Abstract
This essay conducts a comparative analysis of the literary use of kabbalistic motives in the two seemingly very distant authors: Jacques Derrida and Philip K. Dick. It shows how the Lurianic “fable,” conceived in the Derridean terms as a literary récit, shapes their understanding of time as an open-ended game whose outcome remains unknown. It thus wants to prove that Derrida’s essay Given Time, based on the little prose by Charles Baudelaire called “The False Coin,” and the penultimate book by Philip K. Dick, The Divine Invasion, tell the same story which is also a meta-story: a speculative meditation on the nature of temporality and story-telling, which involves the messianic “theology of risk.” In both cases we deal with what the essay terms as an “inverted Gnosticism”: while the traditional Gnostic doctrine envisions time as the factor of the world’s decay and imperfection, Derrida and Dick, inspired by the Lurianic kabbalah, see it as the chance of the world to verify itself, that is, to make itself real and true in the process of “unprejudiced becoming.”
He created his world with three books: the Book, the book, and the story.Stephane Mosès (Mosès 1987, p. 79: free translation from Sefer Yetsirah)
Then, and still today, I have been seeking a new concept of time and a new experience of history opened up by Christianity as an eschatology—itself the fruit and consequence of the apocalypse of the first pre-Christian century […] Carl Schmitt thinks apocalyptically, but from above, from the powers that be; I think from the bottom up. Common to us both is the experience of time and history as deferral, as a time of reprieve [als Frist, als Galgenfrist].Jacob Taubes (Taubes 2013, pp. 12–13; emphasis added)
This essay is about the Lurianic Fable and its specific form of messianicity that can only make sense within a narrative framework: a story which evolves in time and which not only takes time, but also—in fact, predominantly—gives time. This is why I call it, after Derrida, a fable and not a system. When considered as a system, the Lurianic kabbalah does not differ from the Neoplatonic conceptions where time figures as nothing but a distorted image of eternity. While it makes room for the time of the world, this allowance is only temporary, limited by a strict eschatological scenario: time has its time and must end with the grand finale of tikkun olam which will redeem both the world and God, in the end eternally united and ultimately saved from time. But when considered as a fable, a literary narrative, the Lurianic kabbalah presents time differently. Here, time is not just a delay of the loop closing the Alpha and the Omega: a temporary disturbance within the Neoplatonic “everlasting circle” in which all proceeds sub species aeternis. In the story, time becomes autonomous, liberated from the eschatological–historiosophic cycle of the system: it has a power to create and to destroy, to push things either to universal ruin or to universal redemption. What the system fixes in the rigid imaginary of the redemptive Omega point, the fable-story leaves open-ended: the end of history is not preestablished; it is totally up to time.
This is how, according to Jacques Derrida, the literary messianicity differs from the theologico-philosophical one. When Derrida states after Paul Valery, that “in the beginning was the fable” (Derrida 2009, p. 190), he places us in a very different universe than the one envisaged by historiosophic systems assuring us that, in the end, all shall be well: the time will dutifully do its expected historical work and bring us back into the folds of eternity. The literary–narrative universe liberates time as a free agent which cannot be a priori harnessed to do any job: the messianic prospect is not self-assured. But the liberation of time—no longer forced to return the world to eternity—opens new, not less messianic, prospects which now focus not on the fulfilment of the Omega-point, but on this world, happening and developing in time. Paraphrasing Spinoza, the time must be given time—and credence—to show what it can do: on its own, released from the historiosophic harness.
It is this new liberated concept of time which Jacob Taubes seeks in order to describe the alternative occidental eschatology, differing from the apocalyptic one: the time as deferral and reprieve, Galgenfrist (see the second epigraph). While it defers the grand finale indefinitely, it also offers a reprieve—relief from the pressures of rigidly following the eschatological plan. Thanks to this, the world is given time to show what it can evolve into by its own immanent power, emancipated from the role it was supposed to play in the cosmic theo-drama of the world’s redemptive return to eternity. It is thus the gift of time that allows the world to be something more than just an episode in the theo-dramatic “holy history.” Gershom Scholem refers to this something extra, by talking about a “liberated creation” whose freedom consists precisely in the fact that it has been given time as Galgenfrist and can use it freely for its own purposes—be it a universal ruin or universal redemption.1 This is why he terms this more risky, non-assured and non-scripted-in-advance form of the innerworldly messianism with the term he also applied to the Lurianic kabbalah: die Theologie des Hasards, “the theology of risk.”2
My essay is divided in two parts. In the first, I will focus on Derrida’s reading of Charles Baudelaire’s little story about the counterfeit money as the paradigmatic narrative of literary messianicity whose main hero is le temps donné, “given time”: a modern version of the Lurianic Fable. In the second, perhaps a bit surprisingly, I will argue that the best illustration of the Derridean literary kabbalah is the penultimate novel of Philip K. Dick called Divine Invasion. This juxtaposition is not as surreal as it might appear prima facie, for it is precisely the Lurianic Fable which offers what would seem a hopelessly missing link: both Derrida and Dick used it quite consciously in their writings.3 The Divine Invasion is the most peculiar experimental type of narrative fusing SF with theological tractate, in which late Dick comes very close to late Derrida’s position which I will call here an “inverted Gnosis.” While the traditional Gnosticism, with which Lurianic kabbalah was often associated as a fine specimen of “Jewish Gnosis,”4 presents the world negatively as an incomplete being lacking proper essence, the inverted Gnosis takes as a positive point of departure: yes, the world is unfinished, a mere appearance perhaps, but it is also given time to show what it can do and turn the fabula mundi [the fable of the world] into reality. It is not doomed from the start, as in the timeless Gnostic verdict sub specie eaternis, but it constitutes an ontological challenge: something that can still turn into a true being, provided that we, the participants of the creaturely spectacle, do not withdraw from it in disgust, but—to paraphrase Taubes—invest in it spiritually instead.5
In what follows I do not apply the term “Gnosticism” in a strict technical manner as referring to a particular doctrine (Mandean, Manichean, Basilidian, Valentinian, etc.), but rather to what Hans Blumenberg described as a more general “Gnostic syndrome”: a sense of metaphysical instability of the world as hovering between being and nothingness and in that sense ontologically insecure. According to Blumenberg, “gnosticism had made acute the problem of the quality of the world for man” (Blumenberg 1983, p. 142), by radically questioning the solidity of the cosmic order and rejecting its ontological “petrification” (Blumenberg 1983, p. 131). As he states in The Work on Myth, “gnosticism is the expression of a universal and great disappointment with the cosmos, the systematic form of its revaluation” (Blumenberg 1985, p. 357). For the Gnostics, therefore, the world is not a paragon of the real: it lacks true being and as such is closer to illusion into which we are seduced by the deceptive powers of the demiurge, the “false God” who stole the secret of being from the true Godhead, never wishing to engage in the dubious project of creating the world. The Gnostic dualism is thus based on the rigid distinction between the full being called pleroma and the false spectacle of the world as a mere shadow of the highest real: “the Gnostic pleroma [fullness] draws all the predicates of existence to itself and allows the world to be degraded to a mere appearance of nothing, to the demiurge’s deception” (Blumenberg 1983, p. 148).
The term “degradation” is crucial here for it points to the negative tendency within the “Gnostic syndrome,” which consists in interpreting the insecure status of the world as the sign of its inherent nothingness, leading to the final verdict that it does not really exist. Gnosis, after all, means “knowledge” which insists on solving the riddle of the cosmic being by a negative solution and, as such, is strictly opposed to faith, pistis, as an attitude which does not call for an immediate answer, but can tolerate uncertainty. For Blumenberg, “the competition between the pretension to knowledge and the acknowledgement of faith,” that is, between “the Gnostic cognitive drive” that “claims to see all questions already resolved here” (Blumenberg 1983, p. 293) and the pistic suspension of decision as to the ultimate realness of the worldly being, determines the fate of the whole religious tradition of the West. While “gnosticism has its root in the obstinate insistence on further questioning” (Blumenberg 1983, p. 299), which leads to the ultimate gnosis as the negative verdict on the deceptive status of the world, faith resists this temptation to know and maintains itself in the state of indeterminacy, delegating the knowledge to the future eschatological revealment of all things hidden in the grand apocalyptic finale.
But we can also imagine a yet another position, going beyond the Gnostic negative knowledge of this world as a mere deception, on the one hand, and the faithful expectation of all mysteries being finally revealed in the apocalyptic Day of Judgement (or, in a more secularised historiosophic variant, at the End of History), on the other. This is what I call here an “inverted Gnosticism”: a position which accepts the Gnostic dia-gnosis of the world as ontologically unstable and insecure, but refuses to reach the ultimate gnosis as the negative solution to the world’s indeterminacy. Akin to faith, yet not necessarily in its apocalyptic expectation of a delayed knowledge of all things, the “inverted Gnosticism” does not stake on the cognitive certainty, either achievable here and now or in the eschatological future. It rather faithfully invests in the world as it is—indeterminate, hovering between being and nothing, forming an open question which cannot be answered by a simple “yes” or “no.” While the traditional Gnostics interpret the world’s unsettled status as the sign of its self-evident negativity, the “inverted” ones—in my essay represented by Derrida and Dick—perceive it as not-yet-decided, that is, as a high stake in the metaphysical game which lasts as long as there is a “gift of time.”
The Gnostic dualism can take an open form, as in the ancient Gnostic systems which opposed the precreational pleroma to the demiurge as the “false God,” but it can also be present in the monotheistic formation where Godhead itself is perceived as being in the state of an inner conflict between the urge to create, on the one hand, and the desire to remain in its pleromatic eternal perfection, on the other.6 According to Scholem, it is this unresolved conflict that defines the Lurianic kabbalah and its vision of the created world as an open stake—a scenario that can resolve this conflict either by reconciling God with the worldly reality or by negating the catastrophe of creation and returning God to the pleromatic perfection. Both ways of interpreting the Lurianic tikkun olam are valid and Scholem himself is visibly hesitant as to which messianic finale to choose, hovering between the restorative version, which involves the return of the divine sparks scattered within the material shards back to the original Godhead from before the creation of the world, on the one hand, and the proleptic–constructive redemption of all things, in which the conflict between the sparks and the shards will be resolved for the sake of the world as capable of welcoming the divine, on the other (Scholem 1991, p. 4). There is, however, yet another variant of the Lurianic narrative which we can find in some forms of what David Biale called “secular kabbalah”, which elaborated on Luria’s theosophy in a philosophical manner, that is, taking its main tenets but developing them in the detachment from the original Jewish religious lore.7 Jacques Derrida’s concept of messianicity—a deliberately abstracted form of messianism without a Messiah—is the good example of Biale’s “secular kabbalah”: while it adopts the Lurianic scenario of the beginning in the act of the divine contraction (tsimtsum), it feels free to reject the closure in the final stage of tikkun olam, which, in the original Lurianic narrative, forms the religious clue of the whole “holy history” that must end in the redemptive finale. In Derrida’s secular reading of the Lurianic narrative, the world has a value on its own and it should not be made subservient in the story of the divine resolution of God’s internal conflict. Since the world was made possible by tsimtsum, the withdrawal of God’s “absolute presence,” it can exist only insofar as it is maintained by the play of différance which plays itself in the ambivalent mixture of sparks and shards, the true and false being. Following the logic of the original tsimtsum or what Derrida calls le trait de retrait, “the trace of retreat,” différance simultaneously differs, that is, allows to emerge something other than God (as in Scholem’s account on tsimtsum), and defers, that is, postpones the end of the game by using the “gift of time,” hopefully ad infinitum. Already in the 70s, long before Derrida began to reveal openly the Jewish sources of inspiration for his thought, he already defines différance in thinly disguised theological terms as the strategy of keeping God in the state of tsimtsum-retreat and the world in the state of “playful” indeterminacy. While différance represents the procosmic principle of worldliness/saeculum, it holds in check what Blumenberg defined as the acosmic “Gnostic cognitive drive” which craves the advent of the Kingdom of true being or “absolute presence” where all things will be finally determined and known face to face:
In all his writings, Derrida mentioned the name “Luria” only once, in Dissemination, but this lack of reference is not untypical for philosophical “secular kabbalists” (another good example could be Adorno’s Negative Dialectics where the “Jewish theologoumenon” of tsimtsum, although constitutive for the main argument, gets an equally rare mention).8 The motif of retrait du Dieu, the divine withdrawal from the position of absolute sovereignty, will accompany Derrida from his early discovery of différance to his later, more openly theological reflections on “God without omnipotence,” as, for instance, in this discussion with Yvonne Sherwood, Kevin Hart and John D. Caputo:Not only is there no kingdom of différance, but différance instigates the subversion of every kingdom. Which makes it obviously threatening and infallibly dreaded by everything within us that desires a kingdom, the past or future presence of a kingdom.(Derrida 1982, p. 22)
It is precisely in this context that we should understand Derrida’s essay on the “gift of time” as unconditionally forgiving or hospitably granting the world the right to be, despite its non-absoluteness and indeterminacy. The context is the Lurianic narrative turned into a philosophical “secular kabbalah,” but with an inverted Gnostic spin. While, in the gnosticising reading of Luria’s theosophy, tsimtsum is often considered as a cosmic error which needs to be undone by the redemptive restoration of the divine pleroma of Ein Sof,9 in Derrida’s procosmic rendering of the story, tsimtsum is the highest unconditional gift—both of being and time—that the world takes and uses in order to create itself further on its own. Messianicity of choice consists in either rejecting or accepting this gift.I have tried again and again to dissociate two concepts that are usually indissociable: unconditionality and sovereignty. I would like to think about something unconditional in forgiving, in grace, in forgiveness, in the gift, in hospitality—an unconditionality that wouldn’t be a sign of power, a sign of sovereignty […] One has to dissociate God’s sovereignty from God, from the very idea of God. We would have God without sovereignty, without omnipotence.(Sherwood and Hart 2005, p. 42)
1. Derrida Reads Baudelaire or a Metaphysics of Counterfeit Being
In Derrida’s Given Time I: Counterfeit Money,10 the eponymous “given time” has all the characteristics of the Taubesian Galgenfrist, the time of reprieve. By working within the folds of being as différance, time differs and defers the apocalyptic finale of the worldly reality, by postponing the end, hopefully for ever. Temporality, disseminated as a new currency thrown into universal circulation, turns out to be a game-changer: it is “a new concept of time,” decisive for the modern metaphysical mutation which, unlike all atemporal metaphysics before, takes time seriously. Here Derrida, giving his own version of the Schellingian–Rosenzweigian erzählende Philosophie [narrative philosophy], openly plays with the Lurianic myth, by calling it simply a fable, le récit.11 Just as Adorno before him, Derrida too sees the kabbalistic “heretical theology” as the unique lore of the modern transformation of metaphysics, which for the first time insisted on “the infinite relevance of the intra-mundane, and thus the historical, to transcendence, and to any possible conception of transcendence” (Adorno 2001, p. 100).
Given Time I can also be read as an alternative earlier version of Derrda’s essay from 1994, Foi et savoir—Fides et ratio—where the latter, knowledge, appears as gnosis opposed to pistis: ratio contra fides. It is in Faith and Knowledge where Derrida begins to play quite openly with the Lurianic notion of tsimtsum as the “God in withdrawal” or the “deserted re-treat [re-trait desertique]” which “opens the way to everything from which it withdraws,” that is, the worldly being which is then left to its own devices (Derrida 2002a, p. 55). Here, the divine origin is conceived as a place-maker whose role is only to give way: withdraw and make something else possible instead. As withdrawn from anything knowable into the night of the desert, this origin—le Dieu en retrait, here also associated with the Platonic khora as the dark place of all things—can only be a subject of faith which Derrida calls la foi originaire.
In Given Time I, knowledge too emerges as the main adversary of the “originary faith”: a wrong kind of knowing that arrests the flow of time and demands to verify the gift of temporality here and now, with the Hegelian “immediacy of the pistol shot” (Hegel 1977, p. 16). But the gift of time, Derrida argues, can only show what it can do in time—so the only way to accept it is through faith: a credit of trust given to time as a new currency in circulation. A blank check to be—perhaps, for this is a risky gamble—redeemed in the future.
The new concept of the “given time,” therefore, demands not a new philosophical system, which would inquire into its timeless essence, but a new story in which it can be told in time: to acknowledge time as time means to give up the pursuit of the eternal eidos of time and put faith in it as a flow of accidents, a pure contingency. Both gift and time—and the gift of time a fortiori—require a different medium in which they could come out undistorted by the philosophical search for eternal truths. For where there is a true gift, there also must be a story, the only form capable to grasp the “tukhe of the gift” (Derrida 1994, p. 125): “The gift would be that which does not obey the principle of reason: It is, it ought to be, it owes itself to be without reason, without wherefore, and without foundation” (Derrida 1994, p. 156; emphasis added). Time, therefore, can only be given. Time, contingent and non-essential, can only emerge without foundation as the pure tukhe, an incident: the tukhe of the gift is here also the gift of the tukhe.
As already mentioned, this is not the first time when Derrida experiments with the Lurianic motives, most of all tsimtsum: the idea of the divine contraction in which God abdicates on his absolutist prerogatives—eternity, self-sufficiency, immutability—and gives himself over to the adventure of time and thus exteriorises into the temporal world of “unprejudiced becoming” (Jonas 1996, p. 134) whose outcome cannot be told in advance. The disappearance of foundation, understood as the most radical act of tsimtsum rendering all transcendental Absolutes—“the good-father-capital-sun”—inoperative, appears in Derrida’s thought as early as “Plato’s Pharmacy”:
The disappearance of foundation means that there is no “transcendental Thing”: there are merely “partial objects” (Derrida 1994, p. 53), but then, without the contrast, also no longer “partial,” i.e., fragmentary, incomplete, broken, deficient. There is no longer God the Father to guard the cosmic totality and control the catachrestic originless “dissemination without return” or “the without-return of the gift” (Derrida 1994, p. 48): by the act of tsimtsum the divine origin empties itself completely into the story of the world. Here, “in the beginning” does not constitute a constant point of authenticating reference, but is rather like an incipit of a narrative which, once begun, can take various aleatory paths. If, in the philosophical system, the origin has a power of the founding axiom comprising Alpha and Omega, in the Lurianic Fable, the way Derrida conceives it, it is just the beginning of a long winding story whose outcome remains unknown.The disappearance of the good-father-capital-sun is thus the precondition of discourse […] The disappearance of truth as presence, the withdrawal of the present origin of presence, is the condition of all (manifestation of) truth. Nontruth is the truth. Nonpresence is presence. Différance, the disappearance of any originary presence, is at once the condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility of truth.(Derrida 1981, pp. 165–66; emphasis added)
The leitmotif of the Given Time I is the concept of counterfeit money which lends itself to endless speculation—simultaneously economical and metaphysical: the “chrematistic vertigo” (Derrida 1994, p. 159) of speculative economy meets here the Scholemian “theology of risk.” The eponymous la fausse monnaie derives from the short story composed by Charles Baudelaire, “The False Coin,” in which a rich Parisian bourgeois makes a practical joke and offers a beggar a large sum of false coins:
The “literary secret” which initiates the story and keeps it alive, potentially for ever, is that the beggar may never know if the coin given to him was genuine or false: there is no way to tell in advance whether his life will be either redeemed by wealth or brought to total ruin. There is no way to know, right here and now: only the time can tell, actualising one of all possible deductions of all possible hypotheses. The primary situation of the ambiguous gift disarms the claims of knowledge, for it generates a truly aleatory narrative in which all can turn for the better and all can turn for the worse. Derrida, however, goes one step further than Baudelaire whose porte parole telling the story is, in the end, quite furious with his friend’s “criminal enjoyment.” Derrida joyfully endorses the whole intrigue. For it is this very secret eluding any knowledge which Derrida associates with the gift proper. Only counterfeit money can truly be given in its “pure phenomenality”: pure, because it is liberated from the metaphysical inquisition (or what Blumenberg calls the “Gnostic cognitive drive”), always trying to test the currency of worldly appearances and verify its ontological validity in constant reference to the donor who is supposed to know the true value of the gift. Once the donor agency recedes in the act of tsimtsum, the metaphysical desire to test the currency of appearances right now and thus verify its ontological status cannot ever be fulfilled. Gift does not have a pre-established set value controlled by the donor as the Master Signifier, the Lacanian le sujet supposé de savoir [the subject supposed to know] or the “father-capital-sun-God.” It has a value only insofar it is accepted and made valuable by the donee-beggar who can dispose of it freely: even reject it, if he believes it is valueless. There is no sure knowledge of the value of the gift: it is dependent solely on the faith/credit the donee puts in it. Seeing is believing.My friend’s offering was much larger than mine and I said to him, “You are right; except for the pleasure of being astonished, there is no greater than to cause surprise.”—“That was the false coin,” he replied tranquilly, as if to justify his prodigality. But my poor brain, always scouting out imaginary byways (what a tiresome head nature foisted on me), suddenly arrived at the idea that my friend’s conduct was excusable only if meant to create an event in the life of this poor devil, maybe even to understand the diverse consequences, baleful or other, that could result from a false coin in a beggar’s hand. Might it not multiply into genuine coins? could it not get him thrown in prison? An inn-keeper, for instance, or a baker, could have him arrested as counterfeiter or passer of false coins. Just as likely, the false coin might prove, for a petty speculator, the germ of a few days’ wealth. So my fantasy went on, lending wings to my friend’s wit and deducing all the possibilities of all possible hypotheses.(Baudelaire 2009, p. 57)
For Derrida, the speculative secret of the counterfeit money is a perfect act of Seinlassen or what Scholem calls “liberated creation” (Scholem 1976, p. 283): letting-be, as well as letting-go of the realm of appearances, liberated from the phallic ground-criterion of the unscathed, genuine, authentic, absolute, original, omniscient. Fake or not—who cares—this is the world of the living-on and its “likely tale” (Plato’s eikos mythos) in which life itself—life given to the beggar, which he will be able to prolong thanks to these dubious means—proves to be the only truth, the only reality: “Nontruth is the truth. Nonpresence is presence” (Derrida 1981, p. 165). The beggar does not know the true value of the currency and this non-knowledge, coupled with his faith that he was given the real money, changes the very status of la fausse monnaie. Even if the donor—the rich bourgeois on his Parisian tour of fun—is, in the Lacanian formulation, “supposed to know” that the money is false, it is no longer simply false for the beggar. Once the donor disappears from the picture, all that is left is the Schrödinger Box of the worldly immanence where appearances simply cannot be told to be either true or false. This, for Derrida, constitutes the rule of undecidability: some things just cannot be known, not because we lack means to reveal their secret. They cannot be known by their very nature—and being is one of them.
But to say that all that counts is the currency of which we do not know and will never know where it came from—that all we have is the weight of “pure phenomenality” which, taken in absolute terms, might be as heavy as the thing in itself, but also as light as the foam of a mere appearance—this means, precisely, to give up forever on the absolutist perspective, and in this sense, realise the implications of the Lurianic tsimtsum to the end. More than that, it means to give up on the absolutist perspective as abandoned and dissolved by this very absolutist perspective, the “donor agency” which itself retreated, abdicated, and thus made itself no longer valid, erased from the gamble of the world. It means to deactivate the whole traditional metaphysical dualism of genuine and false beings with one stroke of the gift: we will never know whether it brought, as Baudelaire calls it, “universal ruin or universal progress—for the name little matters” (Derrida 1994, p. 131; emphasis added). Precisely, the name does not matter anymore, because the decision does not depend on our knowledge. If counterfeit money is all that counts, then there is no need to stick to the negative terminology of the Gnostic Fall which envisages finite being as a cosmic ruin—or, on the other hand, to claim, after Thomas Aquinas, that being is essentially true, good and beautiful. Now we truly enter the realm of the new metaphysics of indeterminacy and its “chrematistic vertigo,” which presents itself consciously as a speculative narrative, based not on axioms but stories which are more like the Kafkan rumours/hearsays deriving from a source that disappeared: “In the beginning was not… the Logos, but the Fable,” says Derrida by paraphrasing Valery (Derrida 2009, p. 190).12 Or, in other words, in the beginning was a “desire to create an event”: to make something happen in the form of a new dynamic category of reality that would escape the simple opposition between being and non-being—
The metaphor of counterfeit money navigates a subtle middle way between the traditional theological condemnation of the material world as nothing but “dust and ashes,” or, in the ruinous idiom of another modernist, T. S. Eliot, a “heap of broken articles,” on the one hand, and the modern, militantly anti-theological praise of liberated materialism on the other. In Derrida’s account, matter is indeed what matters, for it is all we have, but it also needs a special investment which requires a vestigial form of theological framework: the Lurianic Fable which created the material event of the world and the subjective element capable of investing, putting faith and credit in the phenomenal reality. Derrida’s position, therefore, could be described as the reversal of the apocalyptic standpoint of Jacob Taubes who, in Theology of Paul, famously declared: “I have no spiritual investment in the world as it is” (Taubes 2003, p. 103). Derrida urges us precisely to make this investment without which matter turns into insignificant nothing—and speculate on the counterfeit money, the fictional event created by the “literary experiment” as the only possible currency of the worldly existence. Here, materialism and theology are not at the loggerheads. On the contrary, the Derridean paraphrase of the Lurianic Fable does not “bring myth to an end” (Blumenberg 1985, pp. 6–7), but validates it even further as the only narrative which allows one to take the finite world seriously. In the Hegelian fashion, Derrida maintains that there is only a speculation; i.e., our stakes, investments, and credits which we put in motion and in this manner “convert nothing into something” (Hegel 1977, p. 19): there is not other, metaphysically more solid, creatio ex nihilo. The Gnostics may thus be right in claiming that the ontological status of the world is shaky and uncertain, but they are wrong by announcing it in the form of gnosis-knowledge, formulated here and now and taking no heed of the aleatory element of time. As long as we live in the Schrödinger Box of the worldly reality, there is no way to tell the difference between true being and mere appearance. All we can do is put faith—la foi originaire which cannot rely on any further argument—in the material realness of this world. If matter matters, it is because we believe in it.It [story] integrates the possible, aleatory, incalculable consequences of counterfeit money. We were saying that one can give only in the measure of the incalculable; therefore, only an hypothesis of counterfeit money would make the gift possible […] This opposition between true and counterfeit money loses here all its pertinence—which would be one of the things demonstrated by this literary experiment […] The desire to “create an event” by the offering of counterfeit money can only excuse, can only render a criminal enjoyment excusable if there were desire to create an event. In itself, this desire would be good, it would be the desire to give that on which to live, very simply, to give more to live [donner plus à vivre], indeed to give life…(Derrida 1994, p. 157; emphasis added)13
But this undecidability is only the beginning of the story, for we can nonetheless make this difference, by investing in the counterfeit money and treat it as fully real—and then it will begin to become real and the Fable will turn itself true. A few years later, in Without Alibi, Derrida will develop this new logic of veri-fiction/verification as the “history of a becoming-true of illusion”: “It is indeed a matter of a history of truth. A matter, more precisely, of a trial of verification, qua the history of a becoming-true of illusion. A history which is made qua the story one tells to oneself and others: history is made while the story is being told; it is made in being related” (Derrida 2002b, pp. 32–33; emphasis added). Verification, therefore, should be understood here literally: not as a process of testing the validity of the factual realisation of the ideal, but as a process of “making-it-true” or veri-fiction, fiction turning real, illusion playing itself into reality (il-ludere). The truth, therefore, is in the very process of becoming—of making-itself-true—which, while in the process, is still a gamble, a stake in the game called playing the world. The Derridean pra-affirmation, therefore—“Yes to being”—is performative per se: it creates what it affirms, thus constituting an act which Werner Hamacher called with a particularly apt neologism: afformation (Hamacher 1994). The investment in the counterfeit money is precisely such a performance of both affirmation and formation. And it chimes perfectly well with Paul Valery’s description of our attitude towards mythic fables, “We can love only what we create”, and, perhaps more importantly, vice versa: we can create only what we love. The commitment, faith and credit are not external to what they affirm: they are directly involved in its making. The Derridean metaphysics of veri-fiction—of the world as a fable-récit which “aspires to become true”—helps thus to explain the enigmatic formulation in Litterature au secret: “In the beginning was forgiveness. For nothing. For meaning (to say) nothing” (Derrida 2008, p. 157). To forgive the world and acknowledge its aspiration to become true is the same as to forgive the Giver who created a playful event just for the sake of it, without having anything particular to say or even anything specific in mind (voulouir-dire rien). It means to forgive the world for being nothing and then, patiently and mercifully, convert it into something—by the power of “spiritual investment” and “original faith.”
2. Philip K. Dick’s Kabbalah
Strange but true: the penultimate creation of Philip K. Dick, The Divine Invasion, reads like a perfect literary confirmation of Derrida’s inverted Gnosticism, where the Gnostic diagnosis according to which the world is a counterfeit spectacle (dokos) leads to the reverse conclusion than in traditional Gnosticism, instead of giving a good reason for the acosmic withdrawal from the fake theatrum mundi, it rather reinforces the will of its inhabitants to spiritually invest in the world and make it real. Composed in 1980 as the second part of the VALIS trilogy, it has only one thing in common with Derrida—the reference to what I call here the “Lurianic Fable”—but it is more than enough: the logic of veri-fiction, of the world becoming true due to our investment in it, to our engagement in the aleatory story evolving in time, emerges also here as Dick’s final mature answer to his earlier Gnostic doubts. In his own variant of the “overcoming of Gnosticism,” Dick replaces his former negative gnosis with a hopeful pistis: a faith in the world in the making, a credit in playful fantasy becoming science, fiction becoming real.
How much did Dick know about kabbalah? In his Exegesis—the scrupulous autoanalysis which he began to write after his “revelation” on 2 March 1974 (hence notified as 2-3-74) when the cosmic intelligence called Valis showed to him the Gnostic nature of reality—the kabbalistic references appear almost from the beginning and intensify around 1980, that is, the time when he composes The Divine Invasion. The sources are unknown, apart from few brief mentions of Martin Buber’s I and Thou, the dialogist manifesto based on the highly spiritualised version of the Lurianic kabbalah.14 Yet, the main tenets of the kabbalistic teaching sink deep into Dick’s vivid theosophic imagination. On 2 March 1980, he thus scribbles a note in capital letters, “THE ULTRA HIDDEN (CRYPTIC) DOCTRINE: THE SECRET MEANING OF THE GREAT SYSTEMS OF THEOSOPHY OF THE WORLD, OPENLY REVEALED FOR THE FIRST TIME” and then adds: “So to explain 2-3-74 I draw on The Tibetan Book of the Dead, Orphism, Gnosticism, Neoplatonism, Buddhism, esoteric Christianity and the Kabbala; my explanation sources are the highest—which is good and which makes sense” (Dick 2012, [82:30]). And although Dick’s theosophic system is syncretic, kabbalah occupies in it a quite special place. While his 2-3-74 revelation could indeed be interpreted as traditionally Gnostic, disclosing the illusory fabric of the worldly reality that needs to be negated in the ascent to the true light of Valis,15 his work on the kabbalah leads him away from the Gnostic dualism into an affirmation of dialectical monotheism in which the deity, very much in the Lurianic vein, is in conflict with itself: it simultaneously wills the cosmic reality and negates it as imperfect, makes it happen and unmakes it at the same time. While exploring the kabbalistic dialectics, Dick begins to distance himself from his earlier “acosmic” phase, by calling it an “illness”:
As with everything in The Exegesis, this dense and idiosyncratic fragment was not destined for being published: it was meant as a living record of the mystical stream of consciousness, constantly gripping with the wonder of the 2-3-74 experience which Dick tried to capture with the help of all the theosophic traditions of the world. It is an esoteric self-help, but also a fulcrum of his latest novels which—similarly to Dostoyevsky’s novels of ideas—flesh out his theosophic intuitions. What is important in the above note is that Valis, formerly recognised as the purely spiritual entity opposed to the material world, now metamorphoses into YHWH, the God of Jewish monotheism, against the Gnostic tradition, from Marcion to Schopenhauer, which saw in the deity of the Old Testament the evil demiurge miscreating the world out of his wicked caprice. By trying to absorb the monotheistic wisdom, which Dick associates as much with the “OT” as with the kabbalah, he sheds his former “acosmism” and assumes a new procosmic attitude as a cure to his previous dualistic illness. Thus, while Gnosticism perceives the creation of the world as an unnecessary and unwished for act as harming the pleromatic Godhead which should have remained intact in its uncreated fullness, Dick now insists on God’s non-contingent “relationship to the universe”: God had to create and is bound with its creation in a necessary manner. Such God, no longer antithetical to being, becomes a warrant of a true reality which is now also a share of the created world, unlike in Dick’s primary vision: “YHWH’s prime role: to keep reality from becoming dreamlike. For me in 3-74 it became dreamlike” (Dick 2012, [48:935]). What once seemed like a liberating Gnostic revelation—the self-annihilating, ungrounded, bottomless dream of a badly simulated world—now turns into a source of anxiety: “This is the ultimate fear: falling through the universe. This is what YHWH protects us against. It shows absolute trust of me by him to let me see how it really is” (Dick 2012, [48:935]). If, as he states a moment later, “all my acosmic novels deal with the topic of VR [Virtual Reality]: putting your foot through reality—e.g., through the ground, the ground sinking away, as if you’ve stepped into an old septic tank” (Dick 2012, [48:974]), The Divine Invasion, Dick’s first truly procosmic novel, is a testimony of awakening to the “true reality” not out of but in this world.… due to the final note about monotheism and what monotheism really means. Illusion and evil are the same. Reality and God are the same. Thus to truly see would be to see (this follows logically) what I saw: Valis and the plasmate—i.e., God, since he could not have a merely contingent relationship to reality. (I had really done my homework: Spinoza and Buber and Heidegger and the OT.) […] When illusion (dokos) departs evil departs and YHWH remains; or, when evil departs, YHWH-as-reality remains. And this is what I saw. YHWH did not break into reality (it was not a theophany in that sense); reality reverted to its actual form for me: that of the one God—there is no other […] But YHWH is here, not remotely there (far off: transcendent) […] For the first time I see that if monotheism is the case, it would have to be so. By understanding monotheism I find that I understand Valis—how Valis must be the case. What is not Valis (YHWH) is dokos [...]. My acosmism (shown in my books) was the illness besetting all of us to some degree; viz: cut off from the one true reality: YHWH. I had the illness so severely that the only cure was the radical necessity of waking up and experiencing God—as I did in 3-74: as I had been formerly more sick than others I wound up cured: but they linger on half-sick.(Dick 2012, [49:1052])
For Dick, it is essential to realise that such a dialectical solution—of finding true reality within the worldly condition of ambivalence—as the cure to the illness can only come after the illness, that is, the Gnostic dualism: Gnosticism must be consciously overcome, otherwise we remain without a clue, “half-sick.” But once overcome, the typically Gnostic difference between dokos as mere appearance and real being travels into the immanence itself: no longer indicating the rift between the transcendence and the fake world, it rather points to the traces of the divine presence on earth—or what the Lurianic kabbalah calls the sparks and the sum of which is personified by Shekhina, the female aspect of the deity dwelling in the material world in a dispersed form.16 For Dick, those divine sparks will be imagined as “the plasmate”—simultaneously an energy, information and the Spinozist natura naturans, the living naturing nature that gives shape to the material reality:
The voice communicating with Dick had many names, but the one named Shekhina sends a quite specific message: the world is not, as he previously thought, a one Big Iron Prison (in his notes BIP) miscreated by a “Blind God,” but the true reality resulting from the process of conversion in which the divine information of the plasmate-Torah actualises itself in the cosmic being: nothing becomes a tangible reality, just as in Hegel’s description of the “magical power” that is able to “convert nothing into something” (Hegel 1977, p. 19). While in his early stages of self-exegesis, Valis was a pure free energy opposed to the mechanistic realm of matter, now it is identified with YHWH who makes information realise itself in the created reality—“YHWH turns info (Torah) into reality. Thus YHWH creates reality out of Torah (info). Without YHWH it (Torah) would remain info” (Dick 2012, [48:927])—which also means that, by remaining info without the informed reality, it would also remain unfulfilled. The world is thus necessary—and this is the lesson Dick draws from the kabbalistic sources:I am sure that the plasmate […] is the living Torah, the informational basis of reality, and my 2-3-74 experience was Kabbalistic […] I mean, one of the few precise elements I have that I can go on is this Kabbalistic Jewish mysticism angle […] I could be in communication with the Shekhina or the Torah itself (the AI voice).(Dick 2012, [49:1043])
For Dick, reality is “used as vehicle—medium—by which to process information.” From this axiom he derives a vision of the “observer-participant universe” (Dick 2012, [49:1072]). Beings of this world, which Dick calls “ontogons,” are not only passive recipients of the information or merely simulated epiphenomena, but can also actively participate in the process of creation, by adding to it singular effects which were not “planned” in the divine ontogeny: “We ontogons are not only systems for processing information but (1) information creates us; and (2) the main processing is a diversification and proliferation. You get more info out of the ontogon than you put in” (Dick 2012, [49:1119]). Thus, while the “info” as the basis of the worldly reality is made solely of types and general archetypes, the very process of their actualisation adds an enriching feedback, by creating individual beings, which Dick sees—once again in agreement with kabbalah and against the Neoplatonic tradition—as an ontological bonus, perhaps even the true goal of creation.17 This, however, also generates a conflict which for Dick constitutes the ongoing irresolvable dilemma of the whole enterprise of being: the tension between the cosmic totality in which God-YHWH wants to express himself, on the one hand, and each and every singular creature which refuses to be reduced to nothing but a part of the whole, on the other:YHWH differs from Brahman in that he is involved in history—human history, what is involved is the evolution of human freedom. And the universe is real: seeing it we are seeing the field (web) in which YHWH operates. Not (as Sankara believes) mere maya. Human history represents successive levels of self-disclosure by YHWH—meaning self-awareness. Human history is the deity waking up […] But the phenomenal world is not illusory; YHWH is its guarantor. He is involved in it or is it (v. Spinoza). Camouflaged in it or as it. He is interwoven in it, not separate from it.(Dick 2012, [49:1057]; emphasis added)
It is precisely this inner conflict of the creating deity that gives the dialectical plot to our world’s tale, as well as to the narrative of The Divine Invasion. It is a novel of theosophic ideas which offers a “solution” to the never-ending drama of the structural whole and the parts refusing to be just parts, that is, demanding a singular role in the process of creation and wishing to be acknowledged as active protagonists in the verifictive becoming of the world: “The whole is not greater than the sum of its parts; no: each and every part (ontogon) is more important than the whole!” (Dick 2012, [49:1132]). Right after the completion of his novel, Dick writes:(Out of this the dialectic which never ends is initiated. This here is the dramatic tragic story which our world can be reduced to; it is our world’s tale.) […] Thus the Godhead is ipso facto divided and pitted against itself; it assumes an antithetical interaction with itself, part (half) of the Godhead works synthetically, to fit everything together harmoniously into an integrated whole (kosmos) and half works to assist and rescue the epiparts subjected to stress, torment and death in the pursuit of the above goal. Hence the Godhead is in infinite crisis. A push-pull binary dialectic is created, and this is exactly what was revealed to me as the basis—not just of reality—but of the Godhead itself.(Dick 2012, [49:1132]; emphasis added)
Once again Dick confirms the weird status of The Divine Invasion as his kabbalistic experiment that simultaneously continues the Gnostic motives, but also shifts them on a dialectical plane with a new concept of monotheism and the one creation as a continuing story whose outcome is still undecided, because it lies in the hands of its “participant-observer” inhabitants, and thus in the future. This future, however, is not teleologically determined; it is staked on a fantasy—on a faith and spiritual investment in the world of the “parts” which, no longer content to be clogs in the cosmic machine, rebel (the Gnostic stage) and then overcome their Gnostic rebellion, by joining the enterprise of becoming—but then only on their own terms.I just now looked over DI [The Divine Invasion]. As I recently realised about VALIS, the dialectic that is the inner life of God—as revealed to Boehme and explicated later by Schelling [both deeply influenced by the Lurianic kabbalah—A. B.-R.]—is presented as the very basis of the book. In VALIS it is expressed dramatically as world-order in which the irrational confronts the “bright” or rational, designated (properly) logos. In DI this same dialectic reappears and this time is stated to be the two sides of God (rather than world order; that is, in DI it is now correctly seen to be within God himself!) […] DI is not so loose a sequel to VALIS as it might seem (by, e.g., the shift from Gnosticism, the present, realism, to Kabbala, the future, fantasy).(Dick 2012, [54:M-8]; emphasis added)
3. Divine Invasion: The World as the Play of Veri-Fiction
The plot of the book is a classic SF mixed with theosophic personifications. Its main protagonist is Herb Asher (in Hebrew: “a blessed one”), who lives as a recluse on a distant planet and becomes chosen by the local deity called Yah, appearing to him in a burning flame. Yah commands Herb to contact his female neighbour Rybys who is pregnant with Yah’s son (a name suggesting a feminine form of Reuven, meaning “behold, a son”). They both are to return to Earth and secure the safe birth of Yah’s son Emmanuel (“God-is-among-us”) and thus inaugurate the process of regaining Yah’s power over the world after he had been expelled into the cosmic exile by his main adversary Belial (“the wicked one”) two millennia before. The plan meets many obstacles, because Belial learns about Yah’s second coming and tries to prevent it, by attempting to kill the child. The son survives many lethal accidents, but emerges out of them badly damaged: he is now an orphan with a deep amnesia, completely ignorant of his origin and destiny. It is only later, in a school for specially gifted children, that Emmanuel encounters Zina (a name related to Hebrew “shine” and Arabic “beauty”), a girl who helps him to recollect his true identity as the son of the creator of the universe and the saviour sent on Earth to deliver it from the dark dominion of Belial. Yet, she also teaches him her own special skill: a magical power to conjure a better world and then turn the fantasy into reality. It is thanks to Zina, who in the final scenes reveals her true name—Shekhina, “God’s-dwelling-on-earth”—that Emmanuel begins to understand the subtlety of messianic logic as the third option beyond simple affirmation of reality, represented by Yah, and the equally simple negation of it, represented by Belial. By fusing his male-Christian aspect of incarnation as the parousiastic Emmanuel with the Jewish-kabbalist female aspect of incarnation as the divine presence in the world, the child-saviour is finally awaken. He–She now knows that the world is neither solid something nor worthless nothing: it is a fictional entity that writes itself into the future and its final outcome, if it ever emerges, is unknown. The world, therefore, can be saved only if treated as a story whose protagonists are vividly engaged in the process of its veri-fiction, the fiction becoming true or what Derrida calls a “history of a becoming-true of illusion” (Derrida 2002b, pp. 32–33).
The main theme of the book is the cosmic battle between the God named Yah—the Yes of emphatic affirmation, as well as YEHI, the word commanding/converting nothing into being—and Belial-Satan as God’s major prosecutor who sees things as they are in their seemingly naked truth. It is a metaphysical drama which reflects the struggle between the two antagonistic principles of being: the holy enthusiasm of a great Yeah versus nihilistic knowledge of the Gnostic No which drags everything back into nothing. Yet, this dualism gets soon complicated by the appearance of a mysterious third party, Zina-Shekhina, who cuts in into the apocalyptic battle of the children of light against the children of darkness with a more dialectical message, less militant and more playful. For, despite their loggerhead conflict, there is one thing which Yah and Belial have in common and which Zina-Shekhinah puts into doubt: the belief in absolute truth that can be stated here and now in a timeless verdict. They just see it in different perspectives—Yah positively, deeply convinced about the purposefulness of the act of creation, and Belial negatively, seeing in creation nothing but failure and botchery. But what they see is the same truth: grey, colourless and disappointing. Yah, as the stubborn defender of creation, defends being in its “gray truth,” assuming that to be is always better than to not be, even if miserable—while Belial attacks it, precisely for the same reason. During the quarrel over the nature of reality with Zina the Enchantress, who shows Emmanuel the soft beauty of her own magical world, he, the second incarnation of Yah on Earth, blurts out:
Belial’s verdict is no different, at least prima facie: he uses exactly the same words about the grey truth as always better than the dream, but invokes them in his battle against the created reality which he perceives as a dream/nightmare from which his followers should awake. When disguising as a helpless goat and tricking Herbert Asher into taking care of him, Belial invades the mind of his human host telepathically as if lending it its inner voice—the “evil tongue” (lashon ha-ra) which William Blake, Dick’s favourite fellow Gnostic, associated with the “state of Satan.” In the state of Satan, the mind is not capable of any faith or trust, only of constant reasoning which turns it into a Blakean all-doubting Idiot Questioner:“Gray truth is better than the dream,” he said. “That, too, is sooth. It is the final truth of all, that truth is better than any lie however blissful. I distrust this world because it is too sweet. Your world is too nice to be real. Your world is a whim.”(Dick 2011, p. 176; emphasis added)
Let us reason, the goat-creature thought to him. This is my view of the world and I will make it your view and the view of everyone. It is the truth. The light that shone originally was a spurious light. That light is going out and the true nature of reality is disclosed in its absence. That light blinded men to the real state of things. It is my job to reveal that real state. Grey truth, the goat-creature continued, is better than what you have imagined. You wanted to wake up. Now you are awake; I show you things as they are, pitilessly; but that is how it should be. How do you suppose I defeated Yahweh in times past? By revealing his creation for what it is, a wretched thing to be despised. This is his defeat, what you see —see through my mind and eyes, my vision of the world: my correct vision.(Dick 2011, p. 248; emphasis added)
Both Yah and Belial, therefore, offer a Gnostic enlightenment based on the ultimate knowledge: a liberation from the dream into a true reality. Their opposition derives not from their position on “grey truth,” but from the reverse perception of what is dream and what is reality. While Yah as the Creator resembles the Gnostic demiurge who made this world and was pleased with it despite all the horrors it contained, Belial is the Gnostic accuser who, following Job, exposes creation as a “wretched thing.” Thus, while Yah-Creator approves the greyness of the necessitarian reality which to him gets more real with every bitter disappointment of its inhabitants (or, to use the term from The Exegesis, the “parts” of the cosmic whole), Belial despises it for exactly the same reason. But when the two male antagonists clash in the struggle for the absolute truth, the female heroine—named differently as Fairy, Diana, Torah, Malkuth, and finally, which was to be expected from the Lurianic allegory from the start, Skekhina—disturbs the dualistic conflict, by opposing simultaneously both. By arguing with Yah-Emmanuel, she wants to dissuade from his desire to bring about The Terrible Day and mitigate his anger (in that sense she may be seen as the personification of the Derridean play of différance the goal of which is also to delay the advent of the absolute truth and presence). She points to the autonomy of the world as evolving independently from either Yah or Belial, just taking its own time as the Taubesian Galgenfrist, a time of respite from the cosmic battle. Assuming the aspect of the Smiling Sophia (according to the Russan sophiologist, Vladimir Solovyov, it is precisely the “smile of Sophia” that keeps the world in existence against the apocalyptic wrath of God), she extolls the beauty of creation, which she presents as the world’s own inner power, independent of the creative one, but also translating and continuing the creative impulse here on earth, in the immanent manner. Even if she presents the world’s beauty as enchanting and seductive, she refuses to see in it an element of Gnostic deception:
There is no deceit in you and there is no deceit in me, but just as you curse, I play. Which of us has found the Way? For two thousand years you have bided your time until you could slip back into Belial’s fortress to overthrow him. I suggest that you find something else to do. Walk with me and we will see flowers. It is better. And the world will prosper as it always has. This is the springtime. It is now that flowers grow, and with me there is dancing also, and the sound of bells. You heard the bells and you know that their beauty is greater than the power of evil. In some ways their beauty is greater than your own power, Yahweh, Lord of Hosts. Do you not agree?(Dick 2011, p. 162; emphasis added)
Let me digress for a moment from the novel to examine Dick’s notion of the play, which closely chimes with the Derridean play of différance and God’s playful “desire to create an event.” This is Dick’s most cherished theosophic invention to which he often returns in the last folders of the Exegesis, written in the two years before his death in 1982. In the entry in which Dick describes the kabbalistic framework of The Divine Invasion, he suggests that it is precisely the play that offers a solution to the dialectical tension tearing the Godhead apart:
Dick derives this “unification in play” from Sufism which sees creation as a playful act of the divine imagination and the cosmos as a continuous dance, with its particles moving to the divine rhythm: “An incredible beauty lies over DI; it is simply wonderful—love and dance and color. I have revealed the beauty of God—ah! And thus: I am of the Sufis!” (Dick 2012, [54:M-11]). And then, enchanted by the new theosophic possibilities, he exclaims: “Could the new attribute of God—revealed to us now—be that he plays, at games? This is a long way from Sinai. Trickster God—like Krishna. Power, wisdom, love, beauty, and now play—playing guessing games. Related to joy: the joy of play!” (Dick 2012, [80:J-106]). But is this really such a “long way from Sinai”? Does not the Derridean play-gamble of différance derive from one of the Sinaitic sources which is the Lurianic kabbalah, as I tried to prove in the first section? The play which Zina-Shekhina offers in The Divine Invasion is quite specific and cannot be easily reduced to a playful trickstery of Krishna: the game she wants to play—and invites us, “ontogons,” to play with her—has a serious stake which is the future of the creation as transcending the grand cosmic machinery into a kingdom of beauty and freedom. Thus, still faithful to his kabbalistic understanding of the innerly conflicted processual God who evolves together with the history of the world, Dick writes:In DI this same dialectic reappears and this time is stated to be the two sides of God (rather than world order; that is, in DI it is now correctly seen to be within God himself!): It is now (in DI) between Emmanuel who is the terrible, destroying “solar heat” warring side—and Zina who is loving, playful, tender, associated with bells and flowers; and what unifies the two at last (by the way, it is she who takes the lead in restoring memory and hence unification; Emmanuel is the side that has forgotten—i.e., is impaired; she has not and is not impaired) is play. She plays, and Emmanuel has a secret desire to play.(Dick 2012, [54:M-8]; emphasis added)
But—now coming back to the novel—Yah has still a lot to learn in his evolution: from law, through love, to play. Although taken by the beauty of the Garden of Palms (Dick’s Californian variant of the Zoharic Garden of Apples), to which Zina gave her merciful enchanting touch, Emmanuel (Yah’s incarnation on earth) still begs to differ and insists on the primary importance of harsh realness as the true gift of the demiurge: “That is the power I have, and it is not the power of enchantment; it is the most precious gift of all: reality” (Dick 2011, p. 173; emphasis added). Yet even then, when he still perceives Zina as a suspect neither-friend-nor-foe, he is willing to enter her magical world and try a kind of synthesis between her magic that spins merciful veils and his hard sense of the Real, which rejects all enchantment. Yah’s adventurous experiment in the dreamy land of Zina anticipates thus the future union or the coming together of the two attributes of the kabbalistic God who, in the beginning of times, underwent a catastrophic split: rahammim and din, mercy and judgement, love for the singular beings and severe glory of the cosmic whole.God is becoming more free and more flexible, evolving from an info-generating and processing machine to a moment (Mt. Sinai) where it can say, “I—(am),” to feeling love (NT and late Judaism), to creating for beauty’s sake, to playing. I see an internal logic in this axis; away from machine intelligence to consciousness—a motion toward freedom—playing is an ultimate expression of freedom and the non-machine.(Dick 2012, [80:J-12]; emphasis added)
However, before that final synthesis—hierosgamos—happens in the finale of the novel, Yah-Emmanuel submits Herb Asher to the test of reality within the happier dreamy world conjured by Zina: he destroys the pleasing phantasm of Linda Fox, his favourite singer, by revealing her true nature as an ordinary human being. Asher is obviously deeply disappointed, but instead of breaking down, he feels awakened and loves her even more. By this, Yah wants to prove to Zina that his creation can still cherish the gift of reality, which cannot be easily done away with by a blissful oblivion. At this stage of their agon, he, the creator of the harsh reality principle, emerges as a winner: for being to be being, it cannot be simply composed of this eerie stuff that the dreams are made of. There must be a difference between the wake and the dream—and it is a wish not fulfilled, a sobering disappointment:
Yet, this is also a secret win for Shekhinah: Yah, gloating in his victory over the magical world of dreams, feels sufficiently confident that his creation is still able to value reality over illusion, and postpones the advent of the apocalypse, which was Zina’s goal from the beginning. For, all she wants is that the world lasts and prospers and it is not possible without “given time”: by letting Yah’s apocalyptic wrath subside, Shekhina-Smiling Sophia buys more time for creation in its open-ended “unprejudiced becoming” (Jonas 1996, p. 134).“Yes, I have lost.” She nodded. “You made her real and he still cares for her. The dream for him is no longer a dream; it is true down to the level of disappointments.”“Which is the stamp of authenticity.” “Yes,” she said. “Congratulations.” Zina extended her hand to Emmanuel and they shook(Dick 2011, p. 203; emphasis added)
But this initial disagreement is also the beginning of their dialectical merger, because, as Dick states in his Exegesis, “Emmanuel has a secret desire to play” (Dick 2012, [54:M-8]). Yah represents reality pure and simple, something better than nothing, even if it constantly disappoints, because “the alternative is das Nichts—which is worse” (Dick 2012, [49:1132]). Zina-The Fairy Queen represents enchantment which can either turn against the frustrating reality and create a separate world of dreams as wishes fulfilled or turn towards reality, by lending it an affirmation, this seemingly “spurious light” (Dick 2011, p. 192) that gives things created a halo, a beautiful shine. The secret cooperation of Yah-Emmanuel and Zina-Schekhina works towards the latter option: a fusion of fiction and truth, Dichtung und Wahrheit, Schein and shine, which will transform the world into something lovable and playful, a common project of universal imagination. Now, all this project needs is time and suspension of knowledge which exposes the world in its supposedly naked “gray truth.” While for Belial, the agent of disenchantment, the Zauberung is nothing but a “spurious light,” that is, yet another deceptive ruse of the demiurge who seduces his victims into accepting the greyness of reality, by painting a fake rainbow halo around it, for Yah gradually fusing with Shekhina, it begins to show a power of affirmation in which the “participant observers” of the world share in the enterprise of being, by taking the experimentum mundi [the experiment of the world] further. What is thus merely a counterfeit trick for Belial, the Mephistophelian Geist der stets verneint,18 is an additional aid for Yah, the spirit of affirmation, who now, thanks to the reunion with Shekhina, understands that this affirmation must take place also within the world which is itself dreaming about what it can yet do.
Yah, the creator, is now willing to consent that he did not create the world as fully planned and finished: “The maker of all things is astonished at the things he has Himself made” (Chesterton 1916, p. xvi). Before, he thought he knew perfectly well what being is about and he felt sure and possessive about his creation; now, he lets himself be surprised by its inner power of becoming in which the sharp antithesis between fiction and truth—or, in the Derridean parlance, the true and false coins—disappears. When harsh reality and dream come together, this difference is replaced by the dialectical process of veri-fiction in which at least some fables can still come true. Again, the crucial factor here is giving time: stepping back, watching in surprise, letting be, giving up on possessive control—in other words, all the aspects of what the Lurianic kabbalah calls tsimstum, the divine withdrawal. Thanks to his innerworldly fusion with Zina-Shekhina, Yah, whose primary intention of revisiting Earth was to destroy it in the apocalyptic fire of punishment for her infidelity and submission to the rule of Belial, “withdraws his wrath” and gives in to the Smiling Sophia: he lets the world be, gives it time.19 Before he was determined, as the merciless God of Judgement, that reality can only be taught and inculcated in the minds of its participants solely in the punitive manner, that his faithful must be punished into being and thus learn to recognise the difference between what is and what is not. Now, however, united with Shekhina as the Queen of Mercy—“Together we form a unity. Separated, we are not whole” (Dick 2011, p. 216)—he gives up on his former black pedagogy and discovers that the inhabitants of the world should rather be persuaded into being: gently prompted to “choose being and life,” precisely as in the biblical plea of u’baharta ba’hayim (Deut. 30:19).
The plan is good, but it is easier said than done. Belial, the perennial adversary, is not yet automatically vanquished by the holy union. Sitting in Herb Asher’s head, now his own Idiot Questioner, Belial-goat represents the eternally destructive “pessimism of evil”:
Before, in conversation with Asher, Emmanuel explains to him the dangerous “power of evil”:This is how the goat-creature sees God’s total artifact, the world that God pronounced as good. It is the pessimism of evil itself. The nature of evil is to see in this fashion, to pronounce this verdict of negation. Thus, he thought, it unmakes creation; it undoes what the Creator has brought into being. This also is a form of unreality, this verdict, this dreary aspect.(Dick 2011, p. 248; emphasis added)
Yet, in Dick’s ingenious retelling of the Lurianic Fable, even the Fall, which endangered the divine existence, by making it susceptible to the entropic “slow slipping away” together with the whole of being, is not purely negative. The world may be fallen—fallen away from the Godhead and its absolute modus essendi, if that ever existed—but it also does quite surprisingly well in its condition of separation: “Strange, he thought. The world evolves even as it falls more and more. There are two distinct movements: the falling, and then, at the same time, the upwardrising work of repair. Antithetical movements, in the form of a dialectic of all creation and the powers contending behind it” (Dick 2011, p. 139; emphasis added). It is, after all, this evolution—the serious play of hope and disappointment, affirmation and negation, being and nothingness, which could have only arisen within the worldly reality of “unprejudiced becoming” (Jonas 1996, p. 134)—that in the end makes possible the redemption announced by the dialectical High Wedding of Emmanuel and Zina or Yahveh and Skekhinah, the Irrascible One and the Forgotten Bride. This hierosgamos restitutes the integrity of the primordial Ein Sof (persistently misspelled by Dick as ‘Ein Soi’—a typically Joycean French–German coinage for absolute asseity: En Soi, An Sich or The One in Itself):The power of evil […] is the ceasing of reality, the ceasing of existence itself. It is the slow slipping away of everything that is, until it becomes, like Linda Fox, a phantasm. That process has begun. It began with the primal fall. Part of the cosmos fell away. The Godhead itself suffered a crisis; can you fathom that, Herb Asher? A crisis in the Ground of Being? What does that convey to you? The possibility of the Godhead ceasing—does it convey that to you?(Dick 2011, p. 146; emphasis added)
It is precisely the forgotten Bride—the scattered sparks of light and beauty within the shards of fallenness—that introduces the tertium into the dualistic battle of the two principles: creation versus decreation, making versus unmaking. Only when uniting with the merciful enchantress and enlisting her powers of benign illusion, Yah can wage a victorious battle against Belial and his negative verdict of “gray truth” and the “pessimism of evil” (which was once a part of Dick’s Gnostic “illness”). For this dream-world, once recognised and accepted as such, that is, il-luded, entered in as a game and gamble, can indeed evolve: gain flesh in the process of veri-fiction or becoming-true, despite Belial’s arid wisdom of nihil novi sub sole—Hand in hand, Emmanuel walked with Zina through the dark woods of Stanley Park. “You are myself,” he said. “You are the Shekhina, the immanent Presence who never left the world.” He thought, The female side of God. Known to the Jews and only to the Jews. When the primordial fall took place, the Godhead split into a transcendent part separated from the world; that was En Soi. But the other part, the female immanent part, remained with the fallen world, remained with Israel […] “That is so,” he said. “Returned to you. I had forgotten that you existed. I only recalled the world.” You the kind side, he thought; the compassionate side. And I the terrible side that arouses fear and trembling. Together we form a unity. Separated, we are not whole; we are not, individually, enough”.(Dick 2011, p. 216)
In the end, therefore, waking up is not about shattering the dream: it is no longer the traditional Gnostic procedure of getting liberated from the snares of erroneous being into the eternal truth of pleromatic stillness of no-being. The liberating wake up call operates within the dream itself and its story-in-a-story-in-a-story mise en abyme, by converting it miraculously from just-a-dream into no-longer-a-dream. This conversion, however, requires a constant vigilance that watches over the “spiritual investment in the world” which has the unique Hegelian “magical power,” i.e., die Zauberkraft, that “converts nothing into something” (Hegel 1977, p. 19), even if this worldly being will always remain imperfect:“The future need not resemble the past,” Herb Asher said.“Nothing changes,” the goat-creature answered.(Dick 2011, p. 248)
In the end, the Forthbringer of Existence—Yah as simultaneously the imperative “be!” (Yehi) and the descriptive “all that is” (Hayah)—appears helpless without this Zauberkraft, this “magical power” which solely can enchant the grey existence into something lovable. Without it, Belial always wins. This is why the true name divine—Yah—designates also the Derridean performative of afformation which chooses to invest in the essentially unfinished, essentially indeterminate true–fake existence that forever hovers between nothing and being, universal ruin and universal redemption, Egypt and Promised Land. It is this grand Yah/Yeah that defines Derrida’s and Dick’s messianicity of choice: a chosen participation in the enterprise of being as an unfinished project that needs its own time and because of that has to be protected from definitive verdicts/judgments, both the “knowledge of good,” and the “knowledge of evil” which define things as they are, in a timeless verdict here and now. Afformation does not offer a judgement of knowledge, because the reality it joins is never as it is: it loves/wishes things into existence in the veri-fictional world. There is no being without faith in being. Dick’s Shekhinah, therefore, is the other creative–afformative aspect of Yah; only with the Derridean repetition of Yes–Yes the Godhead becomes whole again and unites with its creation.“Will Egypt always exist?” he said. “Will slavery always exist?”“Yes,” Zina said. “And so will we”.(Dick 2011, p. 216)
4. Conclusions
While overcoming his earlier dualistic Gnosticism, Dick did not abandon Gnosis completely: as he himself announced in The Exegesis, he merely shifted it to a more complex dialectical level. The Gnostic call to wakeness, which Elias the Prophet wants to broadcast through the public radio—“It will say, sleepers awake. That is our message to the listening world. Wake up!” (Dick 2011, p. 237)—is now to be conceived dialectically: it is a wake-up call, yet not to some absolute reality which always is what it is (in the image of Yah, the “I Am That I Am”), but to a dream taken seriously—no longer just a dream, but a dream that is no longer a dream (Dick 2011, p. 203), because it is held up and verified by the power of spiritual investment of its protagonists. This is how the story becomes independent from its inventor: even if, in the beginning, it were nothing but a fable, a counterfeit spectacle or a game, it does not matter—the actors of the story are no longer passive puppets; they choose this reality as the only one they have and turn it into something Real, independently of Yah’s intentions or control. To be no longer means to be His: Sein is not sein; to be is not, in Franz Kafka’s words, Ihmzugehören.20 Dick’s novel is consciously styled after the kabbalistic form of theosophy as a “holy history” in which God gains knowledge of himself: he raises from the stage of the unconscious impulsive production of being to the conscious stage of caring for the world as a free enterprise of being, which he gradually learns to let be and let go. Yah begins to understand that without this potentially subversive and rebellious immanent power of the world, represented by Shekhina-Sophia, his own creative project is doomed to fail. He thus agrees to abandon his transcendent position of the Derridean “God-Father-Sun” and truly become Emmanuel. He is now an immanent God, taking part in creation as the ultimate, essentially indeterminate reality:
Everything, even God, the Forthbringer of Existence, is thus caught in the undecidable reality which can either derealise the moment it loses belief in itself or last thanks to the constantly renewed acts of re-affirmation, this seemingly “spurious light.” It is thus always a matter of choice: the either/or between negation, which refuses to participate in the unfinished enterprise of becoming, on the one hand, and afformation which decides to form the world further, by affirming it, on the other. This is still the Gnostic diagnosis, but the latter possibility is something completely new, made possible by the Lurianic invention of tsimtsum and its later philosophical avatars.Beyond this there is no more. So rise up from the dust, you creatures, and begin; begin to live. You will live only insofar as you will fight; what you will have, if anything, you must earn, each for himself, and each now, not later.(Dick 2011, p. 237; emphasis added)
The traditional Gnosis had no doubt that there is only one—negative—solution: the only way to defeat the deceitful demiurge is to stop playing the game into which he illuded us (the Latin illusio means precisely to be played, to be thrown in ludus, into a game). Contrary to this, the new variant brings a positive inversion which we know already from Derrida: if the world is incomplete and its ontological status indeterminate (perhaps just a dokos—perhaps a real thing), it does not mean that it is worthless, botched, and deceitful. It only means that it is a yet-unfinished story in the making, which we can also make ourselves. Thus, while the ancient Gnostics believed that their retreat from the false spectacle of being will unmake it, because it only hangs on the forced engagement of its actors blinded by the demiurge, the new dialectical-inverted Gnostics believe that their extra-affirmative “fighting” participation in being will make it further in the creatio continua enfolding in the world’s “given time,” regardless of any demiurgic intention. With the “donor agency” withdrawn from the picture, there also disappears the whole context of deceit versus truth, fakeness and authenticity, which can only come from the “subject supposed to know.” All that is left is the game of being, which now we play ourselves within the “liberated creation.”
The dialogue which I staged here between Derrida and Dick points to the continuing vitality of the Lurianic motives in the various forms of the “secular kabbalah,” which in many ways departed from the original Jewish religious lore, but remained faithful to the concept of tsimtsum as the withdrawal of God, conceived in terms of the divine absolute authority on the matter how things really are. Derrida’s literary variant of tsimtsum as the “desire to create and event” and Dick’s conviction that “Emmanuel has a secret desire to play” develop further the mode of thinking called by Schelling die erzählende Philosophie, “narrative philosophy,” which, going against all timeless systems, declares that “the world is not a riddle whose solution can be given in a single word” (Schelling 1942, p. 94)—particularly if this word were to be No, the Gnostic negative conclusion drawn on the basis of the world’s indeterminate status. Derrida’s and Dick’s appropriation of the kabbalah as a récit or a “fable” follows a path, inaugurated by Schelling, which decided to grant metaphysical priority to an open-ended story and thus take seriously the “gift of time.” Since, as Hans Blumenberg argued, “overcoming of Gnosticism” has been a major challenge for the whole modern thought (Blumenberg 1985, p. 128), the inverted Gnosis coupled with the “narrative philosophy,” which I proposed in my reading of Derrida and Dick, offers one possible way of answering this challenge. For both Derrida and Dick, such overcoming begins with the acceptance of the Gnostic dia-gnosis about the indeterminate status of he worldly reality, but ends with the rejection of gnosis as the ultimate negative verdict on the world as nothing but a dream, deception, false spectacle, and illusion. What they offer in their narrative version of the messianicity of choice—of choosing to say Yes to being even if it is not fully formed—is a new vision of the truth as a fiction becoming true in time. This is why Derrida can say of the literary narratives in which, as in the Lurianic Fable, we tell the story of the world, fabula mundi, as, precisely, the story, that is, a text liberated from the authority of absolute presence and truth: “No more than myth, fable and phantasm are doubtless not truths or true statements as such, but neither are they errors or deceptions, false witnesses or perjuries” (Derrida 2002b, p. 28).
Funding
This research received no external funding.
Data Availability Statement
Data sharing is not applicable. No new data were created or analyzed in this study. Data sharing is not applicable to this article.
Conflicts of Interest
The author declares no conflict of interest.
Notes
| 1 | Scholem interprets tsimtsum, the main concept of the Lurianic kabbalah meaning the “contraction of God,” as a new variant of creatio ex nihilo, which now denotes the “creation of the nothing.” It is this barrier of nothingness/void that separates God from the world and allows the latter to emerge as something else than God: “Creation out of nothing, from the void, could be nothing other than creation of the void, that is, of the possibility of thinking of anything that was not God. Without such an act of self-limitation, after all, there would be only God—and obviously nothing else. A being that is not God could only become possible and originate by virtue of such a contraction, such a paradoxical retreat of God into himself. By positing a negative factor in Himself, God liberates creation” (Scholem 1976, p. 283). Creation, therefore, is no longer in God: as radically separated, it does not participate in the divine, as in all traditional Neoplatonic systems. The story of the world begins with this act of separation and then develops, but it is no longer controlled by the strict metaphysical methexis. It is “liberated,” that is, continuing on its own—precisely as a story. |
| 2 | Scholem introduces this term while commenting on Miguel Abraham Cardozo, a Marrano-Sabbatian kabbalist who created a particularly hazardous variant of the messianic “risk theology” on the canvas of the Lurianic kabbalah (Theologie des Hasards) (Scholem 1997, p. 142). The concept of the “endangered God with risk” (gefährdeter Gott, ein Gott mit eigenem Risiko) emerges also in Hans Jonas’ philosophical elaboration of what he calls the “Lurianic myth” in his essay on the concept of God after Auschwitz: “In the beginning, for unknowable reasons, the ground of being, or the Divine, chose to give itself over to chance and risk an endless variety of becoming. And wholly so: entering into the adventure of space and time, the deity held back nothing of itself: no uncommitted or unimpaired part remained to direct, correct, and ultimately guarantee the devious working-out of its destiny in creation. On this unconditional immanence the modern temper insists. It is its courage or despair, in any case its bitter honesty, to take our being-in-the-world seriously: to view the world as left to itself, its laws as brooking no interference, and the rigor of our belonging to it as not softened by extramundane providence […] In such self-forfeiture of divine integrity for the sake of unprejudiced becoming, no other knowledge can be admitted than that of possibilities, which cosmic being offers in its own terms: to these, God committed his cause in effacing himself from the world” (Jonas 1996, p. 134; emphasis added). In my essay, I will develop Jonasian intution about “taking our being-in-the-world seriously” and “viewing the world as left to itself” in the context of the Derridean “gift of time,” which also involves a similar understanding of the divine tsimtsum as “giving itself over to chance and risk an endless variety of becoming.” |
| 3 | In my comparative analysis of Derrida and Dick, I am very much indebted to the works of Kitty Millet, especially her Kabbalah and Literature, where she demonstrates the kabbalistic influence on the modern conception of writing: “literature too receives a new dimension, a depth that extends into another world: it no longer reduces to mimetic representations of phenomena” (Millet 2024, p. 3), but penetrates to the very core of creation itself. Literature no longer just depicts the world, but insinuates itself into the process of writing the world: it joins the sacred creation continua, even if now continued by secular means or what Millet, after David Biale, calls a “secular kabbalah,” manifesting itself in the works of “writers as disparate as Heine, Borges, Kafka, Schulz, Benjamin, Auerbach, Atlan, Celan, Tokarczuk, and Mulisch” (Millet 2024, p. 3). These writers (here I am adding also Derrida and Dick), as different as they may be, have one thing in common: they experiment with a new ontology of literature which was made possible by “the introduction of kabbalistic content” (Millet 2024, p. 3). |
| 4 | Compare Scholem: “Gnosis, one of the last great manifestations of myth in religious thinking, conceived at least in part as a reaction against the Jewish conquerors of myth, gave the Jewish mystics their language […] the old God whom Kabbalistic gnosis opposed to the God of the philosophers proves, when experienced in all His living richness, to be an even older and archaic one” (Scholem 1969, pp. 98, 119). For Scholem, the most powerful expression of such return is “the Lurianic gnosis” (Scholem 1969, p. 114), which combines the most archaic vision of the Jewish deity with the most modern experience of universal displacement, exile and the redemptive stake of history. |
| 5 | In that sense, the procosmic attitude of the “inverted Gnosis” constitutes the opposite of Taubes’ famous statement: “I can imagine as an apocalyptic: let it go down. I have no spiritual investment in the world as it is” (Taubes 2003, p. 103). |
| 6 | According to Ciril O’Regan, the idea of the processual and vulnerable “God in pain,” who must pass through the ordeal of negativity in order to conquer it, is Gnostic per se: while it originates in Valentinus, it enjoys a powerful “Gnostic return” in modernity, starting from the Lurianic, then Christian kabbalah and culminating in christliche Gnosis of Hegel (O’Regan 2001). |
| 7 | On Biale’s account, most of the “secular Kabbalists” (he mentions Hayim Nahman Bialik, Gershom Scholem, and Franz Kafka) remain inescapably tinged with Gnosticism which presents this world in a negative manner as pervaded by the terrible “void of God”: “the secular Kabbalists have affinities with the ancient Gnostics, who believed that the true God is hidden and inaccessible” (Biale 2011, p. 15). In my essay, I will simultaneously develop Biale’s definition of the “secular Kabbalists” and challenge his conviction that their theosophic tradition must imbue them all with the non-erasable trace of Gnostic acosmism. Some—most notably Derrida—made a considerable effort to overcome it and transform the theosophic narrative into a story with a strong procosmic conclusion. The same attempt, as I will argue, can also be detected in the latest works of Philip K. Dick. On presenting Derrida as a “secular kabbalists” who freely used the Lurianic narrative as an inspiring myth/fable, see my book, Derrida’s Marrano Passover (Bielik-Robson 2023). |
| 8 | The only one explicit mention of tsimtsum as “linked to the mythology of Louria” appears in the essay “Dissemination,” devoted to Philippe Soller’s novel Nombres (Derrida 1981, p. 344). Compare also (Adorno 2004, p. 299). On the reason why those vital sources deriving, in Hermann Cohen’s term, “out of the sources of Judaism,” so often remain implicit, see my argument on the “philosophical marranos,” that is, the Jewish thinkers who entered the space of the so-called universal discources of Western philosophy, by deliberately concealing the “Jewish theologoumena” which they then translated into abstract philosophical terms—like the Derridean différance, the “retreat from presence” or “messianicity” (Bielik-Robson 2014). On the kabbalistic traces in Derrida’s work, see also Elliot Wolfson’s pioneering essay: “Assaulting the Border: Kabbalistic Traces in the Margins of Derrida” (Wolfson 2002). |
| 9 | The strong Gnostic leanings are characteristic of the Hasidic reception of the Lurianic kabbalah, especially the one following the teaching of Rabbi Nachman of Bretslav. Today the most sophisticated variant of interpreting Lurianic kabbalah as a mythopoetic “path of Gnosis” is offered by Elliot Wolfson, especially in his Heidegger and Kabbalah. In Wolfson, the Gnostic dualism between the true and only being versus its fake shadow takes the form of the Lurianic distinction between sparks and shards which, even as material and obstructive, can exist only thanks to the borrowed light of the Infinite: “It is not possible for the light to disappear absolutely, as it is the only thing that is real” (Wolfson 2019, p. 163). On the continuing debate between the gnostic/acosmic and non-gnostic/procosmic readings of the Lurianic kabbalah and its aftermath in modern thought, not only Jewish, see also the collective volume of essays Tsimtsum and Modernity. Lurianic Heritage in Modern Philosophy and Theology (Bielik-Robson and Weiss 2020). |
| 10 | See the original in French: (Derrida 1991). |
| 11 | Schelling outlines the method of narrative philosophy in the introduction to the third draft of The Ages of the World as the science of an open living experience: “We must also recall that all history, not only in reality but also in narration, can only be relived; it cannot be communicated by a universal concept all at once, as it were. Whoever wishes knowledge of history must make the long journey, dwell upon each moment, submit himself to the gradualness of the development. The darkness of the spirit cannot be overcome suddenly, nor with a single blow. The world is not a riddle whose solution can be given in a single word; its history is too involved to be presented, as it were, in a few short, chopped-off sentences on a page of paper, as some seem to wish” (Schelling 1942, p. 94; emphasis added). The self-evident opponent of Schelling’s narrativity is Hegel: the thinker who attempted to sublate the whole historical movement of the world in one philosophical formula. For Schelling, the living experience of history is strictly linked to the religious stories/myths/fables telling the life of the “living God,” who is emphatically not the “God of the system” (Schelling 2006, p. 62). Also for Rosenzweig who applies Schellingian narrative method in The Star of Redemption, the story of the world is still “living” in its open suspense. Here too the future of creation remains, as in all good stories, open-ended. It is not conceptually assured as the immanent telos of the philosophical system. Man, thy only participant observer in the realm of being, plays here a messianic role the outcome of which is not metaphysically guaranteed. On the intricacies of the narrative approach, also in the conext of the “Lurianic fable,” see my essay “The Story Continues… Schelling and Rosenzweig on Narrative Philosophy” (Bielik-Robson 2019). |
| 12 | Comp. also Paul Valery who, in his essay “On Myth and Mythology,” writes: “Universe, then, is only a mythological expression […] In the begnining was the Fable. It always will be […] Myths are the very soul of our actions and our loves. We can act only in pursuit of a phantom. We can love only what we create” (Valery 1950, p. 201). When Derrida states La littérature reste un reste de religion (Derrida 1999, p. 208), “the literature remains the remains of religion,” he clearly indicates that his experimental narrative theology is a literary enterprise. |
| 13 | In “A Testimony Given…,” Derrida links the desire to create an event—the ultimate gift to the absolute non-knowledge of what is actually given: “I can only give if I don’t know what it is I am giving. If I cannot calculate what I am giving, if I am not ultimately expecting the thanks or the commerce of gratitude, if I can’t even know that I am giving, if the other cannot know that they are receiving. In this sense there would be an initial and radical expropriation at the origin of the gift” (Weber 2004, p. 43; emphass added). |
| 14 | It is quite possible that it was Buber’s affrmative take on the Hassidic kabbalah that informed Dick’s procosmic use of the kabbalistic imaginary—contrary to the warnings against such interpretation, uttered by Gershom Scholem, who firnly insisted on the Gostic–acosmic nature of the Hasidic reception of the Lurianic kabbalah: “The Hasidic authors obviously did not believe that they had in any way broken with the gnostic tradition of the Kabbalah and, little as Buber wants to admit it, they wrote clearly and plainly as Gnostics […] The Hassids do not teach us to enjoy life as it is; rather, they advise us—better: demand of us—to extract, I am tempted to say distill, from ‘life as it is’ the perpetual life of God […]. For precisely in that act in which we let the hidden life shine forth we destroy the here and now, instead of—as Buber would have it—realizing it in its full concreteness” (Scholem 1991, pp. 240–41). But even if Dick learned about the Lurianic kabbalah not only from Buber, but also from Western hermetic sources (e.g., Christian Kabbalah and its later esoteric elaborations, from Rosenroth through the Rosicrucians to Aleister Crowley), it is not essential for my argument. Here I am only interested in the vitality of certain Lurianic concepts—most of all tsimtsum, Shekhinah, and tikkun olam—which took life of their own apart from the strictly Jewish context. Derrida (a self-declared Marrano) and Dick do not belong to the Judaic tradition, yet they freely use the elements of the Lurianic myth. The same may be said of German Idealism, most of all Schelling and Hegel, who appropriated the crucial elements of the Lurianic narrative, sometimes not even fully aware that they originated in the Jewish religious lore. On the latter, see Paul Franks’ brilliant essay “‘Nothing Comes from Nothing’: Judaism, the Orient, and Kabbalah in Hegel’s Reception of Spinoza” (Franks 2018), which demonstrates very well the after-life of the kabbalistic esotericism outside of the strictly Jewish tradition, as well as my “God of Luria, Hegel, Schelling: The Divine Contraction and the Modern Metaphysics of Finitude” (Bielik-Robson 2017). |
| 15 | Compare the diagnosis of Dick’s biographer, Lawrence Sutin: “For Phil, the Gnostic view that our world is an illusory reality created by an evil, lesser deity was utterly compelling. It could account for the suffering of humankind, as well as for startling phenomena such as a vision of ‘absolute evil’ (the Gnostic god’s true visage!) in the sky. Not that Phil would have labeled himself with conviction as a Gnostic. But as a fiction writer, Phil naturally gravitated to theories that spurred his imagination and provided a useful framework for his experiences-and Gnosticism fit the bill most excellently” (Sutin 2005, p. 143). |
| 16 | According to Scholem, Shekhinah represents God-in-exile or the remnants of the original Or Ein Sof, “the light of the Infinite” which, after the cosmic catastrophe of breaking of the vessels that mixed light with matter, became dispersed in the world (Derrida would have said disseminated): “The exile of the Shekhinah is not a metaphor, it is a genuine symbol of the ‘broken’ state of things in the realm of divine potentialities. The Shekhinah fell, as the last Sefirah, when the vessels were broken […] Sparks of the Shekhinah are scattered in all worlds and there is no sphere of existence including organic and inorganic nature, that is not full of holy sparks which are mixed up with the Kelipoth [the shards] and need to be separated from them and lifted up […] To lead the Shekhinah back to her Master, to unite her with Him, is in one way or other the true purpose of the Torah” (Scholem 1995, pp. 313–18). And while in Zohar (The Book of Splendour) Shekhinah is symbolised as the “holy apple garden” (Scholem 1995, p. 309), in Dick’s Divine Invasion, it will be the Californian “Garden of Palms.” |
| 17 | See David Biale’s comment on Scholem’s thesis according to which the goal of the kabbalah was to introduce “mystical nominalism”: “Perhaps what he [Scholem] has in mind is that the dialectical theology of the Kabbalah established the principle of individuation within God Himself, thus giving legitimacy to the essential distinctions between individuals in the lower worlds. This emphasis on singular individuals, based on the distinctions between the sefirot, was perhaps the result of the desire to avoid any pantheistic formulations. Where neoplatonism failed to solve the problem of individuation and thus was threatened by pantheism, the Kabbalah postulated the movement from the impersonal One to the many attributes of the biblical God within the divine itself. Similarly, the reference to ‘mystical nominalism’ may be connected to the tendency in medieval nominalism to cast doubt on universal essences and to emphasize instead the singularity of individual beings. But more importantly, the Kabbalah might be called a school of ‘mystical nominalism’ as a consequence of its notion that only names (or signs) signify essences although, as opposed to the philosophical nominalism of William Ockham, the Kabbalah took the divine names to be essential attributes of God rather than merely subjective significations” (Biale 1985: pp. 67–93, 84; emphasis added). |
| 18 | Dick’s Belial is clearly cast as the new Goethean Mephisto, the “spirit who always says no” and thus declares: “For whate’er to light is brought/Deserves again to be reduced to naught/Then better ‘twere that naught should be/Thus all the elements which ye/Destruction, Sin, or briefly, Evil, name/As my peculiar element I claim” (Goethe 1994, p. 42). |
| 19 | This version of tsimtsum, in which God ‘takes in his breath’ and withdraws his anger, derives already from Isaiah, as described by Elliot Wolfson in his interpretation of one of the bahiric texts: “The notion of withdrawal, itself withdrawn and thus not stated overtly, is a secret exegetically derived from the verse lema‘an shemi a’arikh appi u-tehillati ehetam lakh le-vilti hakhritekha, ‘For the sake of my name I will postpone my wrath and my glory I will hold in for you so that I will not destroy you’ (Isa 48:9). The plain sense of the prophetic dictum relates to divine mercy expressed as God’s long-suffering, the capacity to restrain his rage. The expression tehillati ehetam, literally ‘my glory I will hold in,’ is parallel to a’arikh appi, ‘I will postpone my wrath.’ One may surmise that at some point in ancient Israel the notion of a vengeful god yielded its opposite, the compassionate god who holds in his fury” (Wolfson 2006, pp. 132–33). |
| 20 | See Kafka’s powerful aphorism: Das Wort sein bedeutet im Deutschen beides: Dasein und Ihmgehören (“The German word sein signifies both ‘to be there’ and ‘to belong to Him’”) (Kafka 2006, p. 46). |
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