Property Rights for the Post-Growth City: Reframing Development in Urban Land Governance

Abstract

Post-growth planning seeks to meet social needs within ecological limits, yet housing, infrastructure and services often depend on development revenues and property appreciation. This paper examines how property arrangements sustain this dependence and how their reconfiguration might support post-growth urban governance. Drawing together post-growth planning and property-rights scholarship, it develops a framework examining who can authorise changes to land, how benefits from its ownership and use are distributed, who can access and continue using it, and who is responsible for its long-term care. This paper uses illustrations from England and Bulgaria to explore development-funded affordable housing and the coordination of maintenance among individual apartment owners. It advances three propositions: environmental restrictions may reinforce exclusion without measures addressing access and redistribution; public control and land value capture may retain dependence on further development; and long-term care requires responsibilities supported by decision-making powers, funding and accountability. The framework identifies tensions between these objectives and helps assess whether provision can endure when development activity declines. It distinguishes development addressing unmet needs from institutional pressures to generate further development, clarifying how property arrangements can support equitable access and continuing care within ecological limits.

1. Introduction

Urban planning faces the challenge of securing adequate housing, infrastructure and public space while reducing the environmental pressures associated with urban development. Green-growth approaches emphasise innovation, investment and resource efficiency as means of reconciling economic expansion with environmental protection [1]. Hickel and Kallis [2], however, question whether sufficiently rapid absolute reductions in resource use and carbon emissions can be achieved alongside continued economic growth. Research by O’Neill et al. [3] further demonstrates the difficulty of combining high social outcomes with resource use within planetary boundaries under existing provisioning arrangements. These debates direct attention towards how needs are met, how resources are distributed and whether collective well-being depends on continued expansion.

Post-growth planning translates these concerns into questions about the organisation of urban space. Savini, Ferreira and von Schönfeld [4] bring together approaches that reconsider planning’s relationship with markets and economic growth. Durrant, Lamker and Rydin [5] examine how planning instruments might support housing and infrastructure provision beyond growth-oriented assumptions. Savini [6] explicitly connects urban degrowth with property relations, zoning and the political construction of land scarcity, while his subsequent work considers the actors and institutional pathways through which degrowth strategies could be advanced [7]. These contributions establish property relations as an important component of post-growth transformation. However, they are less explicit about how powers over development, claims on land benefits, and access to urban space and responsibilities for its upkeep interact to sustain or reduce development dependence. This limits understanding of why arrangements pursuing social or environmental objectives may still depend on continued development. It also leaves unclear which rights and responsibilities could sustain collective provision, i.e., the delivery and upkeep of housing, infrastructure, services and shared urban assets, when development declines. This paper therefore asks: how do property-rights arrangements reproduce dependence on urban development, and how might they be reconfigured to sustain collective provision within ecological limits?

The paper uses post-growth to describe an orientation towards meeting social needs within ecological limits while reducing institutional dependence on expansion. Economic growth, additional construction, rising property values and material consumption are related but distinct processes. Housing shortages, infrastructure deficits and climate adaptation may require substantial physical development. Development dependence refers to a condition in which maintaining provision or fulfilling institutional commitments relies on recurring development-generated revenues or property appreciation. Such dependence can create pressure to facilitate further development even where its justification in terms of needs or ecological compatibility is weak. Financing infrastructure associated with a particular project does not, by itself, establish an ongoing dependence. The question is whether provision requires successive developments and how it would be sustained if that activity declined.

Property-rights scholarship provides concepts for examining these relationships. Schlager and Ostrom [8] distinguish entitlements to access and use resources from powers concerning management, exclusion and transfer. Needham, Buitelaar and Hartmann [9] show how legal and economic rules structure land use and the possibilities for planning intervention. Davy [10] examines the spatial consequences of property and the plurality of relationships through which land is valued and used. Slaev and Shahab [11] further conceptualise property as complex institutional arrangements combining private and common interests. Together, these perspectives support analysis of the allocation and interaction of particular entitlements, rather than attributing uniform characteristics to private, public or collective ownership.

Planning also participates in constituting these arrangements. Shahab and Hengstermann [12] identify uneven engagement with property across planning paradigms and examine planning’s role in producing and transforming entitlements, obligations and exclusions. This perspective extends analysis beyond whether owners accept or resist regulation. Development permission, entitlement to income, occupancy and responsibility for maintenance may belong to different actors, with consequences that emerge through their interaction. Public authority to restrict development, for example, does not itself establish equitable access to existing space or provide resources for its upkeep.

The relationship between property and growth also involves political interests and financial expectations. Molotch’s growth-machine thesis [13] explains how land-based interests mobilise around development and increased land values. Aalbers [14] places housing within processes of financialisation, directing attention to its organisation as a financial asset as well as a means of accommodation. These perspectives illuminate pressures for property-based accumulation, while post-growth planning highlights their implications for collective provision. Durrant et al. [5], for example, question arrangements through which public benefits become tied to generating further development value. Meanwhile, Debrunner and Hartmann [15] demonstrate the importance of strategic land-policy interventions for affordable housing under conditions of densification and land scarcity. Development, value redistribution and equitable access therefore cannot be assumed to advance together.

This paper contributes an integrated framework for examining how interventions in one aspect of property arrangements may support or undermine objectives in another. Its central evaluative question is whether an arrangement can sustain essential provision, equitable access and stewardship when development activity or expected property appreciation declines. The framework is developed through a conceptual synthesis of post-growth planning, property-rights theory and land-governance scholarship. Illustrative examples from England and Bulgaria examine development-linked funding and the coordination of shared responsibilities across fragmented entitlements. They elucidate institutional mechanisms rather than provide a comparative empirical test. The paper argues that ecological restraint requires attention to access and redistribution, that public control and value capture can retain development dependence, and that stewardship requires responsibilities supported by authority and resources. The paper goes on to establish the conceptual foundations and develop the framework, before examining the institutional illustrations, discussing the resulting propositions and concluding with implications for planning and further research.

2. Post-Growth Planning and the Property Question

Post-growth planning and property-rights scholarship offer complementary perspectives on urban development. The former questions whether collective well-being requires continued economic and material expansion; the latter examines the arrangements through which land is controlled, used and exchanged. Their intersection concerns how the allocation of rights and responsibilities shapes development pressures and the capacity to meet needs within ecological limits. Three conceptual relationships underpin the framework: development and institutional dependence, formal entitlements and practical powers, and ecological restraint and distribution.

2.1. From Development to Development Dependence

Post-growth planning evaluates development through its contribution to adequate living conditions and its ecological consequences [4,5,6,7]. Savini [6] connects urban growth to territorial competition, constructions of land scarcity and the organisation of property through zoning. His emphasis on habitability directs attention towards the institutional conditions supporting everyday life. O’Neill et al. [3] similarly distinguish social achievements from the resource use associated with obtaining them. Applied to planning, these perspectives require attention to what development provides, for whom, and through which material and institutional arrangements.

Development dependence concerns the reliance of provision or institutional commitments on recurring development-generated revenues or property appreciation. Such reliance becomes particularly consequential where it creates pressure to facilitate further development despite weak justification in terms of needs or ecological compatibility. This differs from undertaking construction to accommodate additional households or financing infrastructure required by a particular project. These purposes can coexist; the analytical question is whether sustaining provision creates an ongoing requirement for further development.

Different forms of dependence should also be distinguished. A public authority may rely on contributions associated with new construction, while an asset-owning organisation may depend on appreciating property values to support its financial commitments. These arrangements need not produce identical development pressures. Aalbers’s [14] analysis of housing financialisation highlights the significance of financial relationships that cannot be reduced to construction volumes. For the present analysis, the relevant questions concern which commitments depend on development or appreciation, how that dependence influences decisions, and who bears the consequences when expected revenues fail to materialise.

Sufficiency provides a normative basis for evaluating these relationships, emphasising adequate provision for everyone within ecological limits. It requires attention to unmet needs alongside excessive resource consumption [3,6]. A uniform restriction on construction would disregard differences in existing provision, demographic conditions and access to urban resources. Equally, additional floor space does not necessarily improve access for disadvantaged groups. Reducing institutional dependence therefore requires arrangements capable of sustaining adequate provision while allowing the scale and form of development to respond to needs and ecological constraints.

2.2. Property as an Arrangement of Rights and Powers

Property-rights theory challenges the treatment of ownership as a single, indivisible power. Schlager and Ostrom [8] distinguish rights to access and use resources from powers to manage them, excluding others and transfer entitlements. Although developed for natural resources, this distinction helps explain how owners, tenants, public authorities and other users may hold different entitlements concerning the same urban site. Davy [10] further directs attention to the plurality of property relationships and their spatial consequences, while Slaev and Shahab [11] explain how private and common interests interact within complex institutional arrangements.

How individual and collective entitlements are combined depends on the political and legal institutions governing property. Guelton et al. [16] illustrate this variation across European countries, identifying both diverse property-rights regimes and shifts towards stronger private rights and libertarian interpretations of ownership. These differences shape the balance between owners’ powers, public intervention and collective obligations. Reconfiguring property for post-growth objectives therefore requires attention to the institutional context in which particular rights are protected and responsibilities assigned. A measure intended to support collective provision may have different implications depending on who can authorise it, resist it or claim its benefits.

Planning helps define and redistribute the powers associated with land. Needham et al. [9] explain how rules governing land use and exchange structure the scope for intervention, while Shahab and Hengstermann [12] highlight planning’s role in producing and transforming property relations. Through these rules, planning influences who can initiate change, which claims receive protection and what obligations accompany development. These powers do not necessarily coincide: permission to develop does not confer ownership, secure occupation or determine entitlement to income. Understanding their interaction is therefore essential to assessing whether an approved development delivers accessible benefits and establishes workable responsibilities for shared facilities.

The allocation of responsibilities also shapes whether actors can coordinate decisions and sustain shared provision. Havel, Shahab and Załęczna [17] show how negotiated arrangements can clarify actors’ responsibilities and create opportunities for cooperation, while emphasising that these arrangements must be aligned with substantive policy objectives. For post-growth planning, the question is therefore what cooperation enables and whose interests it serves. Agreements that facilitate development may leave ecological limits or unequal access unaddressed, whereas arrangements supporting repair and adaptation require clear responsibilities for financing, implementation and long-term care.

Formal entitlements do not fully explain practical power. Ribot and Peluso [18] distinguish property rights from the broader ability to benefit from resources. Finance, knowledge and institutional support can determine whether rights translate into effective access. This distinction also qualifies reliance on negotiation: holding an entitlement does not ensure an equal capacity to participate in agreements. A post-growth framework must therefore examine both the allocation of rights and the conditions under which different actors can exercise them.

2.3. Ecological Restraint and Distributive Consequences

Property arrangements connect development pressures with the distribution of opportunities and costs. Molotch [13] explains how land-based interests mobilise around development and increased land values. Durrant et al. [5] identify a related institutional tension where public benefits depend on generating further development value. Together, these perspectives suggest that redistributing gains can improve particular outcomes without removing the financial or political relationships sustaining development pressure.

Ecological restraint, understood here as limiting the scale or form of development to reduce environmental pressures, may preserve environmental functions while leaving disadvantaged households unable to obtain adequate space where access remains governed by purchasing power and existing entitlements. Research on affordability under densification demonstrates the importance of accompanying physical planning objectives with deliberate land-policy intervention [15]. Restraint also has consequences beyond protected sites, requiring attention to ecological conditions in locations accommodating redirected development [19]. Its assessment must therefore consider both equitable access and the spatial distribution of environmental effects.

A similar relationship arises between stewardship and resources. Prioritising continued use increases the importance of maintenance and adaptation, but assigning duties does not establish the capacity to fulfil them. Drawing on the distinction between formal rights and practical ability [18], and the institutional allocation of responsibilities [11,17], stewardship must be examined alongside financing, collective decision-making and accountability. Otherwise, obligations may remain unfulfilled or transfer unaffordable costs to occupants. These relationships establish why post-growth capacity cannot be inferred from construction volumes, ownership categories or public powers alone. It depends on how arrangements connect necessary change, equitable access, collective provision and long-term care, while accounting for ecological consequences across locations.

3. A Property-Rights Framework for Post-Growth Urban Governance

This paper develops an analytical framework through a focused conceptual synthesis of post-growth planning, property-rights theory, and land-governance scholarship. The literature selection focused on contributions defining sufficiency and development dependence [4,5,6,7], distinguishing property rights, powers, and responsibilities [8,9,10,11,12], or explaining distribution, access, cooperation, and implementation [9,15,16,17,18,20]. Relevance was assessed in relation to how property arrangements shape development pressures and the capacity to sustain urban provision. The synthesis compares the institutional functions addressed by these contributions and considers their implications under reduced development activity; it does not seek comprehensive coverage or constitute a systematic review.

This comparison informs four analytical dimensions: distinctions between decision powers and use rights [8,9,10,11,12] inform authority to transform land; work on land benefits and development-linked provision [5,9,15] informs distribution; the distinction between formal rights and practical access [18] informs access and security; and research on collective action and resource governance [11,17,20] informs responsibility over time. These are analytical categories derived by relating property scholarship to post-growth concerns, rather than themes established through coding. The synthesis examines how the allocation of rights and responsibilities within each dimension affects the others and whether their combined configuration sustains collective provision under reduced development activity.

The four dimensions distinguish institutional functions relevant to meeting needs over time. Authority concerns decisions about physical transformation; distribution concerns claims on benefits and the financing of provision; access concerns the ability to obtain and retain use; and responsibility concerns sustaining assets and ecological functions. Distinguishing these functions matters because powers to develop, receive income, occupy space and organise maintenance need not belong to the same actors. Their overlaps are therefore relationships to investigate, particularly where exercising one entitlement affects another. Drawing on institutional resource regimes scholarship, which examines property rights alongside public policies governing resource use and protection [20], the framework applies a post-growth question to these relationships: can they sustain adequate provision when development activity or expected appreciation declines? Table 1 summarises the dimensions.

Table 1. Analytical dimensions of property arrangements for post-growth urban governance.

Dimension	Central Analytical Question	Mechanisms to Examine	Post-Growth Orientation	Principal Tension
Authority to transform land	Who can authorise, undertake or prevent change?	Permissions, vetoes, decision rules and coordination powers	Enable necessary change within ecological limits	Restraint may protect incumbent advantages or obstruct adaptation
Distribution of land benefits	Who benefits, and how is collective provision financed?	Income entitlements, value capture, revenue sources and loss allocation	Distribute benefits equitably and reduce development dependence	Redistribution may rely on generating further development value
Access and security	Who can obtain and retain use of urban space?	Occupancy rights, allocation rules, affordability and practical barriers	Secure access for existing and prospective users	Incumbent protection may coexist with exclusion
Responsibility over time	Who sustains assets and ecological functions?	Maintenance duties, financing, monitoring and enforcement	Support long-term care and adaptation	Duties may exceed authority or resources, or impose inequitable costs

3.1. Authority to Transform Land

The first dimension concerns powers to authorise, undertake and prevent changes to land and buildings. These may be distributed among owners, planning authorities, infrastructure providers and occupants. Public permission does not necessarily provide control over the resources required for implementation, while ownership does not authorise every form of development [9]. Analysis therefore identifies both formal decision rights and the practical capacity to coordinate action.

A post-growth assessment examines how decisions establish the need for change and evaluate alternatives. Financial returns and social benefits may coexist; profitability alone cannot distinguish necessary from unnecessary development. Assessment therefore asks which needs a proposal addresses, whether reuse or adaptation could meet them, and how its benefits compare with its ecological costs. Drawing on the importance of assessing ecosystem services across affected locations [19], it also examines whether the spatial scope of decision-making captures environmental consequences beyond the application site.

Powers to prevent change require equivalent attention. Restrictions can protect habitats and valued places, but may also preserve exclusionary arrangements or obstruct coordinated adaptation. Havel et al. [17] show why clarifying responsibilities and enabling cooperation are relevant to implementation. Applied here, coordination must be assessed against substantive objectives: agreement among participating owners does not establish that wider needs or ecological constraints have been addressed.

The framework consequently asks who defines necessity, whose claims enter decisions and what opportunities exist to challenge them. It treats transparent justification, representation of affected groups and revision in light of changing needs as components of governing transformation.

3.2. Distribution of Land Benefits

The second dimension concerns claims on benefits arising from ownership, use and public intervention. Financial benefits include income and appreciation; non-financial benefits include amenities and environmental quality. These may accrue to different actors. Improved public space can benefit occupants while increasing owners’ asset values, and the resulting costs may fall elsewhere. Analysis traces these allocations alongside their implications for further development.

Building on Durrant et al. [5], the framework distinguishes the redistribution of gains from the continuity of the activity generating them. A contribution associated with a necessary project may help finance its infrastructure without creating an ongoing requirement for expansion. Dependence becomes more significant where institutions repeatedly need new development receipts to maintain commitments that persist independently of those projects. The source, timing and purpose of revenue therefore matter as much as the proportion captured.

Income from existing assets may provide a different funding basis, but its conditions also require scrutiny. Rental revenue can depend on unaffordable charges, while financial commitments can expose organisations to expectations of appreciation [14]. Public or collective ownership does not remove these possibilities. The framework asks which commitments depend on new construction, transactions, rents or rising values, and whether each source is compatible with affordable provision and ecological restraint.

This dimension also examines losses and adjustment. If expected revenue declines, institutions may reduce services, increase charges, defer maintenance or seek additional development. Identifying who bears these consequences reveals dependencies that an assessment limited to initial benefit allocation would overlook. Financial continuity and equitable distribution must therefore be evaluated together.

3.3. Access and Security

The third dimension examines whether different groups can obtain and retain use of housing, workplaces, services and shared space. Following Ribot and Peluso [18], analysis distinguishes formal eligibility from practical ability. Income, information, administrative procedures and organisational support can determine whether an entitlement becomes effective access.

Security concerns the durability of that access. Renewal and environmental improvement may improve living conditions while increasing rents, service charges or other costs that make continued occupation difficult. The framework therefore directs attention to whether affordability protections and occupancy rights remain effective as places change [15]. The concern is not only the quantity and quality of space delivered, but also who can remain, on what terms and for how long.

Existing occupants are not the only relevant group. Strong protection can coexist with restricted entry for prospective residents or those outside established membership arrangements. Public and collective ownership require examination of allocation and participation rules [10,11]. The question is whether security for current users is compatible with opportunities for people whose needs remain unmet.

This relationship becomes especially consequential where ecological objectives constrain additional construction. Analysis then examines how existing capacity is allocated, whether underused space can become available through equitable arrangements, and which barriers prevent needs from becoming effective claims. Aggregate floor space or nominal eligibility cannot establish that adequate provision has been achieved. Access provides a separate test of who can actually benefit from the urban resources available.

3.4. Responsibility over Time

The fourth dimension concerns stewardship: the continuing care, maintenance and adaptation of buildings, infrastructure, shared spaces and ecological functions, together with the duties and capacities needed to sustain them. These responsibilities extend beyond development approval or completion, and their costs may arise after initial benefits have been distributed, leaving different actors to bear them. Greater reliance on existing assets makes this relationship between immediate benefits and continuing responsibilities central to post-growth governance.

Sustaining shared assets requires clear responsibilities and workable arrangements for fulfilling them. Where maintenance depends on several owners or organisations, duties must be coordinated across individual and collective interests [11,17]. The framework therefore examines who can authorise necessary work, who must contribute and how disagreements or failures to act are resolved. It also considers whether these arrangements are consistent with public requirements for resource protection, so that private decisions about upkeep support the asset’s wider social and ecological functions [20].

Capacity and cost allocation are assessed together. An association may hold maintenance duties without the authority to collect sufficient contributions. An owner may finance improvements through charges that undermine occupants’ security. Collective management may also depend on unpaid work that participants have unequal capacity to provide. The framework therefore examines whether responsibilities are supported by durable finance, whether costs reflect benefits and ability to contribute, and whether affected non-owners have a voice.

Stewardship also includes adaptation, restoration and, where justified, retirement of assets. Its purpose is to sustain socially and ecologically valuable functions rather than preserve every structure or use indefinitely. Analysis considers how institutions manage such transitions and support affected users without transferring unresolved costs to future generations.

3.5. Interactions Between the Dimensions

The framework’s contribution lies in examining how these dimensions interact. Consider an illustrative programme to retrofit a collectively managed building. Decision rules determine whether work can proceed; benefit arrangements determine who receives savings or appreciation; access protections affect whether occupants can remain; and maintenance obligations determine whether improvements endure. These arrangements can reinforce one another: collective decision-making powers and reliable funding can enable repairs, while affordability protections help existing occupants benefit from them. Tensions arise where the means of advancing one objective undermine another. Financing improvements through higher charges may support maintenance while threatening occupants’ security, whereas limiting charges without alternative funding may leave maintenance duties unsupported. Institutional conflicts can also arise where actors responsible for upkeep lack the authority to approve works or secure contributions.

The implications of any intervention therefore depend on how changes in one dimension are supported or constrained by arrangements in the others. The framework does not prescribe a fixed sequence or hierarchy among the dimensions; their relative importance depends on the arrangement being examined. It instead identifies conditional dependencies: assigning maintenance duties, for example, requires sufficient authority and resources to fulfil them, while protecting occupants from unaffordable charges may require alternative funding.

Applying the framework begins with identifying the relevant asset or institutional arrangement, affected groups and assessment period. Authority is evaluated by whether decision powers enable justified adaptation within ecological limits; observable evidence includes approval and veto rules, documented consideration of reuse alternatives, and unresolved coordination disputes. Distribution is evaluated by the equity and durability of provision; indicators include benefits and costs by group, the share of continuing commitments financed by development receipts, and funding shortfalls under lower-revenue scenarios. Access and security are evaluated by whether existing and prospective users can obtain and retain adequate space; indicators include housing costs relative to income, unmet eligible demand and involuntary displacement. Responsibility over time is evaluated by whether duties are supported and fulfilled; indicators include maintenance funding relative to assessed needs, outstanding repairs, compliance with maintenance obligations and changes in asset or ecological condition. Documents and financial or administrative records can be combined with interviews to distinguish formal arrangements from implementation. Comparisons should use explicit definitions and equivalent groups and periods, with context-appropriate benchmarks for affordability, adequacy and ecological condition. These indicators support investigation of the propositions in Section 5. Assessment then examines how lower development activity or weaker appreciation affects provision across all four dimensions, without assuming that reduced construction is always desirable.

The purpose is to identify institutional dependencies and possible points of intervention rather than produce a single post-growth score. Development dependence is indicated where enduring commitments rely on recurring development receipts or property appreciation and cannot be sustained through available alternative resources when these decline. Receiving developer contributions alone is therefore insufficient to establish dependence: what matters is which obligations persist, how exposed their funding is and whether alternatives are adequate. The significance of that exposure depends on the arrangement and institutional context, rather than a universal numerical threshold. Examining these relationships across the four dimensions can help identify whether reform requires altered decision-making powers, different funding, stronger access protections or better-supported responsibilities.

4. Institutional Illustrations from England and Bulgaria

The following illustrative examples examine two complementary challenges in the delivery and upkeep of housing: securing additional provision and sustaining existing assets. England and Bulgaria were selected because they highlight different relationships within the framework. In England, affordable housing secured through private residential development connects public authority and redistribution with continued market activity. In Bulgaria, the maintenance of shared apartment buildings brings the relationship between individual ownership and collective responsibility into focus, including its implications for occupants with unequal resources. Together, these settings allow the framework to address both dependence on new development and the institutional capacity to support continued use of existing housing. The illustrations develop the conceptual argument rather than provide a systematic comparison or examples of established post-growth practice.

4.1. England: Affordable Housing Provision Through Private Development

England illustrates how a redistributive planning instrument can make affordable housing delivery dependent on private development. Section 106 agreements secure affordable housing alongside market housing: local planning policies establish expected contributions, while legally binding obligations specify what a development must provide [21]. This mechanism makes a substantial contribution to provision. The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) reported that Section 106 contributions funded approximately half of affordable housing provided in England in 2020–2021 [22]. Its significance for post-growth planning lies in the connection between meeting housing needs and securing a continuing flow of private development.

Contributions may take the form of affordable dwellings within a development or payments towards provision elsewhere. Their scale depends partly on development viability. Crosby [23] shows how valuation assumptions, particularly the treatment of land prices, affect the resources available for affordable housing. The CMA also identifies geographical differences: weaker housing markets and more costly sites can constrain contributions even where local needs remain substantial [22]. Planning requirements therefore do not translate automatically into equivalent levels of provision across locations.

The institutional tension becomes apparent when private development slows. Affordable housing obligations can redistribute development benefits, but homes secured through this route depend on the associated projects proceeding. Housing needs may persist while the mechanism expected to address them delivers less. Where alternative provision is insufficient, authorities may consequently face pressure to permit further market housing to obtain the affordable homes attached to it. Dependence arises from this recurring relationship, rather than from the use of developer contributions alone.

The four dimensions clarify how this relationship operates. Authority to grant permission enables obligations to be imposed; viability appraisal and negotiation shape the benefits secured; and tenure, eligibility and affordability conditions determine who can access the homes. Responsibility over time concerns who maintains them and sustains their affordability after completion. Securing an initial contribution therefore does not resolve every question about access and continuing care.

Developer contributions can deliver substantial social value and remain appropriate where development addresses unmet needs within ecological limits. The post-growth question is whether affordable housing provision can continue when the private development supporting it declines. Applying the framework would identify the extent of this exposure and whether alternative funding and delivery arrangements can meet enduring needs without requiring successive market developments.

4.2. Bulgaria: Maintaining Shared Housing Assets Under Individual Ownership

Bulgaria illustrates a complementary problem: individual ownership of apartments does not itself secure the collective capacity to maintain the buildings containing them. Owners control their dwellings, but roofs, façades and common installations require joint decisions and expenditure. Research on Bulgarian property arrangements and housing conditions highlights how fragmented decision-making and unequal resources can obstruct this work [24,25,26,27]. For post-growth planning, the challenge is to sustain existing housing through arrangements that enable owners to act together.

The World Bank’s 2017 housing assessment documented deteriorating multifamily buildings inherited from the socialist period, with maintenance constrained by limited household resources, absent owners, unpaid contributions and weaknesses in homeowners’ associations. It also identified uneven housing demand, with pressures in economically attractive locations alongside vacancies and population decline elsewhere [27]. Additional construction alone cannot resolve the coordination problems affecting existing buildings, particularly where investment prospects are limited.

Subsequent reforms have sought to improve renovation capacity. A 2024 World Bank report notes that legislative amendments allow homeowners’ associations to establish bank accounts and highlights the need for technical support and financial assistance for vulnerable households [28]. These developments illustrate efforts to connect collective responsibilities with the resources and organisational capacity needed to fulfil them.

The underlying issue is the relationship between the scale of ownership and the scale of shared resource use. Research on Bulgarian Black Sea resorts examines this relationship [25], while work on private–common entitlements explains how individual and collective powers coexist [26]. In an apartment building, owners may be able to improve their interiors independently but remain unable to secure essential building-wide repairs without agreement and contributions from others. Research on Sofia similarly highlights the financial and organisational means needed to implement collective objectives [24].

The four dimensions identify where these arrangements may fail. Authority concerns who can approve repairs and organise participation. Distribution concerns how costs and benefits are shared among owners with different resources. Access and security concern whether charges threaten occupants’ ability to remain. Responsibility over time concerns who organises maintenance, monitors the building and responds to unpaid contributions or unfulfilled commitments. Stronger maintenance duties may achieve little without decision-making powers and finance; recovering costs without protection for vulnerable occupants may instead undermine housing security.

The post-growth implication is that retaining existing housing requires more than discouraging demolition or replacement. Repair and adaptation depend on institutions that coordinate individual rights, shared decisions and continuing expenditure. Bulgaria therefore illustrates why efforts to reduce avoidable construction must be accompanied by arrangements that make continued use feasible and affordable.

4.3. Implications for the Framework

The illustrations identify two institutional challenges for sustaining housing provision under post-growth conditions. In England, securing affordable housing through private residential development connects a redistributive objective to the continuation of market-led construction. In Bulgaria, maintaining existing apartment buildings requires collective decisions and resources that individual ownership does not itself ensure. The first concerns dependence on development for additional provision; the second concerns the capacity to sustain existing housing. Together, they show why post-growth planning must address both development-linked funding and the collective arrangements supporting continued use.

The framework clarifies how these challenges connect its four dimensions. Authority to secure affordable housing contributions does not guarantee delivery when the associated development stalls. Ownership of a dwelling does not ensure the collective capacity to maintain the building, while stronger maintenance obligations may threaten occupants’ security if costs become unaffordable. Post-growth assessment therefore needs to examine whether funding, decision-making powers and responsibilities can sustain adequate provision without excluding those they are intended to serve.

5. Discussion: Property Arrangements for Post-Growth Planning

The framework connects post-growth concerns about institutional dependence [4,5,6,7] with property scholarship’s attention to rights and responsibilities [11,12,20]. It examines how arrangements governing transformation, benefits, access and care interact to sustain collective provision under reduced development activity. Three propositions specify conditions under which these arrangements may support or undermine post-growth objectives. They are theoretically derived and informed by the institutional illustrations, rather than empirically tested findings.

5.1. Ecological Restraint Requires Arrangements for Access and Redistribution

The first proposition is that ecological restrictions are more likely to preserve incumbent advantages where access remains governed by purchasing power and existing entitlements, and complementary redistributive arrangements are weak. Restricting transformation can protect ecological functions without changing who controls existing space or can afford to use it. The distributional consequences therefore depend on the institutions accompanying restraint.

This proposition connects Ribot and Peluso’s distinction between rights and practical access [18] with Debrunner and Hartmann’s analysis of land-policy intervention for affordability [15]. Protection of existing uses may secure current occupants while offering little to households seeking entry. Conversely, redevelopment may increase aggregate provision without meeting disadvantaged groups’ needs. The framework directs attention towards allocation rules, occupancy conditions and the distribution of costs, rather than assuming that either protection or additional construction secures equitable access.

Investigating this proposition requires tracing outcomes across both protected locations and areas accommodating redirected development. Building on the spatial assessment of ecosystem services [19], research could examine whether restrictions reduce overall ecological pressures and how the resulting benefits and burdens are distributed among communities. This would help establish whether environmental protection and equitable access advance together or whether improvements in one location impose costs elsewhere.

For planning, the proposition supports combining restraint with credible arrangements for meeting unmet needs through existing space and justified new development. Empirical investigation could compare who gains access, who remains excluded and where ecological pressures occur under different combinations of restrictions and redistributive measures.

5.2. Public Control and Value Capture Can Coexist with Development Dependence

The second proposition is that public institutions are more exposed to pressure for further development where enduring commitments depend heavily on recurring development receipts and alternative funding is limited. Increasing the public share of gains may improve distribution without altering this relationship. The England illustration identifies the mechanism through which authority over transformation can secure benefits while leaving their delivery connected to development activity [21,22,23].

The strength of this dependence varies with the share of provision financed through development, the duration of commitments and the availability of alternative funding. The critical question is whether needs and obligations persist when development receipts decline. This distinguishes temporary exposure associated with an individual project from a continuing reliance on successive developments to sustain provision.

The relationship between public intervention and post-growth capacity depends on how public powers are exercised and financed. European property regimes establish different balances between private entitlements and public intervention [16], while land-based political interests and financial expectations can shape development priorities [13,14]. The framework therefore examines public authority alongside the revenue requirements and institutional commitments influencing its exercise. Stronger control may enable ecological restraint and redistribution, but where collective provision relies on recurring development receipts or property appreciation, it may also be exercised to sustain further development.

A practical application is to assess arrangements under scenarios of lower development activity or weaker appreciation. Analysis would identify which needs persist, which revenues decline and who bears any shortfall. Alternative funding would require its own assessment of affordability, durability and ecological implications. The objective is to establish whether provision can remain adequate without creating pressure for development whose wider justification is weak.

5.3. Stewardship Requires Authority, Resources and Accountability

The third proposition is that maintenance and ecological obligations are more likely to remain unfulfilled, or impose exclusionary costs, where responsible actors lack effective decision powers, reliable finance or arrangements addressing unequal capacity to contribute. Formal responsibility alone cannot sustain a shared asset. The Bulgarian illustration makes this relationship visible through the dependence of individually owned dwellings on collective maintenance [25,26,27].

Where buildings and infrastructure serve multiple owners and users, effective stewardship requires decision-making arrangements that encompass their shared functions and clearly allocate responsibilities [17,25,26]. This becomes particularly important when meeting needs within ecological limits requires greater reliance on maintaining and adapting existing assets. Without the authority and resources to coordinate repairs, individual entitlements may coexist with deteriorating shared facilities. Such failures can undermine adequate provision and make continued use less feasible, weakening efforts to avoid premature replacement.

Stewardship also extends to the shared green spaces and habitats that support urban living conditions. Like buildings and infrastructure, these assets require continuing care, funding and coordination beyond their initial provision. Comparative research on biodiversity planning highlights the importance of connecting local planning practices with wider biodiversity objectives [29]. For post-growth planning, this raises the question of how responsibilities and resources can sustain ecological functions over time, particularly where initial funding has been tied to new development.

The framework adds questions about continuity and distribution: who maintains ecological functions after an intervention is completed, what resources remain available, and whose access or security may be affected by the costs? Enforceable duties require corresponding authority and capacity, while accountability should include affected tenants and users as well as owners. Empirical investigation could examine whether changes in these arrangements improve maintenance and ecological performance without displacement or disproportionate burdens.

5.4. Scope and Research Implications

Together, the propositions suggest relationships through which institutional arrangements may reproduce development pressure, exclusion or inadequate stewardship. The illustrations make these relationships more concrete, but do not establish whether or under what conditions they hold in practice. The propositions’ contribution is to connect potential outcomes: an intervention that improves one dimension may transfer difficulties to another. They therefore provide a basis for empirical investigation of combinations of instruments and entitlements, without assigning inherent post-growth qualities to ownership categories.

The selective synthesis and literature-based illustrations provide a basis for developing the framework, but do not establish how prevalent the proposed mechanisms are, measure their ecological consequences or determine how competing needs should be prioritised. The framework’s applicability beyond the European illustrations also requires further investigation, particularly where informal tenure, infrastructure deficits or limited administrative capacity shape how housing and services are provided. Research on urban informality and land titling in the Global South reinforces the importance of examining these conditions, showing why formal ownership alone cannot explain access, tenure security or improvements in provision [30,31].

Future research should distinguish reduced construction from declining appreciation and examine their effects on funding, access and maintenance separately. Comparative and longitudinal studies could trace these relationships alongside changes in occupancy, service provision, material consumption and ecological conditions. Such work would assess whether reducing institutional dependence produces socially and ecologically preferable outcomes, rather than treating lower development activity as sufficient evidence of progress.

6. Conclusions

This paper has developed a property-rights framework for examining how urban needs can be met within ecological limits while reducing institutional dependence on development. It distinguishes construction justified by unmet needs from arrangements that require recurring development revenues or property appreciation to sustain collective provision. This distinction allows post-growth planning to accommodate necessary physical change while questioning the institutional pressures that make further development a prerequisite for fulfilling enduring commitments.

The framework connects four dimensions: authority to transform land, distribution of land benefits, access and security, and responsibility over time. Its contribution lies in examining their interaction and asking whether provision remains viable under reduced development activity. An arrangement may redistribute gains while retaining funding dependencies, protecting existing uses and excluding prospective users, or assigning maintenance duties without providing the capacity to fulfil them. These relationships cannot be inferred from ownership categories or the extent of public control alone.

The illustrations from England and Bulgaria show how the framework can be used to examine exposure to development-linked funding and difficulties coordinating shared responsibilities across fragmented entitlements. They help explain the institutional relationships underlying three conceptual propositions, without providing an empirical test. Ecological restraint is more likely to preserve incumbent advantages where access and redistribution remain inadequate. Public institutions are more exposed to development pressure where enduring commitments depend on recurring receipts and alternatives are limited. Stewardship obligations are more likely to remain unfulfilled or impose exclusionary costs where authority, resources and accountability are insufficient.

These propositions require empirical investigation. Comparative and longitudinal studies could examine whether development restrictions are associated with changes in affordability and access under different redistributive arrangements; whether reliance on development receipts exposes provision to funding shortfalls and creates pressure to approve further development; and whether maintenance outcomes vary with decision-making powers, financial resources and accountability. Relevant evidence could include housing costs relative to incomes, the share of provision funded by developer contributions, maintenance expenditure and outstanding repairs, supported by interviews tracing how these arrangements influence decisions. Such research should distinguish changes in construction from changes in property values and investigate the framework across institutional settings beyond the European illustrations.

For planning practice, the framework provides a basis for assessing reforms through the dependencies they create, retain or reduce. When evaluating a funding mechanism or maintenance arrangement, planners can use the four dimensions to identify who can act, who benefits, whose access is protected and whether continuing duties have adequate support. Its central question is whether property arrangements enable institutions to meet needs and sustain shared assets when further development is ecologically constrained or financially uncertain. Progress towards post-growth urban governance would therefore be assessed through the durability and equity of provision alongside its ecological consequences, with necessary development remaining a means of meeting needs rather than an institutional requirement in itself.