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Open AccessArticle

Cheap Talk Games with Two-Senders and Different Modes of Communication

1
Hamburg Center for Health Economics, University of Hamburg, Esplanade 36, 20354 Hamburg, Germany
2
Department of Economics, Bogazici University, Bebek, Istanbul 34342, Turkey
3
Department of Economics, TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Sogutozu Cad. 43, Sogutozu, Ankara 06560, Turkey
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
We thank Santiago Sánchez-Pagés for sharing with us the software codes for a single sender-receiver game, which we have modified and used in our experiments. We also acknowledge that this research was supported by TOBB University of Economics and Technology. The usual disclaimer applies.
Games 2020, 11(2), 18; https://doi.org/10.3390/g11020018
Received: 17 January 2020 / Revised: 23 March 2020 / Accepted: 1 April 2020 / Published: 9 April 2020
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Experiments on Communication in Games)
This paper deals with the effects of different modes of communication in a costless information transmission environment with multiple senders. To this aim, we present a theoretical and experimental study of three Cheap Talk games, each having two senders and one receiver. The communication of senders is simultaneous in the first, sequential in the second and determined by the receiver in the third game (the Choice Game). We find that the overcommunication phenomenon observed with only one sender becomes insignificant in our two-sender model regardless of the mode of communication. However, as to the excessive trust of the receiver, our results are not distinguished from those in the one-sender model. Regarding the Choice Game, our logistic regressions on experimental results suggest that the receiver is more likely to select simultaneous play if the previous play was simultaneous and the receiver earned the high payoff and much more likely to select simultaneous play if the messages were nonconflicting. View Full-Text
Keywords: strategic information transmission; truth-telling; trust; sender–receiver game strategic information transmission; truth-telling; trust; sender–receiver game
MDPI and ACS Style

Bayindir, E.E.; Gurdal, M.Y.; Ozdogan, A.; Saglam, I. Cheap Talk Games with Two-Senders and Different Modes of Communication. Games 2020, 11, 18.

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