Games, Volume 15, Issue 3

In this paper, we aim to investigate the collusive stability in the presence of network externalities among firms with relative performance in the firm’s objective functions. We demonstrate that collusive stability is increasing (decreasing) in...

We develop a model of cheap talk with transparent and monotone motives from a seller to an informed buyer. By transparent and monotone motives, we mean that the seller’s preference does not depend on the state of the world and is increasing in...

We consider two companies that are competing for orders. Let X1(n) denote the number of orders processed by the first company at time n, and let τ(k) be the first time that X1(n)<j or X1(n)=r, given that X1(0)=k. We assume that {X1(n),n=0,1,&h...

A decision maker (DM) must choose between two projects or decide on no project. The expected benefits of these projects are correlated. The DM seeks advice from an agent with private information about the projects’ benefits. However, the agent&...

We provide sufficient conditions on the primitives of a class of discontinuous Bayesian games such that all games in the class share equilibria. If a Bayesian game in the class also satisfies a weak efficiency condition, then we show its normal form...

“Paying it forward” is a behavior in which people help someone else because they were helped in the past. Although experimental evidence exists that indicates that real human beings often “pay-it-forward” even in the face of f...