June 2016 - 4 articles
We investigate the role of framing, inequity in initial endowments and history in shaping behavior in a corrupt transaction by extending the one-shot bribery game introduced by Cameron et al. (2009) to a repeated game setting. We find that the use of...
We consider a multilateral bargaining game in which the agents can be classified into two groups according to their instantaneous preferences. In one of these groups there is one agent with a different discount factor. We analyze how this time-prefer...
Social motives are frequently used to explain deviations from selfishness in non-strategic settings such as the Dictator Game. Previous research has mainly focused on two-player games; the workings of social motives in multiplayer Dictator Games are...
We propose a dynamic model of decentralized many-to-one matching in the context of a competitive labor market. Through wage offers and wage demands, firms compete over workers and workers compete over jobs. Firms make hire-and-fire decisions dependen...
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