Games, Volume 11, Issue 3

I designed an experiment to study the persistence of the prevailing levels of reasoning across games. Instead of directly comparing the k-level(s) of reasoning for each game, I used cognitive load to manipulate the strategic environment by imposing v...

Given the importance of perceived susceptibility to a disease in adopting preventive behaviors, and the negative impact of optimism bias on prevention, this paper aimed to explore to what extent comparative optimism bias (understood as the tendency t...

We propose a framework in order to econometrically estimate case-based learning and apply it to empirical data from twelve 2 × 2 mixed strategy equilibria experiments. Case-based learning allows agents to explicitly incorporate information avai...

We show that even if information transmission through an honest outside agency is not possible due to the possibility of collusion between the firms and the outside agency, information transmission is still possible through technology licensing. Howe...

This paper examines the idea that adherence to social rules is in part driven by moral emotions and the ability to recognize the emotions of others. Moral emotions like shame and guilt produce negative feelings when social rules are transgressed. The...

Intuitively, we expect that players who are allowed to engage in costless communication before playing a game would be foolish to agree on an inefficient outcome amongst the set of equilibria. At the same time, however, such preplay communication has...

In the much-studied Centipede Game, which resembles the Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma, two players successively choose between (1) cooperating, by continuing play, or (2) defecting and terminating play. The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium implie...

Lower one- or two-dimensional coordination, or potential games, are popularly used to model interactive behavior, such as innovation diffusion and cultural evolution. Typically, this involves determining the “better” of competing solution...

In this paper, I develop a two-stage game of pollution abatement technology adoption in a Cournot oligopoly to investigate a firm’s decision to adopt pollution abatement technology. In particular, I study the adoption incentives and welfare imp...

When groups face difficult problems, the voices of experts may be lost in the noise of others’ contributions. We present results from a “naturally noisy” setting, a large first-year undergraduate class, in which the expert’s v...