Review Reports

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

This is a very good essay, and I recommend that it be accepted in its present form.

Your synthesis of the current scholarship on Aristotle's account of the acquisition of character virtue is commendable. Your distinction between the ownership of one's action and the practical authorship of one's action is quite good, and I agree with you that it is a useful abbreviation of several distinctions within Aristotle's account of character formation.  Your account of those various distinctions is also sound. While your contribution to the scholarship on this topic is modest, I agree with you that it is a valuable "interpretative refinement of the relation among voluntariness, practical description, and good choice" (p. 13, lines 598-9). Nicely done.

Author Response

 

Comment: The reviewer recommends acceptance in the present form and considers the distinction between ownership and practical authorship to be a useful and sound interpretive refinement.

Response: Thank you for this positive assessment. I have kept the central thesis and its limited interpretive scope. The changes made in revision are mainly intended to improve clarity, structure, and accessibility in response to the other reports.

Reviewer 2 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

See the attachment for my comments.

Comments for author File: Comments.pdf

Author Response

 

 

Reviewer 2

Revisions made mainly in response to the Reviewer 2 are highlighted in green in the revised manuscript.

 

Comment 1: The paper is often redundant and contains unclear or insufficiently explained phrases. The reviewer suggests reducing the length by about one fifth to one fourth.

Response: I agree that the submitted version repeated several distinctions and sometimes used compressed expressions. I have removed repeated material, shortened several subsections, simplified the objections section, and rewritten the literature review so that each source has a clear role in the argument. At the same time, Reviewer 3 asked for additional definitions and contextual explanation. I therefore did not apply a mechanical 20–25% cut, but the revised text is still substantially shorter before the reference list while also being clearer.

Changes in revised manuscript: Section 2, pages 4-5, lines 109-160; Section 5, pages 7-9, lines 238-299; Section 6, pages 9-11, lines 300-358; and Section 9, pages 14-15, lines 460-512. The retained rewritten material is highlighted in green.

 

Comment 2: The gap between voluntary action and full virtue is already visible in Nicomachean Ethics III and VI. The reviewer asks whether the paper is only clarifying this gap or making a wider philosophical claim.

Response: I agree that this needed to be stated earlier. The revised Introduction now says directly that the main contribution is a narrow interpretive reconstruction. The terms “causal-agential ownership” and “practical authorship” are used to make explicit the different work done by Aristotle’s accounts of voluntariness, choice, virtuous action, and practical truth. The paper does not claim that Aristotle failed to see the distinction, and it does not present a general theory of libertarian free will.

Changes in revised manuscript: Section 1, pages 2-3, lines 63-77, where the limited interpretive contribution and the ownership/authorship distinction are stated directly. Highlighted in green.

 

Comment 3: Line 54: clarify what “defensible account” means.

Response: Agreed. The vague phrase has been replaced by more direct wording about a textually adequate interpretation and the need to keep the relevant Aristotelian criteria distinct.

Changes in revised manuscript: Section 1, page 2, lines 56-63. Highlighted in green.

 

Comment 4: Line 55: “agential asymmetry” is confusing.

Response: Agreed. I have removed this expression. The revised paper uses the more direct language of a developmental gap between voluntary ownership and practical authorship.

Changes in revised manuscript: Section 1, pages 2-3, lines 63-77, and Section 5.3, pages 8-9, lines 278-298. Highlighted in green.

 

Comment 5: Line 80: “adequate ethical accounts” is unclear and may be confused with the formative role of law.

Response: Agreed. The revised sentence now refers to explicit rational explanations of why actions are good. It also makes clear that law and education can shape conduct before the learner can give such explanations.

Changes in revised manuscript: Section 1, page 3, lines 91-98, where the wording now refers to explicit rational explanations and distinguishes these from the formative role of law and education. Highlighted in green.

 

Comment 6: Line 100: the discussion of habituation as non-mindless is confusing.

Response: I have rewritten this part. The point is now that recent scholarship has already shown that habituation is not simply mechanical repetition. The paper therefore does not present cognition, affect, guidance, or voluntary participation as new discoveries; it asks what voluntariness contributes within this already richer picture.

Changes in revised manuscript: Section 2, page 4, lines 109-118. Highlighted in green.

 

Comment 7: Line 164: make clear whether the ownership/authorship distinction is intended to correct Aristotle or only to clarify a distinction on which his account relies.

Response: Agreed. The revised Introduction now states explicitly that the distinction is reconstructive and explanatory. It is not offered as a correction of Aristotle or as a new Aristotelian technical distinction.

Changes in revised manuscript: Section 1, page 3, lines 71-77. Highlighted in green.

 

Comment 8: Line 167: the opening sentence of the section is unclear.

Response: Agreed. I have replaced the abstract wording with a direct statement of the problem: the learner can respond to rational direction without yet possessing mature practical reasoning.

Changes in revised manuscript: Section 3, page 5, lines 161-166. Highlighted in green.

 

Comment 9: Line 173: italicize katēkoon and peitharchikon.

Response: Corrected.

Changes in revised manuscript: Section 3, page 5, line 172. The terms katēkoon and peitharchikon are italicized and highlighted in green.

 

Comment 10: Line 203: specify the “second distinction.”

Response: Corrected. The transition now names the distinction directly: correct performance can occur without virtuous agency.

Changes in revised manuscript: Section 3, page 6, lines 197-202, where the transition now states directly that correct performance can occur without virtuous agency. Highlighted in green.

 

Comment 11: Line 228: “developmental continuity without identity” is unclear.

Response: Agreed. I have replaced this with clearer wording: there can be developmental continuity without equivalence between the learner’s action and the action of the fully virtuous agent.

Changes in revised manuscript: Section 4, page 7, lines 220-229. Highlighted in green.

 

Comment 12: Line 289: the subsection is redundant.

Response: Agreed. The repeated material has been removed or integrated into the surrounding discussion.

Changes in revised manuscript: Sections 5.2-5.3, pages 8-9, lines 263-299. The redundant subsection was removed and its necessary content was integrated into the surrounding discussion; the retained rewritten material is highlighted in green.

 

Comment 13: Line 347: the sentence about conduct whose practical orientation is supported by others is too complex.

Response: Agreed. The sentence has been simplified, and the relevant point is stated earlier where supported voluntary action is introduced.

Changes in revised manuscript: Section 5.3, pages 8-9, lines 278-299. Highlighted in green.

 

Comment 14: Line 381: explain how the discussions of Hampson and Leunissen contribute to the argument; more generally, make the role of secondary literature clearer.

Response: Agreed. Section 2 and the later literature discussions have been revised so that each source is connected to a specific step in the argument. Hampson is used to explain learning through first-personal practice and imitation; Leunissen supports the embodied and psychophysical dimension of habituation.

Changes in revised manuscript: Section 2, pages 4-5, lines 109-160, and Section 6.1, pages 9-10, lines 301-319. The revised literature discussion is highlighted in green; the psychophysical wording at lines 314-316 that also answers Reviewer 3 is highlighted in pink.

 

Comment 15: Line 406: explain how shame fits the argument.

Response: The revised paragraph now makes the connection explicit. Shame is treated as a transitional affect that can move a learner from external social response toward a better appreciation of the value of action, although it can also remain merely reputation-oriented.

Changes in revised manuscript: Section 6.2, page 10, lines 327-333. Highlighted in green.

 

Comment 16: Line 433: clarify how Moss and Fiecconi contribute to the argument.

Response: I have made their function explicit. Their work is used to support the claim that habituation changes evaluative appearance and practical salience, not only explicit beliefs or propositions.

Changes in revised manuscript: Section 6.3, pages 10-11, lines 350-358. Highlighted in green.

 

Comment 17: Line 434: this subsection repeats points already made in Section 5.

Response: Agreed in part. Repeated material has been removed. The remaining discussion is kept only where it adds a distinct point about the development of evaluative discrimination through practice.

Changes in revised manuscript: Section 6.3, pages 10-11, lines 342-358. Repeated material was removed and the remaining argument was compressed; the retained revised wording is highlighted in green.

 

Comment 18: Line 458: “An important section; articulates the assumption to your argument.”

Response: Thank you. I have retained this point and clarified its role within the revised argument.

Changes in revised manuscript: Section 7.1, page 11, lines 360-377. The relevant revised wording is highlighted in green.

 

Comment 19: Line 501: strengthen the discussion of how Aristotle thinks a city can become just.

Response: I have expanded the political context. The revised paper now explains the relation among law, constitution, public education, the common advantage, and the lawgiver’s role in forming citizens. It also distinguishes successful social formation from genuine ethical virtue, since defective constitutions can form stable but defective character.

Changes in revised manuscript: Sections 7.1-7.2, pages 11-12, lines 360-402, especially Section 7.2 at lines 378-402. Highlighted in green, except the culture-specific clarification at lines 364-367, which is highlighted in pink for Reviewer 3.

 

Comment 20: Line 538: the contrast between virtue and cleverness might fit Section 4.

Response: I considered this suggestion, but I have kept the contrast near the discussion of good choice and phronesis. The contrast between craft and virtue in Section 4 concerns the difference between correct performance and the state of the agent. The later contrast between cleverness and phronesis has a different role: it shows that efficient deliberation is not enough when the end is bad. I have made this relation clearer in the revised text.

Changes in revised manuscript: Section 8.1, page 13, lines 436-443. Highlighted in green.

 

Comment 21: Line 553: the subsection is redundant with Section 5.

Response: Agreed. The repeated material has been shortened and integrated into the earlier analysis.

Changes in revised manuscript: Section 9.3, page 14, lines 481-490. The repeated material was removed and the remaining point was restated directly; highlighted in green.

 

Comment 22: Line 601: several expressions are unclear, including “salience structure,” “domain-relative,” and the account of mature agents evaluating guidance.

Response: Agreed. I have rewritten this subsection in simpler language. It now states directly why voluntary action does not by itself amount to practical authorship: another person or practice may still supply an ethically important description, end, or judgement that the learner cannot yet assess well for herself.

Changes in revised manuscript: Section 9.3, page 14, lines 481-490. Highlighted in green.

 

Comment 23: Line 620: say more about defective political formation and Aristotle’s answer to it.

Response: The revised political section now addresses this issue more directly by distinguishing correct and deviant constitutions, the good citizen and the good person, and political formation ordered either to the common good or to a defective regime. I have not based the revision on a definite claim about the chronological order of composition of the Nicomachean Ethics and Politics, because that historical claim is not needed for the argument.

Changes in revised manuscript: Section 7.2, pages 11-12, lines 378-402, and Section 9.4, pages 14-15, lines 491-502. The Section 7.2 revisions are highlighted in green; the culture-specific part of Section 9.4 is highlighted in pink because it also responds directly to Reviewer 3.

 

Comment 24: Line 674: clarify what is meant by “single stage theory.”

Response: Agreed. The phrase has been removed. The Conclusion now says directly that Aristotle does not give one fixed developmental sequence in which voluntariness, choice, character virtue, and practical wisdom appear as simple successive stages.

Changes in revised manuscript: Section 9.5, page 15, lines 503-512, and the Conclusion, pages 15-16, lines 513-541. Highlighted in green.

 

 

 

Author Response File: Author Response.docx

Reviewer 3 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

The author studies a specific aspect of Aristotle's dianoethic virtues. Although s/he does not express it in this way, what can be deduced is that human acts are free actions when they respond to a voluntary decision; but that is not enough for them to be correct decisions. For the latter, the person must be virtuous precisely, that is, that he or she become accustomed to making correct decisions. However, this requires reflection. Let's say that, when faced with the stimulus, the human mind puts into action the habits that correspond to that stimulus and thus gives rise to a decision proposal, on which the person might reflect and, after that, decide. 
Within this explanatory framework, the author poses a specific problem, which is how the "learner" can make a good decision if he or she is precisely a "learner"; that is: how he or she is in the process of learning the correct behavior. From this question, the author develops a reasoning that is very rich in nuances and well informed by the literature. Their contribution is clear and interesting enough for the study to be published.
Now, what I have just summarized is what this reviewer has understood; the author omits everything that has been said. Either he takes it for granted or this reviewer has not understood the substance of the article and, if so, it is precisely because the author does not frame the problem s/he raises clearly enough. As it is written, the article will interest specialists in Aristotle's ethics and in the problems it raises. But perhaps no one else. The current wording of the article presupposes knowledge of all the questions that should contextualize it.
The author may think that this would mean turning the article into a informative, popular text. But this is not the case. The subject matter it deals with is the object of study in neuroscience – to give the clearest example –; the difference with philosophy is that neuroscience does not study it from the point of view of the mind but from that of the brain. And the result is that too many neuroscientists show that they do not know philosophy and, nevertheless, dare to interpret its findings philosophically. Their philosophical ignorance even leads them to believe that philosophy is something else. Specifically, most of the neuroscientists whose writings I have read do not even know what a habit is and that is why they deny freedom in human beings. They observe that neurons move microseconds before making a decision and do not hypothesize that these previous movements could correspond to stable neural networks produced – stabilized – precisely by the repetition of acts. That would make habits characterized by their permanence, to the point that they are habits for that reason. 
I am not asking the author to go into the neuroscientific aspect of his/her topic. What I would like is for neuroscientists to be able to understand this study and, like them, for students of very diverse other forms of knowledge. I believe that current research, in many specialties, suffers from a serious deficit of philosophical elements of judgment. An allusion to the problem of the neuroscientists to which I have referred would not be superfluous. It would be enough for the author to read Benjamin Libet's seminal article (1983) and, in one paragraph, say what this article tacitly warns about the observation made by Libet and exaggerated by many others. (At least, Libet concluded that human beings are only free to refuse to do what they feel impelled to do. Perhaps he lacked the concept of habit.)
In short, I believe that the author should make the effort to show the reader the interest in considering the problem s/he is addressing. One way to do this, for example, would be to frame it in the general problem of the psychophysical development of the person and, specifically, in the ideal of the integral development of each human being. This could be followed by his/her vision of the process that I have tried to summarize in the first paragraph, of course as s/he understands that process, not necessarily as I have proposed it.
On the other hand, it seems clear that what the author proposes is related to the transmission of culture from parents to children, from educators to learners and, in short, from all those who coexist with a learner. And, to this end, it should not be forgotten that Aristotle did not go so far as to propose a concept of culture (Marín 1993). To the extent that culture consists of sharing habits that are considered valuable in the community that precisely that culture brings together, the absence of this concept in Aristotle is important.
In any case, from a contextualization such as the one I propose only as an example, the author would have to develop the current wording of the entire article with the same criteria. There are many points where an explanation of what s/he takes for granted is lacking. I give several examples below:
In line 88, s/he states that Aristotle makes character virtue and phronesis mutually dependent. It would be necessary for the author to clarify why phronesis is not a character virtue.
On the other hand, some paragraphs seem to induce the reader not to fall into Aristotle's "modernization" and, if so, the author would have to make it clear. For example, in lines 567-8 s/he says that "on her own" should not be understood as "modern self-legislation"; but s/he does not define the latter concept (nor is its meaning deduced from the context). Something similar had already happened to him in lines 89-90 and 286-8 and it happens again in 613: why is it a risk to modernize Aristotle? By resorting to modern authors in this study, is not the author modernizing Aristotle?
The author's reasoning seems to revolve around three fundamental Greek concepts that s/he uses without having defined them; s/he does it once, too briefly, and, in the rest of the article, s/he seems to assume that the reader knows what s/he is talking about: I am referring to hekousion, prohairesis and praxis (lines 23-24). I would have to define them from the beginning and remember their meaning as much as necessary throughout the article.  
It should also do so with phronesis, on which, for years, there has been a lot and very good bibliography. For centuries it has been translated as "prudence"; but the number of nuances introduced by Aristotle has ended up giving the word phronesis its own meaning, which must be clarified here.
In the end, all this presupposes a theory of action and the theme, much less a treatment of the education of desire. It should situate the reader in these concepts in such a way that s/he clearly understands their respective proper meaning.
Another example: what do you mean by "fine" when you talk about "fine action"? Certainly, it can be deduced from lines 108-19. But, from the continuation, it can also be deduced that the fineness of action is not enough. To clearly express what the learner lacks, it would be necessary to specify it.
The same applies to "logos" from line 165. "Logos" can mean anything from "word" to "wisdom". What does this article mean to the author?
And "dianoia"? This word enters fully into the subject studied if we talk about dianoethic habits in Aristotle. It is mentioned in line 280 as something that seems relevant and it is not defined and does not appear again.
The same happens with "prattein" (line 302).
It is certain that, by developing all the necessary explanations and contextualizations, the article will be perhaps three or four pages longer. Now it only has 15 and there is, therefore, room to expand it. 

Author Response

 

 

Reviewer 3

Revisions made mainly in response to Reviewer 3 are highlighted in pink in the revised manuscript.

Comment 1: The paper is interesting and well informed, but it presupposes too much specialist knowledge. The problem and its wider importance should be framed more clearly.

Response: I agree with this main criticism. The revised Introduction now begins with the developmental problem in more general philosophical language before introducing the technical Aristotelian distinctions. It also explains why the issue matters: a learner must act in ways that are genuinely her own before she has the stable character and practical wisdom of the virtuous person.

Changes in revised manuscript: Abstract, page 1, lines 7-22, and Section 1, pages 2-3, especially lines 34-56 and 78-91. The Reviewer 3-specific contextualization and definitions are highlighted in pink; overlapping clarity revisions prompted mainly by Reviewer 2 are highlighted in green.

 

Comment 2: The reviewer describes the issue in terms of voluntary decision, reflection, and the learner’s difficulty in making good decisions.

Response: The revision clarifies one important point here. In Aristotle, hekousion is broader than deliberative decision or prohairesis. The paper therefore starts from the possibility of voluntary action before mature deliberative choice. The question is how such action can contribute to the later formation of good choice.

Changes in revised manuscript: Section 1, page 2, lines 45-56, and Section 5.1, pages 7-8, lines 239-246 and 255-262. Highlighted in pink.

 

Comment 3: A brief reference to neuroscience, especially Libet (1983), could show the wider relevance of the problem.

Response: I have added a short and carefully limited paragraph. It uses Libet and later discussion of the readiness potential only to show why agency should not automatically be reduced to one reported moment of conscious intention. The paper does not claim that Aristotle explains modern neuroscience, and the main argument remains philosophical and developmental.

Changes in revised manuscript: Section 1, page 3, lines 78-85; corresponding new references appear on page 17, lines 559-563. Highlighted in pink.

 

Comment 4: The issue could be framed in terms of psychophysical development and integral human development.

Response: I have strengthened the psychophysical aspect of the argument, especially through the discussion of embodied habituation. I have not made “integral development” a technical category of the paper, because that would introduce a modern framework that is not needed for the Aristotelian argument.

Changes in revised manuscript: Section 6.1, pages 9-10, especially lines 314-316, and Section 6.2, page 10, lines 334-341. The Reviewer 3-specific psychophysical wording is highlighted in pink.

 

Comment 5: The paper is also related to cultural transmission, but Aristotle does not have a modern concept of culture.

Response: Agreed. The revised paper does not attribute a modern theory of culture to Aristotle. It instead uses the more specific Aristotelian categories of law, custom or ethos, education, household relations, and constitutional forms. The reference suggested by the reviewer is used only as a modern discussion of this broader problem.

Changes in revised manuscript: Section 7.1, page 11, lines 364-367; Section 9.4, page 15, lines 492-502; and Reference 32, page 18, lines 613-614. These culture-specific additions are highlighted in pink.

 

Comment 6: Clarify why phronesis is not a character virtue.

Response: Agreed. The revised Introduction identifies phronesis as an intellectual virtue concerned with practical truth, while also explaining Aristotle’s claim that full character virtue and phronesis depend on one another.

Changes in revised manuscript: Section 1, page 2, lines 51-56, and Section 8.1, page 13, lines 424-435. Highlighted in pink.

 

Comment 7: Explain the risk of modernizing Aristotle and what is meant by modern self-legislation. Does the use of modern authors itself modernize Aristotle?

Response: The revised paper now distinguishes the use of modern analytical vocabulary from the attribution of modern doctrines to Aristotle. The risk is not the use of later terminology itself, but allowing that terminology to import ideas such as a libertarian will, Kantian self-legislation, or independence from social formation. The term “practical authorship” is therefore defined in a limited sense.

Changes in revised manuscript: Section 9.1, page 14, lines 462-470. Highlighted in pink.

 

Comment 8: Define hekousion, prohairesis, and praxis from the beginning and recall their meanings when needed.

Response: Agreed. These three terms are now defined together in the Introduction and briefly restated at the points where their differences become part of the argument.

Changes in revised manuscript: Section 1, page 2, lines 45-56; Section 5.1, pages 7-8, lines 239-246 and 255-262; and Section 5.2, page 8, lines 263-277. The definitions and distinctions added or clarified for Reviewer 3 are highlighted in pink.

 

Comment 9: Define phronesis more fully.

Response: Agreed. Phronesis is now defined in the Introduction and discussed again in the section on good choice, where its relation to right desire and character virtue is directly relevant.

Changes in revised manuscript: Section 1, page 2, lines 51-56, and Section 8.1, page 13, lines 424-435. Highlighted in pink.

 

Comment 10: The paper presupposes a theory of action and an account of the education of desire.

Response: I have made this structure more explicit. The revised sequence moves from rational receptivity, to correct performance without virtue, to voluntariness and choice, then to affective and evaluative formation, and finally to right desire, practical truth, and phronesis.

Changes in revised manuscript: Section 1, pages 2-4, lines 57-108, and the revised argumentative sequence in Sections 3-8, pages 5-14, lines 161-459. Reviewer 3-specific contextualization is highlighted in pink; structural and compression revisions responding primarily to Reviewer 2 are highlighted in green.

 

Comment 11: Clarify what is meant by “fine” in “fine action,” and why fineness is not sufficient.

Response: Agreed. The paper now explains that “fine” or “noble” translates kalon in the relevant ethical contexts. It also states clearly that performing an action of a fine type is not yet the same as acting virtuously: the learner may still lack choice for the action’s own sake, stable character, or adequate practical understanding.

Changes in revised manuscript: the terminology note before Section 1, pages 1-2, lines 26-31, and Section 1, page 3, lines 86-91. Highlighted in pink.

 

Comment 12: Clarify the meaning of logos in the paper.

Response: Agreed. The revised Section 3 explains that logos means rational account or rational direction in the relevant passages, including speech insofar as it expresses such direction. It is not used simply as a synonym for language.

Changes in revised manuscript: Section 3, pages 5-6, lines 168-174. Highlighted in pink.

 

Comment 13: Define dianoia, which appears only briefly.

Response: Rather than add another technical term that the argument does not need, I removed the isolated transliteration and now use “thought” or “reasoning” where appropriate.

Changes in revised manuscript: the isolated transliteration was removed. The replacement English wording appears in Section 1, page 2, lines 51-55, and Section 8.1, page 13, lines 425-435. The revised wording is highlighted in pink.

 

Comment 14: The same issue applies to prattein.

Response: Agreed. I removed the unnecessary transliteration and use ordinary English wording about doing or acting, while keeping the distinction between the broad uses of action-language and the stricter EN VI.2 context.

Changes in revised manuscript: the unnecessary transliteration was removed. The revised English action-language appears in Section 5.2, page 8, lines 270-277. The revised wording is highlighted in pink.

 

Comment 15: The added contextualization may make the paper several pages longer.

Response: I have added the necessary definitions and context, but I have also removed substantial repetition in response to Reviewer 2. The revised paper is therefore clearer and more accessible without becoming longer and more diffuse.

Changes in revised manuscript: the principal added contextualization appears in the Abstract (page 1, lines 7-22), Section 1 (pages 2-3, especially lines 34-56 and 78-91), and Section 3 (pages 5-6, especially lines 161-202). Reviewer 3-specific additions are highlighted in pink; overlapping revisions prompted mainly by Reviewer 2 are highlighted in green.

 

 

Thank you again for the constructive comments. I hope that the revised manuscript addresses the concerns raised and presents the argument in a clearer and more focused form.

 

 

Author Response File: Author Response.docx

Round 2

Reviewer 3 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

The author has listened perfectly well to my suggestions. I am therefore compelled to explain why I do not rate the article as optimal from all points of view. The reason is its style. Perhaps it is academic, or it is simply strictly in line with the language of those who raise Aristotle's ethical problems. If I give an example, it is easier for me to explain why I consider it important. I have thought a lot, for years, about Thomas Kuhn's concept of "paradigm" and I see that the question of this article could shed light on what Kuhn and his many commentators proposed. Kuhn concluded that every scientific community shares a "paradigm" (say a way of thinking, a method, and even concrete conclusions) and that scientific revolutions do not change the "paradigm" on their own, even if they prove it to be wrong. Kuhn gave the example of Copernicus. Copernicus did not change the astronomy of his time. People had to wait more than half a century for Galileo, Kepler, and others to change it. I concluded some time ago that not only scientific communities, but every human community shares a paradigm because, without it, it cannot exist. To coexist in a community, we have to share a minimum of habits that make it possible. Those habits may be wrong; but they do not change because their error is demonstrated. In my opinion, this happens because whoever breaks the paradigm, demonstrating its error, breaks the community, and its members refuse to accept it. The main reason is, in my hypothesis, that they are afraid of being alone. Fear of intellectual loneliness. Nietzsche said that a person's worth is measured by her/his ability to endure loneliness and I think he was right. What does that have to do with the question that the article we are reviewing deals with? Everything. The "learner" wants to be recognized as a member of the community who shares the knowledge that he is trying to learn and that they have as a habit. This is their “paradigm”. And for the “learner” that means accepting this habit. If the "learner" thinks on his own and concludes that the one of the corresponding community is an erroneous paradigm, s/he will not be accepted in it. Without asking it like this, the author of the article gives clues to understand why, for example when he talks about the weight of custom, institutions and a long etcetera. But, for this very reason, the solution s/he finds – being too subtle and apparently weak – is the path that must be followed by those who discover that the paradigm is wrong. They have to develop the practical reason to express their opinion without being rejected by the community. But they also have the moral duty to be faithful to what they believe to be true, and all this requires phronesis, prudence in all its forms.

I would continue to develop my reasoning; but I believe that this is not the place or the time. I hope that, with what has been said, it is enough to understand why I relate two apparently unrelated topics and why I point to language as one of the main obstacles to making the article useful to more people. The "learner" has to express her/his novelty with prudence, and that implies assuming the language of the community in which s/he is trying to integrate. In doing so, s/he has to adapt her/his discovery to a way of expressing himself that, in reality, is used to maintain a wrong position at least in part. But s/he has no other way to join the community and, once in it, s/he will have to move forward in the same way until hes/his effort and a host of unforeseeable events cause the paradigm to collapse on its own and be replaced by another. The collapse of the Soviet regimes in 1989 is a good example. It meant the abandonment of the last worldview that promised universal happiness. In Poland, they were fighting against it since the beginning of that decade, the 1980s. But the paradigm only collapsed years later, in part perhaps because it happened in Germany, a country with greater economic and political weight in the West.

I don't know if I have explained myself enough, but I would like to make it clear that all this should not detract from the value of the commented article. I think it can be published as it is, without a doubt.

Author Response

Thank you for your generous assessment of the revised manuscript and for explaining your remaining concern about its style and accessibility. I am grateful for your clear statement that the article is suitable for publication.

Your discussion of community membership, shared habits, and the difficulty of questioning established commitments helped me see where the wider significance of the argument could be expressed more clearly. In response, I have made three focused revisions.

First, in Section 1, immediately after introducing causal-agential ownership and practical authorship, I have added a plain-language explanation illustrated by the example of returning another person’s property. This makes the central distinction more accessible before the detailed textual discussion.

Second, at the end of Section 7.3, I have added an example of a learner who initially follows her companions in excluding someone from a shared activity but subsequently comes to recognise the practice as unjust. The example explains how developing judgement concerns both assessing an established practice and deciding how to challenge it. It also clarifies that preserving acceptance cannot itself determine the right response: acting well may sometimes require risking disapproval.

Third, in Section 10, I have rewritten the paragraph on the endpoint of habituation to state its broader significance more directly. The revised passage explains how an agent can continue learning from others while developing the capacity to assess their advice and expectations, including the practices through which she was educated.

These changes address your concern about accessibility while preserving the article’s focus on Aristotle. Thank you again for your thoughtful engagement and for drawing attention to the broader human significance of the argument.