Special Issue "Environmental Economics and Game Theory"

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (31 July 2020) | Viewed by 3153

Special Issue Editor

Dr. Ana Espinola-Arredondo
E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Washington State University Pullman, Pullman, WA, USA

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

The use of game theory in environmental problems has increased over time. Game theory offers a powerful tool to understand strategic interactions between diverse agents in the economy that face environmental problems, i.e., pollution, climate change, and biodiversity loss, among others. This Special Issue focuses on applications of game theory to environmental issues. Potential topics include but are not limited to bargaining, industrial organization, signaling games, and non-cooperative and cooperative games—specifically, research work that models a current environmental problem and provides a strategic analysis, considering the negotiation process between, for instance, a regulator and firms or environmentally concerned consumers and firms. Papers can also provide a strategic analysis of environmental regulation, such as emission fees or permits focusing on its effects on competition or on the incentives to invest in clean R&D. We especially welcome contributions that provide policy implications.

Dr. Ana Espinola-Arredondo
Guest Editor

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access semimonthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1400 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • Game Theory
  • Environmental Regulation
  • Pollution
  • Climate Change
  • Environmentally concerned Agents
  • Environmental Groups
  • Clean Technology

Published Papers (2 papers)

Order results
Result details
Select all
Export citation of selected articles as:

Research

Article
Market Power in Output and Emissions Trading
Games 2020, 11(4), 43; https://doi.org/10.3390/g11040043 - 12 Oct 2020
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 938
Abstract
This article focuses on the strategic behavior of firms in the output and the emissions markets in the presence of market power. We consider the existence of a dominant firm in the permit market and different structures in the output market, including Cournot [...] Read more.
This article focuses on the strategic behavior of firms in the output and the emissions markets in the presence of market power. We consider the existence of a dominant firm in the permit market and different structures in the output market, including Cournot and two versions of the Stackelberg model, depending on whether the permit dominant firm is a leader or a follower in the output market. In all three models, the firm that dominates the permit market is more sensitive to its initial allocation than its competitor in terms of abatement and less sensitive in terms of output. In all three models, output is decreasing and the permit price is increasing in the permit dominant firm’s initial allocation. In the Cournot model, permit dominance is fruitless in terms of output and profit if the initial allocation is symmetric. Output leadership is more relevant than permit dominance since an output leader always tends to, ceteris paribus, produce more and make more profit whether it also dominates the permit market or not. This leadership can only be overcompensated for by distributing a larger share of permits to the output follower, and only if the total number of permits is large enough. In terms of welfare, Stackelberg is always superior to Cournot. If the initial permit allocation is symmetric, welfare is higher when the same firm dominates the output and the permit market at the same time. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Environmental Economics and Game Theory)
Show Figures

Figure 1

Article
Promotion of Green Technology under Different Environmental Policies
Games 2020, 11(3), 32; https://doi.org/10.3390/g11030032 - 09 Aug 2020
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 1736
Abstract
In this paper, I develop a two-stage game of pollution abatement technology adoption in a Cournot oligopoly to investigate a firm’s decision to adopt pollution abatement technology. In particular, I study the adoption incentives and welfare implications of popular environmental policies, namely emission [...] Read more.
In this paper, I develop a two-stage game of pollution abatement technology adoption in a Cournot oligopoly to investigate a firm’s decision to adopt pollution abatement technology. In particular, I study the adoption incentives and welfare implications of popular environmental policies, namely emission fees and quotas. Tradeable permits result in identical outcomes to emission fees. Within each policy regime, the conditions for Nash equilibria are identified where both firms invest in the green technology, neither firm invests in the technology, or only one firm invests. The following extensions are also analyzed: asymmetric adoption costs, increase in the marginal cost of production from adoption, and a type-dependent fee where adoption reduces the emission fee. Social welfare under an emission fee is identical to that under a quota. However, when policy is (not) stringent, firms are more willing to adopt expensive technology under a fee (quota) than under a quota (fee, respectively). Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Environmental Economics and Game Theory)
Show Figures

Figure 1

Back to TopTop