Abstract
Sigmund Freud’s analysis of Shakespeare’s King Lear focuses on how the titular character is driven by repressed desires, fears, and internal conflicts. He believes that the audience grasps this emotional complexity by projecting their unconscious feelings upon him. Freud’s engagement with Shakespeare serves as a natural entry point into questions about how one understands another’s inner life, specifically as it impacts the modern-day conception of empathy. His philosophical compeers Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein propound theories that allow one to access another’s mind. For them, speech, intonation, and facial expressions serve an epistemic function, revealing that person’s motives, desires, and beliefs. Their seminal treatises of empathy expand upon Freud’s theory of projection and thus serve as a vital heuristic tool in explicating King Lear. Just as Freud grounds his theory of empathy in the listener’s response to a comic’s jokes, Shakespeare uses the Fool’s acerbic riddles to express the affectionate knowing between him and Lear. The intelligence underlying these witticisms not only undoes the rigid taxonomy of “fool” and “wise man,” but also brings to light those matters that weigh most heavily upon Lear’s consciousness, proving that “the phenomenon of foreign psychic life is indubitably there.” (On the Problem of Empathy 1989, p. 5) All of these writers espouse a view of empathy that creates a web of shared understanding that explicates how the Fool grasps Lear’s unconscious mind and forges a meaningful connection with him.
1. Introduction
The intertextual relationship between William Shakespeare, Sigmund Freud, Edmund Husserl, and Edith Stein can be understood through their shared concern with the problem of how humans understand themselves and others. Although Shakespeare was a dramatist of the late sixteenth century, while Freud, Husserl, and Stein were modern thinkers, their works converge around the question of interiority-the existence of an inner life—and the possibility of gaining access to another person’s experiences. Shakespeare explores this question artistically through drama, whereas Freud, Husserl, and Stein examine it theoretically through psychology and philosophy. Together, their works form a continuous intellectual dialogue about empathy and human understanding.
Shakespeare’s dramatic figures do not merely act according to established moral types, social roles, or narrative functions; they think about themselves, assess the consciousness of those closest to them, and adapt their relationships to this ever-evolving awareness. Among modern critics, Harold Bloom presents the strongest version of this argument, contending that Shakespeare effectively “invented the human” by creating characters whose personalities are shaped by their own acts of thinking and speaking (Bloom 1999). In Bloom’s account, Shakespeare not only transforms literature but also shapes modern human consciousness via figures such as Hamlet and Lear who seem capable of revising themselves from within.
Whether or not one accepts Bloom’s expansive formulation, the remarkable depth of psychological representation found in these characters cannot be denied. It provides access to internal conflicts, anxieties, and hopes. Their interactions lay the foundation for Freud’s examination of unconscious desires and their impact upon their decision-making process. For instance, he argues that Hamlet’s hesitation reflects the unconscious emotional dynamics rather than simple indecision. In this sense, Freud treats Shakespeare’s characters as psychologically real subjects whose inner lives can be analyzed. Their interactions reveal that understanding another person requires moving beyond surface behavior to explore the deeper layers of psychic life. The empathetic engagement encouraged by Shakespeare becomes, in Freud’s work, a method of uncovering hidden motives and emotional truths.
Freud’s account of empathy identifies it as a mode of psychological understanding through which what is initially foreign to the ego can become intelligible from within: “We are faced by the process which psychology calls empathy and which plays the largest part in our understanding of what is inherently foreign to our ego in other people.” (Freud [1922] 1955, p. 108). Empathy thus entails more than inference from externally observable behavior; it involves a movement toward the other’s psychic position, an imaginative taking-up of another’s standpoint that makes possible a form of experiential access to another mental life. In this respect, Freud’s formulation finds a striking parallel in Husserl’s phenomenological account of intersubjectivity, according to which “In empathy, the empathizing I experiences the inner life or, to be more precise, the consciousness of the other I.” (Husserl 2006, p. 82). The conceptual proximity between these formulations is particularly revealing when read intertextually: although Freud and Husserl pursue different theoretical projects, both understand empathy as part of the epistemological machinery through which one subject gains access to another not simply as an object of observation but as a subject with an inner life. Freud makes this progression explicit when he describes how “A path leads from identification by way of imitation to empathy, that is, to the comprehension of the mechanism by which we are enabled to take up any attitude at all towards another mental life.” (Freud [1922] 1955, p. 110, n. 2). Empathy therefore occupies a crucial position between identification and comprehension: it is not merely an effective response to another person but a mode of entering into relation with another subject, enabling the ego to take up a position toward a mental life that is otherwise inherently foreign to it.
While Freud focuses on empathy as putting oneself into the psychical process to grasp how these unconscious motives shape behavior, Husserl and Stein approach this act from a phenomenological perspective. For them, empathy explains how one experiences others as subjects rather than objects. Their consciousnesses comes to light through bodily expressions, speech, and action. Shakespeare’s dramatic art as exemplified in The Tragedy of King Lear anticipates this process of knowing. Characters like Lear and his companion, the Fool, are embodied centers of experience who gain insight into the other’s mental state via language, specifically riddles, while maintaining their individuality. For Husserl and Stein, the empathizer does not lose himself in the other person’s consciousness, but rather appreciates the reality of his experiences. Just as the Fool never loses his own identity in his engagement with Lear, these philosophers insist that empathy is the direct experience of another’s joy or suffering as theirs, not mine. In this way, their phenomenological accounts both resonate with and give conceptual expression to Shakespeare’s dramatic representation of empathy. Shakespeare’s characterization thus anticipates this thought by allowing the characters to discern the other’s expectations and intentions without having the boundaries between the self and the other collapse.
The intertextual connection among these writers therefore revolves around a common exploration of empathic expression. Shakespeare provides the literary representation of inner life; Freud interprets that inner life in terms of unconscious psychological processes; Husserl and Stein explain how consciousness encounters the consciousness of others while preserving their asymmetry. Each thinker contributes a different layer to the same intellectual inquiry. Together they form a continuous intellectual tradition centered on the problem of understanding another person’s inner life.
2. The Intertextual Theme of Empathy
According to Freud, Shakespeare is “the greatest of poets” because his plays dramatize so poignantly how the unconscious affects a character’s judgment (Freud [1916] 1956, p. 313). For instance, Hamlet’s internal struggle in taking the action necessary to exact justice for his murdered father exposes the tension between thought and action. He attributes this hesitation to a repressed emotional life: “Hamlet is able to do anything—except take vengeance on the man who did away with his father and took that father’s place with his mother, the man who shows him the repressed wishes of his own childhood realized.” (Freud [1899] 2010, p. 86). The audience relates to Hamlet’s actions (or lack thereof) because it taps into their own latent desires to “to see [their] unconscious impulses expressed without having to act on them.” (Freud [1905] 1956, p. 309). When examining King Lear, Freud interprets the play not so much as a political or family tragedy, but rather as a psychological drama revolving around the king’s dependence on others (Freud [1913] 2025). The insecurities that arise from satisfying these needs prevent him from discerning what constitutes his three daughters’ love. This difficulty strips him down to the raw emotional states of pride, guilt, and shame. The precipitous fall from authority to vulnerability prompts the audience to delve deeply into his emotional register to gauge the fragility of his mental state.
Freud’s study of a character’s unconscious and repressed desires serves as a natural entry point into a discussion of how one accesses another’s inner life and empathizes. In his estimation, the observer projects his experiences and places himself in the other person’s shoes: “We take the producing person’s psychical state into consideration, put ourselves into and try to understand it by comparing it with our own.” (Freud 1905, p. 186). Freud’s account of empathy in Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious shares important similarities with the phenomenological theories of empathy developed by Husserl and Stein. Freud views empathy as an implicit psychological alignment in which the listener unconsciously recognizes and participates in the mental processes that give a joke its meaning. The success of a joke depends on the audience’s ability to identify with the speaker’s hidden assumptions, repressed desires, or emotional attitudes, thereby creating a shared psychic experience.
Husserl and Stein likewise understand empathy as the means by which one apprehends another person’s conscious experience. For them, empathy is not a matter of inference or emotional contagion but an intentional act in which another person’s experiences are directly presented as belonging to that person rather than to oneself. This intersubjective recognition makes shared understanding and communication possible. Freud’s analysis similarly presupposes that the listener can enter into another person’s perspective, although he explains this process through unconscious mechanisms rather than through the structures of intentional consciousness.
While the seminal treatises of these phenomenological thinkers assert that one can access another’s mind directly by observing his actions, differences exist in their approaches. Husserl stresses the immediate grasping of another’s subjectivity while Stein focuses on the process of explicating the other’s consciousness. Still, for both of them, speech, intonations, and facial expressions serve an epistemic function, disclosing that person’s motives, desires, and beliefs. Its surety not only allows the empathizer to grasp the other’s distinctiveness but also involves a specialized use of the mind. In the words of Stein, apprehending the other person’s subjectivity is a “sui generis” act (Stein 1989, p. 11). While all three scholars believe that each person’s psyche is something both hidden and yet legible, Husserl and Stein’s refinement of Freud’s view explicates more fully Shakespeare’s dramatization of how one understands another’s mental states and employs this knowledge to forge a meaningful connection.
To illustrate the intertextual link between these modern-day theories of empathy and Shakespeare’s depiction of how a character accesses another’s inner thoughts and then expresses this insight, this article will examine the Fool’s riddles and how they draw from Lear’s experiences to reveal his repressed feelings. After watching the King recklessly divide his lands between two ungrateful daughters, Goneril and Regan, and then banishing the loving one, Cordelia, the Fool gains a keen insight into Lear’s thought process. The knowledge conveyed by these observations informs his riddles with a truth that, if deciphered, reveals how Lear can cultivate healthy relationships. The witticism’s perspicacity undoes the prescribed taxonomy of being either wise or foolish; meaning oscillates between the two as they articulate an affectionate knowing from the other’s perspective. Despite their caustic nature, these riddles do not denigrate Lear’s person but show that their two streams of consciousness remain separate. According to Husserl and Stein, asymmetry ensures that the observer realizes what distinguishes the other’s self as well as one’s own, illustrating the evolution from Freud’s position (Husserl 1973a, p. 385). This intelligence instantiates his riddles with an empathic awareness that brings the unconscious to the forefront of Lear’s thoughts and discloses a web of shared understanding between these writers.
The Fool’s jokes reveal that he is deeply aware of Lear’s thoughts and emotions and uses them both to encourage self-reflection and show genuine care for Lear’s well-being. They anticipate Freud’s conception of the comic in Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, where humor becomes a means of expressing repressed thoughts and revealing the workings of the unconscious. To explain how the listener processes the comic’s jokes, Freud writes: “Here for the first time our attention is drawn to the other person putting himself into the psychical process that occurs in the person who produces the remark.” (Freud 1905, p. 186). The listener projects his feelings on the comic and uses this comparison to ascertain his intentions: “It is these processes of empathy and comparison that result in the economy in expenditure which we discharge by laughing.” (Freud 1905, p. 186). Laughter communicates the realization that the comic has experiences akin to the listener’s own, thus allowing the listener to empathize with him. Similarly, Shakespeare relies upon a jokester’s riddles to create a conduit for Lear to confront his repressed feelings and attune himself to the value of others. They recognize that the King’s actions are imbued with psychological meaning and resolving them offers a means to use his intellect constructively. These clever, albeit caustic, witticisms function as a performance of empathy because they reveal to the King how to amend his flawed line of reasoning and fashion valued relationships.
Even though the term “empathy” does not come into existence until the turn of the twentieth century, the Fool’s affectionate knowing finds its clearest articulation in Husserl and Stein’s phenomenology. They maintain that the spoken and physical cues exchanged between two people are a direct kind of empirical knowledge that allows the observer to grasp the consciousness of the other. Lear’s actions enable the Fool to penetrate his unconscious mental states and, in doing so, validate Husserl’s claim that the expressivity of the other is imbued with psychological meaning from the start and that it is empathy that allows one to understand and grasp this meaning (Husserl 1989, p. 244). The Fool’s rebarbative gibes thus reify Husserl and Stein’s theories and, by doing so, continue the intertextual conversation initiated by Freud’s interest in Shakespeare’s portrayal of the unconscious.
3. Empathy’s Origins in King Lear
Empathy aligns the Fool with Lear’s mind. It is not an indirect or passive reaction, but an active mode of consciousness that apprehends the motivations underpinning his actions. Upon witnessing the King’s folly in dividing up his kingdom based upon his daughters’ proclamation of their love, the Fool sees that Lear has not honed the skill necessary to access their innermost thoughts. He articulates this insight via acerbic riddles, which elevates his role above the one-dimensional view of critics like Grigori Kozinstev who malign him as “a youthful village idiot.” (Kozinstev 1977, p. 72). He observes that the banishment of Cordelia coupled with Goneril and Regan’s mistreatment has resulted in an overwhelming shame. Attuned to this remorse, the Fool presents a series of barbed witticisms that may irritate the King’s sensitivities, but prompt him to address his flawed line of reasoning.
Fool: If thou wert my fool, nuncle, I’d have thee beaten for being old before thy time.Lear: How’s that?Fool: Thou shouldst not have been old till thou hadst been wise.Lear: O let me not be mad, not mad, sweet heaven! I would not be mad.(1.5.38-44)1
The Fool’s tough love approach shifts the blame from the absurdity of his decision-making process to his wizened age. By avoiding a direct onslaught on his reasoning faculties, he invites Lear to reflect upon his mistakes so that he can redirect his ego-centered perspective to an interpersonal one. The gibe points out that Lear’s guilt could have been avoided if he had learned how to cultivate relationships instead of satisfying his own desires. Lear’s plea to “not be mad” does not signify a fear of losing his mind as much as being unable to use it properly. Repeatedly exclaiming that he does not want to “be mad, not mad” underscores the very real worry that shame will compromise his lucidity. It indicates a desperate need for someone to help him develop his intellect so that he can overcome these repressed feelings. Since guilt and pride prevent him from conceiving a reality other than the present one, the Fool’s barbs force him to assess his past experiences and locate the source of his downfall. They urge him to cognize what the experience itself presents—the chance to fortify his relationship with the Fool—and not give in to an impulsive reaction. The truth embedded in these words subvert the predetermined classification of wise man and fool. “Wisdom” and “folly” cannot be used as rigid, exclusionary terms. As evident in this interplay, these terms are ultimately dependent upon each other and necessarily imply the presence of the one and the other. This movement of meaning restructures the perception of these characters’ distinctiveness and connectedness. Their relationship dismantles the traditional, hierarchical notions and invites a broader, more liberal dimension of interpreting their bond.
Indeed, the Fool’s very first riddle focuses explicitly upon how the term “fool” can signify different types of people. It exposes the dangers of relying upon labels to define a person’s value. The challenge is not simply to delineate a sweet from a bitter fool but for Lear to gain a greater self- and interpersonal awareness.
Fool: That lord that counseled thee to give away thy land,Come place him here by me; do thou for him stand.The sweet and bitter fool will presently appear,The one in motley here, the other found out there.(1.4.137-40)
Cloaked under the thin veil of a simple metaphor, “bitter fool” refers to the King’s folly for relying on flattery to determine how to divide his kingdom. He listens to their professions of love only with the intention of hearing their praises but not why they speak them. Believing Regan and Gonerill’s hyperbolic declarations and then construing Cordelia’s response that her love is in accord with their natural bond—“no more, nor less”—as an insult illustrates a disabling egoism. It nullifies the epistemic possibilities of their interaction. Since the starting point for empathy begins with the “lived experience” of that individual, Lear’s ego-centrism isolates him from his daughters and dooms any attempt to become empathetic (Stein 1989, pp. 87–8). Conversely, a “sweet fool” readily perceives the other person’s experiences as substantive and is conscious of how another’s actions reveal her particular expectations and beliefs. While a dominant premise of Freud’s theory is that human behavior is often driven by unconscious desires and fears, the Fool’s riddles strive to break through Lear’s repression so that he can confront them. Resolving them is designed to fortify his sense of self so that he can reintegrate himself within the world, showing that empathy is a cognitive skill honed through practice, whereas the Fool’s attentiveness shows that he is a sweet fool, the one who is “found out there,” Lear’s self-centeredness makes him the fool “in motley here.” The riddle thus presents a truth that Lear must come to accept so that he can realign this thought process accordingly.
Grasping the reality of his situation would allow Lear to move past the shame of giving “away thy land” and appreciate the Fool’s unique expression of support. His witticisms create a “livable space” where, according to Kathryn Schwartz, covenants of “allegiance, affiliation, fidelity, and reciprocity have their basis in the capacity of persons to agree within and among themselves, to formulate priorities of intercourse that work against the drives of dominance and opposition but respond to a more foundational imperative of coexistence.” (Schwartz 2011, p. 3). Although Schwartz’s interpretive focus centers upon gender issues, it applies to the Fool as he recasts his prescribed place in society and strives to establish a reciprocity of understanding. Asking Lear to apprehend the differences between these two types of fools points out the limitations of relying upon an absolute standard to judge another person’s character.
Although the Fool’s riddles present an interpretative experience that involves both parties, Lear struggles to grasp the subtlety of their meaning. Guilt and regret consume him, inflaming his self-defensiveness: “Dost thou call me fool, boy?” (1.4.141). Until freed from this repression, he cannot appreciate the value of his relationship with the Fool and how it impacts who he is. Husserl observes that the self is fully developed only when personalized intersubjectively; he becomes a person exclusively through his life with others and their expression of empathy (Husserl 1973b). These riddles offer him a means to participate more fully in the experience. Acquiring this understanding socializes both of them in a community of consciousness.
Despite Lear’s struggles, the Fool does not relent. He intensifies their rebarbative quality, prompting the King to exercise his intellect and restructure his perception of others.2 The singular focus on his mind shows that empathy does not spring from an emotionally charged response, but rather an astute grasp of interpersonal dynamics:
When thouclovest thy crown i’the middle and gav’st away bothparts, thou bor’st thine ass on thy back o’er the dirt.(1.4.152-4)
Thou mad’st thydaughters thy mothers; for when thou gav’st them therod and putt’st down thine own breeches.(1.4.163-5)
In both instances, the Fool mocks Lear for giving away his crown and becoming an “ass.” Accusing him of making “thy daughters thy mothers” points out Lear’s passivity, for he chooses not to discern Goneril and Regan’s true desires. By not exercising this necessary mental energy, he lets Goneril and Regan gain sovereignty over him. These quick-witted riddles bring to light that authoritarian power either as a king or a father does not make him infallible. They force him to use his faculties in a way that he has never done before, namely to access his inner thoughts and appreciate others’ perspectives. By not doing so, he forsakes his parental authority and becomes the child being reprimanded with a rod.
To soften the harshness of this role reversal critique, the Fool situates his words within a dulcet harmony:
Then they for sudden joy did weepAnd I for sorrow sung,That such a king should play bo-peep,And go the fools among.(1.4.167-9)
The descent from king to clown fills the Fool with sorrow. This sadness shows that the Fool appreciates the magnitude of what Lear has lost. By apprehending what Lear has lost as a king, father, and man. By so doing, he reifies Stein’s theory that the empathizer understands “how [that] a person’s constitution is in contrast with [his] own.” (Stein 1989, p. 109). If the Fool does not maintain this distinction, then the encounter would merely “present me with myself as different.3 While this melodious riddle identifies Lear once again as a “fool,” the polysemy of this word does not equate him with the Fool. Rather, it denotes him behaving foolishly, which is proven by Lear’s succeeding response. He lashes out at the Fool, calling him a liar whom “we’ll have you whipped” (1.4.172). Referring to himself as the royal “we” shows that he has yet to separate himself from his political identity. This disconnect with the essence of his person accounts for his resistance to the riddle’s truth.
In terms of the play’s performance, Lear’s threat of bodily harm necessitates him assuming an aggressive stance. It signifies the angst caused by not utilizing his intellect in a constructive capacity, validating Husserl and Stein’s theory. For them, the body performs a much greater function than simply linking oneself with the other person at sensorimotor or affective levels. It houses a body of experience that conveys vital information about that person’s mental states. As stated by Stein, “a single action and also a single bodily expression, such as a look or a laugh, can give me a glimpse into the kernel of the person.” (Stein 1989, p. 109). This “kernel” unfolds a horizon of meaning that discloses the King’s mental states. It is what makes this interchange a genuinely original phenomenon. The Fool’s caustic quips apprehend the inimitability of Lear’s actions, creating a pathway to know each other more fully. This knowledge is not known by inference or analogy, but as directly existing. Individual difference underpins this act and maintaining this mode of consciousness expands upon the limits of projection. Of course, being on opposite ends of the social hierarchy also helps the Fool readily grasp what comprises Lear’s subjectivity. He may not occupy the same social strata as the King, but class difference means little when the focus rests upon the epistemological purport of their interactions. The surety of this knowledge is not discerned as his own feeling, but draws from the experience as a whole, inclusive of both men.
The density of this wordplay encourages Lear to reconcile views that he perceives as seemingly incompatible, such as the Fool’s lowly place in the social hierarchy with him being a valued companion. They upset his notion of what want defines either one. As Thomas Burns notes, the poetics of riddles mediate “conceptual ambiguity and stimulate cognitive reexamination.” (Burns 1976). They initiate a game of interpretation.
I had rather be any kind o’thingthan a fool, and yet I would not be thee, nuncle. Thouhas pared thy wit o’both sides and left nothing i’themiddle.(1.4.176-9)
Mocking Lear’s use of his “wit” and the fact that he is left with “nothing i’the middle” exposes the causes of his paternal failings. Being homeless stems from an inability to ascertain his daughters’ intentions. Pondering why he “has pared thy wit o’both sides and left I’the/middle” directs him to determine why he chose not to access his daughters’ minds. The efficacy of this gibe centers upon its “astonishing accuracy” in accessing the unconscious and challenging Lear’s acumen (Abrahams 1972). Even when the social constructs of wisdom and folly are couched in pointed taunts, they strive to recast Lear’s thought processes so that he can see that the Fool is not an adversary, but someone who offers him the support that he seeks.
The affectionate knowing underlying these witticisms stands in stark contrast to Goneril’s words. When she questions Lear’s wisdom, she does not mask her critique in clever quips, but attacks his intelligence:
I would you would make use of your good wisdom,Whereof I know you are fraught, and put awayThese dispositions, which of late transport youFrom what you rightly are.(1.4.211-4)
Goneril blames Lear’s decision to retain his “insolent retinue” and “all-licensed fool” as evidence of straying from “what you rightly are” (1.4.191-2). Her invective excoriates the integrity of those who still respect his person and undercuts the Fool’s efforts by stating that his gibes are merely part of his professional duty. She makes no attempt to ascertain her father’s thoughts as a recently retired sovereign. By coldly expecting him to act with the same surety he had before losing political power and paternal respect, she conversely highlights the Fool’s attentiveness.
Such arrogance precludes her from realizing that Lear needs this company of people to bolster his self-worth. Such disregard voids his political and familial identity, causing him to question his sense of self.
Lear: Who is it that can tell me who I am?Fool: Lear’s shadow.(1.4.221-2)
Lear’s existential question “Who is it that can tell me who I am?” shows that without meaningful social bonds he cannot determine his place in the world. Referring to himself as “Lear’s shadow” shows that the Fool readily grasps those unconscious desires pressing upon his mind. Lear wants to be valued by others and be part of the community. That the Fool neither imagines nor theorizes about Lear’s condition validates Husserl’s claim: “empathy is what allows the empathized to be present to the observer; for what he sees is not a sign, not a mere analogue, but rather the other (Husserl 1973a, p. 385). It is not enough that the Fool attunes himself to Lear’s consciousness. Both must participate in this reality to foster a mutual understanding. Embracing the totality of this interchange holds the potential to transmute his distress into solace. Being his “shadow” ensures that Lear remains socialized in a communal horizon, where his bearing to himself is appropriated from others. Here, it lies not with Goneril, but with the Fool.
His insight proves that he is not a symbol of the court, but someone who apprehends Lear’s unconscious desires. Their experiences intertwine and generate something binding. It accounts for why the King repeatedly asks about the Fool’s whereabouts.
Where’s my knave, my fool?/Go you and call my fool hither.(1.4.42-3)
Where’s my fool, ho? Ho, I think the world’s asleep/How now, where’s that mongrel?(1.4.47-8)
But where’s my/fool? I have not seen him this two days.(1.4.69-70)
Go you; call hither my fool.(1.4.75)
The King’s descriptors, such as “knave,” “mongrel,” and “fool,” suggest that he thinks lowly of the Fool, but in actuality, they disclose his struggle to express affection. It also attests to the barriers imposed by society’s insistence to define itself by hierarchical categories. Still, the continual inquiries about the Fool show how he overcomes these linguistic limitations. It attests to a devotion that extends beyond what the court can articulate. Being cognizant of that “two days” have passed since he last saw the Fool confirms their relationship’s authenticity, proving that empathy thrives when directed towards someone who is close to the observer (Motomura et al. 2015).
That the term “fool” expresses an affection that transcends its socially prescribed denotation accentuates that the interplay between “wisdom” and “folly” undoes any fixed or bounded meaning for either term or character. The continual movement between wise man and fool describes a relationship that operates apart from the court’s expectations. As evidenced by Lear’s heartfelt desire for the Fool’s company, his use of the term “fool” breaks free from the linguistic limitations imposed by prevailing attitudes and, in doing so, creates a space for each one to know about the other. Moreover, his obvious affection prevents the Fool’s riddles from being denigrated as “an act of displacement that enacts the usurpation of the sovereign by the clown.”4 They do not attempt to steal the King’s power but help him discover that the power to know another person’s motivations lies within himself and not in adhering to predetermined attitudes. By their very design, riddles invest language with the fullness of meaning to reveal alternate modes of using the intellect and understanding another’s actions. As illustrated by the continuous counterpointing of “wisdom” and “folly,” this witty repartee simultaneously emphasizes the similarities and differences between these two men, proving that each one is a minded individual who can attune himself to the other’s actions.
This wordplay helps recast Lear’s thought processes so that he can see that the Fool is not an adversary, but someone who can access his unconscious and wants him to participate in the dialogue. By bringing together two individual streams of consciousness, these witticisms deepen the affinity between them. No matter how much Lear tries to repress his shame for misusing his intellect, they prevent him from thinking that he is a self-enclosed or self-sufficient person. By prompting him to exercise his intellect, they help recast the perception of himself and others.5 The knowing generated by these riddles brings to light his individuality and an identity apart from the one assigned by his hierarchical position. As Husserl writes, “The origin of personality lies in empathy and in the social acts which are rooted in the latter. To acquire a personality, it is not enough that the subject becomes aware of itself as the center of its acts: personality is rather constituted only when the subject establishes social relations with others (Husserl 1973a, p. 385). By understanding another’s motivations and beliefs, an empathetic individual is more willing to collaborate, compromise, and act in ways that benefit the other person or a group rather than focusing solely on his own interests. Their lived experiences sustain a mindful continuity between them, engendering a greater appreciation of each other’s worth.
Yet, before he can attempt to strengthen his bond with the Fool, Lear must endure an unpleasant meeting with Regan. Just like Goneril, she tells him that his retinue is superfluous and should be dismissed. Then, as if to throw salt in his wounds, she tells him to return to Goneril and say that “you have wronged her” (2.2.341). The blatant disregard for his situation enrages him. Yet, instead of demanding an apology, he launches into a tirade against Goneril: “All the stored vengeances of heaven fall/On her ingrateful top! Strike her young bones…with lameness!” (2.2.351-3). Despite striking out with such vituperation, he ultimately recognizes that he has no power over these daughters and must either acquiesce to their demands or become homeless. It causes him to weep that his heart “shall break into a hundred thousand flaws” (2.2.474). Without any familial attachments to validate his sense of self, he reaches out to the Fool: “O fool, I shall go mad” (2.2.475). The felt emotion in this desolate cry expresses the growing awareness of the innate need for someone to exert the effort to understand his vulnerable state of mind. The intensity of his worry draws the Fool into the moment and, in so doing, verifies Stein’s claim that the “experience is no longer an object for me, but has pulled myself into it.” (Stein 1989, p. 18). It produces a moment that involves both of them, making the Fool an integral figure in his insular world.
This interchange highlights the phenomenological idea that the experience itself conveys the other’s motives, desires, and beliefs. Such knowledge fosters an interconnectedness.6 Kris McDaniel explains, it is “through the higher-order empathetic act that I come to recognize myself as a physical object imbued with psychological states. Not only must I have empathy but there must also be other people who have empathy in order for me to have this kind of self-knowledge.” (McDaniel 2017, p. 218). The Fool’s riddles prove that he is someone capable of expressing this kind of knowing. They allow Lear to consider his distinct role in this experience and discern what comprises his own person. Yet, both men exit the stage before either one can act on this knowledge.
Unable to attain any peace of mind, Lear’s inner turmoil begins to overwhelm his reasoning capacities. When he appears next on stage, he is standing out in a thunderstorm and defiantly challenging the lightning-streaked skies to “[s]inge my white head” (3.1.6). To some critics, this bluster symbolizes unbridled anger, functioning as a type of pathetic fallacy, but, I submit, that it signifies his repressed desire to engage with someone—or, more properly, something—who recognizes his worth.7
Blow winds and crack your cheeks! Rage, blow!You cataracts and hurricanes, spout‘Till you have drenched our steeples, drowned the cocks!You sulphurous and thought-executing fires,Vaunt-couriers of oak-cleaving thunderbolts,Singe my white head!(3.2.1-6)
The energy pulsating throughout his speech accentuates a desperate need to prove his mettle by facing nature’s brutal force head on.8 By anthropomorphizing the storm makes his actions more than sound and fury. Their intensity parallels the pain inflicted by Goneril and Regan’s disdain. Detailing the storm’s various features illustrates his attentiveness to assess what constitutes its power, proving that he is in full possession of his mental faculties. The downpour drenches church steeples, drowns farm animals, and splits centuries-old oak trees. All of creation, whether natural or manmade, is subject to its destructive force. Its unrivalled might validates Lear’s own power in daring it to strike him. Provoking a non-human entity may put into question his wisdom, but it attests to how much the unconscious affects his behavior. The pain caused by his repressed feelings of shame fills him with an earnest desire to be heard and interact with others in a meaningful manner.
Despite his earnestness, the Fool points out that this night “pities neither/wise men nor fools” (3.2.12-13). For the first time in the play, these two opposites are not pitted against one another. They fall into one category inclusive of both men. Since the physical reality of the storm’s dangers threatens their well-being, they must both fend for themselves to protect their bodily health. Lear, however, remains defiant and continues taunting the storm: “Rumble thy bellyful! Spit fire, spout rain!” (3.2.14). Venting his repressed frustration, he makes clear that his anger is not directed at “you elements,” but rather at his children (3.2.16). He tells the storm, “You owe me no subscription” (3.2.18). His words disclose a growing awareness of his present state. They instill a sense of self unaffected by those who strive to alienate him from others. While his dealings with Goneril and Regan provoke his ire, those with the storm not only give him a chance to expunge these feelings, but also attest to the efficacy of the Fool’s riddles. The give-and-take of their repartee exposes the fallacy of authoritarian presumption, emboldening him to move closer to an honest understanding of who he is.
Once exhausting his anger at the storm’s fury, Lear conducts a self-assessment that contradicts the bravado that he has just dramatically displayed. He describes himself as a “poor, infirm, weak and despised old man” (3.2.20). While the harshness of these words shows that Regan and Goneril’s insults have had a lasting impact on his state of mind, they also point out the need for someone to reassure him that whatever his physical condition may be, he still has value. When telling the storm that “I stand your slave,” he displays two conflicting truths. On the one hand, it demonstrates a mature realization that having power in this world does not necessarily safeguard one’s well-being. On the other hand, it presents a self-defeating mentality that prevents him from accepting that the Fool wants him to become part of his world (3.2.19).9
Believing that the only conclusion is to let the storm and “two pernicious daughters” battle him illustrates the necessity to enter into an empathic relationship (3.2.22). Sadly, the will to move forward wanes and makes him unable to see the positivity in the Fool’s final riddle:
He that has a little tiny wit,With heigh-ho, the wind and the rain,Must make content with his fortunes fit,Though the rain it raineth every day.(3.2.74-7)
Once unraveled, this witticism encourages Lear to look past the contempt of his ungrateful daughters. Instead of letting Goneril and Regan’s insults take hold of his mind, he needs to conform his happiness to the present circumstances. Its tone may seem overly pessimistic, but it offers a practical wisdom: since suffering and uncertainty are unavoidable, he must accept that every person experiences life’s trials and misfortunes. If he could redirect his cognitive energies and embrace this fact, Lear could move past any repressed feelings of shame. Even though their time on stage together comes to a close, the affectionate knowing subtending their interplay proves that the riddles are not an exercise in caustic cruelty. They offer a means for him to realign his perspective and enter into a healthy, empathic relationship.
Although the Fool’s efforts fall short of their intended goal, the fault lies with the crippling damage caused by the ungrateful daughters’ mistreatment. Their lack of empathy that distorts Lear’s baseline compromises his ability to use his mind constructively and ascertain others’ motivations and beliefs. Still, the Fool’s riddles strive to bring to light those unconscious matters weighing most heavily upon his mind and help him realign his thought processes. They underscore that empathy is a sophisticated skill that recognizes the asymmetry between the two parties. It is not a simple transference of emotion, but a deliberate effort to access his mental states. Alina Wyman observes that this process is the “most productive way of ‘entering’ other selves…and is grounded in the empathizer’s sovereignty as an active subject, whose unique individuality is not dissolved in the process of empathizing.” (Wyman 2016, p. 15). It is not enough that the Fool discerns Lear’s unconscious life. He must do so selflessly. By maintaining this objectivity, the Fool ensures that there is “no question of comparing [the other] to myself.” (Gordon 1995, p. 56). Maintaining this mode of consciousness is a sui generis act. His riddles illustrate an evolution from Freud’s stance of projection to Husserl and Stein’s phenomenology that the experience itself discloses the other’s specific motivations, desires, and beliefs.
The intelligence underlying these witticisms not only undoes the rigid taxonomy of “fool” and “wise man,” but also brings to light those matters that weigh most heavily upon Lear’s consciousness, proving that “the phenomenon of foreign psychic life is indubitably there.” (Stein 1989, p. 5). By disclosing a keen grasp of Lear’s interiority, the Fool’s riddles anticipate key elements of modern theories of empathy developed by Freud, Husserl, and Stein. They apprehend the tensions underlying Lear’s psychological conflict, foreshadowing Freud’s emphasis on the hidden dimensions of the psyche. Moreover, their acerbic nature ensures that Lear and the Fool’s interactions maintain the distinction between self and other, which embodies the principles articulated by Husserl and Stein. The empathy expressed in them thus reifies Freud’s emphasis upon putting oneself in the other person’s place and the phenomenological view that the other person’s actions disclose key elements about his state of mind. As espoused by all these writers, empathy is not an indirect or passive reaction, but an active mode of consciousness. The riddles thus demonstrate a web of shared understanding that explicates how the Fool grasps Lear’s unconscious mind and forges a meaningful connection with him. Thus, Shakespeare remains not only a master dramatist but also an early explorer of the philosophical and psychological foundations of human understanding.
Funding
This research received no external funding.
Institutional Review Board Statement
Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement
Not applicable.
Data Availability Statement
The original contributions presented in this study are included in the article. Further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding author.
Conflicts of Interest
The author declares no conflict of interest.
Notes
| 1 | All passages from the play are taken from (Shakespeare 2014). |
| 2 | In the words of W. P. Albrecht, the truth found in this verbal repartee “lies in the tension between the pertinence of the Fool’s comments and the impertinence of his language. The Fool’s remarks both ‘relieve’ and ‘aid’ the intensity of passions” (Albrecht 1978). |
| 3 | Husserl (1973a, p. 314). The difference between his perception and Lear’s experience accounts for Stein’s critique of her precursor Theodor Lipps whom she believes advocates a complete immersion of oneself into the other. “Lipps says that as long as empathy is complete … there is no distinction between our own and the foreign “I,” that they are one. For example, I am one with the acrobat and go through his motions inwardly. A distinction only arises when I step out of complete empathy and reflect on my “real ‘I’” (Stein 1989, p. 16). |
| 4 | Wilson downplays the source of Lear’s “anger and self-hate, in the negative dialectic of King Lear” in favor of examining “the defilement that held a mirror up not only to the grime of ‘The Wisest Fool’, but the filth of the fool himself” (Wilson 2013, p. 262). |
| 5 | See Note 2. |
| 6 | Husserl believes that when both parties are aware that they are being experienced and understood by the other, they enter into a higher interpersonal unity, a “we.” See Husserl (1973c). |
| 7 | Interpreting the storm as metaphoric for Lear’s conflicted state of mind has received much scholarly attention throughout the years. William Elton believes that demystifing the storm correlates to Lear’s own process of forlorn realization and acceptance (Elton 1966). See (Dunn 1952; Bennett 1962; Kirsch 1988). |
| 8 | Janet Adelman interprets this speech as authorizing Goneril with the power of the weather: “No longer under the aegis of a male thunderer, the very wetness of the storm threatens to undo civilization, and manhood itself, spouting rain until it has ‘drench’d the steeples, drown’d the cocks’, its power an extension into the cosmos of Goneril’s power to shake Lear’s manhood” (Adelman 1991, p. 110). While the misogyny in Lear’s speech is undeniable, his claim that “all germens spill at once” references man’s contribution to reproduction complicates the view that the storm represents a female counterpoint (3.2.8). |
| 9 | Husserl believes that when both parties are aware that they are being experienced and understood by the other, they enter into a higher interpersonal unity, a “we.” Although this is the Fool’s goal, the King cannot see this possibility. See Husserl (1973c). |
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