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Games, Volume 11, Issue 2 (June 2020) – 8 articles

Cover Story (view full-size image): A three-player (large country, small country, and terrorist organization) hierarchical differential game is studied to analyze Europe’s refugee situation, in which terrorists may take advantage of the Open Door Policy and enter Europe as refugees. Two scenarios are considered: myopia (countries ignore each other’s security efforts and the terrorist group only considers the weakest link’s security) and full awareness. Equilibria are compared for a full awareness model under varying degrees of time patience for the large country. With a patient large country, full awareness yields a stable equilibrium characterized by larger investments in security but more terrorist attacks than the myopic model. However, continental safety is higher with myopic players than with full awareness. View this paper
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Article
The Refugee Game: The Relationship between Individual Security Expenditures and Collective Security
Games 2020, 11(2), 24; https://doi.org/10.3390/g11020024 - 04 Jun 2020
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 2021
Abstract
This paper studies a three player hierarchical differential game (with a large country, a small country, and a terrorist organization), to analyze the actual European refugee situation. Terrorists may enter Europe as refugees, taking advantage of the Open Door Policy, to attack both [...] Read more.
This paper studies a three player hierarchical differential game (with a large country, a small country, and a terrorist organization), to analyze the actual European refugee situation. Terrorists may enter Europe as refugees, taking advantage of the Open Door Policy, to attack both countries. There are two scenarios: myopia and full awareness. Countries are myopic when they ignore each other’s security efforts, and the terrorist group only considers the weakest link’s security efforts. A comparison between the scenarios shows that for an extremely impatient large country, full awareness yields a greater level of security effort for the large country, a greater level of security effort for the small country, and more terrorist attacks. This is, however, an unstable equilibrium. The full awareness model with a patient large country is stable and lies in between the previous model and the myopic model. Although it yields larger investments in security, this still results in more terrorist attacks than the myopic model. Continental safety is higher in the myopic model than in the full awareness model. Full article
Article
The Role of Suggestions and Tips in Distorting a Third Party’s Decision
Games 2020, 11(2), 23; https://doi.org/10.3390/g11020023 - 19 May 2020
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 1803
Abstract
This paper experimentally investigates the impact of suggestive messages and tipping on a third party’s judgment. The experimental design uses a model with three players, wherein two players (A and B) create a joint project, and the third player (C) decides how to [...] Read more.
This paper experimentally investigates the impact of suggestive messages and tipping on a third party’s judgment. The experimental design uses a model with three players, wherein two players (A and B) create a joint project, and the third player (C) decides how to divide the project’s earnings between the first two players. In two treatments, player B has an opportunity to influence player C’s decision via a numeric message or an ex-post tip. The main finding of this paper is that giving player B the option to suggest a specific amount to the allocator does not increase his share. In contrast, when player C knows that player B can send him a tip, the share awarded to player B increases. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Experiments on Dishonesty in Strategic Interactions)
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Article
Dynamic Durable Goods Monopoly and Market Power
Games 2020, 11(2), 22; https://doi.org/10.3390/g11020022 - 18 May 2020
Viewed by 1732
Abstract
We analyze a vertically differentiated market for an imperfectly durable good served by a monopolist in an infinite-horizon, discrete-time game. Our goal is to identify the Markov perfect stationary equilibria where the seller can maintain his monopoly power. We establish that the set [...] Read more.
We analyze a vertically differentiated market for an imperfectly durable good served by a monopolist in an infinite-horizon, discrete-time game. Our goal is to identify the Markov perfect stationary equilibria where the seller can maintain his monopoly power. We establish that the set of parameters supporting a monopoly outcome is larger when the seller offers different quality versions of the same product. Hence, our results suggest that, when the innate durability of a product is high, the seller should offer different quality versions of the product. Full article
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Article
The Intuition of Punishment: A Study of Fairness Preferences and Cognitive Ability
Games 2020, 11(2), 21; https://doi.org/10.3390/g11020021 - 07 May 2020
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1998
Abstract
Can differences in cognitive reflection explain other-regarding behavior? To test this, I use the three-item Cognitive Reflection Task to classify individuals as intuitive or reflective and correlate this measure with choices in three games that each subject participates in. The main sample consists [...] Read more.
Can differences in cognitive reflection explain other-regarding behavior? To test this, I use the three-item Cognitive Reflection Task to classify individuals as intuitive or reflective and correlate this measure with choices in three games that each subject participates in. The main sample consists of 236 individuals who completed the dictator game, ultimatum game and a third-party punishment task. Subjects afterwards completed the three-item Cognitive Reflection Test. Results showed that intuitive individuals acted more prosocially in all social dilemma tasks. These individuals were more likely to serve as a norm enforcer and third-party punish a selfish act in the dictator game. Reflective individuals were found more likely to act consistently in a self-interested manner across the three games. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Behavioral Game Theory)
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Article
Game Theoretic Modeling of Infectious Disease Transmission with Delayed Emergence of Symptoms
Games 2020, 11(2), 20; https://doi.org/10.3390/g11020020 - 20 Apr 2020
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 2056
Abstract
Modeling the spread of infectious diseases and social responses is one method that can help public health policy makers improve the control of epidemic outbreaks and make better decisions about vaccination costs, the number of mandatory vaccinations, or investment in media efforts to [...] Read more.
Modeling the spread of infectious diseases and social responses is one method that can help public health policy makers improve the control of epidemic outbreaks and make better decisions about vaccination costs, the number of mandatory vaccinations, or investment in media efforts to inform the public of disease threats. Incubation period—the period when an individual has been exposed to a disease and could be infectious but is not yet aware of it—is one factor that can affect an epidemic outbreak, and considering it when modeling outbreaks can improve model accuracy. A change in outbreak activity can occur from the time a person becomes infected until they become aware of infection when they can transmit the disease but their social group considers them a susceptible individual and not an infectious one. This study evaluates the effect of this delay between the time of infection of an individual and the time of diagnosis of the infection (incubation period) in an epidemic outbreak. This study investigates the social dynamics of vaccination and transmission in such epidemic outbreaks, using a model of the public goods game. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Non-Imitative Dynamics in Evolutionary Game Theory)
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Article
The Exact Query Complexity of Yes-No Permutation Mastermind
Games 2020, 11(2), 19; https://doi.org/10.3390/g11020019 - 13 Apr 2020
Viewed by 2007
Abstract
Mastermind is famous two-player game. The first player (codemaker) chooses a secret code which the second player (codebreaker) is supposed to crack within a minimum number of code guesses (queries). Therefore, the codemaker’s duty is to help the codebreaker [...] Read more.
Mastermind is famous two-player game. The first player (codemaker) chooses a secret code which the second player (codebreaker) is supposed to crack within a minimum number of code guesses (queries). Therefore, the codemaker’s duty is to help the codebreaker by providing a well-defined error measure between the secret code and the guessed code after each query. We consider a variant, called Yes-No AB-Mastermind, where both secret code and queries must be repetition-free and the provided information by the codemaker only indicates if a query contains any correct position at all. For this Mastermind version with n positions and k n colors and : = k + 1 n , we prove a lower bound of j = k log 2 j and an upper bound of n log 2 n + k on the number of queries necessary to break the secret code. For the important case k = n , where both secret code and queries represent permutations, our results imply an exact asymptotic complexity of Θ ( n log n ) queries. Full article
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Article
Cheap Talk Games with Two-Senders and Different Modes of Communication
Games 2020, 11(2), 18; https://doi.org/10.3390/g11020018 - 09 Apr 2020
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 2115
Abstract
This paper deals with the effects of different modes of communication in a costless information transmission environment with multiple senders. To this aim, we present a theoretical and experimental study of three Cheap Talk games, each having two senders and one receiver. The [...] Read more.
This paper deals with the effects of different modes of communication in a costless information transmission environment with multiple senders. To this aim, we present a theoretical and experimental study of three Cheap Talk games, each having two senders and one receiver. The communication of senders is simultaneous in the first, sequential in the second and determined by the receiver in the third game (the Choice Game). We find that the overcommunication phenomenon observed with only one sender becomes insignificant in our two-sender model regardless of the mode of communication. However, as to the excessive trust of the receiver, our results are not distinguished from those in the one-sender model. Regarding the Choice Game, our logistic regressions on experimental results suggest that the receiver is more likely to select simultaneous play if the previous play was simultaneous and the receiver earned the high payoff and much more likely to select simultaneous play if the messages were nonconflicting. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Experiments on Communication in Games)
Article
Guessing the Game: An Individual’s Awareness and Assessment of a Game’s Existence
Games 2020, 11(2), 17; https://doi.org/10.3390/g11020017 - 26 Mar 2020
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 2187
Abstract
In everyday life, games begin inconspicuously, leaving an individual to stumble upon their assessment of a situation. An unaware individual is unlikely to exhibit strategic behavior in a given situation, which highlights the importance of awareness examination. The purpose of this exploratory analysis [...] Read more.
In everyday life, games begin inconspicuously, leaving an individual to stumble upon their assessment of a situation. An unaware individual is unlikely to exhibit strategic behavior in a given situation, which highlights the importance of awareness examination. The purpose of this exploratory analysis is to examine awareness and assessment of a game’s existence at the individual level. That requires examination of respondents’ detection (as an indication of their awareness) and identification (as an indication of their assessment) of game elements in game-like situations and their relation to awareness of the game existence. The empirical data is collected using a scenario technique and is statistically analyzed. The results show that the respondents are, on average, at least partially aware of possibility for strategic interaction (even in vague situations). The revealed regularities point out to the relation of the game elements to game existence belief, but also indicate the presence of psychological biases and information utilization issues. For example, the respondents assign different levels of belief to game existence regarding possible losses or gains. Research limitations involve the use of a small convenience sample and lead to suggestions for results validation in future research. Possible implications of the results are discussed. Full article
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