Abstract
Political sponsorship is often invoked to explain contested public-health reforms. Its relationship to coalition resource use requires closer examination. Drawing on the Advocacy Coalition Framework, the article offers an exploratory assessment of executive anchoring in Türkiye’s 2008 smoke-free reform. Document-centered process tracing uses legislative and policy records alongside retrospective interview accounts. The full doctoral interview corpus was rescreened, and accounts from three of the 16 interviewees were selected. The reconstruction distinguishes stronger hospitality coverage during deliberation, adoption with an 18-month transition, and executive reaffirmation before commencement in July 2009. Four proposed processes guide the assessment: access integration, strategic coordination, authoritative signaling, and scope protection. The record documents parliamentary initiative, ministerial cooperation, international standards, and government support for stronger coverage. The record does not establish an executive-induced change in another actor’s resource use and a linked actor response. Therefore, executive anchoring remains unverified under the minimum evidentiary criterion. The contribution lies in a provision-level reconstruction and an explicit standard for assessing resource conversion. The analysis focuses on statutory design and commencement. It does not assess long-term enforcement or health outcomes.
1. Introduction
Comprehensive tobacco-control legislation is negotiated under a structural asymmetry. Its health benefits are broadly dispersed and often become visible only over time, whereas anticipated losses are concentrated among tobacco producers and businesses affected by restrictions on smoking, promotion, and sale. These actors therefore have strong incentives to organize early. Tobacco companies commonly combine claims about employment, tax revenue, illicit trade, personal freedom, and administrative feasibility with coalition building, lobbying, reputation management, and efforts to shape evidence (Ulucanlar et al. 2016). Yet the recurrence of these strategies does not explain why some governments enact comprehensive measures while others accept exemptions, delay implementation, or adopt weaker alternatives. That variation requires attention to the political capacity mobilized against commercial opposition. Although access to decision-makers, strategic evidence use, coalition mobilization, exposure of industry conduct, and legal action are recognized counterstrategies, their effects remain insufficiently examined (Matthes et al. 2023).
Türkiye’s 2008 smoke-free reform provides a consequential case for addressing this problem. After becoming a party to the World Health Organization (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) in 2005, Türkiye strengthened its national program and statutory framework. Law No. 5727, adopted in January 2008 as an amendment to Law No. 4207, extended smoke-free rules across workplaces, public institutions, public transport, and indoor hospitality venues, while strengthening restrictions on tobacco promotion and depiction. Staged implementation brought restaurants, cafés, and bars within its scope in July 2009. The reform attracted international attention because comprehensive coverage survived despite widespread smoking and organized claims of serious commercial loss (Law No. 4207 1996; Law No. 5727 2008; World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe 2012).
Research on Türkiye explains important parts of this trajectory. Hoe et al. (2016) show how domestic and global streams, European Union aspirations, international visibility, and a cohesive advocacy network raised tobacco control on the political agenda. Keklik and Gultekin-Karakas (2018) document tobacco companies’ market strategies but leave their non-market activity outside the empirical scope. More recent evidence cautions against treating these gains as irreversible, given continuing enforcement challenges, high tobacco use, and the expanding market for new products (Değerli et al. 2025; WHO 2025b). Hoe et al. (2019) compare tobacco control and road safety. Their findings further demonstrate the importance of political leadership, cohesive advocacy, and connections between domestic and international networks. They also identify the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) as a useful framework for examining actors’ roles.
Building on Hoe et al. (2016, 2019), the article offers an exploratory assessment of how political sponsorship relates to the reform’s statutory design. It reconstructs three decisions: strengthening hospitality coverage, adopting an 18-month transition, and reaffirming coverage before commencement. The reconstruction links research on political prioritization and policy networks to the content and timing of particular provisions. The analytical contribution lies in specifying and applying an evidentiary threshold. This threshold distinguishes documented sponsorship from executive-induced changes in coalition resource use.
The ACF provides the analytical basis for addressing this gap. It treats policy subsystems as arenas in which actors sharing policy-core beliefs coordinate strategies and pool resources such as formal-legal authority, information, public opinion, mobilizable supporters, finance, and leadership. Recent research highlights both the joint deployment of these resources and the often decisive role of formal authority (Nohrstedt and Heinmiller 2024). Applications beyond pluralist systems further indicate that hierarchical authority can coexist with networked advocacy and that intervention by superior political authorities may be a pathway to policy change (Li et al. 2024). Building on these insights, this article defines executive anchoring as a resource-conversion mechanism rather than an additional ACF resource. It describes how sustained high-level sponsorship connects resources dispersed across ministries, parliament, international organizations, experts, and civil society through four observable processes: access integration, strategic coordination, authoritative signaling, and scope protection. The analysis examines these processes within Türkiye’s parliamentary institutions in 2007–2009, distinguishing executive coordination capacity and parliamentary majority from evidence that party discipline shaped legislative support.
The study asks: How were executive sponsorship and coalition resources connected to the statutory design and commencement arrangements of Türkiye’s 2008 smoke-free reform? The unit of analysis is the policy episode surrounding Law No. 5727 rather than any single organization. A document-centered, theory-guided process-tracing design reconstructs the 2007–2009 sequence using legislative proposals, commission materials, plenary debates, statutory and policy documents, and episode-relevant evidence from semi-structured interviews.
2. Tobacco-Industry Political Activity and Resistance to Comprehensive Regulation
2.1. Constructing the Costs of Smoke-Free Regulation
Opposition to tobacco control is often framed as a dispute over evidence or proportionality, but internal-industry documents show that it forms part of a broader program of corporate political activity. The Policy Dystopia Model distinguishes between discursive strategies that construct regulation as harmful and instrumental strategies that carry those claims into policymaking venues (Ulucanlar et al. 2016). Common predictions include job losses, business closures, declining tax revenue, illicit trade, administrative burdens, and infringements of individual freedom. These arguments foreground immediate and visible costs while discounting, delaying, or questioning the health benefits of regulation.
Smoke-free legislation allows tobacco interests to shift the controversy from second-hand smoke to the economic position of restaurants, cafés, bars, and hotels. Hospitality organizations can then serve as locally credible opponents, obscuring or distancing the tobacco industry’s role. Internal-document studies show that companies supported existing hospitality associations, created new organizations, and promoted accommodation measures such as separate smoking areas and ventilation systems (Dearlove et al. 2002). The “Courtesy of Choice” initiative used similar partnerships across Latin America to resist fully smoke-free workplaces and public venues (Sebrié and Glantz 2007).
The political force of economic-loss claims does not depend on demonstrated sectoral decline. A systematic review and meta-analysis found no overall association between smoking bans and reduced hospitality sales or employment, although results varied by establishment and outcome measure (Cornelsen et al. 2014). During legislative debate, however, policymakers confront projections rather than observed effects, allowing opponents to emphasize worst-case scenarios and portray exemptions as prudent safeguards. Separate smoking areas, transition periods, ventilation standards, and venue-specific exceptions can therefore be presented as compromise. The principal contest is often not whether legislation will pass, but whether its coverage, timing, enforcement, or implementing rules will be diluted.
2.2. Access, Coalition Management, and Regulatory Dilution
Discursive claims gain policy influence through instrumental activity. Ulucanlar et al. (2016) identify coalition management, information management, direct access, litigation, and reputation management as recurring and mutually reinforcing strategies. Companies recruit organizations with greater public legitimacy, commission supportive evidence, magnify uncertainty, supply selectively framed information, lobby decision-makers, threaten legal action, and use corporate social-responsibility programs to claim standing as legitimate policy participants.
The combination varies with institutional context. Where direct participation is acceptable, companies may enter consultations and provide technically detailed submissions. Where access is politically sensitive, influence can travel through trade associations, consultants, experts, media relationships, or personal networks. Historical evidence from Singapore shows how tobacco companies cultivated relationships in education, academia, the arts, and the media while relying on less visible contacts in a formally hostile policy environment (van der Eijk and Tan 2023). Apparent institutional distance from the industry therefore does not establish an absence of influence.
Strategies also change across the policy process. Before adoption, opponents may seek agenda exclusion or voluntary alternatives; once legislation appears likely, they may pursue narrower language, exceptions, delays, or delegation of important decisions to subsequent regulations. After enactment, permissive interpretation, weak inspection, non-compliance, and amendment campaigns can reduce practical coverage. Coalition success must consequently be assessed through both statutory scope and early implementation (Crosbie et al. 2017). Disputes over electronic cigarettes, heated tobacco products, and other nicotine products reproduce this structure in a new register. Through the language of harm reduction and investments in scientific capacity, firms seek reputational repair, regulatory access, and market continuity—a process described as the “pharmaceuticalisation” of the industry (Hendlin et al. 2024).
2.3. Counter-Mobilization and the Problem of Political Capacity
Public-health actors respond by exposing industry relationships and misleading claims, securing access to decision-makers, producing timely evidence, invoking international standards, mobilizing professional and civil-society networks, and pursuing administrative or legal remedies. These responses are usually combined and adapted to the interference encountered. The literature nevertheless describes advocates’ actions more often than it demonstrates how those actions alter policy outcomes (Matthes et al. 2023).
The WHO FCTC supplies legal commitments, technical guidance, comparative evidence, and an international community of expertise. Article 5.3 and its guidelines also establish a normative basis for protecting public-health policy from the tobacco industry’s commercial and vested interests (World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 2008). These resources can recast comprehensive regulation as internationally validated rather than locally experimental. They cannot, however, enact domestic legislation: standards must be translated into proposals, defended in political venues, and joined to actors possessing formal authority.
Comparative research illustrates this need for resource combination. Tobacco-tax reforms in the Philippines and Ukraine depended on coalitions linking civil-society advocates, public officials, economists, and policy experts. They used domestic and international evidence to answer fiscal claims while political change and international commitments opened new venues (Hoe et al. 2021). Conversely, subnational smoke-free policymaking is more vulnerable to hospitality-sector exemptions when civil-society advocacy is weak and political authorities are divided (Yamada et al. 2015).
Evidence, public support, and international norms are therefore not self-executing. Information must reach authoritative venues, support must become politically visible, and coalition members must coordinate when opponents seek dilution. Labeling a government or leader “committed” does not explain how these tasks are accomplished. Research on political prioritization in Türkiye informs this analysis (Hoe et al. 2016, 2019). We examine how these political conditions related to the retention of statutory coverage during 2007–2009. The ACF guides our assessment of links between executive involvement, coalition resource use, and responses to proposals for narrower coverage. We distinguish documented actions from interpretations of their effects. We also acknowledge that the evidence is uneven across the proposed processes.
3. Advocacy Coalitions, Coalition Resources, and Executive Anchoring
3.1. Coalitions as Resource-Pooling Organizations
The ACF locates policy conflict within a subsystem of public officials, legislators, interest groups, researchers, civil-society organizations, journalists, and other actors regularly engaged with a policy problem. Coalitions emerge when actors sharing policy-core beliefs coordinate their behavior to translate those beliefs into policy (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2018; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). Shared positions are therefore insufficient: influence depends on joint strategies, resource mobilization, policy influence, collective awareness, task allocation, and the mutually reinforcing use of assets. This organizational view directs attention to coordinated political action rather than lists of actors holding similar preferences (Nohrstedt and Heinmiller 2024).
The ACF identifies six principal coalition resources: formal-legal authority, information, public opinion, mobilizable supporters, financial resources, and skillful leadership (Sabatier and Weible 2007). These resources are analytically distinct but politically interdependent. Information has limited effect unless it reaches an authoritative venue; public support may remain latent unless made politically visible; and formal authority is more credible and durable when supported by evidence and social legitimacy. Leadership can coordinate action but cannot substitute for the legal competence to enact decisions. Coalition capacity must therefore be assessed through the relationships by which resources are pooled, sequenced, and directed toward policy venues rather than through a simple inventory.
Recent ACF scholarship recognizes this interdependence but provides less evidence about the mechanisms through which joint resource use produces influence. Formal-legal authority often proves especially consequential, while access, trust, and internal organization affect whether other assets can be mobilized effectively (Nohrstedt and Heinmiller 2024; Wesche et al. 2025). This leaves an important question: how does formal authority reorganize the practical value of dispersed coalition resources?
3.2. Formal Authority in Centralized and Party-Disciplined Settings
The value of formal authority varies by institutional setting. In fragmented systems, coalitions can pursue multiple legislative, judicial, administrative, and subnational venues. In centralized and party-disciplined systems, fewer actors may control a proposal’s movement from agenda setting and ministerial drafting to legislative adoption and implementation. High-level executive support may consequently have disproportionate effects, while excluded coalitions become more dependent on indirect access.
Although the ACF developed largely through pluralist-democratic cases, its application has expanded beyond them. A review of 112 studies from mainland China finds that top-down decision-making coexists with horizontal negotiation, networked influence, and bottom-up advocacy, while intervention by hierarchically superior authorities appears more frequently than in global ACF reviews (Li et al. 2024). Centralization thus does not eliminate coalition politics; it changes the distribution and effectiveness of coalition resources.
Executive support can place an issue on the governmental agenda, authorize administrative investment, open senior venues to advocates, and signal priority to governing-party legislators. It can also reduce opponents’ expected returns from lobbying when central provisions are presented as non-negotiable. Yet sponsorship is not command. Executives still depend on information, drafting capacity, legislative cooperation, credible advocates, and implementing organizations, and they may endorse a broad objective without defending the provisions that determine its strength. Executive involvement may also marginalize participation. The argument developed here is therefore analytical rather than normative: it concerns how concentrated authority affects coalition organization and policy scope, not whether such concentration is desirable.
3.3. Executive Anchoring as a Resource-Conversion Mechanism
Executive sponsorship refers to sustained high-level political support for a reform. Executive anchoring describes the proposed mechanism through which this support links coalition resources to formal authority. It also helps coordinate their use. The outcome examined here is the adoption and early preservation of comprehensive statutory coverage. Evidence of anchoring must link executive intervention to subsequent coordination, authorized action, or responses to proposed dilution. Public endorsement and successful enactment alone do not establish this mechanism.
Holding executive office does not, by itself, establish coalition membership. An executive actor may participate in a coalition while exercising formal authority. Alternatively, the actor may sponsor the coalition’s objectives from outside it. Membership requires evidence of shared policy commitments and coordination, just as it does for other actors. In either case, executive anchoring requires evidence of resource conversion.
We identify executive anchoring when the evidence links an executive intervention to the use of a specified resource held by another actor. The evidence must show how the intervention enabled or redirected that use. A subsequent response must be traceable to this link. Examples include changed access, joint activity, shifts in expectations, or action on a particular statutory provision. At least one proposed process must meet this standard. Evidence for one process does not establish the others or explain the reform as a whole. A directive documents executive action. Endorsement followed by enactment documents a sequence. Neither alone establishes resource conversion. Where the connecting evidence is absent, the proposed process remains unresolved. Identifying executive anchoring does not require a demonstrated statutory consequence. Establishing its effect on policy design is a separate claim and requires an additional evidentiary link between the resource-conversion process and a specific statutory outcome.
Four analytically distinct processes guide the assessment. Access integration refers to changes in actors’ access to authoritative venues. Strategic coordination concerns changes in how coalition resources are jointly deployed. Authoritative signaling refers to observable responses to executive commitments. Scope protection concerns executive action directed at an identifiable proposal to narrow coverage. It also includes the subsequent response to that action. These processes may overlap or occur separately. We do not assume a fixed sequence or that they are jointly necessary. Each process requires its own evidence. Preservation of statutory coverage is the outcome to be explained. It cannot, on its own, establish scope protection.
Executive anchoring is neither necessary nor sufficient in every case. Coalitions may prevail through decentralized venue shopping, judicial action, electoral change, or legislative leadership. Executive support may fail when it is episodic, internally contested, administratively unsupported, or disconnected from evidence and social legitimacy. The proposed scope concerns settings where concentrated executive authority can influence access, coordination, and legislative decisions. Parliamentary majority and party discipline are possible conditioning factors whose presence and causal role require separate evidence.
3.4. Analytical Expectations
If executive anchoring operated during the reform, the evidence should reveal more than agreement among tobacco-control actors. It should connect executive intervention to the deployment of coalition resources and subsequent changes in coordination or regulatory scope. Table 1 identifies the observable implications used in the process tracing.
Table 1.
Executive anchoring: Proposed processes and observable implications.
These expectations guide process tracing rather than serve as deterministic hypotheses. Evidence of executive support establishes sponsorship, not anchoring; the latter requires temporal and relational evidence that sponsorship connected resources, altered behavior, or protected scope. Alternative explanations also remain possible. Cross-party consensus may remove veto opportunities, international commitments may constrain alternatives, and public approval may reduce electoral risk. The analysis therefore examines whether executive sponsorship merely accompanied these conditions or reorganized their policy effects.
4. Materials and Methods
4.1. Research Design and Case Boundaries
The study uses document-centered, theory-guided qualitative process tracing to assess executive anchoring in the statutory design and commencement arrangements of Türkiye’s 2008 smoke-free reform. Process tracing is appropriate because the inquiry concerns a causal mechanism connecting actor configurations and resource deployment to a bounded policy outcome. Documents and interviews are therefore treated as diagnostic evidence within a temporal sequence rather than as independent observations (Beach and Pedersen 2019; Collier 2011).
The unit of analysis is the reform episode surrounding Law No. 5727. The principal window extends from the convergence of national tobacco-control planning and legislative preparation in 2007 to the inclusion of hospitality venues in the indoor smoking prohibition in July 2009. Law No. 4207 and Türkiye’s accession to the WHO FCTC establish the institutional baseline. The 2010 amendment proposal, Law No. 7151, and the 2019 plain-packaging regulations provide subsequent context only (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi 2010; Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 2019).
The analysis distinguishes three outcomes: the strengthening of hospitality coverage during legislative deliberation, its adoption with an 18-month transition, and the retention of the enacted scope. Retention is assessed up to July 2009, when the hospitality provisions took effect. Comprehensive hospitality coverage refers to the prohibition under amended Article 2(1)(d) of Law No. 4207. It rules out designated smoking sections and ventilation-based alternatives in restaurants, coffeehouses, cafés, bars, and similar venues. This definition does not mean that all statutory exceptions were eliminated. Limited smoking areas remained permissible in nursing homes, psychiatric hospitals, prisons, specified passenger-vessel decks, and outdoor event venues. Designated hotel rooms were also permitted. Authorized indoor smoking areas remained subject to isolation and ventilation requirements (Law No. 5727 2008, art. 3). Evidence of draft strengthening is assessed separately from evidence of scope protection after adoption.
4.2. Data Sources
The study is document-centered. Table 2 summarizes the evidence base, source identification, and its analytical use. The documentary corpus was assembled purposively using four criteria: relevance to the formulation, adoption, scope, or early implementation of Law No. 5727; identification of actors or institutional responsibilities; evidence of support, opposition, or proposed dilution; and relevance to the four proposed processes in Table 1. Contemporaneous official records were prioritized. Later reports were used to clarify chronology or context but not as substitutes for contemporaneous evidence of actor positions (Bowen 2009).
Table 2.
Evidence base, source identification, and analytical use.
Document retrieval was purposive and guided by Turkish search terms including “sigara” (cigarette), “tütün” (tobacco), “dumansız” (smoke-free), “dumansız hava sahası” (smoke-free airspace), “tütünsüz” (tobacco-free), and “sigarasız” (cigarette-free). Official sources were obtained from TBMM’s legislative and plenary archives, the Official Gazette, and WHO/FCTC websites. Specific records were also located using document titles, dates, and legislative identifiers. The three press reports were accessed through their publishers’ websites. Table 2 identifies the sources cited in the empirical reconstruction and policy context. A complete log of individual searches, screened documents, and exclusions was not maintained. Screening and exclusion totals are therefore unavailable, limiting the reproducibility of source selection.
The main documentary sequence runs from 2007 to July 2009, when the hospitality provisions took effect. Earlier records establish institutional and legislative antecedents. Later materials provide context on subsequent developments. Legislative records were examined for objections, alternative provisions, and transition arrangements. The press reports identify the positions of named organizations, including contrasting responses within the hospitality sector. They were selected purposively and do not constitute a comprehensive media corpus. Evidence that qualified the executive-anchoring interpretation was considered alongside evidence consistent with it.
Interview evidence supplements the documentary record. The doctoral corpus comprised 16 semi-structured interviews conducted in February 2023, totaling 10 h and 44 min. Participants were purposively invited based on their relevant expertise. The doctoral corpus included seven Green Crescent staff members, four education professionals, and three physicians. Two further participants held legislative or health-policy roles during the reform period. The accounts explicitly cited in this article come from M1, M2, and M10. We re-screened the full corpus of 16 interviews for passages concerning the 2007–2009 reform. The screening focused on legislative preparation, actor coordination, commercial opposition, executive or parliamentary support, and attempts to narrow regulatory scope. M1, M2, and M10 provided the detailed accounts most directly relevant to these issues. Their accounts form the basis of the interview evidence presented here. Their accounts of the reform were retrospective. The remaining thirteen interviews provided contextual information about the reform, but pre-adoption debates fell outside these participants’ areas of expertise. M1, M2 and M10 had worked on the issue during the reform period and supplied the detailed accounts used here. No conflicting accounts emerged from the other interviews. Their contextual observations are not treated as independent corroboration of specific interactions or causal links.
The original doctoral study examined the Green Crescent’s role in the adoption of tobacco-control policies. Relevant questions from the interview guide are translated here from Turkish. One asked, “What contacts did you have with public-sector experts during the preparation or implementation of tobacco-control legislation?” Another asked, “What joint work was undertaken with members of parliament during this process?” The guide also included the question, “Who were the principal actors in adopting and implementing these policies?” The choice, wording, and order of questions were adapted to each participant’s expertise. The interviews were not originally designed to test executive anchoring. The 2008 reform was not a separate planned interview topic. Relevant accounts emerged during broader discussions and were developed through spontaneous follow-up questions prompted by participants’ remarks.
M1 recalled being present in parliament during deliberations, while M2 described involvement in national tobacco-control planning and technical support for legislative drafting. M10 offered an expert assessment of industry lobbying and party discipline. The cited passage does not establish firsthand observation of specific lobbying contacts during the reform. Potentially identifying job titles and institutional positions are withheld to protect confidentiality.
The first author transcribed the recordings. The transcripts were structurally coded in NVivo for the doctoral research. For the present article, we used a separate ACF-based coding framework. The undated account discussed in Section 5.5 was retained as contextual testimony. It was excluded from the dated causal sequence. We used interview evidence to illuminate informal interactions and interpret the chronology. We did not treat retrospective testimony as sufficient causal evidence when contemporaneous documentation did not support it or contradicted it.
4.3. Analytical Procedure
Analysis proceeded in four stages. First, official records were ordered chronologically from international and national commitments through drafting, parliamentary deliberation, enactment, and staged implementation. This identified the points at which the reform’s scope could have been expanded, delayed, or weakened.
Second, actors were mapped by their stated positions, resources, and evidence of coordination. Coalition membership was not inferred from institutional affiliation or support for the same outcome alone; it required a shared position on comprehensive smoke-free regulation and evidence of complementary or coordinated activity. The same criterion was applied to proponents and opponents of the reform: similar demands alone were insufficient to establish coalition membership.
Third, documents and interview passages relevant to each episode were analysed using the coding matrix in Table 1. Additional codes covered commercial arguments, lobbying, proposed exemptions or ventilation, cross-party support, public opinion, and international commitments. The first author carried out the detailed analysis and developed the initial codes and categories. During meetings with the second author, passages were presented without code annotations. These presentations also included explanations of the proposed codes. The authors discussed the interpretations and jointly refined the coding framework, including how codes were grouped into categories. The corpus was not independently double-coded. No substantial disagreements arose during these discussions.
Qualifying evidence remained part of the interpretation. M10’s remarks about the limits of party discipline qualified claims of executive control. Evidence linking executive action to subsequent actor responses was given greater diagnostic weight than statements of support alone.
Fourth, the analysis assessed four alternative explanations. It considered whether cross-party agreement facilitated adoption and whether parliamentary entrepreneurship advanced the proposal. It also examined whether international commitments shaped the design and whether public approval reduced political risk. Each explanation was assessed against the available evidence. We also considered whether its contribution could be distinguished from executive sponsorship. Where the evidence was insufficient, the explanation was retained as unresolved. Claims were limited to the strength of the evidence. Uncorroborated interview accounts of lobbying or informal intervention are reported as attributed testimony rather than established organizational fact.
4.4. Ethics, Confidentiality, and Research Transparency
The interviews were conducted for a completed doctoral dissertation with approval from the [Anonymized] Social and Human Sciences Ethics Committee (approval details anonymized for peer review). All participants provided informed consent. Participants were assigned identifiers M1-M16, and potentially identifying institutional details were withheld. Interviews were conducted in Turkish and translated into English by the first author. Conversational fillers were removed only when substantive meaning was unaffected, and omissions are marked by ellipses.
The consent form explained that participation was voluntary, that participants had the right to withdraw, and that their personal information would remain confidential. It also explicitly stated that the data could be used for research and publication. This article reanalyzes the doctoral material using a research question and theoretical framework focused on the 2007–2009 reform. The original confidentiality safeguards remain in place. The unit of analysis, theoretical framework, coding categories, and evidentiary emphasis were defined specifically for the 2007–2009 legislative episode. Because the interviews contain confidential and potentially identifiable information, full transcripts cannot be publicly shared. The documentary sources and their analytical uses are identified in Table 2, with retrieval details provided in the References. Anonymized interview excerpts may be provided where compatible with participants’ consent and ethical approval. ChatGPT (6.1 Sol. OpenAI) assisted with language editing, revision drafting, and identification of potentially relevant documentary sources. Its outputs informed the authors’ revisions and were subject to their review. The authors retained responsibility for source verification, analytical decisions, and the final text.
5. Results
The documentary record establishes institutional arrangements, political sponsorship, and legislative decisions. These observations vary in their causal specificity. Table 3 distinguishes recorded actions and subsequent developments from behavioral responses that remain unverified. It also identifies alternative interpretations for each proposed process.
Table 3.
Evidence matrix for the proposed executive-anchoring processes.
5.1. Assembling the Public-Health Coalition
Coordination began before the final parliamentary debate. The amendment was submitted in April 2005 by Trabzon Member of Parliament (MP) Cevdet Erdöl and 73 other MPs. A subcommittee examined it during four meetings in February 2006 with representatives from the Ministries of Justice and Health, other public bodies, and civil-society organizations. The Justice Commission continued deliberations with the same categories of participants. After the proposal lapsed at the end of the parliamentary term, Erdöl renewed it in September 2007. In November, the new Justice Commission unanimously adopted the previous report and text, presenting the amendment as a domestic expression of the WHO FCTC and emphasizing its urgency (TBMM 2007a, pp. 1–4, 11–12).
This legislative work developed alongside an executive-led national policy structure. Prepared under Ministry of Health coordination and issued through Prime-Ministerial Circular No. 2006/29, the National Tobacco Control Program assigned responsibilities to ministries, regulatory bodies, universities, municipalities, professional organizations, and civil society. It connected health evidence and international commitments with public communication, agricultural policy, education, taxation, and enforcement (Prime Ministry of Türkiye 2006).
M2 similarly described concurrent work on the WHO FCTC process, the national program, and the amendment of Law No. 4207, recalling cooperation among Ministry of Health experts, Health Minister Recep Akdağ, and Erdöl, then chair of the parliamentary Health Commission. This account corresponds with the documentary sequence: international commitments supplied standards and legitimacy, ministry experts provided policy and legal knowledge, and parliamentary sponsorship moved the proposal into the legislature.
The 2005 legislative initiative and the committee work in February 2006 came before Circular No. 2006/29. The circular therefore documents a formal coordination framework following existing legislative activity. Ministry representatives had already taken part in committee work. This chronology does not rule out earlier executive support. It remains unclear whether the circular reinforced those relationships or how any such reinforcement affected subsequent provisions (TBMM 2007a, pp. 1–4; Prime Ministry of Türkiye 2006).
5.2. Commercial Counter-Mobilization and the Politics of Regulatory Scope
Law No. 5727 prohibited tobacco use in enclosed public and private premises accessible to more than one person, including restaurants, coffeehouses, cafés, beerhouses, and similar establishments. It also strengthened restrictions on promotion and tobacco depictions in television programs and other audiovisual content, regulated sales to minors and product display, and introduced more enforceable sanctions. Although application to hospitality venues was delayed for 18 months, the final text did not substitute ventilation or smoking sections for smoke-free coverage (Law No. 5727 2008).
Interviews identify two forms of counter-mobilization. First, hospitality interests emphasized anticipated economic losses. M1 recalled: “Hotels, restaurants, and tourism agencies said that if the law passed, tourism would collapse and the country would be ruined; they wanted the bill to be considered later.” Rather than dispute the harms of second-hand smoke, this argument framed postponement as protection against economic disruption.
Contemporaneous press coverage records specific demands from the hospitality sector. A report published on 11 January 2008 described the position of the coffeehouse and kiosk operators’ federation (TKBF). Its president, Murat Ağaoğlu, called for separate smoking sections with ventilation. He also criticized penalties imposed on proprietors for customers’ violations. Kaya Demirer, vice-president of TURYİD, an association representing restaurant and club investors and operators, expected customer numbers to fall by around 25%. He warned about uneven enforcement but supported the law’s health rationale (Habertürk 2008). A report published on 18 July 2009 quoted TKBF board member Hüseyin Menekşe. He described unsuccessful appeals to opposition parties and plans to challenge the ban in court. His arguments focused on expected business closures and job losses (Timeturk 2009). Both reports postdate the law’s adoption on 3 January 2008. They document positions reported after adoption and do not, by themselves, establish when pre-adoption lobbying occurred.
Hospitality organizations nevertheless took different positions. Ramazan Bingöl, president of TÜRES, an association representing restaurants and their suppliers, supported the proposed legislation. He argued that smoke-free restaurants would attract families concerned about their health (Türkiye Turizm 2008). These statements show that commercial interests did not uniformly oppose the reform. We treat the projected losses and benefits as actors’ expectations rather than measured economic effects.
Second, interviewees described attempts to influence legislators. M10 stated that industry representatives approached MPs considered persuadable across party lines rather than directing their efforts toward a single party. This testimony does not establish the identity, frequency, or effects of those contacts, and company lobbying records were unavailable for triangulation. It nevertheless indicates how influence was perceived to operate when the proposal depended on a plenary vote.
Parliamentary speakers raised implementation concerns and called for stronger coverage, sometimes while explicitly supporting the bill (TBMM 2007b, pp. 58, 74, 82). These interventions do not, by themselves, establish commercial links. The sources show partly overlapping preferences among some commercial actors. They do not establish coordination between tobacco companies and hospitality organizations. We therefore use “commercial opposition” descriptively, without presenting these actors as a demonstrated advocacy coalition. Press reports document organizations’ stated positions and announced strategies. Interview accounts of informal lobbying remain attributed testimony. The available evidence does not establish the scale of opponents’ financial resources or the extent and effectiveness of their access to decision-makers.
5.3. Executive Sponsorship and Reported Coordination
The reform took place within Türkiye’s parliamentary system. In the July 2007 election, Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) won 341 of the 550 seats, securing a single-party parliamentary majority (Yüksek Seçim Kurulu n.d., p. 1). Prime-Ministerial Circular No. 2006/29 assigned the Ministry of Health responsibilities in tobacco control. These covered cooperation meetings, implementation support, and monitoring (Prime Ministry of Türkiye 2006). These sources establish a governing-party majority and centrally assigned coordination responsibilities. They do not establish executive control over individual MPs. M10’s retrospective account also cautions that party discipline did not always hold on tobacco issues. The role of party discipline in securing support for this reform therefore remains unresolved.
Table 4 distinguishes the principal public-health actors’ positions, resources, and coordination evidence. Positions are assessed by legislative stage. Support for the bill is not treated as continuous agreement on hospitality coverage, and assigned responsibilities are distinguished from observed or reported cooperation.
Table 4.
Public-health actors, policy positions, resources, and evidence of coordination.
The evidence supports a narrower interpretation of the coalition, centered on parliamentary proponents and the health ministry. Akdağ is treated as a participant in this collaboration who also exercised ministerial authority. Erdoğan is identified as an executive sponsor. His coalition membership is not independently established. Institutions that participated or were assigned roles are not automatically treated as coalition members. Cross-party endorsement and the invocation of WHO/FCTC standards are also assessed separately from membership.
5.4. Cross-Party Legitimation and Adoption
Cross-party support was evident during parliamentary deliberation. During the December 2007 debate, governing- and opposition-party speakers accepted the public-health rationale while questioning particular provisions. Hasip Kaplan of the Democratic Society Party (DTP) and Tekin Bingöl of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) announced their parties’ support. İzmir MP Recai Birgün, while identifying himself as a smoker and advocating narrower smoking areas, described the proposal as the first measure of the parliamentary term on which government and opposition agreed. Osman Durmuş, speaking for the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), warned of tobacco-lobby influence and urged parliament to complete the legislation (TBMM 2007b, pp. 58, 74, 82, 86–89).
Earlier on 2 January, Akdağ anticipated that village coffeehouses would be included, with a transition period. Demirtaş later described a forthcoming governing-party amendment that would remove smoking sections from hospitality venues (TBMM 2008a, pp. 197, 203–4).
Later, Kamer Genç asked how smoking sections would accommodate children accompanying their parents. Akdağ replied that families should use non-smoking sections. The amendment signed by Canikli and six other MPs was then read to the Assembly. Akdağ endorsed it, and the commission left the decision to the Assembly. Parliament then adopted the amendment. Its stated rationale referred to WHO recommendations and the FCTC (TBMM 2008a, pp. 208–12).
The earlier references show that changes were already under discussion before Akdağ’s reply about children. This sequence does not establish an abrupt policy reversal. International policy guidance is the relevant informational resource. Ministerial endorsement is the documented executive action. The record does not identify who drafted the revised provisions. Nor does it show that executive intervention enabled or redirected the use of this guidance. It documents government-backed statutory strengthening while leaving the resource-conversion link unresolved. Table 5 compares the resulting provisions and commencement arrangements.
Table 5.
Hospitality coverage and commencement arrangements across legislative stages.
The adopted design therefore combined stronger hospitality coverage with delayed commencement. Akdağ justified the hospitality transition by citing WHO recommendations and the ease of implementation. He linked the four months to preparing public-information broadcasts (TBMM 2008b, p. 368). These statements document the government’s stated rationale. They do not establish whether the transition also reflected bargaining with organized interests.
5.5. Scope Protection and the Later Regulatory Trajectory
Prime-Ministerial Circular No. 2009/13 was published on 16 July 2009, three days before the hospitality provisions took effect. Signed by Erdoğan, it reaffirmed indoor hospitality coverage and repealed Circular No. 2008/6. It assigned communication roles to the Ministry of Health and RTÜK. It also directed enforcement by governors and district governors, among others (Prime Ministry of Türkiye 2009, items 1, 8, 11). The circular documents executive reaffirmation and prescribed coordination before commencement.
M2 recalled an undated Green Crescent meeting at which Erdoğan rejected ventilation-based accommodation. The testimony is retained as an account of perceived executive support. Press coverage documents demands for accommodation (Habertürk 2008). It does not verify the meeting’s date or legislative consequences. The account therefore remains outside the dated causal sequence.
Bill No. 2/567 and the packaging and depiction measures adopted in 2018–2019 provide context on subsequent policy developments (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi 2010; Law No. 7151 2018; Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 2019; World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe 2019). These materials are not used to test executive anchoring during 2007–2009.
6. Discussion
6.1. Executive Anchoring and the Organization of Coalition Power
Table 3 and Table 5 show that legislative initiative and committee work preceded the formal coordination circular. Ministry representatives were already involved at this earlier stage. Stronger hospitality coverage was adopted alongside an 18-month transition, and executive sponsorship coexisted with parliamentary entrepreneurship and cross-party support. This reconstruction links the leadership and policy networks emphasized by Hoe et al. (2016, 2019) to the content and timing of particular statutory provisions.
These observations inform ACF research on the organization of coalition resources and the coexistence of hierarchy and networked advocacy (Nohrstedt and Heinmiller 2024; Li et al. 2024). The assessment begins by asking whether executive intervention enabled or redirected another actor’s resource use and produced a traceable response. It examines evidence of an effect on statutory design separately. As Table 3 summarizes, the resource-conversion links remain unverified.
Cross-party agreement represents documented support for the reform. It could complement government action or provide a basis for adoption without executive resource conversion. Opposition speakers advanced public-health arguments while questioning particular provisions (TBMM 2007b, pp. 58, 74, 82). The record traces no executive intervention that changed their positions. Their support is therefore not treated as a resource shown to have been mobilized through executive anchoring.
FCTC commitments form part of the antecedent policy context. International standards also supplied an informational resource. The Article 8 guidelines were adopted in July 2007. They reject ventilation and designated smoking areas as substitutes for smoke-free protection (WHO FCTC Conference of the Parties 2007, Annex 1, para. 6, pp. 24–25). The rationale for the 2 January amendment invoked WHO recommendations and the FCTC. It did not name these guidelines (TBMM 2008a, p. 212). Removing hospitality smoking sections was consistent with the guidance, while limited statutory exceptions remained. Parliamentary and ministerial policy learning could explain this alignment. The record does not trace how the guidelines entered the drafting process or whether executive intervention enabled their use.
Public approval remains a possible enabling condition. It may also complement sponsorship. M2 retrospectively recalled support among voters critical of the government. Hoe et al. (2019) report substantial public support. Pre-adoption polling and its use by decision-makers have not been independently verified here. Whether executive intervention mobilized public approval therefore remains unverified. EU accession pressure also remains an untested alternative explanation.
A governing-party majority and assigned coordination responsibilities provide institutional opportunities for executive action. They do not establish that party discipline secured legislative support. Similarly, the July 2009 circular documents reaffirmation and administrative direction. These actions also fit routine implementation of existing legislation (Prime Ministry of Türkiye 2009).
6.2. Commercial Opposition and the Adopted Regulatory Design
The economic-loss arguments documented in Section 5.2 resemble strategies described by the Policy Dystopia Model (Ulucanlar et al. 2016). This comparison concerns the arguments’ content. It is not presented as evidence of a shared organizational strategy. Press reports document hospitality organizations’ differing positions and accommodation demands. M10’s account concerns reported industry approaches to MPs. These materials do not establish coordination between the actors. Demands for ventilation or designated smoking areas concerned the extent of coverage. Postponement requests concerned its timing. These distinctions allow us to examine the statutory outcome without assuming a unified opposing coalition.
The adopted design strengthened hospitality coverage while delaying commencement. The parliamentary record directly documents government endorsement of the scope amendment (TBMM 2008a, pp. 210–12). Akdağ described the transition as an implementation arrangement (TBMM 2008b, p. 368). This justification neither establishes nor rules out bargaining with organized interests. Whether the delay was also a negotiated concession remains unresolved. Preserving eventual coverage therefore does not demonstrate that executive sponsorship prevented all forms of accommodation. This distinction addresses the gap between identifying counterstrategies and demonstrating their effects (Matthes et al. 2023).
Adoption must nevertheless be distinguished from durable policy effectiveness. Preservation of statutory coverage does not by itself establish the mechanism responsible, effective enforcement, or sustained behavioral change. Değerli et al. (2025) report that the ban’s initial positive association with intentions to quit was not sustained in the longer comparison and identify weakening enforcement as a possible explanation. Türkiye’s implementation of the complete MPOWER package at best-practice level similarly demonstrates the breadth of its formal framework, not the absence of implementation challenges (WHO 2025b). Inspection, communication, cessation support, monitoring, and continued political attention remain necessary after enactment.
6.3. Scope Conditions and Transferability
The proposed mechanism may be particularly relevant where information and advocacy resources are dispersed across organizations, but executive actors can assign responsibilities and influence access to decision-making venues. In these settings, executive intervention could connect resource holders to authoritative venues or help coordinate their activities. Anchoring may be less central when actors have independent access or when authority is dispersed across several venues.
Parliamentary majorities may facilitate executive–legislative cooperation, while coalition arrangements may require negotiated support. Party discipline could reinforce executive commitments, although how it operates requires separate evidence. This case documents a governing-party majority and assigned coordination duties but does not establish that they produced resource conversion. These theoretical scope expectations can guide comparative assessment, including research on emerging tobacco and nicotine regulation (WHO 2023, 2024, 2025a).
6.4. Limitations and Future Research
This exploratory assessment has four limitations. First, unverified links between executive action and resource use limit causal inference within this single case. Second, the 2023 interviews are vulnerable to recall bias and retrospective attribution. Third, document selection was purposive, and no complete search-and-screening log was maintained. Evidence on informal lobbying also remains partial. Fourth, the analysis focuses on statutory design and commencement. It does not assess long-term enforcement or health outcomes. Comparative research should examine reforms with different outcomes. It should also trace actors’ responses to executive interventions across institutional settings.
7. Conclusions
Türkiye’s smoke-free reform combined stronger hospitality coverage with an 18-month transition. Parliamentary records document ministerial endorsement of the coverage amendment. They also show government support for delayed commencement. The July 2009 circular reaffirmed the enacted provisions before the hospitality measures took effect. These actions document specific forms of executive participation in statutory design and preparations for implementation.
The contribution is a provision-level account of how political sponsorship accompanied decisions on statutory coverage and commencement. Executive anchoring remains unverified under the minimum criterion; comparative research should trace resource conversion separately from its effects on statutory design.
Author Contributions
Conceptualization, C.N.G.; Methodology, C.N.G. and R.Ş.; Software, C.N.G.; Validation, R.Ş.; Formal analysis, C.N.G. and R.Ş.; Resources, C.N.G. and R.Ş.; Writing – original draft, C.N.G. and R.Ş.; Visualization, C.N.G.; Funding acquisition, C.N.G. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding
This research was funded by the Kocaeli University Scientific Research Projects Coordination Unit (BAP), Project No. SBA-2026-5547. The funder had no role in the conceptualization of the study, the synthesis and interpretation of the literature, the writing of the manuscript, or the decision to submit the article for publication.
Institutional Review Board Statement
The study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki, and approved by the Social and Human Sciences Ethics Committee of Kocaeli University (protocol code E-10017888-100-120145 and 30 January 2023).
Informed Consent Statement
Informed consent was obtained from all participants involved in the study.
Data Availability Statement
The legal and policy documents analyzed in this study are publicly available from the sources cited. Full interview transcripts cannot be publicly shared because they contain confidential and potentially identifiable information. Anonymized excerpts or documentary source lists may be provided where compatible with participants’ consent and ethical approval.
Acknowledgments
This article draws on interview data originally collected for the CNG’s doctoral thesis. These data were reanalyzed to address the specific research questions of the present study. During manuscript preparation and revision, the authors used ChatGPT (OpenAI) 6.1. Sol for the purposes described in Section 4.4 and Grammarly for language checking. The authors reviewed and edited the outputs and take full responsibility for the content of this publication.
Conflicts of Interest
The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
References
- Beach, Derek, and Rasmus B. Pedersen. 2019. Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines, 2nd ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Bowen, Glenn A. 2009. Document analysis as a qualitative research method. Qualitative Research Journal 9: 27–40. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Collier, David. 2011. Understanding process tracing. PS: Political Science & Politics 44: 823–30. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Cornelsen, Laura, Yvonne McGowan, Laura M. Currie-Murphy, and Charles Normand. 2014. Systematic review and meta-analysis of the economic impact of smoking bans in restaurants and bars. Addiction 109: 720–27. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Crosbie, Eric, Patricia Sosa, and Stanton A. Glantz. 2017. The importance of continued engagement during the implementation phase of tobacco control policies in a middle-income country: The case of Costa Rica. Tobacco Control 26: 60–68. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Dearlove, Joanna V., Stella Aguinaga Bialous, and Stanton A. Glantz. 2002. Tobacco industry manipulation of the hospitality industry to maintain smoking in public places. Tobacco Control 11: 94–104. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Değerli, Hakan, Yasin Acar, and Hasan Giray Ankara. 2025. To quit or not to quit? Estimating the causal effects of Türkiye’s indoor smoking ban on the intentions to quit smoking. BMC Public Health 25: 1367. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Habertürk. 2008. Sigara Yasağı Neleri Etkileyecek? January 11. Available online: https://www.haberturk.com/ekonomi/makro-ekonomi/haber/50926-sigara-yasagi-neleri-etkileyecek (accessed on 23 October 2026).
- Hendlin, Yogi Hale, E. Le Han, and Pamela M. Ling. 2024. Pharmaceuticalisation as the tobacco industry’s endgame. BMJ Global Health 9: e013866. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Hoe, Connie, Caitlin Weiger, and Joanna E. Cohen. 2021. The battle to increase tobacco taxes: Lessons from Philippines and Ukraine. Social Science & Medicine 279: 114001. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Hoe, Connie, Daniela C. Rodriguez, Yeşim Üzümcüoğlu, and Adnan A. Hyder. 2016. “Quitting like a Turk”: How political priority developed for tobacco control in Turkey. Social Science & Medicine 165: 36–45. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Hoe, Connie, Daniela C. Rodriguez, Yeşim Üzümcüoğlu, and Adnan A. Hyder. 2019. Understanding political priority development for public health issues in Turkey: Lessons from tobacco control and road safety. Health Research Policy and Systems 17: 13. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Jenkins-Smith, Hank C., Daniel Nohrstedt, Christopher M. Weible, and Karin Ingold. 2018. The advocacy coalition framework: An overview of the research program. In Theories of the Policy Process, 4th ed. Edited by Christopher M. Weible and Paul A. Sabatier. Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 135–71. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Keklik, Seda, and Derya Gultekin-Karakas. 2018. Anti-tobacco control industry strategies in Turkey. BMC Public Health 18: 282. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Law No. 4207. 1996. Tütün Mamullerinin Zararlarının Önlenmesine Dair Kanun [Law on the Prevention of Harms from Tobacco Products]. Resmî Gazete. no. 22829. Available online: https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/22829.pdf (accessed on 6 August 2026).
- Law No. 5727. 2008. Tütün Mamullerinin Zararlarının Önlenmesine Dair Kanunda Değişiklik Yapılması Hakkında Kanun [Law Amending the Law on the Prevention of Harms from Tobacco Products]. Resmî Gazete. no. 26761. Available online: https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2008/01/20080119-1.htm (accessed on 6 August 2026).
- Law No. 7151. 2018. Sağlıkla Ilgili Bazı Kanun ve Kanun Hükmünde Kararnamelerde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun [Law Amending Certain Health-Related Laws and Decrees]. Resmî Gazete. no. 30616. Available online: https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2018/12/20181205-8.htm (accessed on 6 August 2026).
- Li, Wei, Jonathan J. Pierce, Fang Chen, and Fuguo Wang. 2024. The politics of China’s policy processes: A comparative review of the Advocacy Coalition Framework’s applications to mainland China. Politics & Policy 52: 728–56. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Matthes, Britta K., Praveen Kumar, Sarah Dance, Tom Hird, Angela Carriedo Lutzenkirchen, and Anna B. Gilmore. 2023. Advocacy counterstrategies to tobacco industry interference in policymaking: A scoping review of peer-reviewed literature. Globalization and Health 19: 42. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. 2019. Tütün Mamullerinin Üretim Şekline, Etiketlenmesine ve Denetlenmesine Ilişkin Usul ve Esaslar Hakkında Yönetmelik [Regulation on the Production, Labeling, and Inspection of Tobacco Products]. Resmî Gazete. no. 30701. Available online: https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2019/03/20190301-5.htm (accessed on 24 August 2026).
- Nohrstedt, Daniel, and Tim Heinmiller. 2024. Advocacy coalitions as political organizations. Policy and Society 43: 304–16. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Prime Ministry of Türkiye. 2006. Ulusal Tütün Kontrol Programı Ile Ilgili 2006/29 Sayılı Başbakanlık Genelgesi [Prime-Ministerial Circular No. 2006/29 on the National Tobacco Control Program]. Resmî Gazete. no. 26312. Available online: https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2006/10/20061007-8.htm (accessed on 23 October 2026).
- Prime Ministry of Türkiye. 2009. 4207 Sayılı Kanun Hükümlerinin Uygulanması. Genelge 2009/13 [Implementation of Law No. 4207. Circular No. 2009/13]. Resmî Gazete. July 16, no. 27290. Available online: https://resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2009/07/20090716-9.htm (accessed on 3 November 2026).
- Sabatier, P. A., and Christopher M. Weible. 2007. The advocacy coalition framework: Innovations and clarifications. In Theories of the Policy Process, 2nd ed. Edited by Paul A. Sabatier. Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 189–220. [Google Scholar]
- Sabatier, Paul A., and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, eds. 1993. Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach. Boulder: Westview Press. [Google Scholar]
- Sebrié, Ernesto M., and Stanton A. Glantz. 2007. “Accommodating” smoke-free policies: Tobacco industry’s Courtesy of Choice programme in Latin America. Tobacco Control 16: e6. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Timeturk. 2009. Sigara Yasağı Yargı Yolunda. July 18. Available online: https://www.timeturk.com/tr/2009/07/18/sigara-yasagi-yargi-yolunda.html (accessed on 23 October 2026).
- Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi. 2007a. Trabzon Milletvekili Cevdet Erdöl’ün Tütün Mamullerinin Zararlarının Önlenmesine Dair Kanunda Değişiklik Yapılması Hakkında Kanun Teklifi (2/9) ve Adalet Komisyonu Raporu (S. Sayısı: 55). Appendix to the Proceedings of the 43rd Sitting, 27 December 2007, separately paginated. pp. 1–24, (PDF pp. 166–189). Available online: https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d23/c011/tbmm23011043.pdf#page=166 (accessed on 21 October 2026).
- Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi. 2007b. Tutanak Dergisi, 23. Dönem, 2. Yasama Yılı, Cilt 11, 43. Birleşim, 27 Aralık 2007. Available online: https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d23/c011/tbmm23011043.pdf (accessed on 21 October 2026).
- Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi. 2008a. Tutanak Dergisi, 23. Dönem, 2. Yasama Yılı, Cilt 11, 44. Birleşim, 2 Ocak 2008. Available online: https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d23/c011/tbmm23011044.pdf (accessed on 25 October 2026).
- Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi. 2008b. Tutanak Dergisi, 23. Dönem, 2. Yasama Yılı, Cilt 11, 45. Birleşim, 3 Ocak 2008. Available online: https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d23/c011/tbmm23011045.pdf (accessed on 21 October 2026).
- Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi. 2010. Tütün Mamullerinin Zararlarının Önlenmesine Dair Kanunda Değişiklik Yapılması Hakkında Kanun Teklifi (2/567). Available online: https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/Yasama/KanunTeklifi/f72877be-7582-037b-e050-007f01005610 (accessed on 21 September 2026).
- Türkiye Turizm. 2008. TÜRES: Sigara Yasağı Uygulanmalı. January 1. Available online: https://www.turkiyeturizm.com/turessigara-yasagi-uygulanmali-7768h.htm (accessed on 23 October 2026).
- Ulucanlar, Selda, Gary J. Fooks, and Anna B. Gilmore. 2016. The policy dystopia model: An interpretive analysis of tobacco industry political activity. PLoS Medicine 13: e1002125. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- van der Eijk, Yvette, and Grace Ping Ping Tan. 2023. Tobacco industry’s “behind the scenes” tactics in Singapore. Tobacco Control 32: 280–86. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Wesche, Julius P., Elisabeth Dütschke, Simona O. Negro, and Marko P. Hekkert. 2025. Coalitions, coordination, and contestation: A systematic review of the advocacy coalition framework and its implications for sustainability transitions research. Frontiers in Political Science 6: 1497731. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- WHO FCTC Conference of the Parties. 2007. Decisions. Second Session. Document A/FCTC/COP/2/DIV/9, September 20, Decision FCTC/COP2(7) and Annex 1. pp. 6–15. Available online: https://apps.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/cop2/FCTC_COP2_DIV9-en.pdf (accessed on 3 November 2026).
- World Health Organization. 2023. Urgent Action Needed to Protect Children and Prevent the Uptake of e-Cigarettes. December 14. Available online: https://www.who.int/news/item/14-12-2023-urgent-action-needed-to-protect-children-and-prevent-the-uptake-of-e-cigarettes (accessed on 21 September 2026).
- World Health Organization. 2024. Hooking the Next Generation: How the Tobacco Industry Captures Young Customers. Available online: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240094642 (accessed on 21 September 2026).
- World Health Organization. 2025a. WHO Calls for Urgent Action to Ban Flavoured Tobacco and Nicotine Products. May 30. Available online: https://www.who.int/news/item/30-05-2025-who-calls-for-urgent-action-to-ban-flavoured-tobacco-and-nicotine-products (accessed on 21 September 2026).
- World Health Organization. 2025b. WHO Report on the Global Tobacco Epidemic, 2025: Warning About the Dangers of Tobacco. Available online: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240112063 (accessed on 21 September 2026).
- World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. 2008. Guidelines for Implementation of Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: Protection of Public Health Policies with Respect to Tobacco Control from Commercial and Other Vested Interests of the Tobacco Industry. Available online: https://fctc.who.int/resources/publications/m/item/guidelines-for-implementation-of-article-5.3 (accessed on 21 September 2026).
- World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe. 2012. Tobacco Control in Practice: Article 8—Protection from Exposure to Tobacco Smoke: The Story of Turkey. Available online: https://www.who.int/europe/publications/i/item/WHO-EURO-2012-4433-44196-62406 (accessed on 21 September 2026).
- World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe. 2019. Turkey Opts for Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products. January 15. Available online: https://www.who.int/europe/news-room/15-01-2019-turkey-opts-for-plain-packaging-of-tobacco-products (accessed on 21 September 2026).
- Yamada, Keiko, Nagisa Mori, Mina Kashiwabara, Sakiko Yasuda, Rumi Horie, Hiroshi Yamato, Loic Garçon, and Francisco Armada. 2015. Industry speed bumps on local tobacco control in Japan? The case of Hyogo. Journal of Epidemiology 25: 496–504. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Yüksek Seçim Kurulu. n.d. 1983–2007 Yılları Arası Seçim Çevresine Göre Milletvekili Genel Seçimi Sonuçları: Türkiye Geneli. Available online: https://www.ysk.gov.tr/doc/dosyalar/docs/Milletvekili/1983-2007/Turkiye.pdf (accessed on 25 October 2026).
Disclaimer/Publisher’s Note: The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and contributor(s) and not of MDPI and/or the editor(s). MDPI and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or products referred to in the content. |
© 2026 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license.