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Games, Volume 11, Issue 2

June 2020 - 8 articles

Cover Story: A three-player (large country, small country, and terrorist organization) hierarchical differential game is studied to analyze Europe’s refugee situation, in which terrorists may take advantage of the Open Door Policy and enter Europe as refugees. Two scenarios are considered: myopia (countries ignore each other’s security efforts and the terrorist group only considers the weakest link’s security) and full awareness. Equilibria are compared for a full awareness model under varying degrees of time patience for the large country. With a patient large country, full awareness yields a stable equilibrium characterized by larger investments in security but more terrorist attacks than the myopic model. However, continental safety is higher with myopic players than with full awareness. View this paper
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Articles (8)

  • Article
  • Open Access
1 Citations
4,690 Views
13 Pages

The Refugee Game: The Relationship between Individual Security Expenditures and Collective Security

  • João Ricardo Faria,
  • Andreas Novak,
  • Aniruddha Bagchi and
  • Timothy Mathews

4 June 2020

This paper studies a three player hierarchical differential game (with a large country, a small country, and a terrorist organization), to analyze the actual European refugee situation. Terrorists may enter Europe as refugees, taking advantage of the...

  • Article
  • Open Access
2 Citations
4,522 Views
21 Pages

19 May 2020

This paper experimentally investigates the impact of suggestive messages and tipping on a third party’s judgment. The experimental design uses a model with three players, wherein two players (A and B) create a joint project, and the third playe...

  • Article
  • Open Access
4 Citations
5,562 Views
25 Pages

7 May 2020

Can differences in cognitive reflection explain other-regarding behavior? To test this, I use the three-item Cognitive Reflection Task to classify individuals as intuitive or reflective and correlate this measure with choices in three games that each...

  • Article
  • Open Access
7 Citations
5,702 Views
17 Pages

20 April 2020

Modeling the spread of infectious diseases and social responses is one method that can help public health policy makers improve the control of epidemic outbreaks and make better decisions about vaccination costs, the number of mandatory vaccinations,...

  • Article
  • Open Access
1 Citations
5,041 Views
11 Pages

13 April 2020

Mastermind is famous two-player game. The first player (codemaker) chooses a secret code which the second player (codebreaker) is supposed to crack within a minimum number of code guesses (queries). Therefore, the codemaker’s duty is to help th...

  • Article
  • Open Access
4 Citations
5,802 Views
22 Pages

Cheap Talk Games with Two-Senders and Different Modes of Communication

  • Esra E. Bayindir,
  • Mehmet Y. Gurdal,
  • Ayca Ozdogan and
  • Ismail Saglam

9 April 2020

This paper deals with the effects of different modes of communication in a costless information transmission environment with multiple senders. To this aim, we present a theoretical and experimental study of three Cheap Talk games, each having two se...

  • Article
  • Open Access
7 Citations
5,011 Views
28 Pages

26 March 2020

In everyday life, games begin inconspicuously, leaving an individual to stumble upon their assessment of a situation. An unaware individual is unlikely to exhibit strategic behavior in a given situation, which highlights the importance of awareness e...

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Games - ISSN 2073-4336