investigated under a specific aspect. For this reason, the subject matter of tajwīd cannot be identified simply by naming the entity with which it is concerned. Rather, it must be determined by identifying both the entity investigated by tajwīd and the specific aspect under which that entity is examined. The definitions of tajwīd found in the sources provide an appropriate starting point for this determination, since they consistently place letters (ḥurūf) at the center of the discipline.

One definition states:

فَتَجْوِيدُ   الْقُرْآنِ   هُوَ   إِعْطَاءُ   الْحُرُوفِ   حُقُوقَهَا   وَتَرْتِيبُهَا   مَرَاتِبَهَا،   وَرَدُّ   الْحَرْفِ   مِنْ   حُرُوفِ   الْمُعْجَمِ   إِلَى   مَخْرَجِهِ   وَأَصْلِهِ،   وَإِلْحَاقُهُ   بِنَظِيرِهِ   وَشَكْلِهِ،   وَإِشْبَاعُ   لَفْظِهِ،   وَتَمْكِينُ   النُّطْقِ   بِهِ   عَلَى   حَالِ   صِيغَتِهِ   وَهَيْئَتِهِ،   مِنْ   غَيْرِ   إِسْرَافٍ   وَلَا   تَعَسُّفٍ   وَلَا   إِفْرَاطٍ   وَلَا   تَكَلُّفٍ

“The tajwīd of the Qurʾān consists in giving the letters their due rights and assigning them their proper ranks, returning each letter of the alphabet to its point of articulation and origin, joining it to its counterpart and similar form, giving full realization to its pronunciation, and articulating it firmly in accordance with its form and configuration, without excess, strain, exaggeration, or affectation”.

(al-Dānī 2000, pp. 68–69)

A closely related formulation appears in Ibn al-Jazarī, who describes tajwīd as “the ornament of recitation and the adornment of reading” and defines it through giving letters their due rights, returning them to their points of articulation and origins, and realizing their pronunciation without excess, strain, exaggeration, or affectation (Ibn al-Jazarī 2001, pp. 59–60). The same definitional tradition is later transmitted by al-Suyūṭī, who introduces it with the expression qāla al-qurrāʾ (“the reciters said”) (al-Suyūṭī 1967, vol. 1, pp. 259–60).

Another definition presents tajwīd as a habitual faculty:

التَّجْوِيدُ   مَلَكَةٌ   يُقْتَدَرُ   بِهَا   عَلَى   إِعْطَاءِ   كُلِّ   حَرْفٍ   حَقَّهُ   وَمُسْتَحَقَّهُ

“Tajwīd is a habitual faculty (malaka) through which one becomes capable of giving each letter its due right and what it requires”.

(Birgivī n.d., p. 1)

A further definition reads:

التَّجْوِيدُ   تَحْسِينُ   أَلْفَاظِهِ   بِإِخْرَاجِ   الْحُرُوفِ   مِنْ   مَخَارِجِهَا   وَإِعْطَاءِ   حُقُوقِهَا   مِنْ   صِفَاتِهَا   وَمَا   يَتَرَتَّبُ   عَلَى   مُفْرَدَاتِهَا   وَمُرَكَّبَاتِهَا

“Tajwīd is the refinement of its utterances by producing the letters from their points of articulation, giving them the rights arising from their attributes, and observing what follows from their occurrence in isolation and in combination”.

(Şaʿbān Efendi n.d., p. 9)

Although these definitions differ in wording and emphasis, they converge on a shared conceptual ground. In each case, the predicates through which tajwīd is defined ultimately concern letters (ḥurūf). Letters are given their due rights, assigned their proper ranks, returned to their origins and points of articulation, realized according to their attributes, or refined through correct vocal performance. At a preliminary level, therefore, the subject matter of tajwīd may be identified as letters. This conclusion is also stated explicitly in the description of the subject matter of tajwīd as the letters of the alphabet and of the discipline as an inquiry into their states (Karakılıç 2013, p. 20).

In Avicennian terms, however, identifying letters as the subject matter is not sufficient. It is also necessary to determine the specific aspect under which tajwīd investigates them. Tajwīd does not examine letters in every possible respect or treat them merely as abstract linguistic units. Rather, it examines the letters of the Qurʾān insofar as they are articulated in recitation. This qualification identifies the specific aspect under which Qurʾānic letters constitute the subject matter of tajwīd. The properties investigated by the discipline accordingly include the points of articulation (makhārij), phonetic attributes (ṣifāt), contextual sound interactions, and recitational properties of letters insofar as these determine their correct or incorrect realization within Qurʾānic recitation. Tajwīd considers the states and properties that arise both when letters are pronounced individually and when they occur in combination. In this sense, points of articulation, phonetic attributes, sound interactions, and related conditions of pronunciation may be understood as the states or essential accidents examined in relation to tajwīd’s subject matter. Tajwīd thus investigates letters as components of Qurʾānic speech that is recited, transmitted, and preserved according to determinate norms of pronunciation and performance.

This determination also clarifies the distinction between tajwīd and qirāʾāt. The Qurʾān and qirāʾāt are distinguished in the Qurʾānic sciences literature as two distinct realities: the Qurʾān is the revelation sent down to Muḥammad for exposition and inimitability, whereas qirāʾāt consist of variations in the expressions of that revelation, whether in the letters themselves or in modes of realization such as lightening and gemination (al-Zarkashī 1984, vol. 1, p. 318). The science of qirāʾāt therefore investigates these transmitted variants and their attribution to their respective authorities (Karaçam 1981, p. 241). By contrast, tajwīd concerns how Qurʾānic letters are articulated in correct recitation. Knowledge of transmitted recitational variants and of the authorities to whom they are attributed does not, by itself, constitute proficiency in recitational performance. Such proficiency requires the acquisition of a stable habitual faculty (malaka) through which letters are realized in accordance with their proper points of articulation, phonetic attributes, and transmitted modes of performance (Birgivī n.d., p. 1).

These considerations indicate that tajwīd possesses a distinguishable subject matter within the Avicennian analytical framework. Its subject matter may be formulated as the letters of the Qurʾān under the aspect of their correct recitational realization. Its distinctive analytical orientation lies in examining the phonetic, articulatory, and performance-related properties of those letters insofar as they contribute to the accurate transmission and preservation of Qurʾānic speech in its oral form. Tajwīd may therefore be treated as a codified and systematic discipline with respect to its subject matter. The next stage of the inquiry is to examine the foundational principles (mabādiʾ) upon which its rules and problems depend.

5.2. The Principles of Tajwīd (Mabādiʾ)

The second criterion in evaluating the disciplinary structure of tajwīd is its foundational principles (mabādiʾ). As explained above, in Avicenna’s conception of science, principles are the foundational premises from which a science proceeds and which are accepted at the beginning of its study (Avicenna 2013, p. 112). Accordingly, the principles of tajwīd should not be identified with its individual rules, but with the more fundamental premises that render those rules intelligible and necessary.

Taşköprülüzāde’s discussion of ʿilm makhārij al-ḥurūf is instructive in clarifying the epistemic structure of these principles. He identifies the subject matter of this science as the Arabic letters with respect to their points of articulation and attributes and states that its principles are partly self-evident (badīhī) and partly inductive (istiqrāʾī) (Taşköprülüzāde n.d., vol. 1, pp. 141–42). On the basis of this distinction, the principles relevant to tajwīd may be analytically divided into two groups. Some may be regarded as self-evident: recitation consists of articulated letters, and letters are realized through distinguishable points of articulation and phonetic attributes. Incorrect articulation may therefore distort the verbal form of the recited text and the proper realization of its letters. Other principles may be regarded as inductive: the identification and classification of particular points of articulation, attributes, and context-dependent sound interactions rely on the systematic observation, comparison, and discrimination of Arabic pronunciation and established recitational practice (cf. al-ʿUmānī 2006, pp. 73–75).

Alongside these self-evident and inductive principles, tajwīd also rests on a normative principle grounded in transmission.3 As established above, the Qurʾān is not merely an abstract content consisting of meaning alone, but divine speech articulated in Arabic, recited, heard, and transmitted. Tajwīd therefore proceeds from the premise that not only the semantic content and written form of the Qurʾān, but also the verbal and recitational performance through which it was transmitted must be preserved. This normative premise is not established as one of tajwīd’s internal problems; rather, the discipline derives its practical necessity from it. Ibn al-Jazarī expresses this principle in his didactic poem:

• وَالْأَخْذُ   بِالتَّجْوِيدِ   حَتْمٌ   لَازِمُ
• مَنْ   لَمْ   يُجَوِّدِ   الْقُرْآنَ   آثِمُ
• لِأَنَّهُ   بِهِ   الْإِلَهُ   أَنْزَلَا
• وَهَكَذَا مِنْهُ إِلَيْنَا وَصَلَا

“Adherence to tajwīd is a binding obligation; Whoever does not recite the Qurʾān with tajwīd is sinful. For in this manner God revealed it, And in this manner it has reached us from Him” (Ibn al-Jazarī 2006, p. 17, vv. 27–28).

The premise underlying this statement is clear: tajwīd is necessary because the Qurʾān was revealed and transmitted in a determinate recitational form. Tajwīd therefore does not merely aim at phonetic embellishment or aesthetic refinement; it regulates the articulation and performance through which the transmitted recitational form of the Qurʾān is maintained (al-Dānī 2000, pp. 68–69; Ibn al-Jazarī 2001, pp. 59–65, 75–78).

The foundational principles of tajwīd may therefore be described as composite in character. They are partly self-evident, insofar as recitation necessarily presupposes articulated letters and distinguishable phonetic forms; partly inductive, insofar as the properties of correct articulation are identified and classified through linguistic and recitational observation; and partly transmitted and normative, insofar as they rest on the obligation to preserve the Qurʾān in the recitational form in which it was revealed and received. This composite foundation indicates that tajwīd is not a purely demonstrative and theoretical science, but a codified normative discipline grounded in linguistic self-evidence, phonetic induction, and authoritative transmission. The following section examines how these principles are articulated at the level of tajwīd’s problems (masāʾil).

5.3. The Problems of Tajwīd (Masāʾil)

The third criterion to be considered is the problems or issues (masāʾil) of tajwīd. The problems of a science are the questions and propositions examined within that discipline on the basis of its subject matter and principles. In the case of tajwīd, these questions concern the rules by which Qurʾānic letters and words are correctly articulated, combined, prolonged, paused upon, and protected from error in recitation. The masāʾil of tajwīd should therefore be identified not in abstract theoretical debates, but in the concrete topics through which the discipline regulates correct Qurʾānic recitation.

Ibn al-Jazarī’s al-Muqaddimah al-Jazariyyah provides a particularly clear textual basis for identifying the masāʾil of tajwīd. At the beginning of the poem, he states that the reciter must know the points of articulation of the letters (makhārij al-ḥurūf), their attributes (ṣifāt al-ḥurūf), the principles of pausing and resumption (al-waqf wa-l-ibtidāʾ), and matters related to the written form of the muṣḥaf before undertaking recitation (Ibn al-Jazarī 2006, p. 1). The poem then proceeds through a sequence of specific topics: the articulation points of the letters (makhārij al-ḥurūf), the attributes of the letters (ṣifāt al-ḥurūf), the obligation and proper meaning of tajwīd, warnings against common errors in pronunciation, the rules of rāʾ, the rulings concerning lām and the divine name (lafẓ al-jalālah), the distinction between ḍād and ẓāʾ, the rulings of nūn and mīm, nūn sākinah and tanwīn, madd, waqf and ibtidāʾ, maqṭūʿ and mawṣūl, the written forms of tāʾ, hamzat al-waṣl, and rules related to stopping at the ends of words (Ibn al-Jazarī 2006, pp. 1–11). This organization shows that tajwīd is not a loose collection of recitational habits, but a discipline structured around a determinate set of problems.

These problems may be grouped into four interrelated categories. The first concerns the individual realization of letters. This includes the investigation of makhārij and ṣifāt, together with related properties such as hams, jahr, shiddah, rikhwah, istiʿlāʾ, istifāl, qalqala, tafkhīm, and tarqīq. These issues determine the phonetic identity of each letter and prevent confusion between letters whose articulation or attributes are close to one another. In Ibn al-Jazarī’s arrangement, this category occupies a foundational position: the poem begins with the articulation points of the letters and then proceeds to their attributes before treating the more complex rules of recitational interaction. This order is significant, since the rules governing combinations, elongations, pauses, and errors presuppose the prior identification of letters as distinct phonetic units.

The second category concerns the behavior of letters in combination. Qurʾānic recitation is not composed of isolated sounds, but of connected verbal units in which letters affect one another. For this reason, tajwīd examines rules such as iẓhār, idghām, ikhfāʾ, iqlāb, and the rulings of nūn sākinah, tanwīn, and mīm sākinah. These rules determine how a letter is to be realized when it occurs before or after another sound. The problem at stake is therefore not merely the identity of a letter in isolation, but its correct realization within a recitational sequence. This category shows that tajwīd examines not only the intrinsic properties of letters, but also their relational behavior within connected recitation.

The third category concerns duration, continuity, and interruption. Rules of madd and qaṣr determine when and to what extent a sound is to be prolonged, whereas waqf, ibtidāʾ, waṣl, and saktah regulate how recitation is paused, resumed, or continued. These issues have both phonetic and semantic relevance. An inappropriate pause may obscure syntactic structure or distort the intended meaning, while proper pausing and resumption help preserve the intelligibility of the recited discourse. The inclusion of waqf, ibtidāʾ, maqṭūʿ, mawṣūl, and related orthographic matters in Ibn al-Jazarī’s poem demonstrates that tajwīd is concerned not only with sound production, but also with the conditions under which recitation remains coherent and meaningful.

The fourth category concerns the prevention and correction of error (laḥn). Since tajwīd aims to preserve the received verbal and recitational form of the Qurʾān, its problems necessarily include criteria for distinguishing correct from incorrect performance. Such errors may involve the misarticulation of a letter, the loss of a required attribute, the confusion of similar sounds, improper elongation, or pausing in a way that disrupts the verbal or semantic structure of the recitation. In this respect, the masāʾil of tajwīd function as criteria of evaluation and correction, not merely as descriptions of phonetic phenomena.

This structure also clarifies the relation between tajwīd and the wider traditions of qirāʾāt, rasm, and Qurʾānic recitation. The issues treated in tajwīd did not emerge in isolation. Early literature on Qurʾānic recitation already included discussions of transmitted readings, the written form of the muṣḥaf, maqṭūʿ and mawṣūl, and pausing and resumption (Sezgin 1991, vol. 1, pp. 25–29). Tajwīd systematizes one specific dimension of this wider field: the correct oral realization of the Qurʾān through regulated articulation and recitational performance.

Accordingly, the masāʾil of tajwīd may be described as concrete applications of its foundational principles to its subject matter. They take the form of determinate propositions and rulings: this letter is articulated from this point; this attribute belongs to this letter; this sound is assimilated, concealed, or made clear in this context; this elongation is necessary, permitted, or prohibited; this pause is appropriate or inappropriate in this position. Such propositions are descriptive insofar as they identify phonetic and recitational features, but they are also normative insofar as they prescribe the correct form of Qurʾānic recitation.

On this basis, tajwīd satisfies the Avicennian criterion of possessing identifiable masāʾil. Its problems are not random practical details, but systematically organized determinations through which the discipline connects its subject matter with its foundational principles. They demonstrate that tajwīd is a codified and rule-governed discipline whose internal structure is directed toward preserving the Qurʾān’s received verbal and recitational form.

5.4. The Aim of Tajwīd (Gharaḍ)

Having identified the subject matter, principles, and issues of tajwīd, it is also necessary to examine the aim toward which these elements are directed as a supplementary analytical criterion that clarifies the disciplinary identity of tajwīd; for the coherence of a discipline becomes apparent through the common aim served by its constituent topics. In the case of tajwīd, this aim may be determined through the common function performed by the different issues examined in the preceding section. This common function will be identified by considering together Ibn al-Jazarī’s reason for composing al-Tamhīd, his definition of tajwīd, his explanation of tartīl, and his classification of laḥn.

In the introduction to his work, he observes that some reciters of his time had neglected tajwīd and thereby introduced distortions into the recitation of the Qurʾānic wording. He states that he composed the work to explain the foundations of tajwīd, bring together the matters needed by reciters, and benefit both students and scholars. Indeed, the organization of the work around such subjects as the meanings of tajwīd, taḥqīq, and tartīl; the modes of recitation; the categories of laḥn; the articulation points of the letters; and pausing and resumption shows how this purpose of composition shaped the structure of the work (Ibn al-Jazarī 2001, pp. 51–53).

Ibn al-Jazarī’s definition of tajwīd gives this aim a clear disciplinary formulation. Tajwīd consists in regulating and beautifying recitation, giving the letters their proper rights, assigning them their appropriate ranks, returning each letter to its articulation point and original form, and realizing the wording in accordance with its proper structure. All of this must be accomplished without excess, strain, or artificiality (Ibn al-Jazarī 2001, pp. 59–60). The beauty intended here is not vocal ornamentation based on the reciter’s personal preference. Rather, it arises from the measured and accurate realization of the phonetic identities of the Qurʾānic letters and their transmitted modes of performance. The aim of tajwīd is therefore not merely to produce a pleasing sound but to preserve the phonetic structure of the Qurʾānic wording.

This aim becomes still more evident in Ibn al-Jazarī’s explanations of tartīl and taḥqīq. He interprets the command to recite the Qurʾān with tartīl as requiring the articulation of the letters in accordance with the rules of tajwīd and knowledge of the appropriate places of pause. In the reports he cites, tartīl means reciting without merging the letters into one another, articulating each letter distinctly, and rendering the recitation intelligible. Taḥqīq, by contrast, entails training the tongue, giving the letters their proper rights, distinguishing sounds from one another, and performing the recitation with care. The decisive criterion is therefore not simply whether the recitation is rapid or slow, but whether the letters and words are realized in accordance with their structures and transmitted modes of performance (Ibn al-Jazarī 2001, pp. 60–65).

The aim of tajwīd also has a semantic dimension. Ibn al-Jazarī states that the proper realization of language and wording assists the reciter in reflecting on the meanings of the Qurʾān, understanding its purposes, drawing lessons from its verses, and comprehending its guidance. Sound recitation also contributes to a clearer understanding of the Qurʾān’s commands, prohibitions, exhortations, warnings, promises, and threats (Ibn al-Jazarī 2001, pp. 57–58). Phonetic accuracy therefore serves not only the correctness of performance but also the intelligibility of the recited text.

This semantic function does not, however, make tajwīd a discipline of exegesis or one that directly investigates meaning. Its immediate subject matter is the oral performance of the Qurʾānic wording. Its relationship to meaning is established through the preservation of word structures and syntactic relations during recitation, as well as through the organization of the recitational flow into meaningful units. Failure to realize letters in accordance with their articulation points and phonetic attributes, or the confusion of similar letters, may in some cases alter the structure and meaning of a word. Incorrect pausing and resumption may likewise obscure syntactic relations and distort the intended meaning. Tajwīd thus contributes to preserving the integrity between wording and meaning by regulating the accurate oral realization of the wording.

The aim of the discipline may also be clarified negatively through the concept of laḥn. Ibn al-Jazarī defines laḥn as a departure from sound recitation and linguistic usage and divides it into manifest and subtle error. Manifest error (laḥn jalī) comprises mistakes that produce an evident alteration in the structure, grammatical inflection, or meaning of a word. Subtle error (laḥn khafī) refers to finer deviations that usually do not affect meaning but violate the rights and context-dependent properties of the letters, the prescribed degrees of elongation, nasalization, emphatic and non-emphatic articulation, or other features of performance. For example, a manifest error may occur in Q 1:7 if anʿamta is incorrectly pronounced anʿamtu, since the change in the final vowel alters the grammatical subject and consequently the meaning. As an example of subtle error, al-Saʿīdī notes, in his discussion of bismillāh al-raḥmān al-raḥīm, that the bāʾ preceding the sīn should be pronounced lightly, without excessive pressure at its point of articulation or exaggeration in its pronunciation (al-Saʿīdī 1985, p. 261). Such errors may not be recognized by ordinary reciters but can be identified by specialists in qirāʾāt and tajwīd (Ibn al-Jazarī 2001, pp. 75–78). This classification shows that tajwīd not only describes phonetic phenomena but also establishes normative criteria for distinguishing correct from incorrect performance.

The aim of tajwīd may therefore be defined as protecting Qurʾānic recitation from manifest and subtle error, giving the letters their proper rights and context-dependent properties, realizing them through their correct articulation points and phonetic attributes, and preserving the integrity between wording and meaning in oral performance. These considerations show that the issues of tajwīd are not isolated phonetic details but systematically organized rules directed toward the common aim of preserving sound recitation. Tajwīd is thus neither merely an aesthetic art concerned with beautifying the voice nor a theoretical field that describes the production of sounds. Rather, it is a normative and practical discipline grounded in transmitted authority, regulating Qurʾānic recitation, establishing the criteria of sound performance, and seeking to correct erroneous recitation. The following section examines the methods employed in realizing this aim.

5.5. The Method of Tajwīd (Manhaj)

Having identified the aim of tajwīd, it is necessary to examine the methodological processes through which that aim is realized. Here, method, like aim, is treated not as an independent element added to the constitutive components of a science, but as a supplementary analytical criterion that explains how tajwīd investigates its subject matter, organizes its rules, and regulates their application. Within this framework, the section examines whether tajwīd possesses a systematic methodology appropriate to its transmitted, normative, and performance-centered character by considering the relationship between theoretical systematization and practical instruction and correction.

Descriptive, comparative, and classificatory activities are prominent within the theoretical dimension of tajwīd. The articulation points and phonetic attributes of the letters, their relations to one another, and the phonetic phenomena arising in connected recitation have been examined and organized into specific categories. Ibn al-Jazarī’s following verse concerning the number of articulation points indicates that this classification also involved processes of examination and selection:

مَخَارِجُ   الْحُرُوفِ   سَبْعَةَ   عَشَرْ

عَلَى   الَّذِي   يَخْتَارُهُ   مَنِ   اخْتَبَرْ

“The articulation points of the letters are seventeen, according to the view chosen by one who has examined and tested the matter”.

(Ibn al-Jazarī 2006, p. 1)

The expression man ikhtabara indicates that the classification of articulation points did not consist merely in repeating transmitted classifications; it also involved examining sounds, distinguishing their places of production, and selecting among different arrangements. In this respect, the verse provides textual evidence that transmitted knowledge was processed through description, comparison, and classificatory judgment.

The organization of particular data concerning articulation points and phonetic attributes into general categories according to their similarities and differences suggests that this activity possessed a certain inductive character. The induction involved here, however, was not intended to produce a new standard of pronunciation independently of transmitted recitation, but to explain the phonetic features of the existing performance, determine the relations among them, and transform them into systematic knowledge.

The structure of classical tajwīd works likewise reflects this theoretical method. The definition and differentiation of such concepts as tajwīd, taḥqīq, and tartīl; the classification of errors in pronunciation; and the organization of articulation points, phonetic attributes, and various sound phenomena under specific rules demonstrate that tajwīd rendered the phenomena within its field of inquiry comparable and teachable (Ibn al-Jazarī 2001, pp. 59–65, 75–78). Transmitted performance thus did not remain merely a practice maintained through actual recitation, but became a codified field of knowledge possessing its own concepts and rules. In this respect, the theoretical method of tajwīd may be characterized as a descriptive, comparative, classificatory, and, to a certain extent, inductive systematization operating within the normative limits established by transmission.

The methodology of tajwīd, however, is not confined to theoretical description and classification. Al-ʿUmānī distinguishes between knowledge acquired “by analogy and differentiation” (qiyāsan wa-tamyīzan) and knowledge received “by hearing and imitation” (samāʿan wa-taqlīdan), regarding knowledge based on understanding and discrimination as more reliable than knowledge based solely on imitation (al-ʿUmānī 2006, pp. 73–75; al-Ḥamad 2008, pp. 184, 202). This distinction reveals the relationship between the theoretical and practical dimensions of tajwīd. In instruction, written explanation identifies the rule and its conceptual basis, while oral demonstration shows how that rule is realized through sound and the articulatory organs. The student then reproduces the model and presents the recitation to the teacher for supervision and correction.

Ibn al-Jazarī’s account of taḥqīq further clarifies this practice-centered structure. According to him, taḥqīq requires training the tongue, refining utterance, giving each letter its proper right, distinguishing letters from one another, and preventing distinct sounds from being confused. At the same time, recitation must not become excessive, strained, or artificial (Ibn al-Jazarī 2001, pp. 61–65). This explanation shows that taḥqīq is not merely a slow or careful mode of recitation; it is a practical process involving articulatory training, the differentiation of sounds, and the establishment of correct performance through repetition.

The definition of tajwīd as a habitual competence points to the same methodological structure. Such competence refers not merely to the occurrence of correct pronunciation in an isolated instance, but to an established capacity that enables it to be performed regularly and consistently in different recitational contexts. Ibn al-Jazarī’s statement in al-Muqaddimah that performance in accordance with tajwīd is acquired through training the jaw and oral organs indicates that this competence is attained not through conceptual knowledge alone, but through sustained exercise (Ibn al-Jazarī 2006, p. 4). The aim of tajwīd instruction is therefore not merely to provide the student with knowledge of articulation points, phonetic attributes, and other rules, but to cultivate a stable performative competence through which this knowledge can be realized in actual recitation. Demonstration, imitation, repetition, and exercise constitute the principal practical processes through which theoretical knowledge becomes habitual competence.

Correction and supervision are also integral to this practical methodology. Ibn al-Jazarī’s distinction between manifest and subtle error indicates that not every error in pronunciation can be independently recognized by the reciter. Manifest error may produce an evident alteration in wording, grammatical inflection, or meaning, whereas subtle error includes finer deviations in such features of performance as elongation, emphatic articulation, and concealment. According to Ibn al-Jazarī, subtle errors are not easily recognized by ordinary reciters and can generally be identified only by those proficient in tajwīd and qirāʾāt (Ibn al-Jazarī 2001, pp. 75–78). The methodological implication of this classification is that recitation must be heard by a qualified person, the deviation must be identified, the correct performance must be demonstrated, and the corrected form must be established through repetition. Correction is therefore not an ancillary activity added at the end of instruction, but one of the principal methodological processes through which the rules of tajwīd are applied and verified in actual performance.

The theoretical and practical dimensions examined thus far converge upon a common criterion of correctness: authoritative transmission. Transmission is not a third methodological procedure operating at the same level as these two dimensions. Rather, it constitutes the epistemic and normative foundation of the correct performance that theoretical systematization organizes and practical instruction seeks to instill in the student. Ibn al-Jazarī’s following verse, which states that the Qurʾān was revealed in a particular manner and reached the community in that same manner, demonstrates that correct performance depends upon a transmitted model:

لِأَنَّهُ   بِهِ   الْإِلَهُ   أَنْزَلَا

وَهَكَذَا   مِنْهُ   إِلَيْنَا   وَصَلَا

“For God revealed it in this manner, and in this manner it has reached us from Him”.

(Ibn al-Jazarī 2006, p. 3)

Transmission thus both determines the normative boundaries of theoretical systematization and provides the model of correct performance toward which practical instruction is directed.

In conclusion, the method of tajwīd consists of two dimensions united around a transmission-based criterion of correctness. The first is the transformation of transmitted performance into systematic and teachable knowledge through description, comparison, classification, and a certain degree of induction. The second is the realization of this knowledge in actual recitation through samāʿ, ʿarḍ, mushāfaha, repetition, exercise, and correction. These two dimensions are not independent of one another. Theoretical systematization provides the conceptual framework of practice, while performance under the supervision of a teacher ensures that the rules are realized in oral performance and tested against the standard established through transmission. Tajwīd can therefore be reduced neither to an autonomous theoretical investigation of the Arabic sound system nor to a practical skill devoid of rule-governed knowledge. It is a codified discipline in which transmitted phonetic and performative features are systematically explained, preserved, and taught through supervised practice. The disciplinary structure of tajwīd has thus been presented as an integrated whole in terms of its subject matter, principles, problems, aim, and method. On this basis, the following section evaluates its position and significance within the classification of the Islamic sciences.

5.6. The Position and Significance of Tajwīd Within the Classification of the Islamic Sciences

Having established the disciplinary structure of tajwīd, it is necessary to consider its position and significance within the classification of the Islamic sciences. In this context, al-Ghazālī’s classification of the Qurʾānic sciences may be considered alongside Taşköprülüzāde’s approach, which organizes disciplines according to their subject matters, principles, and aims.

Al-Ghazālī classifies the sciences related to the Qurʾān in terms of the relationship between the ẓāhir and the bāṭin. Within this framework, the ẓāhir concerns the Qurʾān’s sound, wording, and linguistic form, whereas the bāṭin denotes its meanings, truths, and mysteries. Al-Ghazālī lists the sciences concerned with the outward dimension of the Qurʾān as makhārij al-ḥurūf, lughat al-Qurʾān, iʿrāb al-Qurʾān, ʿilm al-qirāʾāt, and ẓāhirī tafsīr. Within this sequence, knowledge of the articulation points of the letters, which constitutes one of the central domains of tajwīd, occupies the initial level and performs a preparatory function in relation to the other sciences concerned with the verbal form of the Qurʾān (al-Ghazālī 1986, pp. 35–38).

According to Abū Zayd, this classification was shaped not only by the distinction between religious and worldly sciences but also by the Ashʿarite conception of divine speech as an essential attribute of God rather than one of His acts. Within this structure, language is positioned as an instrument that extends from the level of sound to that of signification and discloses the external form of the text. Abū Zayd critically examines al-Ghazālī’s classification in relation both to the sharp opposition established between this world and the hereafter and to the Ashʿarite conception of divine speech. Within the hierarchy he analyzes, a science acquires greater value as it approaches the inner dimension of the Qurʾān, whereas it is assigned a lower position as it approaches the Qurʾān’s verbal and external form (Abū Zayd 2014, pp. 246–49). Abū Zayd’s critique indicates that tajwīd’s position within this hierarchy should be distinguished from its disciplinary significance. Although al-Ghazālī’s classification makes visible tajwīd’s direct relationship with the verbal and phonetic form of the Qurʾān, the proximity of a discipline to verbal form does not necessarily diminish its disciplinary importance. The meaning of the Qurʾān is not transmitted independently of its recited and heard wording; rather, its wording constitutes the principal medium through which meaning reaches the audience during recitation. The preservation of pronunciation and recitational performance therefore serves not only to maintain the external form of the text but also to sustain the integrity of wording and meaning.

Taşköprülüzāde’s classification offers a complementary perspective in this respect. He treats ʿilm makhārij al-ḥurūf, one of the central phonetic components of tajwīd, as a distinct field among the sciences concerned with linguistic units and identifies its subject matter, principles, relationship with other sciences, aim, and the established competence it cultivates. The treatment of the science of articulation points under a separate heading indicates that the central phonetic domain of tajwīd was recognized in the classical tradition not merely as a practical skill but as a systematic field of knowledge possessing a determinate subject matter and an ordered mode of inquiry. Since Taşköprülüzāde does not address tajwīd in the entirety of its issues but instead considers its foundational domain concerning articulation points and phonetic attributes, his classification should be regarded as historical evidence supporting the conclusions reached in this article.

Taken together, these considerations indicate that tajwīd occupies a dual position within the Islamic sciences: structurally, it is a distinct discipline; functionally, it is an auxiliary science. Its auxiliary status does not reflect a disciplinary deficiency but rather the specific service it renders to the correct recitation, transmission, and preservation of the Qurʾān. From the perspective adopted in this study, its placement at the initial level of al-Ghazālī’s sequence should not be read as evidence of lesser importance. Rather, tajwīd provides the foundational competence required for the correct oral realization of the Qurʾān’s verbal form and serves to preserve the integrity of wording and meaning. The significance of tajwīd within the Islamic sciences derives from this foundational and indispensable function.

6. Conclusions

This study has assessed the disciplinary status of tajwīd by applying Avicenna’s criteria of subject matter (mawḍūʿ), principles (mabādiʾ), and problems (masāʾil) in an analogical and structural manner. The analysis indicates that tajwīd exhibits the formal organization of a codified discipline. Its subject matter is the letters of the Qurʾān, insofar as they are realized in recitation; its principles combine self-evident premises, inductive phonetic determinations, and normative authority grounded in transmission; and its problems constitute an ordered body of rules governing articulation, phonetic interaction, elongation, pausing and resumption, and recitational error.

The examination of aim and method further clarifies the discipline’s distinctive character. Tajwīd seeks to preserve the transmitted verbal and recitational form of the Qurʾān, protect recitation from error, and sustain the integrity of wording and meaning in oral performance. Description, comparison, classification, and a limited form of induction render transmitted performance systematic and teachable, while samāʿ, ʿarḍ, mushāfaha, repetition, exercise, and correction enable this knowledge to be realized and verified in actual recitation. Authoritative transmission (riwāyah) provides the normative criterion connecting these theoretical and practical dimensions.

The principal contribution of this study is therefore not to claim that tajwīd was previously unrecognized as an ʿilm, nor to reconstruct a historical dependence on Avicennian epistemology. Rather, it offers a systematic account of tajwīd’s disciplinary architecture by bringing its subject matter, foundational principles, problems, aim, method, and classificatory position into a single analytical framework. In doing so, the study clarifies how a Qurʾānic discipline grounded in authoritative transmission and embodied performance can nevertheless possess a coherent internal organization comparable, at the structural and functional level, to the elements used in classical Islamic theories of science. This also contributes to broader discussions of the classification of the Islamic sciences by drawing attention to forms of disciplined knowledge whose epistemic legitimacy rests not only on demonstration, but also on transmission, normativity, and supervised practice.

Within the classification of the Islamic sciences, tajwīd is structurally distinct and functionally auxiliary. Its auxiliary status does not imply disciplinary inferiority; rather, it reflects the specific service it renders to the correct recitation, transmission, and preservation of the Qurʾān. Tajwīd may therefore be characterized as a codified, normative, transmission-grounded, and practice-centered Qurʾānic discipline. This conclusion neither equates tajwīd with Avicenna’s theoretical and demonstrative sciences nor claims direct historical dependence on Avicennian epistemology. It shows instead that a discipline grounded in authoritative transmission and embodied performance can possess a determinate subject matter, foundational principles, organized problems, a coherent aim, and systematic methods within the broader classical conception of ʿilm.