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Introduction to the Special Issue “Pro-Sociality and Cooperation”

by Riccardo Ghidoni

Games 2021, 12(3), 69; https://doi.org/10.3390/g12030069 - 16 Sep 2021

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Abstract

This short piece presents the contributions of the special issue of Games, “Pro-sociality and Cooperation” [...] Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Pro-sociality and Cooperation)

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23 pages, 2488 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Punishment Strategies across Societies: Conventional Wisdoms Reconsidered

by Ramzi Suleiman and Yuval Samid

Games 2021, 12(3), 63; https://doi.org/10.3390/g12030063 - 1 Aug 2021

Cited by 3 | Viewed by 3108

Abstract

Experiments using the public goods game have repeatedly shown that in cooperative social environments, punishment makes cooperation flourish, and withholding punishment makes cooperation collapse. In less cooperative social environments, where antisocial punishment has been detected, punishment was detrimental to cooperation. The success of [...] Read more.

Experiments using the public goods game have repeatedly shown that in cooperative social environments, punishment makes cooperation flourish, and withholding punishment makes cooperation collapse. In less cooperative social environments, where antisocial punishment has been detected, punishment was detrimental to cooperation. The success of punishment in enhancing cooperation was explained as deterrence of free riders by cooperative strong reciprocators, who were willing to pay the cost of punishing them, whereas in environments in which punishment diminished cooperation, antisocial punishment was explained as revenge by low cooperators against high cooperators suspected of punishing them in previous rounds. The present paper reconsiders the generality of both explanations. Using data from a public goods experiment with punishment, conducted by the authors on Israeli subjects (Study 1), and from a study published in Science using sixteen participant pools from cities around the world (Study 2), we found that: 1. The effect of punishment on the emergence of cooperation was mainly due to contributors increasing their cooperation, rather than from free riders being deterred. 2. Participants adhered to different contribution and punishment strategies. Some cooperated and did not punish (‘cooperators’); others cooperated and punished free riders (‘strong reciprocators’); a third subgroup punished upward and downward relative to their own contribution (‘norm-keepers’); and a small sub-group punished only cooperators (‘antisocial punishers’). 3. Clear societal differences emerged in the mix of the four participant types, with high-contributing pools characterized by higher ratios of ‘strong reciprocators’, and ‘cooperators’, and low-contributing pools characterized by a higher ratio of ‘norm keepers’. 4. The fraction of ‘strong reciprocators’ out of the total punishers emerged as a strong predictor of the groups’ level of cooperation and success in providing the public goods. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Pro-sociality and Cooperation)

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10 pages, 949 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Is Voting for a Cartel a Sign of Cooperativeness?

by Joris Gillet

Games 2021, 12(2), 48; https://doi.org/10.3390/g12020048 - 1 Jun 2021

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 3201

Abstract

This paper tests the hypothesis that a (partial) reason why cartels—collective but costly and non-binding price agreements—lead to higher prices in a Bertrand oligopoly could be because of a selection effect: decision-makers who are willing to form price agreements are more likely to [...] Read more.

This paper tests the hypothesis that a (partial) reason why cartels—collective but costly and non-binding price agreements—lead to higher prices in a Bertrand oligopoly could be because of a selection effect: decision-makers who are willing to form price agreements are more likely to be less competitive and pick higher prices in general. To test this hypothesis we run an experiment where participants play two consecutive Bertrand pricing games: first a standard version without the opportunity to form agreements; followed by a version where participants can vote whether to have a (costly) non-binding agreement as a group to pick the highest number. We find no statistically significant difference between the numbers picked in the first game by participants who vote for and against an agreement in the second game. We do confirm that having a non-binding agreement to cooperate leads to higher numbers being picked on average. Both participants who voted for and against the agreement increase the number they pick in situations with an agreement. However, this effect is bigger for participants who voted in favour. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Pro-sociality and Cooperation)

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31 pages, 2065 KiB

Open AccessEditor’s ChoiceArticle

The Effect of Disclosing Identities in a Socially Incentivized Public Good Game

by Britta Butz and Christine Harbring

Games 2021, 12(2), 32; https://doi.org/10.3390/g12020032 - 9 Apr 2021

Cited by 3 | Viewed by 4281

Abstract

We investigate whether revealing the identities in a public good game that includes a donation incentive leads to higher contributions to the public good. Previous evidence suggests that contributions to a public good increase significantly when these take place in public. Also, the [...] Read more.

We investigate whether revealing the identities in a public good game that includes a donation incentive leads to higher contributions to the public good. Previous evidence suggests that contributions to a public good increase significantly when these take place in public. Also, the amount of money given in charitable donations seems to be sensitive to the revealing of identities. Using a laboratory experiment, we implement a 20% donation share that is dependent on participants’ contributions to a public good. The donation is either costless (because it is financed by the experimenter) or deducted from a team’s contributions. In both settings, we explore whether informing participants that group members’ identities will be disclosed at the end of the experiment leads to higher contributions to the public good. Non-parametric statistics indicate that when donations are costly for the participants, the announcement of subsequent identity disclosure results in significantly higher contributions in the second half of the repeated public good game. In contrast, revealing identities in settings with costless donations reduces contributions to the public good significantly. The regression results indicate that conditional cooperators might be one subgroup driving these results. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Pro-sociality and Cooperation)

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14 pages, 3393 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Lab-Sophistication: Does Repeated Participation in Laboratory Experiments Affect Pro-Social Behaviour?

by Tiziana Medda, Vittorio Pelligra and Tommaso Reggiani

Games 2021, 12(1), 18; https://doi.org/10.3390/g12010018 - 22 Feb 2021

Cited by 3 | Viewed by 3609

Abstract

Experimental social scientists working at research-intensive institutions deal inevitably with subjects who have most likely participated in previous experiments. It is an important methodological question to know whether participants that have acquired a high level of lab-sophistication show altered pro-social behavioural patterns. In [...] Read more.

Experimental social scientists working at research-intensive institutions deal inevitably with subjects who have most likely participated in previous experiments. It is an important methodological question to know whether participants that have acquired a high level of lab-sophistication show altered pro-social behavioural patterns. In this paper, we focus both on the potential effect of the subjects’ lab-sophistication, and on the role of the knowledge about the level of lab-sophistication of the other participants. Our main findings show that while lab-sophistication per se does not significantly affect pro-social behaviour, for sophisticated subjects the knowledge about the counterpart’s level of (un)sophistication may systematically alter their choices. This result should induce caution among experimenters about whether, in their settings, information about lab-sophistication can be inferred by the participants, due to the characteristics of the recruitment mechanisms, the management of the experimental sessions or to other contextual clues. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Pro-sociality and Cooperation)

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17 pages, 340 KiB

Open AccessEditor’s ChoiceArticle

Social Pressure in Networks Induces Public Good Provision

by David Jimenez-Gomez

Games 2021, 12(1), 4; https://doi.org/10.3390/g12010004 - 12 Jan 2021

Cited by 2 | Viewed by 2759

Abstract

I develop a dynamic model with forward looking agents, and show that social pressure is effective in generating provision in a public good game: after a small group of agents start contributing to the public good, other agents decide to contribute as well [...] Read more.

I develop a dynamic model with forward looking agents, and show that social pressure is effective in generating provision in a public good game: after a small group of agents start contributing to the public good, other agents decide to contribute as well due to a fear of being punished, and this generates contagion in the network. In contrast to earlier models in the literature, contagion happens fast, as part of the best response of fully rational individuals. The network topology has implications for whether contagion starts and the extent to which it spreads. I find conditions under which an agent decides to be the first to contribute in order to generate contagion in the network, as well as conditions for contribution due to a self-fulfilling fear of social pressure. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Pro-sociality and Cooperation)

16 pages, 289 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Cooperation between Emotional Players

by Lina Andersson

Games 2020, 11(4), 45; https://doi.org/10.3390/g11040045 - 15 Oct 2020

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 2655

Abstract

This paper uses the framework of stochastic games to propose a model of emotions in repeated interactions. An emotional player can be in either a friendly, a neutral, or a hostile state of mind. The player transitions between the states of mind as [...] Read more.

This paper uses the framework of stochastic games to propose a model of emotions in repeated interactions. An emotional player can be in either a friendly, a neutral, or a hostile state of mind. The player transitions between the states of mind as a response to observed actions taken by the other player. The state of mind determines the player’s psychological payoff which together with a material payoff constitutes the player’s utility. In the friendly (hostile) state of mind the player has a positive (negative) concern for other players’ material payoffs. This paper shows how emotions can both facilitate and obstruct cooperation in a repeated prisoners’ dilemma game. In finitely repeated games a player who cares only for their own material payoffs can have an incentive to manipulate an emotional player into the friendly state of mind. In infinitely repeated games with two emotional players less patience is required to sustain cooperation. However, emotions can also obstruct cooperation if they make the players unwilling to punish each other, or if the players become hostile when punished. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Pro-sociality and Cooperation)

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7 pages, 548 KiB

Open AccessArticle

A Note on Stabilizing Cooperation in the Centipede Game

by Steven J. Brams and D. Marc Kilgour

Games 2020, 11(3), 35; https://doi.org/10.3390/g11030035 - 20 Aug 2020

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 4515

Abstract

In the much-studied Centipede Game, which resembles the Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma, two players successively choose between (1) cooperating, by continuing play, or (2) defecting and terminating play. The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium implies that play terminates on the first move, even though continuing play [...] Read more.

In the much-studied Centipede Game, which resembles the Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma, two players successively choose between (1) cooperating, by continuing play, or (2) defecting and terminating play. The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium implies that play terminates on the first move, even though continuing play can benefit both players—but not if the rival defects immediately, which it has an incentive to do. We show that, without changing the structure of the game, interchanging the payoffs of the two players provides each with an incentive to cooperate whenever its turn comes up. The Nash equilibrium in the transformed Centipede Game, called the Reciprocity Game, is unique—unlike the Centipede Game, wherein there are several Nash equilibria. The Reciprocity Game can be implemented noncooperatively by adding, at the start of the Centipede Game, a move to exchange payoffs, which it is rational for the players to choose. What this interchange signifies, and its application to transforming an arms race into an arms-control treaty, are discussed. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Pro-sociality and Cooperation)

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