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Financial Stability
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Financial Stability

A special issue of Journal of Risk and Financial Management (ISSN 1911-8074). This special issue belongs to the section "Financial Markets".

Deadline for manuscript submissions: 31 August 2026 | Viewed by 3274

Special Issue Editor

Prof. Dr. Adrian Cantemir Calin

E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
1. Department of International Business and Economics, Bucharest University of Economic Studies, 010404 Bucharest, Romania
2. Institute for Economic Forecasting, Romanian Academy, 050711 Bucharest, Romania
Interests: asset bubbles; financial markets; asset pricing; monetary policy; credit risk; volatility modeling; financial econometrics; economic forecasting; risk management
Special Issues, Collections and Topics in MDPI journals

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

This Special Issue seeks to examine the fundamental dynamics that underpin the stability of financial systems in the context of an increasingly interconnected and volatile global economy. The primary objective is to attract innovative research on a wide range of topics including, but not limited to, systemic risk, regulatory frameworks, crisis management, and the role of financial institutions in risk mitigation. Contributions that offer insights into the influence of macroeconomic policies, stress testing, and emerging technologies—such as fintech—on financial stability are particularly encouraged. The issue places a strong emphasis on applied research with the potential to shape public policy on financial stability. Ultimately, it aims to provide risk management professionals with both practical tools and theoretical insights to effectively navigate and address financial uncertainties.

Prof. Dr. Adrian Cantemir Calin
Guest Editor

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 250 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for assessment.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Journal of Risk and Financial Management is an international peer-reviewed open access monthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1600 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • systemic risk
  • regulatory frameworks
  • macroprudential policy
  • capital adequacy
  • financial resilience
  • asset bubbles
  • monetary policy

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Published Papers (3 papers)

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Research

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42 pages, 1717 KB  
Article
The Effectiveness of Macroprudential Policy Coordination in Managing Financial Risk in Systemic Economies
by Khwazi Magubane
J. Risk Financial Manag. 2026, 19(6), 403; https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm19060403 - 31 May 2026
Viewed by 235
Abstract
This study evaluates the relative effectiveness and feasibility of synchronized and country-specific macroprudential policies in advanced systemic economies (ASEs) and systemic middle-income countries (SMICs). The analysis is motivated by the growing policy tension between the potential global financial stability gains from macroprudential coordination [...] Read more.
This study evaluates the relative effectiveness and feasibility of synchronized and country-specific macroprudential policies in advanced systemic economies (ASEs) and systemic middle-income countries (SMICs). The analysis is motivated by the growing policy tension between the potential global financial stability gains from macroprudential coordination and the loss of domestic policy autonomy that such coordination may impose. To address this issue, the study develops a common macroprudential policy index (CMPI), which captures the shared component of macroprudential actions across countries and serves as a proxy for cross-country macroprudential policy coordination. In doing so, the study provides an empirical framework for assessing whether synchronized macroprudential policies generate more effective outcomes than country-specific interventions, thereby offering insights into the practical feasibility of international macroprudential coordination. Using a Dynamic Common Correlated Effects (DCCE) model and a Panel Structural VAR (PSVAR), the study examines the effects of domestic and coordinated macroprudential policies on capital flows, credit growth, and house prices. The findings reveal important differences across short-run and long-run horizons. In the long run, both domestic macroprudential policy (MPI) and coordinated macroprudential policy (CMPI) exert contractionary effects on capital flows, consistent with tighter credit conditions and higher lending costs. However, PSVAR results show that synchronized macroprudential shocks can temporarily increase capital flows, credit, and house prices through volatility reduction, portfolio reallocation, and cross-border spillover channels. These effects are transitory, indicating that coordinated policies primarily shape short-run financial adjustment dynamics rather than permanently increasing global liquidity. Overall, the results suggest that macroprudential coordination between ASEs and SMICs is feasible, particularly in areas related to systemic risk containment, volatility management, and the mitigation of destabilizing cross-border spillovers. However, the heterogeneous responses across countries also indicate that effective coordination requires a flexible framework in which broad common principles are coordinated internationally while domestic authorities retain discretion to calibrate instruments according to local financial conditions and vulnerabilities. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Financial Stability)
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35 pages, 2760 KB  
Article
Bubbles and the Pro-Cyclicality of Systemic Risk Measures in Shadow Banking
by Adrian Cantemir Călin, Radu Lupu, Andreea Elena Croicu and Răzvan Alexandru Topa
J. Risk Financial Manag. 2026, 19(4), 242; https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm19040242 - 25 Mar 2026
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 962
Abstract
We examine whether speculative bubbles in shadow banking institutions contribute to the buildup and materialization of systemic risk. Using the Phillips–Shi–Yu (BSADF) bubble detection methodology and market-based systemic risk measures (ΔCoVaR and Marginal Expected Shortfall), we analyze daily data for 17 publicly listed [...] Read more.
We examine whether speculative bubbles in shadow banking institutions contribute to the buildup and materialization of systemic risk. Using the Phillips–Shi–Yu (BSADF) bubble detection methodology and market-based systemic risk measures (ΔCoVaR and Marginal Expected Shortfall), we analyze daily data for 17 publicly listed U.S. shadow banking firms over the period 2010–2026. We document a pronounced pro-cyclical measurement puzzle. During bubble periods, firms exhibit higher market exposure and greater tail risk—Beta increases by 4.9% and Expected Shortfall by 7.9%—yet widely used systemic risk measures decline, with ΔCoVaR falling by 6.6%. This pattern suggests that conventional systemic risk metrics may underestimate vulnerabilities during speculative expansions. However, when bubbles burst, systemic risk materializes rapidly. During burst windows, ΔCoVaR increases by 7.9% and MES by 8.6%, indicating that vulnerabilities accumulated during bubble phases translate into significant systemic spillovers once speculative dynamics collapse. Our findings highlight a pro-cyclical bias in commonly used systemic risk indicators: these measures capture realized financial stress but fail to detect the buildup of fragility during expansion phases. Monitoring bubble dynamics in shadow banking may therefore provide valuable complementary signals for macroprudential surveillance. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Financial Stability)
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28 pages, 922 KB  
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Making Federal Reserve Monetary Policy Transparent and Accountable
by Robert L. Hetzel
J. Risk Financial Manag. 2026, 19(1), 24; https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm19010024 - 1 Jan 2026
Viewed by 1332
Abstract
The Fed defends its independence based on the argument that an apolitical monetary policy brings stability to the economy. The Fed may be right, but how confident should the public be that the monetary arrangements that provide for economic stability are firmly in [...] Read more.
The Fed defends its independence based on the argument that an apolitical monetary policy brings stability to the economy. The Fed may be right, but how confident should the public be that the monetary arrangements that provide for economic stability are firmly in place now and in the future? To provide this assurance, policymakers should be able to explain what macroeconomic variables they control and how they exercise that control. What are the limits to their powers? The explanation should abandon the atheoretical language that focuses on near-term forecasts of the economy. Instead, it should use the general structure of a model to clarify how the Federal Open Market Committee exercises the control over the behavior of firms and households required to achieve its objectives. This explicitness would allow for an assessment of how well the monetary policy regime does in practice to provide for economic stability. It would also promote the durability of a successful regime. Finally, such transparency is required in a democracy. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Financial Stability)
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