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Philosophies, Volume 4, Issue 2 (June 2019)

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Open AccessArticle Spurious, Emergent Laws in Number Worlds
Philosophies 2019, 4(2), 17; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies4020017
Received: 12 February 2019 / Revised: 4 April 2019 / Accepted: 8 April 2019 / Published: 16 April 2019
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Abstract
We study some aspects of the emergence of lógos from xáos on a basal model of the universe using methods and techniques from algorithmic information and Ramsey theories. Thereby an intrinsic and unusual mixture of meaningful and spurious, emerging laws surfaces. The spurious, [...] Read more.
We study some aspects of the emergence of lógos from xáos on a basal model of the universe using methods and techniques from algorithmic information and Ramsey theories. Thereby an intrinsic and unusual mixture of meaningful and spurious, emerging laws surfaces. The spurious, emergent laws abound, they can be found almost everywhere. In accord with the ancient Greek theogony one could say that lógos, the Gods and the laws of the universe, originate from “the void,” or from xáos, a picture which supports the unresolvable/irreducible lawless hypothesis. The analysis presented in this paper suggests that the “laws” discovered in science correspond merely to syntactical correlations, are local and not universal. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Contemporary Natural Philosophy and Philosophies - Part 2)
Open AccessArticle The Quale of Time
Philosophies 2019, 4(2), 16; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies4020016
Received: 2 February 2019 / Revised: 23 March 2019 / Accepted: 8 April 2019 / Published: 11 April 2019
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Abstract
Time is one of the greatest subjects of interest to the disciplines of both Science and Philosophy, being seen to have a greater importance in the workings of reality than other entities. In this paper, a phenomenological analysis of time based on the [...] Read more.
Time is one of the greatest subjects of interest to the disciplines of both Science and Philosophy, being seen to have a greater importance in the workings of reality than other entities. In this paper, a phenomenological analysis of time based on the general workings of the emergent structure of consciousness will be done, and time will be shown to be no different than any other qualia. It will be shown that, like any other qualia, time is an emergent level of consciousness, manifesting all the properties of emergence: inheritance of qualities from the previous levels, top-down influence in levels received from the higher levels and top-down influence in levels impressed on the lower levels. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Philosophies of Time, Media and Contemporaneity)
Open AccessArticle Linguistic Meaning, Rigid Designators, and Legal Philosophy
Philosophies 2019, 4(2), 15; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies4020015
Received: 9 February 2019 / Revised: 26 February 2019 / Accepted: 26 March 2019 / Published: 3 April 2019
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Abstract
This essay is intended to engage some of the controversies that have emerged in legal philosophy concerning the theory of linguistic meaning we should adopt with reference to the law. In particular, I will focus on two theories of linguistic meaning that have [...] Read more.
This essay is intended to engage some of the controversies that have emerged in legal philosophy concerning the theory of linguistic meaning we should adopt with reference to the law. In particular, I will focus on two theories of linguistic meaning that have opposing positions both on the nature of meaning, and the consequences this might have for law and legal objectivity. The first can be called plain meaning view. The plain meaning theory claims that the meaning of legal terms is a settled thing, and it is the duty of legal officials, especially judges, to simply apply that meaning to a given case in hand. In modern American jurisprudence, the plain meaning theory is often associated with various originalist figures, most notably the late Antonin Scalia who called his iteration of the plain meaning theory “textualism.” For this reason, I will largely be focusing on Justice Scalia’s account. The second theory of linguistic meaning I will be examining can be called the indeterminate theory. The indeterminate theory holds that there is no set or foundational meaning to any semantic term in the law which can be objectively applied by legal practitioners. Full article
Open AccessEssay The Problem of Meaning in AI and Robotics: Still with Us after All These Years
Philosophies 2019, 4(2), 14; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies4020014
Received: 7 February 2019 / Revised: 22 March 2019 / Accepted: 27 March 2019 / Published: 3 April 2019
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Abstract
In this essay we critically evaluate the progress that has been made in solving the problem of meaning in artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics. We remain skeptical about solutions based on deep neural networks and cognitive robotics, which in our opinion do not [...] Read more.
In this essay we critically evaluate the progress that has been made in solving the problem of meaning in artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics. We remain skeptical about solutions based on deep neural networks and cognitive robotics, which in our opinion do not fundamentally address the problem. We agree with the enactive approach to cognitive science that things appear as intrinsically meaningful for living beings because of their precarious existence as adaptive autopoietic individuals. But this approach inherits the problem of failing to account for how meaning as such could make a difference for an agent’s behavior. In a nutshell, if life and mind are identified with physically deterministic phenomena, then there is no conceptual room for meaning to play a role in its own right. We argue that this impotence of meaning can be addressed by revising the concept of nature such that the macroscopic scale of the living can be characterized by physical indeterminacy. We consider the implications of this revision of the mind-body relationship for synthetic approaches. Full article
Open AccessArticle Logical Analogies: Interpretations, Oppositions, and Probabilism
Philosophies 2019, 4(2), 13; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies4020013
Received: 31 December 2018 / Revised: 20 March 2019 / Accepted: 22 March 2019 / Published: 2 April 2019
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Abstract
I present two logical systems to show the “analogy of proportionality” common to several interpretations: modality (necessity and possibility), quantification, truth-functional relations, moral attitudes (deontic logic), states of knowledge (epistemic logic), and states of belief (doxastic logic). To display the two underlying analogical [...] Read more.
I present two logical systems to show the “analogy of proportionality” common to several interpretations: modality (necessity and possibility), quantification, truth-functional relations, moral attitudes (deontic logic), states of knowledge (epistemic logic), and states of belief (doxastic logic). To display the two underlying analogical relations, I call upon the originally Scholastic convention, recently put to use again, of using squares, hexagons, and octagons “of opposition”. A combined epistemic–deontic logic happens to be found in the traditional “probabilist” theory of the “good conscience”, and I shall then briefly explain how this is so. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Philosophies on Analogy)
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Open AccessArticle Embodiment: The Ecology of Mind
Philosophies 2019, 4(2), 12; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies4020012
Received: 19 February 2019 / Revised: 19 March 2019 / Accepted: 22 March 2019 / Published: 27 March 2019
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Abstract
Following a suggestion from G. Bateson, this article enquires into the consequence of the idea of embodiment in philosophy of mind, taking seriously the notion of an ecology of mind. In the first half of this article, after distinguishing between the biological and [...] Read more.
Following a suggestion from G. Bateson, this article enquires into the consequence of the idea of embodiment in philosophy of mind, taking seriously the notion of an ecology of mind. In the first half of this article, after distinguishing between the biological and the systemic approaches to ecology, I focus on three characteristics of the systemic approach. First, that a system is an abstract object that is multiply embodied in a collection of physically distinct heterogeneous objects. Second, that there is a form of circular causality between the level of the elements and that of the system as a whole, as some characteristics of the elements partake in the explanation of how the system functions, while the requirement of the system explains why the elements have the characteristics that they do. The third is the ontological uncertainty that we sometimes find in ecology, where the same term is used to designate both a central component of the ecological system and the system as a whole. In the second half, beginning with a critique of the theory of mind approach, I look into the consequences of conceiving that mind is embodied in a collection of physically distinct heterogeneous objects that interact as elements of a system, rather than enclosed in an individual body. Full article
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