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Games
Special Issues
Strategy-Proof Mechanism Design
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Strategy-Proof Mechanism Design

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336). This special issue belongs to the section "Behavioral and Experimental Game Theory".

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (30 June 2023) | Viewed by 3206

Special Issue Editors

Prof. Dr. Bernardo Moreno

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Guest Editor
Department de Teoría e Historia Económica, Campus El Ejido s/n 29071 Málaga, Universidad de Málaga, 29071 Málaga, Spain
Interests: social choice; mechanism design; political economy
Prof. Dr. Shurojit Chatterji

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Guest Editor
School of Economics, Singapore Management University, Singapore, Singapore
Interests: microeconomic theory; mechanism design; dynamics
Prof. Dr. Shigehiro Serizawa

E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Institute of Social Economic Research, Osaka University, Suita 565-0871, Osaka, Japan
Interests: mechanism design; game theory; microeconomics

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Collective decision problems where agents hold private information are ubiquitous in economic environments. Mechanism design uses game theoretic tools to address such problems and strategy-proofness has emerged as a prominent one, since it embodies a robustness property wherein agents report their private information truthfully as a weakly dominant strategy. The study of strategy-proof social choice functions (deterministic and random) under restricted domains of preferences has proven to be instructive for a variety of collective decision problems such as public good provision, locating facilities on networks, division of non-disposable commodities, and the allocation of indivisible goods with or without monetary transfers, among others. This Special Issue of Games is devoted to research that enhances the theoretical underpinnings of this topic and expands its applicability.

Prof. Dr. Bernardo Moreno
Prof. Dr. Shurojit Chatterji
Prof. Dr. Shigehiro Serizawa
Guest Editors

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access semimonthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1600 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • social choice functions
  • restricted domains
  • strategy-proof mechanisms
  • random mechanisms

Published Papers (2 papers)

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Research

19 pages, 452 KiB  
Article
A Note on Binary Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions
by Achille Basile, Anna De Simone and Ciro Tarantino
Games 2022, 13(6), 78; https://doi.org/10.3390/g13060078 - 18 Nov 2022
Viewed by 1347
Abstract
Let Φn be the set of the binary strategy-proof social choice functions referred to a group of n voters who are allowed to declare indifference between the alternatives. We provide a recursive way to obtain the set Φn+1 from [...] Read more.
Let Φn be the set of the binary strategy-proof social choice functions referred to a group of n voters who are allowed to declare indifference between the alternatives. We provide a recursive way to obtain the set Φn+1 from the set Φn. Computing the cardinalities |Φn| presents difficulties as the computation of the Dedekind numbers. The latter give the analogous number of social choice functions when only strict preferences are admitted. A comparison is given for the known values. Based on our results, we present a graphical description of the binary strategy-proof social choice functions in the case of three voters. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Strategy-Proof Mechanism Design)
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24 pages, 369 KiB  
Article
Egalitarian-Equivalence and Strategy-Proofness in the Object Allocation Problem with Non-Quasi-Linear Preferences
by Hiroki Shinozaki
Games 2022, 13(6), 75; https://doi.org/10.3390/g13060075 - 15 Nov 2022
Viewed by 1221
Abstract
We consider the problem of allocating heterogeneous objects to agents with money, where the number of agents exceeds that of objects. Each agent can receive at most one object, and some objects may remain unallocated. A bundle is a pair consisting of an [...] Read more.
We consider the problem of allocating heterogeneous objects to agents with money, where the number of agents exceeds that of objects. Each agent can receive at most one object, and some objects may remain unallocated. A bundle is a pair consisting of an object and a payment. An agent’s preference over bundles may not be quasi-linear, which exhibits income effects or reflects borrowing costs. We investigate the class of rules satisfying one of the central properties of fairness in the literature, egalitarian-equivalence, together with the other desirable properties. We propose (i) a novel class of rules that we call the independent second-prices rules with variable constraints and (ii) a novel condition on constraints that we call respecting the valuation coincidence. Then, we establish that the independent second-prices rule with variable constraints that respects the valuation coincidence is the only rule satisfying egalitarian-equivalence, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and no subsidy for losers. Our characterization result implies that in the case of three or more agents, there are few opportunities for agents to receive objects under a rule satisfying egalitarian-equivalence and the other desirable properties, which highlights the strong tension between egalitarian-equivalence and efficiency. In contrast, in the case of two agents and a single object, egalitarian-equivalence is compatible with efficiency. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Strategy-Proof Mechanism Design)
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