Special Issue "Laboratory Experiments: Cooperation, Sanctions and Norms"

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: 31 August 2021.

Special Issue Editors

Prof. Dr. Sebastian Kube
E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany
Interests: laboratory experiments; personnel and labor economics; public economics; law
Prof. Dr. Sebastian J. Goerg
E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Technical University of Munich, Munich, Germany
Interests: economics; experimental economics; behavioral economics; applied microeconomics
Prof. Dr. Luke Boosey
E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, USA
Interests: economics; behavioral and experimental economics; game theory; contests; public goods

Special Issue Information

Dear colleagues,

The recent decades have seen a tremendous progress in our understanding of cooperative behavior. In particular, the controlled environment offered by laboratory experiments has allowed the causal identification of potential determinants of cooperation. Among these, social norms have been identified as a key factor. Groups establish and maintain norms of behavior by using various forms of sanctions, such as mutual peer punishment, ostracism, gossip, or shaming. However, there is a large degree of heterogeneity in the content of group norms, the adherence to them, and the way that sanctions are used to sustain them. Since these facets are not yet fully understood, the Special Issue on "Laboratory Experiments: Cooperation, Sanctions and Norms” aims at advancing our knowledge in the mentioned areas. We thus invite submissions that touch upon one or more of these areas. The main focus is on work with lab experiments. Yet, given the current restrictions imposed by Covid-19, we also welcome online experiments and field experiments, as well as theoretical contributions, survey articles, and meta-analyses that do not require new experiments.

Prof. Dr. Sebastian Kube
Prof. Sebastian J. Goerg
Prof. Luke Boosey
Guest Editors

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All papers will be peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access quarterly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1400 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • cooperative behavior
  • environment
  • laboratory experiments
  • social norms
  • online experiments
  • field experiments

Published Papers (3 papers)

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Research

Open AccessArticle
Political Mobilization in the Laboratory: The Role of Norms and Communication
Games 2021, 12(1), 24; https://doi.org/10.3390/g12010024 - 03 Mar 2021
Viewed by 377
Abstract
Many field experiments have shown that political mobilization increases voter turnout, with personalized strategies considerably outperforming widely administered ones. Despite the abundant evidence, there is no systematic explanation of what drives citizens’ response to mobilization. In this paper, I propose and experimentally test [...] Read more.
Many field experiments have shown that political mobilization increases voter turnout, with personalized strategies considerably outperforming widely administered ones. Despite the abundant evidence, there is no systematic explanation of what drives citizens’ response to mobilization. In this paper, I propose and experimentally test in the laboratory a theoretical framework that investigates the psychological mechanisms underlying mobilization in both partisan and non-partisan settings. I conjecture that material mobilization efforts should increase participation because of reciprocity concerns. The transmission of normative appeals through interpersonal communication should have a similar effect by making a group norm salient. The results from two experiments show that the combination of a mobilization effort with a normative appeal leads to a significant and substantial increase in participation in both settings. Using content analysis, I show that this interaction effect is due to the way normative appeals are perceived when the sender is in charge of mobilization. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Laboratory Experiments: Cooperation, Sanctions and Norms)
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Open AccessArticle
Trust and Trustworthiness in Corrupted Economic Environments
Games 2021, 12(1), 16; https://doi.org/10.3390/g12010016 - 04 Feb 2021
Viewed by 587
Abstract
We use an original variant of the standard trust game to study the effects of corruption on trust and trustworthiness. In this game, both the trustor and the trustee know that part of the surplus they can generate may be captured by a [...] Read more.
We use an original variant of the standard trust game to study the effects of corruption on trust and trustworthiness. In this game, both the trustor and the trustee know that part of the surplus they can generate may be captured by a third “corrupted” player under different expected costs of audit and prosecution. We find a slightly higher trustor’s giving in the presence of corruption, matched by a significant excess of reciprocity from the trustee. Both the trustor and the trustee expect, on average, corruption to act as a tax, inelastic to changes in the probability of corruption prosecution. Expectations are correct for the inelasticity assumption and for the actual value of the “corruption tax”. Our experimental findings lead to the rejection of four standard hypotheses based on purely self-regarding preferences. We discuss how the apparently paradoxical excess reciprocity effect is consistent with the cultural role of heroes in history, where examples of commendable giving have been used to stimulate emulation of ordinary people. Our results suggest that the excess reciprocity component of the trustee makes the trustor’s excess giving a rational and effective strategy. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Laboratory Experiments: Cooperation, Sanctions and Norms)
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Open AccessArticle
Wage Differences Matter: An Experiment of Social Comparison and Effort Provision when Wages Increase or Decrease
Games 2020, 11(4), 59; https://doi.org/10.3390/g11040059 - 05 Dec 2020
Viewed by 572
Abstract
Wage rates, efficiency wages, and gift exchange in a labor market are all crucial aspects in regard to designing contracts to ensure high effort from workers. We extend this literature by discussing the relationship between known differences in wages (social comparison) and workers’ [...] Read more.
Wage rates, efficiency wages, and gift exchange in a labor market are all crucial aspects in regard to designing contracts to ensure high effort from workers. We extend this literature by discussing the relationship between known differences in wages (social comparison) and workers’ effort provision. We conduct an experiment in which subjects perform effort tasks for piece-rates. All subjects are paid the same wage rate in the first half of the experiment, but in the second half are paid different wage rates; the primary variable we study is the information about others’ wage rates given to a subset of subjects. We find that subjects’ efforts respond strongly to information about others’ wages. Such findings have implications for contract structuring for workers. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Laboratory Experiments: Cooperation, Sanctions and Norms)
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