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Game and Decision Theory Applied to Business, Economy and Finance
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Game and Decision Theory Applied to Business, Economy and Finance

A special issue of Mathematics (ISSN 2227-7390). This special issue belongs to the section "E: Applied Mathematics".

Deadline for manuscript submissions: 30 June 2025 | Viewed by 11334

Special Issue Editor

Dr. Ivan Arraut

E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Laboratory of Applied Neurosciences, University of Saint Joseph, 14-17 Estr. Marginal da Ilha Verde, Macau 999078, China
Interests: applied mathematics; game theory; data analysis; quantum finance; machine learning; deep learning
Special Issues, Collections and Topics in MDPI journals

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Game theory is the branch of Mathematics dedicated to the design of models able to make predictions, under the assumption that the agents under interaction (negotiation) are rational. Game theory can be applied to several different research fields, including computer and social science. It has been applied in business, financial decisions, presidential elections, jury decisions in trials and biology in general. The origin of game theory came out from the necessity of taking logical decisions inside conflicts and negotiations when several possible choices emerge. Within game theory, the information available for each player is crucial for making decisions.

The purpose of this special issue is to contribute papers applying game theory to the industry, business, economy and finance in general. Alternative contributions focusing on other areas might be also considered. Models based on decision trees, machine learning and others are also welcome.

Dr. Ivan Arraut
Guest Editor

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Mathematics is an international peer-reviewed open access semimonthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 2600 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • game theory
  • decision making
  • rationality
  • mathematical modeling optimization
  • optimal control
  • machine learning

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Published Papers (8 papers)

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Research

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29 pages, 1033 KiB  
Article
The Mutual Impact of Suppliers’ Online Sales Channel Choices and Platform Credit Decisions for Offline Channels
by Yangyang Qin
Mathematics 2025, 13(6), 931; https://doi.org/10.3390/math13060931 - 11 Mar 2025
Viewed by 450
Abstract
This study examines the strategic decisions and profit dynamics of suppliers marketing their products through both offline and online channels, alongside online e-commerce platforms providing their own consumer credit services. We develop a model that incorporates consumer disposable income, channel preferences, and credit [...] Read more.
This study examines the strategic decisions and profit dynamics of suppliers marketing their products through both offline and online channels, alongside online e-commerce platforms providing their own consumer credit services. We develop a model that incorporates consumer disposable income, channel preferences, and credit utility. Four supply chain scenarios are analyzed: wholesale and agency models with either private or open credit strategies. Using Stackelberg game theory, we explore suppliers’ sales model choices and the conditions under which platforms extend credit to offline channels. Our results show that increasing credit utility generally leads to higher equilibrium prices, while higher service fees compel suppliers to adjust their prices, favoring lower-cost channels. Notably, suppliers are more likely to adopt the wholesale model to secure platform credit for offline sales, especially when credit service fees or credit utility are high. Furthermore, platform credit strategies are strongly influenced by suppliers’ sales model choices: In wholesale models, platforms are more inclined to extend credit to offline channels under specific conditions of high disposable income (DPI) and credit utility, whereas in agency models, open credit strategies are only adopted when both DPI proportions and credit utility are low. This research provides new insights into how platforms can tailor credit offerings based on supplier strategies, offering a theoretical foundation for consumer credit policies in multi-channel sales environments and valuable guidance for managers in determining optimal channel strategies and credit service offerings. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game and Decision Theory Applied to Business, Economy and Finance)
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32 pages, 1202 KiB  
Article
Blockchain for Mass Customization: The Value of Information Sharing Through Data Accuracy by Contract Coordination
by Zhening Ye, Jie Wang and Huida Zhao
Mathematics 2025, 13(3), 404; https://doi.org/10.3390/math13030404 - 25 Jan 2025
Viewed by 946
Abstract
This study provides the game-theoretical framework to investigate the relationship between the blockchain service and mass customization in the environment of information sharing and contract coordination. Specifically, we construct the game-theoretical models of the manufacturer and the retailer to discuss the optimal strategy [...] Read more.
This study provides the game-theoretical framework to investigate the relationship between the blockchain service and mass customization in the environment of information sharing and contract coordination. Specifically, we construct the game-theoretical models of the manufacturer and the retailer to discuss the optimal strategy of information sharing by the retailer in the case of mass customization. The result explores the conditions of information sharing for the retailer because she understands the end market information of nearby consumers. This discussion helps us to understand that the motivation of the manufacturer pays for the retailer’s construction of a blockchain system in the case of two types of products, such as a standard product and a customization product. Finally, we use the method of contract coordination to obtain the optimal strategy. Results reveal that information costs significantly impact sharing decisions, and cost-sharing contracts can incentivize retailers to share market data. This study has two main contributions. On the one hand, this study adopts the blockchain service for mass customization by supporting contract coordination, showing the technical value of avoiding false information and tampering-proof. On the other hand, although big data has the same information sharing function, this technology can’t play the role of secure data transmission. In order to increase the accuracy of information sharing, we analyze the fusion results of two technologies in the aspect of increasing the accuracy of data sharing, which better reveals the technical value. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game and Decision Theory Applied to Business, Economy and Finance)
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18 pages, 313 KiB  
Article
Manipulation Game Considering No-Regret Strategies
by Julio B. Clempner
Mathematics 2025, 13(2), 184; https://doi.org/10.3390/math13020184 - 8 Jan 2025
Viewed by 773
Abstract
This paper examines manipulation games through the lens of Machiavellianism, a psychological theory. It analyzes manipulation dynamics using principles like hierarchical perspectives, exploitation tactics, and the absence of conventional morals to interpret interpersonal interactions. Manipulators intersperse unethical behavior within their typical conduct, deploying [...] Read more.
This paper examines manipulation games through the lens of Machiavellianism, a psychological theory. It analyzes manipulation dynamics using principles like hierarchical perspectives, exploitation tactics, and the absence of conventional morals to interpret interpersonal interactions. Manipulators intersperse unethical behavior within their typical conduct, deploying deceptive tactics before resuming a baseline demeanor. The proposed solution leverages Lyapunov theory to establish and maintain Stackelberg equilibria. A Lyapunov-like function supports each asymptotically stable equilibrium, ensuring convergence to a Nash/Lyapunov equilibrium if it exists, inherently favoring no-regret strategies. The existence of an optimal solution is demonstrated via the Weierstrass theorem. The game is modeled as a three-level Stackelberg framework based on Markov chains. At the highest level, manipulators devise strategies that may not sway middle-level manipulated players, who counter with best-reply strategies mirroring the manipulators’ moves. Lower-level manipulators adjust their strategies in response to the manipulated players to sustain the manipulation process. This integration of stability analysis and strategic decision-making provides a robust framework for understanding and addressing manipulation in interpersonal contexts. A numerical example focusing on the oil market and its regulations highlights the findings of this work. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game and Decision Theory Applied to Business, Economy and Finance)
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30 pages, 3259 KiB  
Article
Innovation Prioritization Decisions in the Product–Service Supply Chain: The Impact of Data Mining and Information Sharing Strategies
by Jinfa Shi, Wei Liu and Yongqiang Su
Mathematics 2024, 12(24), 3903; https://doi.org/10.3390/math12243903 - 11 Dec 2024
Viewed by 762
Abstract
Driven by the servicing and digital transformation of manufacturing enterprises, product and service innovation for manufacturers and service providers to promote integrated solutions collaboratively has become an important way for enterprises to maintain market competitiveness. Building on this foundation, this paper develops an [...] Read more.
Driven by the servicing and digital transformation of manufacturing enterprises, product and service innovation for manufacturers and service providers to promote integrated solutions collaboratively has become an important way for enterprises to maintain market competitiveness. Building on this foundation, this paper develops an innovation priority decision model for the product–service supply chain, which comprises manufacturers and service providers, considering the data mining and information sharing strategies of service providers. It analyzes the optimal decisions and profits of the members when product innovation is prioritized as well as when service innovation is prioritized, and subsequently explores the selection of innovation strategies for the product–service supply chain under varying conditions. The results of the study show that, firstly, service providers’ data mining and information sharing strategies are not always favorable to the innovation decisions of both parties. Only when data resources can be transformed into real innovation value at a reasonable cost can data mining and information sharing play the role of ‘external incentives’ to promote collaborative innovation between the two parties. Secondly, when service providers do not adopt data mining and information sharing strategies, the efficiency of product and service innovation plays a decisive role in innovation prioritization. The party with high innovation efficiency adopts the sub-priority innovation strategy, which can lead to a larger market share for the innovation results. Finally, under the service provider’s data mining and information sharing strategy, the innovation priority selection of the product–service supply chain depends on the information value transformation ability of the manufacturer and the service provider. Moreover, the profits of manufacturers and service providers under the same innovation priority do not always ‘advance or retreat together’, and there may be cases where one of them suffers a loss of profits. This study provides a theoretical basis for the choice of innovation strategies given to manufacturers and service providers, and promotes the development of collaborative innovation between them. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game and Decision Theory Applied to Business, Economy and Finance)
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16 pages, 518 KiB  
Article
Insider Trading with Semi-Informed Traders and Information Sharing: The Stackelberg Game
by Wassim Daher, Fida Karam and Naveed Ahmed
Mathematics 2023, 11(22), 4580; https://doi.org/10.3390/math11224580 - 8 Nov 2023
Viewed by 1811
Abstract
This paper presents a financial Stackelberg game model with two partially informed risk neutral insiders. Each insider receives a private signal about the stock value and competes with the other insider under a Stackelberg setting. Linear strategies for the game’s participants are considered [...] Read more.
This paper presents a financial Stackelberg game model with two partially informed risk neutral insiders. Each insider receives a private signal about the stock value and competes with the other insider under a Stackelberg setting. Linear strategies for the game’s participants are considered and normal distributions for the fundamentals are assumed. Based on the Stackelberg game and the Backward Induction theory, the unique linear equilibrium is characterized. The findings reveal that the level of partial information might increase/decrease the insiders’ profits as well as the market parameter in the Stackelberg setting relative to the Cournot setting. Additionally, this paper considers the information sharing scenario between the two insiders competing in this Stackelberg game. The results show that multiple equilibria exist in contrast to the information sharing scenario in the Cournot game where the Nash equilibrium is unique. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game and Decision Theory Applied to Business, Economy and Finance)
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24 pages, 8196 KiB  
Article
Dynamic Game Analysis on Cooperative Advertising Strategy in a Manufacturer-Led Supply Chain with Risk Aversion
by Jia Liu and Cuixia Li
Mathematics 2023, 11(3), 512; https://doi.org/10.3390/math11030512 - 18 Jan 2023
Cited by 4 | Viewed by 2096
Abstract
This paper considers a dynamic Stackelberg game model for a manufacturer-led supply chain with risk aversion. Cooperative advertising strategy is applied to the marketing decisions of supply chain participants. Based on Stackelberg game and system dynamic theory, the game and complex dynamical behaviors [...] Read more.
This paper considers a dynamic Stackelberg game model for a manufacturer-led supply chain with risk aversion. Cooperative advertising strategy is applied to the marketing decisions of supply chain participants. Based on Stackelberg game and system dynamic theory, the game and complex dynamical behaviors are studied through the use of several methods, such as the stability region of the system, bifurcation diagram, attractor diagram, and the largest Lyapunov exponent diagram. The expected utilities of participants are given and compared by numerical simulation. The results illustrate that a series of variations in adjustment speed of advertising expenditure, participation rate of local advertising expenditure by manufacturer, risk tolerance levels, and the effect coefficient of advertising expenditure may cause a loss of stability to the system and evolve into chaos. Meanwhile, the Nash equilibrium point and the expected utility of the manufacturer and retailer will change greatly. The parameter control method is further applied to control the chaos phenomenon of the system effectively. By means of analyzing the impact of relevant factors on the game model, the manufacturer and retailer can make optimal strategy decisions in the supply chain competition. The findings of this study mainly include the following three aspects. Firstly, for market stability and maximizing revenue, the manufacturer adjusts the participation rate appropriately, avoiding too high or too low values. Secondly, the manufacturer will try to reduce their own risk tolerance level for the economic revenue, and the retailer appropriately adjust the risk tolerance level to adapt to their own development according to their own enterprise strategy. Finally, both the manufacturer and retailer reduce their own effect coefficients of advertising expenditure. Meanwhile, they will attempt to increase their opponent’s effect coefficient to gain the most revenue. The research results of this study can provide important reference for the advertising expenditure decision and revenue maximization of participants in the context of risk aversion. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game and Decision Theory Applied to Business, Economy and Finance)
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29 pages, 3421 KiB  
Article
Implications of CSR Practices for a Development Supply Chain in Alleviating Farmers’ Poverty
by Qingyu Zhang and Tianlong Luo
Mathematics 2022, 10(20), 3762; https://doi.org/10.3390/math10203762 - 12 Oct 2022
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 1747
Abstract
To alleviate farmer poverty, this paper investigates the effect of a retailer’s different socially responsible practices on a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one rural (poor) farmer, one suburban farmer, and one common retailer. Different from a commercial supply chain (whose members’ objectives [...] Read more.
To alleviate farmer poverty, this paper investigates the effect of a retailer’s different socially responsible practices on a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one rural (poor) farmer, one suburban farmer, and one common retailer. Different from a commercial supply chain (whose members’ objectives are to maximize their profits) and a humanitarian supply chain (whose objective is to save more people, rather than to prioritize profits), the paper aims to study a development supply chain where the CSR-conscious retailer aims to lift the poor farmer out of poverty through cost sharing, altruistic practices, or fairness practices. Can the CSR-conscious retailer (and the development supply chain) do well by doing good? To answer the above question, four models of potential CSR investment are established and analyzed. Considering the different influences of the retailer’s CSR practices, this paper uses a Stackelberg game to analyze the decisions and profits of the farmers and the retailer in these four models. Our study finds that, first, the retailer’s CSR practices can improve the whole supply chain’s performance, which means that the supply chain has the potential to achieve the Pareto improvement for both the farmers and the retailer. Second, the retailer’s CSR practices yield benefits while implementing cost-sharing or fairness practices. Third, the rural farmer always benefits from the retailer’s CSR practices and may prefer the altruistic practice from which they can benefit the most. In addition, to benefit their profit more, the rural farmer should grow high- or low-value-added crops rather than medium-value-added ones. Fourth, from the suburban farmer’s perspective, the retailer’s CSR practices are not beneficial for their performance. However, the extent to which the suburban farmer’s performance decreases is much lower than the extent to which the rural farmer’s performance improves. The results of this paper might be used by stakeholders to alleviate poverty. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game and Decision Theory Applied to Business, Economy and Finance)
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Review

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14 pages, 372 KiB  
Review
Revenue Management in Airlines and External Factors Affecting Decisions: The Harmonic Oscillator Model
by Ivan Arraut, Wilson Rosado and Victor Leong
Mathematics 2024, 12(6), 847; https://doi.org/10.3390/math12060847 - 14 Mar 2024
Viewed by 1555
Abstract
The Revenue Management (RM) problem in airlines for a fixed capacity, single resource and two classes has been solved before by using a standard formalism. In this paper we propose a model for RM by using the semi-classical approach of the Quantum Harmonic [...] Read more.
The Revenue Management (RM) problem in airlines for a fixed capacity, single resource and two classes has been solved before by using a standard formalism. In this paper we propose a model for RM by using the semi-classical approach of the Quantum Harmonic Oscillator. We then extend the model to include external factors affecting the people’s decisions, particularly those where collective decisions emerge. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game and Decision Theory Applied to Business, Economy and Finance)
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