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Dynamic Durable Goods Monopoly and Market Power

Department of Economics, Ozyegin University, 34794 Istanbul, Turkey
Games 2020, 11(2), 22; https://doi.org/10.3390/g11020022
Received: 12 February 2020 / Revised: 22 April 2020 / Accepted: 7 May 2020 / Published: 18 May 2020
We analyze a vertically differentiated market for an imperfectly durable good served by a monopolist in an infinite-horizon, discrete-time game. Our goal is to identify the Markov perfect stationary equilibria where the seller can maintain his monopoly power. We establish that the set of parameters supporting a monopoly outcome is larger when the seller offers different quality versions of the same product. Hence, our results suggest that, when the innate durability of a product is high, the seller should offer different quality versions of the product. View Full-Text
Keywords: durable goods; monopoly; pricing; quality; differentiation durable goods; monopoly; pricing; quality; differentiation
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MDPI and ACS Style

Altan, B. Dynamic Durable Goods Monopoly and Market Power. Games 2020, 11, 22. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11020022

AMA Style

Altan B. Dynamic Durable Goods Monopoly and Market Power. Games. 2020; 11(2):22. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11020022

Chicago/Turabian Style

Altan, Basak. 2020. "Dynamic Durable Goods Monopoly and Market Power" Games 11, no. 2: 22. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11020022

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