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16 November 2026

22 Pages

Functional Environmental Rights and Sustainable Governance in China: The Institutional Transformation of Environmental Interests

,
and
1
Institute for Legal Studies, Dong-A University, 225 Gudeok-ro, Seo-gu, Busan 49236, Republic of Korea
2
Department of Landscape Architecture, Dong-A University, 37 Nakdong-daero 550beon-gil, Saha-gu, Busan 49315, Republic of Korea
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
This article belongs to the Section Environmental Law Issues

Abstract

Environmental rights scholarship commonly evaluates legal protection through express constitutional recognition and direct judicial enforceability. China presents a different institutional configuration: although its Constitution does not establish a standalone and directly justiciable individual environmental right, environmental interests acquire legal significance through constitutional obligations, statutory duties, administrative procedures, participatory mechanisms, and public-interest remedies. Using doctrinal legal research and normative reconstruction, this article develops the concept of functional environmental rights to explain this intermediate form of protection. Functional environmental rights refer to a legally grounded and institutionally mediated structure in which environmental interests are identified by positive law, connected with corresponding duties and procedural positions, and protected through legally authorized remedies without being converted into universally held subjective rights. The analysis identifies four interrelated layers: state environmental obligations, substantive environmental interests, procedural safeguards, and institutional remedies. It further explains how members of the public, regulated entities, qualified social organizations, procuratorial organs, public authorities, and directly injured persons occupy differentiated legal positions within this structure. The article argues that functional environmental rights provide a more precise account of environmental interest protection in China than either the conventional rights-policy binary or a purely governance-centered explanation. The framework clarifies how a state-centered environmental legal order may generate limited but genuine rights-protective effects through information access, participation, supervision, representative enforcement, ecological restoration, and compensation.

1. Introduction

Over the past several decades, environmental protection has increasingly been framed in rights-based terms. Constitutional provisions concerning environmental protection have expanded across jurisdictions, while courts, legislatures, and international institutions have developed different approaches to recognizing and protecting environmental interests. This trend was further reinforced in 2022, when the United Nations General Assembly recognized the right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment as a human right. These developments have encouraged environmental constitutionalism and comparative scholarship on the legal recognition, institutional protection, and judicial enforceability of environmental rights (Boyd 2012; May and Daly 2015; United Nations General Assembly 2022).
China presents a different legal configuration. Articles 9 and 26 of the Constitution require the state to protect natural resources, improve the living and ecological environment, and prevent and control pollution, but they do not expressly establish a freestanding environmental right that individual citizens may directly invoke before courts. At the same time, environmental interests receive legal protection through environmental legislation, administrative regulation, ecological and environmental impact assessment, information disclosure, public participation, environmental public-interest litigation, ecological and environmental damage compensation, ecological restoration, and liability mechanisms (Mu et al. 2014; Tang and Spijkers 2022; Wang 2024; Xie and Xu 2021). The Chinese framework therefore cannot be fully explained either by an approach focused exclusively on directly enforceable subjective rights or by an account that treats environmental protection merely as non-binding policy.
Existing scholarship has clarified important aspects of this legal structure. One strand examines environmental constitutionalism and the legal significance of constitutional environmental provisions. A second focuses on procedural environmental rights, particularly access to environmental information, public participation in decision-making, and access to justice. A third examines the state-centered and administration-led features of China’s environmental governance. These approaches illuminate important but separate dimensions of environmental protection. They do not yet provide a sufficiently integrated explanation of how environmental interests acquire binding legal significance within a system that lacks a standalone and directly justiciable individual environmental right.
First, comparative scholarship on environmental constitutionalism has focused primarily on the express constitutional recognition of environmental rights and their enforcement by courts (Boyd 2012; May and Daly 2015). This literature has made an important contribution by demonstrating that constitutional rights and judicial remedies can strengthen environmental protection. However, constitutional environmental protection is not limited to directly enforceable individual rights. Weis (2018), for example, shows that constitutional directive principles and state obligations may possess legal significance even where they do not create direct individual causes of action. This broader perspective is particularly relevant to China. Wang (2024) characterizes China’s environmental constitutionalism as predominantly state-based rather than rights-based, while recent Chinese scholarship has examined the normative expression, constitutional status, and doctrinal limits of environmental rights (Tang 2025; W. Zhang 2025; L. Zhang 2026). These studies demonstrate that the absence of an express individual environmental right does not render constitutional environmental provisions legally irrelevant. Nevertheless, they do not fully explain how constitutional obligations are translated into statutory duties, administrative procedures, participatory mechanisms, and institutional remedies.
Second, scholarship on procedural environmental rights has emphasized the importance of access to information, public participation, and access to justice in environmental matters (Gellers and Jeffords 2018; Jendrośka 2024). At the international level, these three dimensions are reflected in Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration and elaborated in the Aarhus Convention. The Convention is therefore relevant here as an institutional reference point rather than as a substitute for scholarly analysis. Research on China has examined the gradual institutionalization of environmental information disclosure, public participation in environmental impact assessment, and environmental public-interest litigation (Xie and Xu 2021). Recent Chinese research has also situated public participation within the broader construction of the ecological-civilization institutional system (Li and Shan 2025). This literature shows that Chinese law provides legally structured procedural positions and representative remedies even without a universal individual right to bring environmental litigation. However, it generally focuses on particular procedures or institutions and does not fully explain their relationship to constitutional obligations, substantive environmental interests, and restorative remedies.
Third, scholarship on state-centered environmental governance emphasizes the central role of legislation, administrative agencies, regulatory enforcement, ecological-civilization policies, and institutional coordination (Mu et al. 2014; Wang 2024). More specialized research has examined environmental public-interest litigation, ecological restoration, and eco-environmental damage compensation as mechanisms for addressing collective environmental harm (Li and Song 2024; Xie and Xu 2021). This body of scholarship accurately reflects the state-centered and administration-led characteristics of China’s environmental legal order. Yet an explanation focused primarily on governance capacity or administrative implementation may leave insufficiently examined the legal character of the environmental interests protected through these institutions. The relevant issue is not only whether public authorities govern effectively, but also how environmental interests become legally cognizable, procedurally expressible, and institutionally enforceable.
This article addresses that question through the concept of functional environmental rights. The term does not refer to a complete subjective environmental right held directly and uniformly by every individual. Nor does it imply that all environmental values automatically become judicially enforceable claims. Rather, it describes an intermediate legal form in which environmental interests receive rights-protective effects through the combined operation of legally defined duties, procedural positions, institutional powers, and remedial mechanisms. Environmental interests, in this sense, include legally protected interests in pollution prevention, ecological integrity, environmental information, participation, ecological restoration, and protection against environmental conditions that threaten public health. Their legal protection may be exercised through different actors and mechanisms: members of the public may obtain information, participate, and supervise; qualified social organizations and procuratorial organs may bring public-interest litigation; and state-designated bodies may pursue ecological and environmental damage compensation.
The article therefore asks two questions. First, through which legal mechanisms do environmental interests acquire binding legal significance in China? Second, how should the relationship among constitutional environmental obligations, statutory duties, procedural safeguards, and institutional remedies be characterized in doctrinal terms? It argues that the combined operation of these mechanisms creates a legally grounded and institutionally mediated structure of environmental protection. This structure is stronger than a mere policy commitment but remains distinct from a comprehensive individual environmental right.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains the doctrinal methodology and scope of analysis. Section 3 identifies the constitutional, statutory, procedural, and remedial foundations through which environmental interests are protected in China. Section 4 develops the concept of functional environmental rights, clarifies the legal character and holders of the interests involved, and explains the four-layer institutional structure through which protection operates. Section 5 considers the implications and limitations of this framework for sustainable governance in China. Section 6 concludes.

2. Methodology

This article employs doctrinal legal research to examine how environmental interests are protected within China’s existing legal order. Doctrinal analysis is used to identify, interpret, and systematize the relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, administrative rules, judicial mechanisms, and other authoritative legal materials, with particular attention to the legal duties, procedures, and remedies they establish (Hutchinson and Duncan 2012). Building on this analysis, the article uses normative reconstruction as an analytical strategy to determine whether these dispersed legal norms and institutions form a coherent rights-protective structure.
The inquiry is guided by two questions. First, through which legal mechanisms do environmental interests acquire binding legal significance in China? Second, how should the relationship among state environmental obligations, procedural safeguards, and public-interest remedies be characterized in doctrinal terms? The analysis focuses on the content, structure, and interaction of positive-law materials rather than on the empirical effectiveness of the institutions examined. Normative reconstruction is therefore used in a limited sense: it clarifies the legal implications of existing norms and institutional arrangements but does not infer a standalone or directly justiciable individual environmental right in the absence of a clear legal basis (Van Hoecke 2015).

2.1. Legal Materials and Selection Criteria

This study examines primary legal materials that establish environmental obligations, procedural safeguards, and remedial mechanisms within China’s legal system. The legal corpus was updated through 23 August 2026. It includes the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, with particular attention to Articles 9 and 26 and the 2018 constitutional amendment; the Ecological and Environmental Code; relevant provisions of the Civil Code, the Civil Procedure Law, and the Administrative Procedure Law; the Measures for Public Participation in Environmental Impact Assessment; and judicial interpretations governing environmental public-interest litigation, eco-environmental damage compensation, ecological restoration, and environmental liability. For purposes of tracing institutional development, the former Environmental Protection Law and the former Environmental Impact Assessment Law are also examined as predecessor statutes (Environmental Impact Assessment Law of the People’s Republic of China 2018; Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China 2014). National institutional documents concerning eco-environmental damage compensation are used where necessary to explain the design and development of the relevant remedial mechanisms.
The materials were selected according to three criteria. First, they had to possess national legal or institutional authority, including constitutional provisions, statutes, administrative regulations, departmental rules, judicial interpretations, and formally issued national institutional documents. Second, they had to relate directly to at least one of the article’s analytical dimensions: state environmental obligations, legally protected environmental interests, procedural safeguards, or institutional remedies. Third, the selected materials had to provide coverage across the principal stages of environmental protection, including ex ante risk prevention, information disclosure and public participation, administrative implementation, and ex post accountability and ecological restoration. Officially published guiding and typical cases are used only to illustrate the operation of particular legal mechanisms and are not treated as an empirical dataset (Hutchinson and Duncan 2012). Secondary scholarship is used to interpret and contextualize the primary materials but does not form part of the legal corpus.
The Ecological and Environmental Code was adopted on 12 March 2026 and entered into force on 15 August 2026. Pursuant to Article 1242 of the Code, ten environmental statutes, including the former Environmental Protection Law and the former Environmental Impact Assessment Law, were repealed upon the Code’s entry into force. Accordingly, this article treats the Code as the principal environmental legislation currently in force and refers to the repealed statutes only as predecessor legal sources. Because the Code had been in force for only a short period by the updated closing date of this study, the analysis distinguishes its current normative status from the longer-term question of its administrative and judicial implementation.

2.2. Analytical Method

This study applies doctrinal legal analysis in three stages. First, textual interpretation is used to determine whether the selected legal materials: (a) identify a legally protected environmental interest; (b) impose a corresponding duty on a public authority, regulated entity, or legally authorized actor; (c) establish a procedure through which that interest may be expressed, considered, or supervised; or (d) provide a legal consequence in the form of review, liability, compensation, or ecological restoration. Doctrinal legal research is appropriate because the inquiry concerns the interpretation and systematic organization of authoritative legal materials rather than the empirical measurement of institutional performance (Hutchinson and Duncan 2012).
Second, systematic interpretation examines how constitutional provisions, statutes, administrative rules, judicial interpretations, and remedial mechanisms interact across four analytical dimensions: state environmental obligations, substantive environmental interests, procedural safeguards, and institutional remedies. These dimensions are used as analytical categories rather than treated as predetermined findings. A legal mechanism is included in the analysis only where it has an identifiable basis in positive law and performs a discernible protective, procedural, or accountability function.
Third, normative reconstruction is used to assess whether the combined operation of these rules and institutions can be understood as a coherent, rights-oriented structure. Teleological considerations—including ecological protection, pollution prevention, environmental risk control, public health, and sustainable development—are used only to clarify the legally expressed purposes of relevant provisions where their meaning is uncertain. They do not supply legal elements that have not been recognized in positive law. Accordingly, the reconstruction does not derive a general, standalone, or directly justiciable individual environmental right. Its more limited purpose is to explain the rights-protective effects generated by existing legal arrangements (Van Hoecke 2015).

2.3. Scope of Analysis

This article focuses on the legal structure through which environmental interests receive institutional protection within China’s national legal system. The analysis examines the normative content and interaction of constitutional provisions, statutory rules, administrative procedures, legally defined participatory positions, and public-interest and restorative remedies. It does not assess the implementation of these institutions across individual provinces or local administrative authorities, nor does it measure their empirical effectiveness.
The article is not a comprehensive comparative-law study. References to international environmental-rights scholarship and foreign legal materials are used only to clarify the broader theoretical context in which the Chinese institutional configuration is examined. They do not provide the basis for a separate comparison of legal systems. The central analytical task is instead to explain how environmental interests acquire legally significant protection within China through the interaction of state obligations, statutory duties, procedural safeguards, authorized actors, and institutional remedies.

5. Discussion

Having established the legal foundations, constitutive elements, and institutional operation of functional environmental rights, this section considers the implications of the framework for sustainable environmental governance in China and the institutional conditions under which environmental interests may receive effective legal protection. These implications do not alter the doctrinal limits identified in the preceding section: governance objectives acquire rights-protective significance only where they are connected with legally defined duties, procedures, powers, or remedies.

5.1. Implications for Sustainable Governance in China

The implications of functional environmental rights for sustainable governance are institutional rather than empirical. This article does not establish that the legal mechanisms examined necessarily produce effective environmental outcomes in practice. Instead, the framework identifies the legal conditions under which environmental interests can become stable and reviewable considerations in governance: environmental duties must be specified in positive law, procedural requirements must be capable of review, authorized actors must be able to invoke relevant remedies, and restoration obligations must be connected with implementation and follow-up supervision.
The first implication concerns the implementation of the Ecological and Environmental Code. Its codificatory value lies in bringing environmental obligations, regulatory mechanisms, public participation, ecological restoration, and legal liability into a more coherent legislative framework. The principal challenge is therefore not merely the existence of a unified Code, but whether its provisions can be translated into consistent administrative procedures and effective remedies. Implementation should maintain a clear connection between general environmental principles and the specific duties, procedures, responsible authorities, and legal consequences through which those principles operate. The Code allocates environmental duties among public authorities, enterprises, other organizations, and citizens, while also recognizing legally defined positions concerning participation, supervision, public-interest litigation, and ecological and environmental damage compensation (Ecological and Environmental Code of the People’s Republic of China 2026, arts. 7–10, 137, 147, and 1073–1076). General references to ecological protection or ecological and environmental rights and interests should not be treated as self-executing individual claims. Their practical legal significance depends on supporting rules, technical standards, administrative procedures, and remedial provisions that identify who must act, what procedures must be followed, and what consequences arise from non-compliance.
The second implication concerns the reviewability of procedural safeguards. The task is not simply to introduce additional participation requirements, but to ensure compliance with the procedures already established by law. Under the Measures for Public Participation in Environmental Impact Assessment, project developers must collect and analyze public comments, explain why relevant opinions are not accepted, prepare a public-participation statement, and disclose that statement before submitting an environmental impact report for approval. The competent ecological and environmental authority must review whether the participation procedure complies with the Measures and may require renewed consultation where public opinions have not been adequately solicited (Measures for Public Participation in Environmental Impact Assessment 2018, arts. 18–27). Meaningful participation therefore requires procedural records that permit administrative and, where applicable, judicial review. The relevant questions are whether environmental information was disclosed in an accessible form, whether legally relevant concerns were examined, whether non-acceptance was explained as required, and whether procedural defects produced an appropriate legal response.
The same reviewability logic applies to environmental information disclosure. Existing rules require covered enterprises to disclose environmental information in a timely, truthful, accurate, complete, and comprehensible form and to maintain records supporting that disclosure (Measures for the Administration of Law-Based Disclosure of Enterprise Environmental Information 2021, arts. 4–5). The governance implication is not merely that more information should be published. Rather, disclosure obligations should be linked to standardized content, reliable data sources, supervision, correction of incomplete or inaccurate information, and legal consequences for non-compliance. Information becomes rights-protective when members of the public can use it to understand environmental risks, participate in relevant procedures, and exercise public supervision.
The third implication concerns coordination among administrative enforcement, ecological and environmental damage compensation, environmental public-interest litigation, and ecological restoration. These mechanisms have different legal bases, authorized actors, and procedural purposes; they should not be merged into a single undifferentiated remedy. Nevertheless, effective restoration requires structured coordination. The 2025 joint Opinion on Further Advancing the Reform of the Eco-Environmental Damage Compensation System calls for regular liaison, information sharing, referral of case leads, coordinated investigation, evidentiary and technical support, communication with courts and procuratorial organs, supervision of restoration, and assessment of restoration outcomes (Opinion on Further Advancing the Reform of the Eco-Environmental Damage Compensation System 2025, sec. 11–14). The institutional task is therefore to implement these coordination requirements while avoiding duplicate recovery, conflicting restoration obligations, and gaps in supervision.
A further implication concerns the state-centered character and participatory limits of functional environmental rights. Rights-based approaches are often associated with bottom-up claims through which individuals challenge public power. The Chinese framework does not replace its state-centered and administration-led structure with such a model. Public authorities retain the principal responsibility for standard setting, regulatory approval, monitoring, enforcement, and ecological restoration, while the public does not possess a general power to veto environmental decisions or a universal right to bring environmental litigation. Functional environmental rights should therefore not be presented as equivalent to a comprehensive individual environmental right. Their significance lies instead in creating legally defined channels through which environmental interests may enter decision-making, supervision, and representative enforcement. Information access, participation, reporting, public-interest litigation, and ecological restoration mechanisms can make public authorities and regulated entities more accountable, even though the relevant legal positions remain differentiated and institutionally mediated (Wang 2024).
These implications illustrate the limited but practical contribution of functional environmental rights to sustainable governance. The framework does not require all environmental interests to be converted into comprehensive individual rights. It emphasizes the traceability of environmental principles into concrete legal duties, the reviewability of procedural safeguards, the allocation of authority among different actors, and the coordination of accountability with ecological restoration. Sustainable governance acquires rights-protective significance when environmental interests are not merely declared as policy objectives but are connected with identifiable duties, transparent procedures, authorized actors, and enforceable consequences.

5.2. Limitations and Future Research

This study is limited by its doctrinal and theoretical design. It reconstructs the normative relationships among constitutional obligations, statutory duties, protected environmental interests, procedural safeguards, and institutional remedies, but it does not measure their practical effectiveness. The analysis therefore cannot determine whether environmental information is disclosed adequately, whether public participation substantively influences administrative decisions, whether public-interest litigation and ecological and environmental damage compensation produce consistent restorative outcomes, or whether these mechanisms operate differently across regions and institutions.
A second limitation concerns the analytical character of functional environmental rights. The concept is intended to explain a legally grounded and institutionally mediated structure of protection; it is not a claim that Chinese law has established a comprehensive subjective environmental right. Its explanatory value depends on close attention to the positive-law basis, authorized actors, procedural requirements, and remedial limits applicable in each context. Future doctrinal research should therefore examine how courts, procuratorial organs, administrative authorities, and social organizations interpret and apply these legal positions in specific disputes. Such research would clarify whether functional environmental rights remain primarily an analytical description of the legal system or gradually acquire more stable practical significance.
Future empirical research should test how the legal structure identified in this article operates in practice. Studies of ecological and environmental impact assessment could examine compliance with information-disclosure and public-participation requirements, the treatment of public comments, and the consequences of procedural defects. Research on environmental public-interest litigation and ecological and environmental damage compensation could analyze standing, evidentiary practices, restoration orders, compensation calculations, coordination among administrative authorities and procuratorial organs, and the subsequent supervision of restoration. Comparative empirical studies across regions could further assess whether differences in administrative capacity, institutional coordination, and access to legal remedies affect the protection of environmental interests.
The implementation of the Ecological and Environmental Code presents a further field for research. Because the Code had been in force for only a short period by the closing date of this study, sufficient administrative and judicial practice was not available for a comprehensive assessment of its long-term effects. Subsequent research should examine how implementing rules, administrative practice, and judicial interpretation develop the Code’s provisions on information disclosure, public participation, ecological and environmental impact assessment, public-interest litigation, ecological restoration, and legal liability. Such research will be necessary to determine whether codification improves institutional coherence and practical protection rather than merely reorganizing existing legal norms.
Finally, future research may examine the relationship between functional environmental rights and the broader development of environmental rights with Chinese characteristics. In particular, it may consider whether more robust procedural safeguards, access to environmental information, representative litigation, and judicial review can gradually strengthen the position of affected individuals and communities without presupposing the direct transplantation of a foreign model of a right to a healthy environment. This question requires careful examination of the constitutional structure, allocation of institutional authority, and procedural conditions of China’s legal system. It should therefore be approached as a question of legal adaptation and institutional development rather than as a simple choice between accepting or rejecting an external environmental-rights model.

6. Conclusions

This article has examined how environmental interests acquire legally significant protection in China despite the absence of a standalone and directly enforceable individual environmental right. The analysis demonstrates that the conventional opposition between complete subjective rights and non-binding policy objectives does not adequately explain China’s environmental legal structure. Environmental interests are protected through constitutional obligations, statutory duties, administrative implementation, procedural safeguards, public supervision, representative litigation, ecological restoration, compensation, and liability mechanisms. These arrangements do not collectively establish a comprehensive individual environmental right, but neither can they be reduced to discretionary policy instruments.
The article has developed the concept of functional environmental rights to describe this intermediate legal form. Functional environmental rights refer to a legally grounded and institutionally mediated structure in which positive law identifies protected environmental interests, allocates duties and legal positions among different actors, provides procedures for participation and supervision, and attaches remedial consequences to environmental harm or non-compliance. The concept does not treat all environmental interests as individualized rights. Rather, it explains how different forms of protection are exercised by different actors: members of the public may obtain information, participate, supervise, and report; qualified social organizations and procuratorial organs may pursue public-interest litigation; public authorities may enforce regulatory duties and seek ecological and environmental damage compensation; and directly injured persons may rely on applicable private-law remedies.
The four-layer structure developed in this article clarifies this institutional arrangement. State environmental obligations provide the normative foundation for protection; substantive environmental interests identify the objects and values protected by law; procedural safeguards enable those interests to enter decision-making and public supervision; and institutional remedies provide differentiated forms of accountability, restoration, and compensation. The pathways of legislative concretization, administrative implementation, procedural articulation, and remedial institutionalization explain how these elements operate together without automatically converting constitutional environmental commitments into universal individual claims.
This framework also clarifies the implications of functional environmental rights for sustainable governance in China. The system remains state-centered and administration-led: public authorities retain primary responsibility for standard setting, approval, monitoring, enforcement, and restoration, while the public does not possess a general veto power or universal standing in environmental litigation. Nevertheless, legally defined procedures for information access, participation, supervision, reporting, representative litigation, and restoration make environmental interests more visible, reviewable, and enforceable within that institutional structure. Functional environmental rights therefore describe limited but genuine rights-protective effects rather than a complete subjective environmental right.
The Ecological and Environmental Code provides an increasingly coherent legislative framework through which these previously dispersed duties, procedures, and remedies are coordinated. Its long-term significance will depend on implementing rules, administrative practice, judicial interpretation, institutional coordination, and the practical operation of participatory and restorative mechanisms. Functional environmental rights should therefore be understood as a limited analytical category grounded in positive law. It offers a more precise account of how environmental interests are legally protected in China while preserving the distinction between institutionally mediated protection and a directly enforceable individual environmental right.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, Y.Z.; methodology, Y.Z.; investigation, L.Z.; writing—original draft preparation, Y.Z.; writing—review and editing, J.H.C.; supervision, J.H.C. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

No new empirical data were created or analyzed in this study. The legal materials analyzed in this article are publicly available.

Acknowledgments

During the preparation of this manuscript, the first author used ChatGPT (GPT-6, OpenAI) for translation from Chinese to English and language editing. The authors reviewed and edited the output and take full responsibility for the content of this publication.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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