Special Issue "Behavioral Game Theory"

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (31 July 2020) | Viewed by 9343

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Special Issue Editor

Dr. Russell Golman
E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Interests: behavioral decision; behavioral game theory; strategic deliberation; complex social dynamics

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Humans display pervasive and systematic departures from rationality, which cannot be accounted for by the traditional Nash equilibrium prediction or its various refinements. This has led to the growth of behavioral game theory, which acknowledges bounded rationality, learning, and social preferences. This special issue of Games brings together articles about how people actually make strategic decisions in game theoretic situations. We are looking for both theory and experiments, and especially for research that ties them together. We are particularly interested in the process of strategic decision making, and in research that models or observes response time, attention during deliberation, and/or stochastic choice in games.

Dr. Russell Golman
Guest Editor

Manuscript Submission Information

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Keywords

  • bounded rationality
  • cognitive hierarchy theory
  • dual accumulator model
  • level-k reasoning
  • limited iterated reasoning
  • noisy introspection
  • payoff sensitivity
  • psychological game theory
  • quantal response equilibrium
  • salience

Published Papers (6 papers)

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Editorial

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Editorial
New Directions in Behavioral Game Theory: Introduction to the Special Issue
Games 2020, 11(4), 50; https://doi.org/10.3390/g11040050 - 01 Nov 2020
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1081
Abstract
Behavioral game theory accounts for how people actually make strategic decisions by incorporating social utility, limited iterated reasoning, and learning [...] Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Behavioral Game Theory)

Research

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Article
Cost of Reasoning and Strategic Sophistication
Games 2020, 11(3), 40; https://doi.org/10.3390/g11030040 - 22 Sep 2020
Cited by 4 | Viewed by 1106
Abstract
I designed an experiment to study the persistence of the prevailing levels of reasoning across games. Instead of directly comparing the k-level(s) of reasoning for each game, I used cognitive load to manipulate the strategic environment by imposing variations on the subject’s [...] Read more.
I designed an experiment to study the persistence of the prevailing levels of reasoning across games. Instead of directly comparing the k-level(s) of reasoning for each game, I used cognitive load to manipulate the strategic environment by imposing variations on the subject’s cost of reasoning and their first- and second-order beliefs. Subjects have systematic changes in k-level(s) of reasoning across games. That finding suggests that subjects are responsive to changes in the strategic environment. Changes in k-level(s) of reasoning are mostly consistent with the endogenous depth of reasoning model when subjects are more cognitively capable or facing less cognitively capable opponents. Subjects have cognitive bounds, but often choose a lower-type action due to their beliefs about their opponents. Finally, cognitive ability plays a significant role in subjects making strategic adjustments when facing different strategic environments. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Behavioral Game Theory)
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Article
Estimating Case-Based Learning
Games 2020, 11(3), 38; https://doi.org/10.3390/g11030038 - 15 Sep 2020
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 1326
Abstract
We propose a framework in order to econometrically estimate case-based learning and apply it to empirical data from twelve 2 × 2 mixed strategy equilibria experiments. Case-based learning allows agents to explicitly incorporate information available to the experimental subjects in a simple, compact, [...] Read more.
We propose a framework in order to econometrically estimate case-based learning and apply it to empirical data from twelve 2 × 2 mixed strategy equilibria experiments. Case-based learning allows agents to explicitly incorporate information available to the experimental subjects in a simple, compact, and arguably natural way. We compare the estimates of case-based learning to other learning models (reinforcement learning and self-tuned experience weighted attraction learning) while using in-sample and out-of-sample measures. We find evidence that case-based learning explains these data better than the other models based on both in-sample and out-of-sample measures. Additionally, the case-based specification estimates how factors determine the salience of past experiences for the agents. We find that, in constant sum games, opposing players’ behavior is more important than recency and, in non-constant sum games, the reverse is true. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Behavioral Game Theory)
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Article
Valuable Cheap Talk and Equilibrium Selection
Games 2020, 11(3), 34; https://doi.org/10.3390/g11030034 - 20 Aug 2020
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 1434
Abstract
Intuitively, we expect that players who are allowed to engage in costless communication before playing a game would be foolish to agree on an inefficient outcome amongst the set of equilibria. At the same time, however, such preplay communication has been suggested as [...] Read more.
Intuitively, we expect that players who are allowed to engage in costless communication before playing a game would be foolish to agree on an inefficient outcome amongst the set of equilibria. At the same time, however, such preplay communication has been suggested as a rationale for expecting Nash equilibria in general. This paper presents a plausible formal model of cheap talk that distinguishes and resolves these possibilities. Players are assumed to have an unlimited opportunity to send messages before playing an arbitrary game. Using an extension of fictitious play beliefs, minimal assumptions are made concerning which messages about future actions are credible and hence contribute to final beliefs. In this environment, it is shown that meaningful communication among players leads to a Nash equilibrium (NE) of the action game. Within the set of NE, efficiency then turns out to be a consequence of imposing optimality on the cheap talk portion of the extended game. This finding contrasts with previous “babbling” results. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Behavioral Game Theory)
Article
With Potential Games, Which Outcome Is Better?
Games 2020, 11(3), 33; https://doi.org/10.3390/g11030033 - 17 Aug 2020
Cited by 3 | Viewed by 1469
Abstract
Lower one- or two-dimensional coordination, or potential games, are popularly used to model interactive behavior, such as innovation diffusion and cultural evolution. Typically, this involves determining the “better” of competing solutions. However, examples have demonstrated that different measures of a “good” choice can [...] Read more.
Lower one- or two-dimensional coordination, or potential games, are popularly used to model interactive behavior, such as innovation diffusion and cultural evolution. Typically, this involves determining the “better” of competing solutions. However, examples have demonstrated that different measures of a “good” choice can lead to conflicting conclusions; a fact that reflects the history of game theory in equilibrium selection. This behavior is totally explained while extending the analysis to the full seven-dimensional class of potential games, which includes coordination games. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Behavioral Game Theory)
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Article
The Intuition of Punishment: A Study of Fairness Preferences and Cognitive Ability
Games 2020, 11(2), 21; https://doi.org/10.3390/g11020021 - 07 May 2020
Cited by 3 | Viewed by 2410
Abstract
Can differences in cognitive reflection explain other-regarding behavior? To test this, I use the three-item Cognitive Reflection Task to classify individuals as intuitive or reflective and correlate this measure with choices in three games that each subject participates in. The main sample consists [...] Read more.
Can differences in cognitive reflection explain other-regarding behavior? To test this, I use the three-item Cognitive Reflection Task to classify individuals as intuitive or reflective and correlate this measure with choices in three games that each subject participates in. The main sample consists of 236 individuals who completed the dictator game, ultimatum game and a third-party punishment task. Subjects afterwards completed the three-item Cognitive Reflection Test. Results showed that intuitive individuals acted more prosocially in all social dilemma tasks. These individuals were more likely to serve as a norm enforcer and third-party punish a selfish act in the dictator game. Reflective individuals were found more likely to act consistently in a self-interested manner across the three games. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Behavioral Game Theory)
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