The Problem of Meaning in AI and Robotics: Still with Us after All These Years
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. The Problem of Meaning in AI and Robotics
3. Varieties of Naturalization
3.1. Nature++
3.2. Nature==
3.3. Nature--
4. Discussion
Author Contributions
Funding
Conflicts of Interest
References
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1 | More specifically, we argue that this is a small conceptual step for a scientific perspective that is already used to dealing with complex phenomena that are inherently unpredictable. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that this step has profound implications for our understanding of reality that deserve to be more fully developed in future work, for instance by taking inspiration from related work in the philosophy of physics [69,70]. |
2 | We focus here on the contributions of phenomenological philosophy because we are most familiar with that tradition. Yet we certainly recognize that there are other traditions that have much to offer for the development of a suitably revised concept of nature, including the speculative naturalist philosophy going back to Peirce and Whitehead, as well as contemporary movements within analytic philosophy that argue for more “liberal” [78] and “relaxed” forms of naturalism [79]. Future work could compare and contrast these diverse proposals. |
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Froese, T.; Taguchi, S. The Problem of Meaning in AI and Robotics: Still with Us after All These Years. Philosophies 2019, 4, 14. https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies4020014
Froese T, Taguchi S. The Problem of Meaning in AI and Robotics: Still with Us after All These Years. Philosophies. 2019; 4(2):14. https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies4020014
Chicago/Turabian StyleFroese, Tom, and Shigeru Taguchi. 2019. "The Problem of Meaning in AI and Robotics: Still with Us after All These Years" Philosophies 4, no. 2: 14. https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies4020014