Games

28 pages, 832 KiB

Open AccessFeature PaperArticle

Two-Tier Marketplace with Multi-Resource Bidding and Strategic Pricing for Multi-QoS Services

by Samira Habli, Rachid El-Azouzi, Essaid Sabir, Mandar Datar, Halima Elbiaze and Mohammed Sadik

Games 2025, 16(2), 20; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16020020 - 21 Apr 2025

Viewed by 117

Abstract

Fog computing introduces a new dimension to the network edge by pooling diverse resources (e.g., processing power, memory, and bandwidth). However, allocating resources from heterogeneous fog nodes often faces limited capacity. To overcome these limitations, integrating fog nodes with cloud resources is crucial, [...] Read more.

Fog computing introduces a new dimension to the network edge by pooling diverse resources (e.g., processing power, memory, and bandwidth). However, allocating resources from heterogeneous fog nodes often faces limited capacity. To overcome these limitations, integrating fog nodes with cloud resources is crucial, ensuring that Service Providers (SPs) have adequate resources to deliver their services efficiently. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic model to describe the competition among non-cooperative SPs as they bid for resources from both fog and cloud environments, managed by an Infrastructure Provider (InP), to offer paid services to their end-users. In our game model, each SP bids for the resources it requires, determining its willingness to pay based on its specific service demands and quality requirements. Resource allocation prioritizes the fog environment, which offers local access with lower latency but limited capacity. When fog resources are insufficient, the remaining demand is fulfilled by cloud resources, which provide virtually unlimited capacity. However, this approach has a weakness in that some SPs may struggle to fully utilize the resources allocated in the Nash equilibrium-balanced cloud solution. Specifically, under a nondiscriminatory pricing scheme, the Nash equilibrium may enable certain SPs to acquire more resources, granting them a significant advantage in utilizing fog resources. This leads to unfairness among SPs competing for fog resources. To address this issue, we propose a price differentiation mechanism among SPs to ensure a fair allocation of resources at the Nash equilibrium in the fog environment. We establish the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium and analyze its key properties. The effectiveness of the proposed model is validated through simulations using Amazon EC2 instances, where we investigate the impact of various parameters on market equilibrium. The results show that SPs may experience profit reductions as they invest to attract end-users and enhance their quality of service QoS. Furthermore, unequal access to resources can lead to an imbalance in competition, negatively affecting the fairness of resource distribution. The results demonstrate that the proposed model is coherent and that it offers valuable information on the allocation of resources, pricing strategies, and QoS management in cloud- and fog-based environments. Full article

(This article belongs to the Section Non-Cooperative Game Theory)

► Show Figures

Figure 1

28 pages, 768 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Procedurally Fair Co-Determination with Endogeneous Value Uncertainty: An Experiment

by Werner Güth, Ludivine Martin, Tibor Neugebauer and Sotiria Xanalatou

Games 2025, 16(2), 19; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16020019 - 21 Apr 2025

Viewed by 335

Abstract

We present an experimental test of a procedurally fair co-determination mechanism where group members reduce their value uncertainty before submitting bids for a joint project. The results suggest a relatively efficient mechanism, with unprofitable projects being largely rejected and profitable ones accepted. Repeated [...] Read more.

We present an experimental test of a procedurally fair co-determination mechanism where group members reduce their value uncertainty before submitting bids for a joint project. The results suggest a relatively efficient mechanism, with unprofitable projects being largely rejected and profitable ones accepted. Repeated interactions tended to enhance the efficiency, while uncertain information reduced it. The subjects invested surprisingly little search effort to reduce the uncertainty about the costs and benefits, and appeared to trade off search costs against higher bids. Full article

(This article belongs to the Section Behavioral and Experimental Game Theory)

► Show Figures

Figure 1

16 pages, 5600 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Cultural Dissemination on Evolving Networks: A Modified Axelrod Model Based on a Rewiring Process

by Yuri Perez, Fabio Henrique Pereira and Pedro Henrique Triguis Schimit

Games 2025, 16(2), 18; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16020018 - 17 Apr 2025

Viewed by 142

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the classical Axelrod model of cultural dissemination under an adaptive network framework. Unlike the original model, we place agents on a complex network, where they cut connections with any agent that does not share at least one cultural [...] Read more.

In this paper, we investigate the classical Axelrod model of cultural dissemination under an adaptive network framework. Unlike the original model, we place agents on a complex network, where they cut connections with any agent that does not share at least one cultural trait. This rewiring process alters the network topology, and key parameters—such as the number of traits, the neighborhood search range, and the degree-based preferential attachment exponent—also influence the distribution of cultural traits. Unlike conventional Axelrod models, our approach introduces a dynamic network structure where the rewiring mechanism allows agents to actively modify their social connections based on cultural similarity. This adaptation leads to network fragmentation or consolidation depending on the interaction among model parameters, offering a framework to study cultural homogeneity and diversity. The results show that, while long-range reconnections can promote more homogeneous clusters in certain conditions, variations in the local search radius and preferential attachment can lead to rich and sometimes counterintuitive dynamics. Extensive simulations demonstrate that this adaptive mechanism can either increase or decrease cultural diversity, depending on the interplay of network structure and cultural dissemination parameters. These findings have practical implications for understanding opinion dynamics and cultural polarization in social networks, particularly in digital environments where rewiring mechanisms are analogous to recommendation systems or user-driven connection adjustments. Full article

(This article belongs to the Section Learning and Evolution in Games)

► Show Figures

Figure 1

6 pages, 190 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Von Neumann–Morgenstern Hypergraphs

by Stefano Vannucci

Games 2025, 16(2), 17; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16020017 - 15 Apr 2025

Viewed by 168

Abstract

A simple hypergraph H with vertex set X and edge set

E

is representable by Von Neumann–Morgenstern (VNM)-stable sets—or VNM—if there exists an irreflexive simple digraph D with vertex set X such that each edge of H is a VNM-stable set of D [...] Read more.

A simple hypergraph H with vertex set X and edge set

E

is representable by Von Neumann–Morgenstern (VNM)-stable sets—or VNM—if there exists an irreflexive simple digraph D with vertex set X such that each edge of H is a VNM-stable set of D. It is shown that a simple hypergraph H is VNM if and only if each edge of H is a maximal clique of the conjugation graph of H. A related algorithm that identifies finite VNM hypergraphs is also provided. Full article

19 pages, 392 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Analysis of the Competition of the South-Eastern Railway of Peru Through a Timetable Auction

by Augusto Aliaga-Miranda, Luis Ricardo Flores-Vilcapoma, Christian Efrain Raqui-Ramirez, José Luis Claudio-Pérez, Yadira Yanase-Rojas and Jovany Pompilio Espinoza-Yangali

Games 2025, 16(2), 16; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16020016 - 7 Apr 2025

Viewed by 260

Abstract

Our research analyzes the design of an auction model for railway transportation on the South-East Railway of Peru, managed by Ferrocarril Transandino S.A. (Fetransa) and operated by PeruRail. Initially, the regulatory framework aimed to promote competition in railway transportation through timetable auctions and [...] Read more.

Our research analyzes the design of an auction model for railway transportation on the South-East Railway of Peru, managed by Ferrocarril Transandino S.A. (Fetransa) and operated by PeruRail. Initially, the regulatory framework aimed to promote competition in railway transportation through timetable auctions and infrastructure access. However, the concession has resulted in a vertically integrated structure that favors PeruRail, which faces minimal direct competition, controls high-demand time slots, and hinders the entry of other operators due to strategic and structural access barriers. To address these distortions, we propose reforming the auction mechanism to neutralize these advantages and enhance competition. In this revised framework, the track usage fee will serve as the competitive factor, with the highest bid above a minimum base rate securing the allocation. Additionally, we propose the implementation of asymmetric tariffs to compensate for the higher costs faced by operators with fewer economies of scale, technological optimizations to facilitate equitable access to time slots, and stricter oversight mechanisms to ensure transparency in timetable allocation. These measures aim to balance the market and safeguard competition through a more equitable and efficient auction design. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Applications of Game Theory to Industrial Organization)

► Show Figures

Figure 1

8 pages, 215 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Biased-Manager Hiring in a Market with Network Externalities and Product Compatibility

by Shih-Hao Huang, Chien-Shu Tsai, Jen-Yao Lee and Su-Ching Tsai

Games 2025, 16(2), 15; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16020015 - 21 Mar 2025

Viewed by 1140

Abstract

This paper studies biased-manager hiring in a market with network externalities and product compatibility. We show that the aggressivity of a biased manager has a non-linear relationship with product compatibility; however, since both owners want to hire aggressive managers, product compatibility is irrelevant [...] Read more.

This paper studies biased-manager hiring in a market with network externalities and product compatibility. We show that the aggressivity of a biased manager has a non-linear relationship with product compatibility; however, since both owners want to hire aggressive managers, product compatibility is irrelevant to the type of manager the owner hires. In Cournot competition, product compatibility is crucial in alleviating the “prisoner’s dilemma” due to the net network effect of network externalities with product compatibility. In Bertrand competition, the “prisoner’s dilemma” is resolved when the augmented net network effect of product compatibility is large. Full article

(This article belongs to the Section Applied Game Theory)

17 pages, 530 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Greenwashing Risks in Environmental Quality Competition: Detection and Deterrence

by Arka Mukherjee and Subhadip Ghosh

Games 2025, 16(2), 14; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16020014 - 11 Mar 2025

Viewed by 735

Abstract

The rising prevalence of greenwashing by firms has emerged as a major concern for regulatory authorities over the past decade. This paper examines the impact of regulation on firms’ strategic decisions regarding greenwashing and environmental quality in an oligopolistic market. We model two [...] Read more.

The rising prevalence of greenwashing by firms has emerged as a major concern for regulatory authorities over the past decade. This paper examines the impact of regulation on firms’ strategic decisions regarding greenwashing and environmental quality in an oligopolistic market. We model two firms that compete on environmental quality and greenwashing levels, operating under the oversight of a regulatory authority. The authority’s policy instruments include a detection mechanism and fines imposed on firms engaging in greenwashing. Using a differential game-theoretical framework, we examine the effectiveness of regulatory interventions like detection and penalties in reducing greenwashing behavior and enhancing environmental quality. Additionally, we discuss the post-detection trajectories of both firms, providing insights into the effects on consumer perceptions and market competition. We find that while regulation can reduce greenwashing as expected, it may also reduce firms’ environmental quality efforts. Indeed, when penalties are sufficiently high, the marginal returns on investment in greenwashing exceed those from actual green quality improvements. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Applications of Differential Games and Related Models in Mathematics and Economics)

► Show Figures

Figure 1

25 pages, 808 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Sharing Price Announcements

by Maarten Janssen and Vladimir Karamychev

Games 2025, 16(2), 13; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16020013 - 10 Mar 2025

Viewed by 684

Abstract

We present a simple model where, before competing in prices, firms announce which prices they intend to choose. Deviating from these announcements involves a cost. We show that sharing pricing intentions results in prices being set above their competitive levels. All equilibria result [...] Read more.

We present a simple model where, before competing in prices, firms announce which prices they intend to choose. Deviating from these announcements involves a cost. We show that sharing pricing intentions results in prices being set above their competitive levels. All equilibria result in prices that are higher than in the absence of announcements. When the deviation cost of not sticking to the price announcement is high, the unique equilibrium market outcome is asymmetric, as with price leadership. When this cost is low, a symmetric equilibrium exists with even higher prices. Product differentiation is a key ingredient to these results. Full article

► Show Figures

Figure 1

37 pages, 427 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Structured Equilibria for Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information and Dependent Types

by Nasimeh Heydaribeni and Achilleas Anastasopoulos

Games 2025, 16(2), 12; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16020012 - 3 Mar 2025

Viewed by 947

Abstract

We consider a dynamic game with asymmetric information where each player privately observes a noisy version of a (hidden) state of the world V, resulting in dependent private observations. We study the structured perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBEs) that use private beliefs in [...] Read more.

We consider a dynamic game with asymmetric information where each player privately observes a noisy version of a (hidden) state of the world V, resulting in dependent private observations. We study the structured perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBEs) that use private beliefs in their strategies as sufficient statistics for summarizing their observation history. The main difficulty in finding the appropriate sufficient statistic (state) for the structured strategies arises from the fact that players need to construct (private) beliefs on other players’ private beliefs on V, which, in turn, would imply that one needs to construct an infinite hierarchy of beliefs, thus rendering the problem unsolvable. We show that this is not the case: each player’s belief on other players’ beliefs on V can be characterized by her own belief on V and some appropriately defined public belief. We then specialize this setting to the case of a Linear Quadratic Gaussian (LQG) non-zero-sum game, and we characterize structured PBEs with linear strategies that can be found through a backward/forward algorithm akin to dynamic programming for the standard LQG control problem. Unlike the standard LQG problem, however, some of the required quantities for the Kalman filter are observation-dependent and, thus, cannot be evaluated offline through a forward recursion. Full article

(This article belongs to the Section Learning and Evolution in Games)

► Show Figures

Figure A1

14 pages, 352 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Game Theory Framework for Mitigating the Cost Pendulum in Public Construction Projects

by Yahel Giat and Amichai Mitelman

Games 2025, 16(2), 11; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16020011 - 3 Mar 2025

Viewed by 861

Abstract

The coexistence of the winner’s curse and cost overruns in the construction industry implies a cost pendulum in which the winning bid is undervalued, whereas the final payment to the contractor is overvalued. We posit that this results from a strategic interaction between [...] Read more.

The coexistence of the winner’s curse and cost overruns in the construction industry implies a cost pendulum in which the winning bid is undervalued, whereas the final payment to the contractor is overvalued. We posit that this results from a strategic interaction between three stakeholders: the public agency (PA), the project manager (PM), and the winning contractor, and we propose a game-theoretic framework to model this dynamic. In the current state of practice, the subgame between the contractor and the PM leads to opportunistic contractor behavior and lenient supervision, resulting in increased costs for the PA. We analyze how procedural and cultural interventions by the PA, specifically shifting from a low-bid to an average-bid auction and incentivizing stricter PM oversight, alter the strategic equilibrium. Our findings indicate that while each change alone provides limited improvement, implementing both significantly reduces cost overruns by aligning stakeholder incentives. The findings of this analysis provide insight into how public agencies can mitigate the widespread problem of cost overruns. Full article

(This article belongs to the Section Applied Game Theory)

► Show Figures

Figure 1

Journal Menu

Journal Browser

Games, Volume 16, Issue 2 (April 2025) – 10 articles

Further Information

Guidelines

MDPI Initiatives

Follow MDPI