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8 November 2022

Verifiable, Secure Mobile Agent Migration in Healthcare Systems Using a Polynomial-Based Threshold Secret Sharing Scheme with a Blowfish Algorithm

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Department of Computer Science and Engineering, JSS Academy of Technical Education, Noida 201301, Uttar Pradesh, India
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Institute of Engineering & Technology, Shobhit University, Meerut 250110, Uttar Pradesh, India
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Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Chotu Ram Engineering College, Meerut 250001, Uttar Pradesh, India
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Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Guru Nanak Dev Engineering College, Ludhiana 141006, Punjab, India
This article belongs to the Section Biomedical Sensors

Abstract

A mobile agent is a software application that moves naturally among hosts in a uniform and non-uniform environment; it starts with one host and then moves onto the next in order to divide data between clients. The mobile paradigm is utilized in a wide assortment of medical care applications such as the medical information of a patient, the recovery of clinical information, the incorporation of information pertaining to their wellbeing, dynamic help, telemedicine, obtaining clinical data, patient administration, and so on. The accompanying security issues have grown in tandem with the complexity and improvements in mobile agent technologies. As mobile agents work in an insecure environment, their security is a top priority when communicating and exchanging data and information. Data integrity, data confidentiality and authentication, on-repudiation, denial of service, and access control, are all key security concerns with mobile agent migration. This paper proposes a Verifiable, Secure Mobile Agent Migration model, based on two polynomials (t, n), and an edge secret imparting plan with Blowfish encryption, to enable secure information transmission in clinical medical care.

1. Introduction

Mobile agents [1] are innovations that originated in two distinct disciplines. The first discipline concerns artificial intelligence, and the idea that an intelligent agent is created [2]. The second discipline concerns distributive computing, wherein a mobile agent is created via code mobility. A legitimate definition for mobile agents, regarding the two referenced disciplines, is that they are smart programming substances that can pause and resume their tasks automatically, on various platforms, in order to complete assigned tasks [3]. A relocating mobile agent undertakes a process that is independent; it can navigate its way through, and adapt to, a heterogeneous environment, moving from platform to platform, and interfacing with different mobile agents. Mobile agents automatically [4] decide where and when to migrate, and they may execute their task at anytime, or they may suspend the execution of that task altogether, move to another host, and proceed with executing the task on that host instead. Characteristics of mobile agents are:
  • Mobility: Mobile agents can freeze an operation on one platform and continue with the operation on another (i.e., inside a different region. This is often referred to as agent migration) [5].
  • Individualism: Each mobile agent is guided by a program that is especially written to achieve at least one goal. The operations of mobile agents are entirely governed by this code, with no direct intervention from other groups.
  • Reactivity: Mobile agents respond to environmental changes in order to accomplish their objectives.
  • Proactivity: Mobile agents change their current circumstances and they take a few attempts to accomplish their objectives.
  • Sociability refers to a mobile agent’s ability to interact with other mobile agents. This is important because some agents are only made aware of their present situation via communication with other agents.
The client–server paradigm and mobile agent paradigm are shown in Figure 1. Table 1 represents the difference between remote procedure calls and mobile agent technology.
Figure 1. (a) Client–Server paradigm, (b) Mobile agent paradigm.
Table 1. The differences between the conventional method RPC [6] and mobile agent technology [1].
Mobile agents roam around freely in a malicious environment; therefore, the chances of an attack on a mobile agent are high. Figure 2 shows the different types of conventional and new threat in mobile agent systems.
Figure 2. Conventional and new threats in MAS [7].
There are various advantages to the mobile agent paradigm shown in Figure 3. These include the fact that it is autonomous and self-driven, easily maintainable, fault-tolerant, parallel processing, dynamically adopted, it has a fever load on the network, there is less network delay, and it has a reduced compilation time.
Figure 3. Advantages of mobile agents over conventional methods of protection.

1.1. Protection of Mobile Agents

A prime concern is the security of mobile agents [8]. The manner in which mobile agents work is shown in Figure 4. The security of mobile agents can be threatened via different dangerous assaults. Several types of attacks, including denial of service (DOS), masquerading, specialist and host cracking, renunciation, eavesdropping, information and data manipulation, and so on, are possible due to the mobile agents’ dynamic behavior.
Figure 4. Main security threats to mobile agent technology.
Mobile agent technology suffers from security threats [9], which are divided into four main categories:
  • Assault from agents on platforms;
  • Agent-to-Agent Assaults;
  • Assault from platforms on agents;
  • Additional Assault to Agent Platform.
The challenges when implementing mobile agents include security risks [10], protection of hosts from malevolent specialists, protection of agents from noxious hosts, efficiency, flexibility, mobility, and standardization.

1.2. Mobile Agent Life-Cycle

The life-cycle of [7] the mobile agents (displayed in Figure 5) guarantees that they can adjust the climate (i.e., either at home or in an unfamiliar climate). They can switch between one hub and another, and they can hone in on their last result.
Figure 5. Mobile agent life-cycle [11].
  • Creation: A new mobile agent is made, and the conditions of the mobile agent are initiated.
  • Cloning: A specialist copy is made, and the present status of the first is duplicated in order to create cloning agents.
  • Dispatch: A mobile agent moves to another host.
  • Deactivation: The state of a mobile agent is saved in the repositories when it is in standby mode.
  • Activation: The state of a deactivated mobile agent is restored from the repositories and applied to the lifetime mobile agent.
  • Retraction: A mobile agent can converse with another agent and the stage.
  • Disposal: The life-cycle of a mobile agent ends.
  • Communication: Interactions between mobile agents and platforms.

2. Utilization of Mobile Agents in the Medical Care Domain

Mobile agents are used in a variety of medical-related activities [12], such as obtaining clinical information on executives, clinical data recovery, integrating information pertaining to a patient’s wellbeing, obtaining general clinical information, and so on. The use of mobile agents in the medical care sector ensures medical data integration [13] by combining information from different medical data sources, as shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6. Applications of mobile agents in the healthcare domain.
  • Health Data Management: Acquiring, analyzing, and protecting medical information [14].
  • Information Retrieval: Retrieving medical information from heterogeneous databases.
  • Decision-Making Support: Assisting healthcare workers with procedures, including treatments and diagnostics.
  • Telemedicine: Systems focused on remotely monitoring the situation with patients, thus allowing for a wide range of assessments.
  • Securing Medical Information: Approaches to working, bearing in mind the wellbeing and security of patient information.
Figure 7 and Figure 8 represent the real-time application of mobile agents in healthcare.
Figure 7. Application of a mobile agent in a road accident.
Figure 8. Application of a mobile agent in an emergency.

Requirement of Security

Security is a pressing issue for mobile agents [15] as they migrate from user to user. Security parameters are shown in Figure 9.
Figure 9. Security parameter.
  • Confidentiality: Security of information and data (state + data + code) [8] among platforms and agents.
  • Data integrity: Data and information [16] should not be interfered with by a third party.
  • Availability: Data and information requested by the platform or agents should be easily accessible.

4. Problem Statement

As traditional communication slows down when there is more congestion on the network, mobile agents play a vital role in quickly assessing a patient’s condition during a mass loss incident. Mobile agents manage to retrieve diagnostic data from a few heterogeneous sources of information and the data is presented to the customer upon request. Mobile agents also assist medical professionals when making decisions during treatment. Above all, the aim when developing mobile agents is to automate tasks with minimal human interference. As a smaller number of human assets is required, it is possible to use human assets for other clinical purposes. In clinical regions, the security of prosperity data is a crucial matter that is customarily taken care of in neighbourhood storage facilities.
When studying the literature available for mobile agents in medical care, we saw that mobile agents are broadly utilized in the recovery, transportation, and execution of clinical information. Clinical information [30] is profoundly confidential. Consequently, securing migrating agents is a crucial issue. The mobile agent needs to be navigated away from certain dangers, such as the divulgence of data, forswearing of administration, and defilement of data, and different types of protection need to be utilized in order to obtain a mobile agent. The conventional direction with regard to security continues, and the focal point remains to be the implementation of assurance systems inside the portable specialist. In any case, accentuation involves gradually pushing toward creating strategies that move toward agent security, which is a considerably more troublesome issue. The security of medical data, as well as the security of mobile agents, is a prime concern [31].

5. Proposed Solution

Preliminaries—The prerequisites of the developed framework are discussed in Section 5.1 and Section 5.2. The secret sharing scheme [32] and blowfish symmetric encryption [33] are the main components of the prerequisite of the proposed model.

5.1. Secret Sharing Scheme

The SS scheme is dependent on Shamir’s SS scheme; however, instead of one, two random polynomials, similar to the scheme in Liu et al. for generating two shares per participant, are used. The scheme does not use any cheating detection function [5]; however, the coefficients of the two polynomials are correlated so that the generated shares are related.
Details of the scheme:
The proposed (t, n) threshold SS scheme comprises three phases: share generation, secret key reconstruction, and secret key validation/cheating detection [34]. They are described below.
Share generation phase: In the secret share generation phase threshold scheme (t, n), a trusted dealer considers a random polynomial degree (t-1), as follows:
f x = a 0 + a 1 x 1   + a 2 x 2   + a t 1 x t 1  
where a 0 , a 1 , ……, a t 1 ≠ 0 € Zq for a large prime q.
The secret S € Zq is obtained from f x by replacing (x) with 0 (i.e., s = f 0 = a 0 :). Another polynomial f x of degree t 1 , called the supporting polynomial, is also selected by the dealer, as follows:
g x = b + a 1       x 1   + b 2       x 2   + b t 1       x t 1  
where b 0 , b 0 , ……, b t 1 ≠ 0 € Zq
such that the coefficients of polynomial f x and g x for 0 i t 1 , are random and arbitrary except for a single value of I, for which ai = bi; however, the value of i and the coefficient ai (and bi) are kept secret. In fact, these two polynomials are related implicitly, and in such a way that they can validate each other (i.e., if one polynomial is changed, the other is affected and vice versa).
The dealer generates n pairs of shares k , f k , g k   f o r   k = 1   t o   n using two polynomial equations, f x and g x , respectively, and the dealer secretly distributes them to n participants. Upon secretly pooling their shares, the secrets can be reconstructed by any t share or more, as described below.
Secret key reconstruction phase: After secretly exchanging and receiving shares, any t of n shareholders can redesign the polynomial equation f(x) using the interpolation [35] formula, as follows:
f x = i = 1   t o   t f i j = 1 t o   t   j i x j i j
Similarly, the polynomial g(x) is also reconstructed. Now, the secret s = f 0 = a 0 is taken as valid and correct if the following phase is satisfied.
Secret key validation/cheating detection phase: For 0 i t 1 , the coefficients of f x and g x must satisfy a i b i except for a single value of I, for which a i = b i , and where f x and g x are non-constructed polynomials.

5.2. Blowfish Encryption

The workings of the blowfish and DES-based encryption, based on the Feistel structure are as follows. Blowfish is a block cipher symmetric key cryptography encryption and decryption mechanism proposed by Bruce Schneier to replace the DES encryption and decryption approach. The manner in which the Feistel structure works is efficient and secure. It is one of the first secure cryptographic algorithms and is free to use.
  • Size of each block: In a blowfish symmetric algorithm, 64-bits of block size are used.
  • Size of Symmetric key: The blowfish cipher used variable key length sizes, from 32 to 448 bits.
  • Subkey: In a blowfish cipher eighteen subkey numbers were used for internal operations.
  • Number of rounds used in the blowfish cipher: In the blowfish cipher, 16 rounds were used.
  • Substitution boxes: There were four substitution boxes used in the blowfish cipher.
The complete encryption procedure of the blowfish algorithm is summarized as follows: the block diagram of the blowfish encryption algorithm is shown in Figure 10, and the block diagram showing blowfish decryption is shown in Figure 11.
Figure 10. Blowfish encryption.
Figure 11. Function description.
Step 1: Creation of subkeys in the blowfish algorithm:
  • In the blowfish algorithm for encryption and decryption operations, 18 subkeys are needed {P[0], P[1], P[2]...P[17]}, and the same subkeys are used in encryption and decryption.
  • Eighteen subkeys are stored in eighteen P arrays, and each array consists of 32 bits.
  • P[0] = “456f7d98”, P[1] = “55a788e4”………………. P[17] = “3434eb6d”
  • The relationship between each subkey and input key has been changed, as follows:
    P[0] = Perform the XOR operation between P[0] and the first 32-bits of the applied input key.
    P[1] = Perform the XOR operation between P[1] and the second 32-bits of the applied input key.
    P[i] = Perform the XOR operation between P[i] and the (i + 1)th 32-bits of the applied input key.
(Rotate the key to the first 32 bits, based on its size.)
Perform the XOR operation between P[17] and the 18th 32-bits of the applied input key.
(Rotate the key to the first 32 bits, based on its size.)
P-arrays that result in 18 subkeys are used in the encryption procedure.
Step 2: Setting-up Substitution Boxes:
In the blowfish encryption and decryption process, substitution boxes (S-boxes) play a very important role. Every S-box has 256 entries, starting from S[i][0] to S[i][255], and each has an entry size of 32 bits.
Step 3: Encryption:
  • From i = 1 to 16:
    • Li = Li XOR Ri;
    • Ri = F(Li) XOR Ri;
    • Swap Li, Ri.
  • Undo the previous exchange.
  • R = Perform XOR between R and P17.
    • L = Perform XOR between L and P18.
  • To get 64-bit cypher text, combine L and R.

5.3. Proposed Framework

The framework concerning secure medical information transmission in healthcare is shown in Figure 12. The framework based on secure key generation using two polynomials, blowfish encryption, and a decryption algorithm works in two phases: the first phase pertains to secure key generation, and the second concerns encryption and decryption using the blowfish algorithm. In the second phase, all patient documents and reports are encrypted using the key generated in the first phase, in order to encrypt and decrypt with the blowfish algorithm. The same key is used to decrypt reports and information concerning a patient. A major advantage of the proposed approach is its ability to work well during times of emergency. Every hospital securely shares the information of patients with other hospitals; therefore, the doctor can start treatment without delay and save the patients’ lives.
Figure 12. Secure agent migration framework in the healthcare system.

5.3.1. Threshold Secret Sharing Scheme Using Pair of a Polynomial Equations

  • Our SS scheme follows Shamir’s [31] scheme, in that the generation of participants’ shares, where an irregular polynomial f x of degree t 1 , is used with coefficients from Zq. In addition, another polynomial g x is taken as a supporting polynomial of f x , such that all the coefficients are random, except for one coefficient that matches with a coefficient of f x . As a result, the shares of x are associated with the shares of g x and vice versa.
  • The shares are also independent because a common coefficient does not provide any dependency between f x and g x . Moreover, most t 1 dishonest participants with 2 t 1   shares cannot derive f x and g x (and thus cannot get all shares) as two polynomials contain 2 t 1   unknowns.
  • If none of the shares are modified, any subgroup of ‘t’ participants can generate the correct polynomials for f x and g x , as shown in Figure 13. Due to two random polynomials and a common coefficient between them, the probability of successful share modification is 1 t q 2 .
    Figure 13. Secret sharing scheme.

5.3.2. Blowfish Encryption

The process begins with the generation of subkeys. A P-array is used to store these 18 subkeys, with each array element being a 32-bit item. Next, substitution boxes (S-boxes) [36] are required in both the encryption and decryption processes, with each S-box containing 256 entries S[i][0]...S[i][255], and each item being 32 bits. Then, the last step involves encryption, in which the following steps are carried out:
  • From i = 1 to 16:
    • Li = Li xor Ri;
    • Ri = F(Li) xor Ri;
    • Swap Li, Ri.
  • Undo last swap.
  • R = R xor P17.
    • L = L xor P18.
  • Concatenate L and R to obtain a 64-bit cipher text.

6. Implementation and Result

The security of mobile agents in the healthcare field is provided by combining two polynomial-based secret key schemes and a blowfish symmetric encryption algorithm. The proposed scheme was implemented using python programming, and it was compared with the secret sharing with CRT [37] and EULER [38] algorithms that use the same parameter. After analysis, it was observed that the turnaround time for secret generation and regeneration is much less than the CRT and EULER secret sharing schemes. Table 2 shows the hardware and software requirements for implementing the proposed framework. The average case analysis, regarding the turnaround times for the key generation and regeneration of the CRT, EULER, and two polynomial-based secret sharing schemes [39,40], is shown in Table 3. The results of Table 3 are presented in a graph in Figure 12. It was observed from Figure 14, that the total turnaround time for the two polynomial-based scheme, with regard to secret key generation is optimal compared with other mechanisms.
Table 2. Requirements for computer configuration and software.
Table 3. Average case turnaround time for key generation and regeneration.
Figure 14. Comparison of average key generation and regeneration times.
The best-case analysis of the turnaround times for key generation and regeneration with regard to the CRT, EULER, and two polynomial-based secret sharing schemes is shown in Table 4. The results of Table 4 are presented in the form of a graph in Figure 15. It was observed from Figure 15 that the total turnaround time for the two polynomial-based scheme, with regard to secret key generation, is optimal, as compared with other mechanisms.
Table 4. Best case turnaround time for key generation and regeneration.
Figure 15. Comparison of best-case key generation and regeneration times.
The encryption and decryption times of any algorithm depend on the size of an input file. Table 5 shows the encryption and decryption times of different file sizes, which range from 100 to 1000 kb, and the time observed is noted in msec for the three algorithms: AES, DES, and the blowfish algorithm. The results shown in Figure 16 show that the blowfish algorithm is optimal compared with AES and DES; therefore, our proposed model for the encryption and decryption of patient reports and identity utilizes a blowfish symmetric encryption algorithm.
Table 5. Total time taken for encryption and decryption using the AES, DES, and blowfish algorithms.
Figure 16. Execution times for the AES, DES, and blowfish algorithms.

7. Conclusions

The security of patient personal information and information regarding disease is the main issue discussed in this paper. A mobile agent is used to migrate information from one healthcare center to another. The proposed model, based on the mobile agent, is utilized from a security-based perspective. Another issue facing mobile agent security is resolved by using the proposed model, which is based on two polynomial authentication systems. Here, the authors used the blowfish algorithm to encode a patient’s information. Blowfish is a symmetric cryptography algorithm, and the encryption and decryption of documents requires a secret key that is generated and authenticated by using two polynomial-based mechanisms. The reason behind using the blowfish algorithm is that it is optimal compared with DES and AES encryption and decryption algorithms. After analyzing the proposed model with other symmetric key cryptosystems, key generation, and the recreation of a key, was observed as being far better than the CRT and Euler approach. In future designs, the optimal secret key may be created and recreated, and a secret key based on threshold value can be developed, which may give better results than the proposed model.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, P.K., K.B., N.S., S.R. and C.A.L.; methodology, P.K., K.B., A.K., R.K., S.R. and C.A.L.; software, N.S.,K.B., A.K., R.K. and S.R.; validation, P.K., K.B.,A.K., R.K., S.R. and C.A.L.; formal analysis, P.K., K.B., S.R. and R.K.; investigation, A.K., K.B, R.K., S.R. and C.A.L.; resources, P.K., K.B., N.S., A.K., R.K. and S.R.; data curation, P.K., K.B., A.K., R.K., S.R. and C.A.L.; writing—original draft preparation, P.K., K.B., N.S. and A.K.; writing—review and editing, R.K., S.R. and C.A.L.; visualization, R.K., S.R. and C.A.L.; supervision, R.K., S.R. and C.A.L.; project administration, P.K., K.B., N.S. and A.K.; funding acquisition, C.A.L. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

Not applicable.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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