Reason and Revelation in Ibn Taymiyyah’s Critique of Philosophical Theology: A Contribution to Contemporary Islamic Philosophy of Religion

Abstract

This paper addresses the longstanding tension between reason and revelation in Islamic religious epistemology, with a focus on the thought of Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728/1328). It aims to reassess his critique of philosophical theology (falsafa and kalām) and explore his constructive alternative to rationalist metaphysics. The study adopts a descriptive–analytical methodology, combining close textual reading of Darʾ Taʿāruḍ al-ʿAql wa al-Naql and Naqd al-Manṭiq with conceptual analysis informed by contemporary religious epistemology and philosophy of religion. The findings reveal that Ibn Taymiyyah advances a triadic epistemological model centered on revelation (naql), reason (ʿaql), and innate disposition (fiṭrah). He refutes the autonomy of reason, redefines logic as a tool rather than a judge, and repositions fiṭrah as an intuitive foundation for belief. His approach emphasizes the harmony of sound reason with authentic revelation and challenges the epistemic assumptions of speculative theology. By presenting a comparative table of rationalist and Taymiyyan epistemologies, the study demonstrates how Ibn Taymiyyah’s framework anticipates key themes in Reformed Epistemology and the cognitive science of religion. The conclusions suggest that his vision offers a coherent, theocentric paradigm for religious knowledge that is highly relevant to the contemporary philosophy of religion and Islamic theology.

1. Introduction

1.1. Reason and Revelation: A Foundational Tension

The tension between reason (ʿaql) and revelation (waḥy) represents one of the most enduring and contested questions in the philosophy of religion. Across religious traditions, this dialectic has shaped theological doctrines, hermeneutical strategies, moral reasoning, and epistemological frameworks. In the Islamic tradition, this question has been central to centuries-long debates—between philosophers and theologians, traditionalists and rationalists, literalists and allegorists.

Some classical Muslim exegetes even interpreted the Qur’anic narrative of Iblīs’s refusal to prostrate before Adam as an early paradigmatic expression of this tension. According to this view, Iblīs’s rebellion stemmed from privileging speculative rationality over divine command—an archetypal error in subordinating revelation to reason (Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah 2020, vol. 2, p. 633).

1.2. Epistemological Stakes in Contemporary Philosophy of Religion

In modern philosophical discourse, questions surrounding the justification of belief, the nature of religious knowledge, and the authority of revelation continue to dominate. Debates over whether religious belief should be grounded in rational argument or can be justified as properly basic and whether scriptural sources can stand as legitimate epistemic authorities are far from settled.

Within this context, the Islamic tradition offers a wealth of untapped epistemological resources. Particularly, the thought of Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728/1328) provides an alternative framework that neither dismisses reason nor subjects revelation to it. Instead, he proposes a triadic epistemology grounded in naql (revealed text), ʿaql (functionally sound reason), and fiṭrah (innate disposition). His thought thus offers a robust counter-model to both philosophical rationalism and fideistic traditionalism.

1.3. Aims and Scope of the Study

This study examines Ibn Taymiyyah’s critique of philosophical theology—particularly falsafa and kalām—as a constructive intervention in the ongoing debate about the relation between reason and revelation. Far from a mere polemical rejection of speculative metaphysics, his writings—most notably Darʾ Taʿāruḍ al-ʿAql wa al-Naql and Naqd al-Manṭiq—articulate an epistemological model grounded in scriptural primacy, rational coherence, and the epistemic role of fiṭrah.

The study also explores how Ibn Taymiyyah’s views on the limits of Aristotelian logic, his affirmation of tawḥīd in its three dimensions (lordship, worship, and names and attributes), and his defense of divine authority, can offer insights into contemporary philosophical debates. These include discussions on the sources of religious knowledge, the nature of belief justification, and the interplay between reason, tradition, and intuitive awareness.

Furthermore, this study approaches Ibn Taymiyyah’s epistemological project not as a personal innovation but as a conscious recovery of the foundational principles upheld by the Prophet Muhammad, his Companions, and the early generations of Muslims (al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ). His critique of philosophical theology is consistently framed as a return to the epistemic integrity of the earliest Muslim community—marked by its affirmation of revelation’s primacy, reason’s instrumental role, and fiṭrah’s intuitive function as a divinely endowed faculty.

Revelation (naql) in Ibn Taymiyyah’s framework encompasses both the Qur’an and the authentic Sunnah, as transmitted and interpreted by the Prophet’s Companions and the early generations (Salaf). This collective understanding forms an integral part of what counts as revealed knowledge.

Accordingly, this paper seeks to explore how Ibn Taymiyyah understands the interplay between reason and revelation, and to examine the philosophical relevance of his epistemological framework in the context of contemporary Islamic thought. This guiding inquiry informs the structure and argument of the study and anchors its engagement with classical sources and modern philosophical discourse.

1.4. Literature Review

The relationship between reason and revelation has garnered increasing scholarly attention within Islamic philosophy, theology, and legal theory. Classical figures such as al-Ghazālī, Ibn Rushd, and, more recently, Ibn Taymiyyah have been central to this debate. Al-Ghazālī, for instance, famously prioritized revelation over speculative reason in Tahāfut al-Falāsifah, a position that has shaped subsequent Sunni theology by asserting the ultimate authority of waḥy over rationalist epistemologies. In contrast, works like Reconsidering between Reason and Revelation in Islamic Legal Philosophy by Hidayat (2024) emphasize the complementary interplay between the two in shaping Islamic legal reasoning, arguing that while revelation remains primary, reason serves as a contextualizing tool essential for understanding divine guidance in changing times.

Contemporary scholarship has also revisited the relevance of Islamic theology (ʿilm al-kalām) in responding to modern intellectual challenges such as atheism, secularism, and scientific materialism. A growing body of literature underscores the integrative potential of reason and revelation in sustaining theological relevance in pluralistic and rationalist contexts (Journal of Islamic Thought and Philosophy 2024). In this discourse, Ibn Taymiyyah’s epistemology—grounded in a triadic structure of naql, ʿaql, and fiṭrah—emerges as an underexplored but promising model.

El-Tobgui’s comprehensive study Ibn Taymiyya on Reason and Revelation (El-Tobgui 2020) has been pivotal in highlighting the methodological richness of Darʾ Taʿāruḍ al-ʿAql wa al-Naql, yet stops short of systematically engaging Ibn Taymiyyah’s work within contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. Similarly, while some studies have noted Ibn Taymiyyah’s role in Islamic education and law (Lalahwa et al. 2024), they tend to position him as a jurist or polemicist rather than a constructive epistemologist.

The logical critique in Ibn Taymiyyah’s epistemology has also received scholarly attention. Sobhi Rayan (2011) offers a focused analysis of Ibn Taymiyyah’s objections to Aristotelian syllogism and formal logic, highlighting his emphasis on contextual meaning and real cognition over metaphysical abstraction. Rayan’s work complements broader treatments by showing how Ibn Taymiyyah’s epistemological realism manifests in his rejection of rigid logical structures and his preference for linguistic and experiential understanding.

Recent scholarship by Jamie B. Turner has advanced the philosophical reading of Ibn Taymiyyah’s epistemology by framing his thought within the context of Reformed Epistemology and design-based theism. Turner highlights Ibn Taymiyyah’s emphasis on theistic signs, intuitive knowledge, and the role of fiṭrah as foundational to religious belief, offering a constructive bridge between classical Islamic theology and contemporary analytic philosophy of religion (Turner 2021; 2022).

One recent contribution that is particularly relevant to this study is “The Ontological Capture of the Divine: Genealogies of God in Modern Thought”, which explores how modern philosophical theology has constrained classical conceptions of the divine. Its findings resonate with Ibn Taymiyyah’s critique of ontological abstraction and reinforce the distinctiveness of his theocentric epistemology.

This study addresses the gap by offering a structured philosophical reading of Ibn Taymiyyah’s epistemological project, positioning it within current debates on belief justification, the rationality of faith, and sources of religious knowledge. By doing so, it contributes to the broader endeavor of developing a distinctly Islamic philosophy of religion grounded in textual fidelity, rational coherence, and ontological clarity.

1.5. Central Research Question

As outlined in the introduction, this study is guided by the following question:

How does Ibn Taymiyyah conceptualize the relationship between reason and revelation, and to what extent does his epistemological model contribute to contemporary Islamic philosophy of religion?

This question shapes the structure of the paper and directs its comparative and analytical orientation.

2. Methodology and Analytical Framework

This study employs a descriptive–analytical methodology, integrating historical contextualization with conceptual analysis drawn from both classical Islamic thought and contemporary philosophy of religion. The descriptive dimension aims to reconstruct Ibn Taymiyyah’s epistemological critique of philosophical theology (ʿilm al-kalām and falsafa), with special attention to his most mature articulations in Darʾ Taʿāruḍ al-ʿAql wa al-Naql and Naqd al-Manṭiq. These texts are not only polemical but serve as foundational philosophical interventions into questions of knowledge, truth, and belief justification.

The analytical dimension investigates the internal coherence and broader philosophical implications of Ibn Taymiyyah’s model—particularly its reliance on fiṭrah as a basic epistemic faculty, its redefinition of reason’s function, and its insistence on the compatibility of revelation with sound intellect. Rather than reading Ibn Taymiyyah as a traditional theologian responding to doctrinal controversies, the study treats his work as an alternative epistemological paradigm capable of contributing to current debates in religious epistemology, metaphysics of religion, and theological reasoning.

Building on this framework, the research centers on a close, critical reading of two of Ibn Taymiyyah’s most philosophically substantive works:

Darʾ Taʿāruḍ al-ʿAql wa al-Naql (The Refutation of the Conflict between Reason and Revelation), in which he systematically deconstructs the assumption of inherent contradiction between ʿaql and naql, arguing instead for a principled harmony between sound intellect and authentic revelation (Taymiyyah 1991).

Naqd al-Manṭiq (Refutation of Logic), where he challenges the foundational assumptions of Aristotelian logic—specifically definition (ḥadd), syllogism (qiyās), and universals (kulliyyāt)—and proposes an alternative rooted in real-world cognition and prophetic methodology.

These texts form the basis for assessing the structure, language, and purpose of Ibn Taymiyyah’s thought, including his critique of logic, his affirmation of tawḥīd, and his philosophical rehabilitation of fiṭrah as a legitimate and universal source of religious knowledge.

The study draws conceptually from contemporary discussions in religious epistemology, the logic of theological reasoning, and the philosophy of religion, particularly within the Islamic tradition. It engages critical questions such as:

What constitutes a valid source of religious knowledge?

How can belief be justified without falling into either fideism or rationalism?

What is the role of intuition and innate cognition (fiṭrah) in acquiring religious truth?

To what extent can Ibn Taymiyyah’s framework interact with or critique dominant paradigms in Western thought?

This analytical lens does not presuppose the truth or falsehood of specific theological claims but treats Ibn Taymiyyah’s epistemological project as a philosophical model—open to comparative evaluation, conceptual refinement, and integration into global discourses on religion, reason, and revelation.

A key epistemological pillar of this framework is the concept of fiṭrah, which this study approaches not merely as a theological postulate but as an epistemic faculty analogous to what Reformed Epistemologists describe as a “properly basic belief”. The analysis examines Ibn Taymiyyah’s understanding of fiṭrah as a universal, innate awareness of God, moral values, and existential purpose—one that functions independently of syllogistic reasoning while remaining in harmony with both revelation and sound reason.

Ibn Taymiyyah’s unwavering commitment to naql as the supreme source of knowledge—when rightly understood—is assessed in relation to modern debates about scriptural authority, textual hermeneutics, and the epistemic weight of revealed discourse.

The study analyzes Ibn Taymiyyah’s views on hermeneutical authority: who has the right to interpret revelation, on what basis, and through what tools? His critique of allegorical overreach and his support for a principled, contextual, and grammatically faithful reading of texts are examined through the lens of both classical and modern theories of interpretation.

The research contrasts Ibn Taymiyyah’s critique of reason as an autonomous judge with his model of reason as a calibrated tool—one that is effective when illuminated by revelation. His distinction between sound reason (ʿaql ṣarīḥ) and speculative metaphysics is key to understanding how he preserves the function of intellect without subjecting revelation to its judgment.

3. Discussion

3.1. Ibn Taymiyyah’s Epistemological Model: Foundations and Framework

Ibn Taymiyyah’s engagement with the philosophical and theological traditions of his time—particularly falsafa and kalām—cannot be reduced to a mere dialectical exercise in refutation. Rather, it reflects a deliberate epistemological repositioning rooted in the worldview of early Muslim scholars, who approached reality through the lens of divine revelation. His critique extends beyond isolated doctrines or logical inconsistencies to the foundational assumptions underpinning philosophical theology.

Importantly, Ibn Taymiyyah does not present his epistemological model—based on the triad of revelation, reason, and fiṭrah—as an innovation or personal opinion. Instead, he explicitly attributes this framework to the earliest generations of Muslims, particularly the Prophet Muhammad, his Companions, and the early generations of Muslims (al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ), who are regarded in Islamic tradition as the most authoritative exemplars of religious understanding and practice.

He consistently affirms that the harmonization of reason and revelation, the epistemic authority of the Qur’an and Sunnah, and the role of fiṭrah in knowing God and affirming tawḥīd in all its dimensions (lordship, worship, and divine names and attributes) are not his own inventions but the legacy of prophetic guidance and the consensus of the early Muslim community. By doing so, Ibn Taymiyyah positions himself not as a founder of a new theology but as a restorer of an authentic Islamic epistemology rooted in divine guidance and practiced by the best generations of Islam.

In Darʾ Taʿāruḍ al-ʿAql wa al-Naql, Ibn Taymiyyah argues that the perceived contradiction between reason and revelation is not inherent but rather the outcome of a rationalist methodology that imposes metaphysical frameworks onto divinely revealed truths. He asserts that sound reason and authentic revelation are in perfect harmony and that any apparent contradiction arises from either misinterpretation of the texts or flawed rational inference. He writes:

“Sound reason does not contradict authentic transmitted revelation, but rather confirms and supports it. Revelation does not include what pure reason finds impossible; it may include what is beyond reason, but not what is contrary to it”.

(Ibn Taymiyyah 2004, vol. 1, p. 74)

This critique is not merely negative, but also constructive: Ibn Taymiyyah develops an alternative epistemological framework in which revelation serves as the foundation, reason functions as a necessary yet limited tool, and fiṭrah (natural human disposition) is upheld as a fundamental source of moral and metaphysical knowledge. He reaffirms this view by stating:

“Everything indicated by the Qur’an and Sunnah is in agreement with sound reason, and sound reason does not contradict authentic revelation”.

(Ibn Taymiyyah 2004, vol. 12, p. 81)

Far from rejecting reason, Ibn Taymiyyah considers it essential, though not autonomous. He compares it to vision, which requires external light to function—just as reason needs the illumination of revelation to operate effectively. He explains:

“Reason is a condition for acquiring knowledge and perfecting action. But it is not self-sufficient. It is like eyesight in the eye: it needs the light of faith and the Qur’an, just as the eye needs the light of the sun or fire. If left alone, it cannot perceive what is beyond its capacity… The prophets brought what reason cannot independently comprehend, not what it knows to be impossible”.

(Ibn Taymiyyah 2004, vol. 3, p. 339)

Ibn Taymiyyah also critiques both extremes: the rationalists who subordinate revelation to reason and the mystics who disregard reason altogether. As he notes:

“Many theologians rely solely on reason, making revelation subservient to it, while many Sufis deny reason and consider spiritual states unattainable except through its absence. Both extremes are blameworthy”.

(Ibn Taymiyyah 2004, vol. 3, p. 338)

Thus, Ibn Taymiyyah’s epistemological project is neither anti-rational nor fideistic. It calls for reordering the hierarchy of knowledge: revelation at the apex, reason in service, and fiṭrah as foundation. This integrative vision—what may be called a Sunni realist epistemology—asserts that sound reason, when guided by divine light, becomes a reliable tool, while untethered speculation leads only to confusion.

A central pillar of Ibn Taymiyyah’s epistemological vision is his meticulous analysis of the concept of taʿāruḍ—the perceived conflict between reason (ʿaql) and revelation (naql). While many theologians and philosophers have treated such conflicts as real and irresolvable, Ibn Taymiyyah offers a fundamental distinction between true contradiction and perceived or imagined contradiction. He asserts that any genuine contradiction between sound reason and authentic revelation is epistemologically impossible because both originate from the same divine source: one through creation, the other through instruction.

All apparent contradictions, he contends, can be traced back to epistemic error. These errors may arise from misreported texts, misunderstood meanings, false rational premises, or illegitimate mystical claims. In Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā, he provides a comprehensive diagnosis:

“What came from the Prophet in this matter and others is all truth, each part confirming the other. It aligns with the natural disposition of creation (fiṭrah), sound reason, and upright intent. It does not contradict genuine reason, sound intention, upright nature, or the authentic transmission from the Messenger. The only one who imagines contradiction is he who believes in a false report, or misinterprets a text, or assumes something to be rational when it is sheer ignorance, or takes a so-called unveiling (kashf) as revelation when it is in fact delusion…”

(Ibn Taymiyyah 2004, vol. 6, p. 580).

This framework leads Ibn Taymiyyah to reframe the problem entirely. For him, taʿāruḍ is not a metaphysical reality but a hermeneutical illusion—a sign not of contradiction between truth and truth, but of an error in perception or methodology. In Darʾ Taʿāruḍ, he famously asserts that if a contradiction is found, either the narration is weak, the interpretation flawed, or the reasoning unsound (Ibn Taymiyyah 2004, vol. 1, pp. 130–32).

His critique, therefore, is not limited to the content of philosophical theology but extends to its epistemic foundations. He challenges the rationalist presumption that unaided reason can serve as the supreme arbiter of revealed truth, and he rejects mystical claims that sidestep both reason and revelation. Instead, Ibn Taymiyyah upholds a unified model of knowledge grounded in revelation, reason, and fiṭrah, wherein each confirms and supports the other.

This vision, rooted in the Salafi tradition, not only restores confidence in the coherence of religious knowledge but also provides a methodological tool for evaluating all claims of contradiction. It is a call to epistemic humility: to question not the revealed text but the human apparatus that fails to comprehend it rightly.

In Ibn Taymiyyah’s epistemology, fiṭrah—the innate human disposition—is not merely a theological concept but an essential cognitive foundation for religious knowledge. It is a divine imprint that orients every human being toward the recognition of truth: belief in God, the acceptance of prophetic guidance, and the affirmation of moral and spiritual realities. This natural disposition precedes formal instruction and rational proof, functioning as a pre-reflective epistemic anchor that prepares the mind and heart to receive revelation.

Ibn Taymiyyah repeatedly affirms that revelation is in full agreement with this fiṭrah. He maintains that prophetic guidance never contradicts sound reason or innate human nature, and that any perceived contradiction arises from misinterpretation, false assumptions, or epistemic error (Ibn Taymiyyah 2004, vol. 6, p. 580).

This integrated view positions fiṭrah as part of a triad of mutually reinforcing sources of truth: sound reason, innate disposition (fiṭrah), and authentic revelation. It is not merely compatible with revelation—it is predisposed toward it. Revelation, in turn, awakens and completes what the fiṭrah already inclines toward, thereby eliminating any need for speculative proofs in establishing core religious beliefs.

This resonates with the concept of properly basic beliefs in contemporary epistemology, particularly in the works of Alvin Plantinga. According to Reformed Epistemology, belief in God is not inferred from other propositions but is instead considered rationally warranted by default, provided that the believer’s cognitive faculties are functioning properly within an appropriate epistemic environment (Plantinga 2000). Similarly, Ibn Taymiyyah asserts that belief in God and in the truthfulness of the Prophet arises from the proper functioning of the fiṭrah; any deviation from this natural disposition, he argues, stems from social corruption, flawed intellectual premises, or moral disorientation.

For Ibn Taymiyyah, then, fiṭrah plays both a cognitive and moral role: it facilitates the recognition of truth and fosters the will to accept it. This dual function allows it to operate as an epistemic bedrock—one that grounds the human capacity for religious certainty without dependence on external validation through syllogism or speculative philosophy.

In this way, Ibn Taymiyyah not only anticipates key themes in contemporary religious epistemology but articulates a uniquely Islamic model of knowledge that is holistic, intuitive, and divinely calibrated.

Building on this insight, the discussion can be further enriched by engaging contemporary empirical research in the cognitive science of religion (CSR), which explores how belief in God may be grounded in natural cognitive mechanisms. Rather than relying on Justin Barrett’s HADD theory, which has been interpreted by some as suggesting that belief in God is a false positive, this study turns to Kelly James Clark’s analysis in God and the Brain: The Rationality of Belief (Clark 2019). Clark argues that belief in God can be both natural and rational, emerging from properly functioning cognitive faculties under the right conditions. This aligns more closely with Ibn Taymiyyah’s view of fiṭrah as a God-given capacity for recognizing divine truth, one that is clarified by revelation and supported by reason. Engaging such empirical models helps articulate the philosophical robustness of fiṭrah while distinguishing it from mere cognitive bias or cultural conditioning.

This intersection between traditional religious epistemology and modern cognitive research invites a cross-disciplinary dialogue on whether fiṭrah reflects a universal human disposition or remains a theologically framed construct. Incorporating such perspectives may help enhance the philosophical grounding of fiṭrah as an epistemic foundation while clarifying its distinction from cultural conditioning and socialization.

In Ibn Taymiyyah’s epistemological vision, reason holds an indispensable yet subordinated role. It is not the judge over revelation (naql), but rather its interpreter and servant. Ibn Taymiyyah affirms the utility of sound reasoning as a tool for understanding, applying, and defending divine truths, but firmly rejects the notion that reason is autonomous or sufficient to establish certainty in metaphysical or theological matters. This positioning led him to launch one of the most comprehensive critiques of Aristotelian logic in Islamic intellectual history.

Ibn Taymiyyah’s critical engagement with logic was not based on ignorance or superficial dismissal. On the contrary, he had a deep familiarity with the discipline and initially assumed the truth of many of its propositions. He reflects on this evolution in al-Radd ʿala al-Manṭiqiyyīn, stating:

“I always knew that Greek logic was unnecessary for the intelligent and unhelpful to the slow-witted. But I used to think that its propositions were true, since many of them appeared to be so. Later, however, I discovered that a number of its propositions were in fact false”.

(*Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Radd ʿala al-Manṭiqiyyīn).

This candid admission reveals that his critique emerged from critical examination rather than reactionary rejection. Over time, Ibn Taymiyyah concluded that Aristotelian logic—particularly its reliance on definition (al-ḥadd), syllogism (al-qiyās), and universals (al-kulliyyāt)—was not only methodologically flawed but also epistemologically disruptive when applied to religious inquiry.

Ibn Taymiyyah critiques the notion of definition (ḥadd) as formulated in Greek logic, particularly the claim that non-self-evident concepts can only be known through definitions based on genus and differentia. In Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā (Taymiyyah 2004, vol. 9, p. 44), he argues that such a claim is inherently flawed since the one who defines (ḥādd) must already possess knowledge of the thing being defined (muḥaddad). If he knows it without a definition, the claim is false; if he knows it through another definition, the same problem reoccurs, leading to circularity or infinite regress. Ibn Taymiyyah thus maintains that real understanding arises not from formal definitions but from prior familiarity, linguistic usage, and experiential context.

This critique is consistent with his broader epistemology, which favors linguistic realism and contextual meaning over abstract metaphysical formulations. As Sobhi Rayan (2011) notes, Ibn Taymiyyah “emphasized the contextual and conventional nature of language over the rigid metaphysical structures presumed in Aristotelian logic,” and rejected formal definition as a reliable means of attaining knowledge.

Similarly, he critiques syllogistic reasoning as both unnecessary and misleading. Most human knowledge, he argues, is acquired not through formal logic but through recurrent experience, sensory perception, linguistic clarity, and innate intuition. His rejection of Greek logic was also aligned with the broader scholarly tradition among Muslim theologians and jurists. He writes:

“The purpose here is to note that Muslim dialecticians have always written against them (the Greek logicians), not only in logic but also in other subjects, pointing out their errors in both definition and syllogism, just as they demonstrated their errors in theology and elsewhere. None of the Muslim dialecticians ever gave attention to their methodology”.

(*Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Radd ʿala al-Manṭiqiyyīn, p. 337).

His objection to universals is likewise rooted in epistemic realism. Ibn Taymiyyah denies that abstract concepts have an independent ontological status. Instead, he sees them as mental constructs that emerge through abstraction from particular instances. Over-reliance on such constructs, he warns, leads to detachment from reality and misapplication in religious discourse.

At its core, Ibn Taymiyyah’s critique of Aristotelian logic is both methodological and theological. He argues that logic, as inherited from Greek philosophy, imposes an external epistemic framework onto revelation, thereby threatening its clarity, sufficiency, and accessibility. True certainty (yaqīn), he contends, is attained through a combination of authentic transmission, sound reasoning, linguistic clarity, and a preserved fiṭrah.

Table 1. Key epistemological distinctions: philosophical rationalism vs. Taymiyyan model.

Epistemological Dimension	Philosophical Rationalism (Falsafa/Kalām)	Taymiyyan Epistemology (Naql, ʿAql, Fiṭrah)
Source of Truth	Autonomous reason	Revelation as supreme; reason as subordinate tool
Role of Reason	Independent judge	Guided instrument under revelation
View of Revelation	Subject to rational evaluation	Inherently coherent and supreme
Methodology	Deductive syllogism and metaphysical speculation	Textual coherence, fiṭrah, empirical reason
Knowledge of God	Derived from abstract philosophical arguments	Rooted in fiṭrah, revelation, and reason
Status of Fiṭrah	Marginalized or overlooked	Foundational epistemic source
Authority Framework	Philosophers and speculative theologians	The Prophet, Companions, and the righteous predecessors (salaf)

summarizes key epistemological distinctions between the dominant philosophical rationalist model and Ibn Taymiyyah’s integrated model based on revelation (naql), reason (ʿaql), and fiṭrah.

This emphasis on epistemic integration—rather than isolation—anticipates certain developments in later Western thought, particularly in pragmatic and linguistic philosophy. For instance, Ibn Taymiyyah’s rejection of purely abstract, decontextualized metaphysical reasoning resonates with the later critique by Ludwig Wittgenstein, who emphasized the embeddedness of meaning in language use and rejected the idea of fixed essences discoverable by logical analysis (Wittgenstein 1953). Similarly, the pragmatic tradition—exemplified by thinkers such as William James and John Dewey—regarded knowledge as a function of its practical consequences and rooted understanding in lived human experience (James 1907; Dewey 1938). Ibn Taymiyyah’s emphasis on fiṭrah, empirical signs, and revelation as integrated and experientially grounded sources of knowledge parallels these developments in its refusal to isolate reason from the totality of human cognition. Rather than elevating reason above all else, he recalibrates it as one component among several—an indispensable but situated tool, bounded by the limits of language, culture, and divine guidance.

This also exemplifies Ibn Taymiyyah’s broader project: to restore revelation to its central epistemological position and to position reason as a limited yet vital instrument in the pursuit of divine knowledge.

For Ibn Taymiyyah, the knowledge of God (maʿrifat Allāh) is neither contingent upon speculative reasoning nor reliant on complex theological argumentation. Rather, it is a self-evident truth inscribed within the fiṭrah—the innate disposition with which all human beings are created. This awareness of the Divine is not acquired through syllogistic proofs but is embedded in the very nature of the human soul.

In Darʾ Taʿāruḍ al-ʿAql wa al-Naql, Ibn Taymiyyah affirms that the acknowledgment of God is an intrinsic, universal reality. He writes:

“It is known that the foundation of acknowledging the Creator and affirming Him is firmly settled in the hearts of all humans and jinn. It is among the necessary concomitants of their creation and is inherent within them—just like their need for food and drink, which is also essential to their nature”.

(*Ibn Taymiyyah, Darʾ Taʿāruḍ al-ʿAql wa al-Naql, vol. 8, p. 438)

This grounding in fiṭrah provides a radically different epistemic model from that of the mutakallimūn and philosophers, who sought to establish the existence of God through cosmological or ontological proofs. While Ibn Taymiyyah does not reject rational reflection, he regards such arguments as confirmatory at best—and often prone to abstraction and detachment from the Qur’anic mode of reasoning. The Qur’an, he notes, does not present syllogistic demonstrations of God’s existence but instead calls attention to signs in creation, moral intuition, and the futility of idolatry.

Revelation, then, does not impose external truths upon a neutral intellect; rather, it resonates with and reawakens the knowledge already present within the fiṭrah. Ibn Taymiyyah illustrates this harmony through a vivid analogy:

“Fiṭrah in relation to truth is like eyesight in relation to the sun. Everyone with eyes, if left without a veil, will naturally see the sun. False beliefs—like those of the Jews, Christians, and Magians—are veils that block the eyes from seeing the sun”.

(Taymiyyah 2004, vol. 4, p. 234)

Here, fiṭrah is not merely a passive receptacle but an active epistemic faculty. When unobstructed by cultural distortion or philosophical confusion, it naturally inclines toward the truth of God’s existence. The task of revelation is not to manufacture belief, but to remove the veils—intellectual, spiritual, or social—that obscure what is already known within.

In sum, Ibn Taymiyyah offers a model of theistic knowledge that is rooted in human nature, clarified by revelation, and supported—but not founded—by reason. This triadic structure—fiṭrah, naql, and ʿaql—ensures that the recognition of the Divine remains accessible, coherent, and grounded in both scriptural fidelity and existential experience.

At the heart of Ibn Taymiyyah’s theological framework lies a dynamic and integrative conception of tawḥīd—not as an abstract metaphysical doctrine, but as the foundation of knowledge, worship, and moral purpose. Distinct from the abstractions of philosophical theology and the syllogistic constructions of speculative kalām, Ibn Taymiyyah grounds tawḥīd in a triadic unity: lordship (rubūbiyyah), worship (ulūhiyyah), and names and attributes (asmāʾ wa ṣifāt).

This dimension affirms that God alone is the Creator, Sustainer, and Controller of all that exists. Ibn Taymiyyah stresses that belief in divine lordship is both intuitive in the fiṭrah and reinforced by reason and revelation. He identifies three primary epistemic pathways to recognizing rubūbiyyah:

The signs within the self (āyāt al-anfus)—human dependency, cognition, and moral instinct.

For Ibn Taymiyyah, cognition (ʿaql) and moral instinct (gharīzah akhlāqiyyah) are not neutral faculties, but internal signs (āyāt) embedded by the Creator to guide the soul toward truth. Human cognition—our innate capacity to grasp causality, recognize purpose, and infer from effects to causes—reflects a rational structure that points beyond the self to a necessary, originating cause. This intellectual orientation, when uncorrupted, naturally leads to the acknowledgment of God. Similarly, the moral instinct—our deep-seated recognition of justice, accountability, and the intrinsic wrongness of certain acts—suggests the presence of a moral lawgiver. In Ibn Taymiyyah’s framework, these internal faculties are not merely functional but teleological: they are designed to support the soul’s recognition of its dependence on, and obligation toward, its Creator.

The signs in the cosmos (āyāt al-āfāq)—order, causality, and purpose observable in the natural world.

Prophetic miracles (āyāt al-anbiyāʾ)—empirical signs with rational evidentiary force confirming the truth of revelation.

According to Ibn Taymiyyah, these signs are not merely suggestive but compelling to the sound intellect. Revelation does not override reason but brings it to clarity. He criticizes speculative arguments like the proof from the origination of accidents (ḥudūth al-aʿrāḍ) as both scripturally foreign and philosophically questionable:

“Every method which contradicts the Sunnah is false both rationally and scripturally… Many believed it was the method of Abraham, but this is a misconception”.

(Taymiyyah 2004, vol. 16, p. 270).

This form of tawḥīd demands exclusive devotion to God—inwardly and outwardly—in all acts of worship. For Ibn Taymiyyah, this is the core of Islamic monotheism, and the point where most theological errors emerge. Importantly, he asserts the rational coherence of this principle: that true lordship entails exclusive worship. This makes rubūbiyyah a rational premise for ulūhiyyah.

Ibn Taymiyyah also affirms that reason itself confirms the legitimacy of the Qur’anic argumentation in calling people to worship God alone. This includes:

The use of Qur’anic analogies (amthāl) that expose the irrationality of polytheism.

The appeal to logical consequence: if God alone creates and provides, He alone must be worshipped.

He thus demonstrates that tawḥīd al-ulūhiyyah is not only revealed but grounded in rational necessity and existential coherence. The call to exclusive worship is therefore both divinely mandated and rationally justified.

In defending the divine names and attributes, Ibn Taymiyyah follows the methodology of the salaf, which he deems superior both scripturally and rationally. His approach is marked by:

Affirmation without distortion (taḥrīf) or denial (taʿṭīl).

Avoidance of anthropomorphism (tashbīh) while affirming the reality of God’s names and attributes as befitting His majesty.

For example, when the Qur’an refers to God’s “hand” (yad) or His “settling upon the Throne” (istiwāʾ), Ibn Taymiyyah affirms these attributes as real and meaningful, without interpreting them away metaphorically (taḥrīf) or denying their occurrence (taʿṭīl). At the same time, he avoids tashbīh—the claim that such attributes resemble those of creation. He holds that these attributes are to be affirmed as God affirmed them for Himself, without delving into their modality (bi-lā kayf) and while maintaining His absolute transcendence. This balanced approach seeks to preserve both the clarity of revelation and the rational coherence of divine uniqueness.

He emphasizes that the path of the salaf is not a rejection of reason, but a return to a sound epistemology that unites the dictates of revelation with the clarity of uncorrupted reason. In his words and method:

Scriptural affirmations of God’s names and attributes do not contradict sound reason, but rather fulfill it. For Ibn Taymiyyah, this harmony is rooted in the rational principle that perfection, when understood without anthropomorphic limitation, is both intelligible and necessary for a being worthy of worship…

Scriptural affirmations of God’s names and attributes do not contradict sound reason, but rather fulfill it. For Ibn Taymiyyah, this harmony is grounded in the rational principle that perfection—when understood in a manner befitting divine transcendence—is both intelligible and necessary for a being worthy of worship. Attributes such as knowledge, power, will, mercy, and wisdom are not arbitrary or anthropomorphic projections; rather, they represent rationally coherent aspects of perfection that reason affirms as essential to the concept of a supreme Creator. Ibn Taymiyyah argues that negating these attributes—under the pretense of safeguarding transcendence—results in a conception of God that is void of meaning and incompatible with both revelation and reason. He maintains that sound reason does not require stripping God of His names and attributes, but instead demands their affirmation in a way that acknowledges His uniqueness and majesty. In this view, revelation does not introduce irrational notions but articulates divine perfections in a manner that completes and confirms what reason, guided by fiṭrah, is already predisposed to recognize.

Revelation-based principles regarding God’s names and attributes are logically consistent and more reliable than philosophical abstractions.

In this sense, Ibn Taymiyyah presents a model of tawḥīd that is holistic, coherent, and actionable. It is revealed in the texts, known in the fiṭrah, and validated by sound reasoning—a theological framework that challenges the inherited assumptions of both philosophers and speculative theologians, while offering a prophetic paradigm rooted in both faith and clarity.

3.2. Contemporary Relevance and Philosophical Engagements

Although Ibn Taymiyyah lived in a premodern Islamic context, his epistemological and theological contributions bear striking relevance to many of the central debates in contemporary philosophy of religion. His critique of speculative theology, prioritization of fiṭrah, and emphasis on the harmony between reason and revelation position him as a valuable interlocutor in several ongoing philosophical conversations.

Contemporary philosophy of religion has witnessed a growing interest in Islamic epistemological frameworks, especially concerning the rationality of belief and the legitimacy of revealed knowledge. Aijaz (2018) provides a detailed philosophical investigation of these themes, highlighting both internal theological reservations and external intellectual challenges in reconciling faith with reason in Islam. His work explores objections to philosophizing about Islamic doctrines, as well as arguments for and against the rationality of Islamic belief in light of contemporary concerns such as religious diversity, the problem of evil, and the nature of divine names and attributes.

Within this broader discourse, Ibn Taymiyyah’s model—though developed in a premodern context—offers a powerful and coherent counterpoint. This triadic model also finds resonance with recent studies by Jamie B. Turner, who has analyzed Ibn Taymiyyah’s use of theistic signs, his appeal to intuitive knowledge, and his critique of rationalist metaphysics through the lens of Reformed Epistemology. Turner presents Ibn Taymiyyah as advancing a common-sense theism grounded in fiṭrah, revelation, and rational clarity—an approach that offers significant contributions to contemporary Islamic philosophy of religion (Turner 2023). Rather than subjecting revelation to rational scrutiny or dismissing reason altogether, he advances a hierarchical but harmonious epistemological framework wherein:

Revelation (naql) serves as the supreme source of divine knowledge,

Reason (ʿaql) functions as a calibrated instrument for understanding and affirming revelation,

Fiṭrah (innate disposition) provides the existential and cognitive grounding for both.

This triadic model anticipates many contemporary calls for epistemological pluralism in religious knowledge, while preserving a theocentric coherence rooted in divine authority. Ibn Taymiyyah’s contribution thus remains highly relevant for contemporary debates on the interplay between reason and revelation in Islamic and global philosophical thought.

Ibn Taymiyyah’s emphasis on the role of fiṭrah in grounding belief parallels contemporary discussions in Reformed Epistemology, particularly in the works of Alvin Plantinga and William Alston, where properly basic beliefs are considered justified without inferential evidence (Plantinga 1983).

For Ibn Taymiyyah, belief in God is not a conclusion drawn from argument, but a pre-rational recognition confirmed by experience, revelation, and reflection. His claim that belief in God is more secure than logical syllogisms positions him as a forerunner of epistemologies that give weight to moral intuition, lived experience, and dispositional cognition.

In modern discourse, the debate over whether religious knowledge comes from reason, experience, revelation, or community tradition remains unresolved. Ibn Taymiyyah’s epistemology is distinctive in its triadic foundation:

Revelation (naql) as the final authority and clearest expression of divine will.

Reason (ʿaql) as a functional instrument for understanding, not overriding, revealed truth.

Fiṭrah as the internal compass that inclines the soul to truth, worship, and moral awareness.

In addition to its theoretical significance, Ibn Taymiyyah’s triadic epistemology holds considerable practical relevance for Islamic education and interfaith dialogue. In the context of education, this model offers a framework for integrating classical sources with critical reasoning and innate moral awareness. It can inform curriculum development in fields such as Islamic theology (uṣūl al-dīn) and worldview studies by grounding pedagogy in a balanced epistemic hierarchy where revelation maintains primacy, reason operates in service, and fiṭrah anchors intuitive moral and spiritual truths (Al-Attas 1993).

In interfaith contexts, the emphasis on fiṭrah—as a shared human faculty—opens constructive pathways for dialogue with other traditions that likewise appeal to natural reason and moral conscience (Nasr 2002). Ibn Taymiyyah’s model allows for principled engagement without relativizing Islamic doctrine, offering a theocentric epistemology that is both faithful and dialogically open.

While Wael El-Tobgui’s Ibn Taymiyya on Reason and Revelation (El-Tobgui 2020) remains the most comprehensive academic study of Darʾ Taʿāruḍ al-ʿAql wa al-Naql, it primarily focuses on textual exegesis and historical contextualization, with limited engagement in comparative or constructive philosophical analysis. The work successfully demonstrates Ibn Taymiyyah’s methodological opposition to kalām and Aristotelian logic, yet it refrains from fully exploring the systematic philosophical implications of his epistemological model. Moreover, El-Tobgui tends to frame Ibn Taymiyyah’s project as a form of theological revivalism rather than a coherent and original epistemological intervention. This paper seeks to build upon El-Tobgui’s philological contributions while critically extending the discussion toward a philosophical reassessment of Ibn Taymiyyah’s model in light of contemporary debates in religious epistemology and philosophy of religion (El-Tobgui 2020).

This integrated model challenges reductionist accounts of religious knowledge—whether rationalist, fideist, or purely experiential—and provides a balanced framework that is still underexplored in contemporary philosophy of religion, especially from within Islamic perspectives.

In sum, Ibn Taymiyyah’s thought opens important avenues for Islamic engagement with global philosophical debates. His legacy offers a compelling framework for answering today’s most urgent questions about faith, knowledge, and reason—without sacrificing the theological depth of revelation or the epistemic integrity of rational inquiry.

While Ibn Taymiyyah’s epistemological model offers a rich and compelling vision that bridges revelation, reason, and fiṭrah, it also invites a number of critical questions that remain relevant in the context of contemporary philosophy of religion. Engaging these questions does not diminish the significance of his project but instead highlights its potential for further refinement, comparative dialogue, and constructive adaptation. Ibn Taymiyyah places great emphasis on fiṭrah as a foundational source of religious knowledge. However, this raises important philosophical questions:

To what extent can fiṭrah be objectively identified, measured, or verified across cultures and histories?

How can one distinguish between fiṭrah and socially conditioned belief or cultural instinct?

Can the appeal to fiṭrah function as a universal epistemic criterion, or does it remain within the bounds of a theologically committed framework?

Addressing these questions is vital for any attempt to incorporate fiṭrah-based epistemology into broader interfaith or philosophical discourse.

Ibn Taymiyyah’s critique of Aristotelian logic—particularly definition, syllogism, and universals—is bold and foundational to his project. However, questions arise concerning:

Whether Ibn Taymiyyah’s rejection of formal logic risks overgeneralization—especially in light of contemporary advances in logic and epistemology—is a question that warrants careful consideration. These advances include the emergence of symbolic and mathematical logic, modal logic, and more recent developments in formal epistemology, such as Bayesian reasoning and probabilistic models of belief justification. These frameworks differ substantially from Aristotelian logic in both method and objective, and their rise has reshaped contemporary discussions on validity, inference, and the structure of knowledge. While Ibn Taymiyyah’s critique remains focused on the classical syllogistic tradition, acknowledging these newer paradigms helps contextualize his arguments and opens space for further comparative inquiry.

Can an Islamic epistemology fully dispense with structured inference, or should it distinguish between different types and levels of reasoning?

Might his critique of logic need to be reassessed and selectively integrated, rather than wholly dismissed?

These reflections open the door to a more nuanced engagement with logic, not as a rival to revelation but as a potentially retooled tool of clarity and consistency.

As global academic discourse becomes increasingly dialogical, a key question emerges:

How compatible is Ibn Taymiyyah’s framework with dominant paradigms in Western philosophy of religion?

His emphasis on properly basic beliefs, his rejection of overdependence on metaphysics, and his integration of intuitive knowledge align with several modern thinkers—such as Alvin Plantinga (1983, 2000), William Alston (1991), and Kelly James Clark (2019)—who likewise advocate non-inferential justification of theistic belief and affirm the epistemic role of intuition and cognitive disposition in religious knowledge. Yet challenges remain, particularly in:

Translating concepts such as fiṭrah (innate disposition) and naql (revealed text) into categories intelligible and persuasive in post-Enlightenment contexts.

Engaging secular philosophical frameworks while maintaining theological commitments.

This tension presents a fruitful area for comparative philosophy and interfaith engagement.

Future Research Directions

Based on these critical reflections, several promising paths emerge for future inquiry:

Comparative studies between Ibn Taymiyyah and Reformed Epistemologists (e.g., Plantinga, Alston).

Reappraisals of logic in the Islamic tradition, beyond the confines of the classical logic debate.

Exploration of fiṭrah in dialogue with cognitive science of religion and moral psychology.

Constructing a Taymiyyan philosophy of religion that interacts meaningfully with contemporary global discourses.

In sum, Ibn Taymiyyah’s intellectual legacy remains not only a historical inheritance but a living discourse, open to critique, development, and contribution to universal philosophical inquiry. Engaging his thought today requires both fidelity and innovation—a commitment to his foundational principles alongside a willingness to extend them into new intellectual terrains.

Another promising direction for future research is a comparative epistemological study between Ibn Taymiyyah’s concept of fiṭrah and contemporary theories in the cognitive science of religion (CSR). While fiṭrah is grounded in Islamic theological anthropology as an innate disposition toward recognizing divine truths, CSR approaches—such as those developed by Barrett and Atran—examine belief in God and religious intuitions through the lens of evolved cognitive mechanisms. A structured comparison could explore areas of convergence and divergence between fiṭrah and constructs such as intuitive theism, teleological reasoning, and agency detection. This line of inquiry may help clarify the epistemic scope of fiṭrah in relation to scientific accounts of religious cognition and contribute to the growing field of integrative religious epistemology.

3.3. Ibn Taymiyyah’s Critique of Aristotelian Definition (al-Ḥadd) and Its Epistemological Consequences

Building upon his broader critique of Aristotelian logic, Ibn Taymiyyah focuses particularly on the concept of definition (al-ḥadd), which he sees as epistemologically fragile and methodologically inadequate.

Ibn Taymiyyah’s critique of Aristotelian logic targets the foundational claim that non-self-evident concepts cannot be known except through precise definitions (al-ḥadd). In al-Radd ʿalā al-Manṭiqiyyīn, he systematically dismantles this assumption from multiple angles: epistemological, logical, and practical. First, he points out that the claim itself is not self-evident and lacks demonstrative proof—making it, by the logicians’ own standards, inadmissible. Second, he argues that the definer must either already know the defined concept or else fall into circularity or infinite regress. Third, he highlights that most people—across all cultures and disciplines—acquire conceptual knowledge without recourse to such formal definitions. Fourth, he shows that even the most common definitions (such as man being a “rational animal”) are contested and insufficient, undermining the supposed universality and precision of Aristotelian methodology (Taymiyyah, n.d., pp. 24–28).

This summary of Ibn Taymiyyah’s critique is closely aligned with the detailed analysis provided by Rayan (2011), who systematically outlines these objections—particularly the issues of circularity, the instability of definitions, and the distinction between mental conception and empirical reality.

Ibn Taymiyyah also criticizes the difficulty and impracticality of formulating definitions that meet all logical criteria, noting that people clearly understand and communicate concepts through experience, language, intuition, and the fiṭrah—without ever needing logical definitions. He further contends that understanding the terms of a definition presupposes knowledge of their meanings, which leads back to intuitive or experiential knowledge, not logical construction. Finally, he observes that definitions can be invalidated or replaced through counterexamples, which presupposes prior conceptual knowledge of the defined entity—thereby proving that such knowledge is possible without definition.

Ibn Taymiyyah’s critique of the Aristotelian definition does not merely aim to dismantle metaphysical abstraction; it opens space for a more inclusive and pluralistic epistemology grounded in revelation, reason, and fiṭrah. This orientation closely parallels Alvin Plantinga’s Reformed Epistemology, which likewise rejects classical foundationalism and defends the rationality of properly basic beliefs. Just as Plantinga challenges the Enlightenment demand for inferential justification in religious belief, Ibn Taymiyyah contests the philosophical requirement for definition as a gateway to conceptual knowledge. In both cases, the standard of rationality is being reconfigured—not abandoned—to accommodate a more primordial, intuitive, and theologically informed account of knowing. The resonance between fiṭrah and sensus divinitatis, while emerging from distinct intellectual traditions, underscores a shared commitment to recognizing the legitimacy of non-inferential theistic belief as both rational and epistemically warranted.

4. Results

This study has yielded several significant results regarding Ibn Taymiyyah’s epistemological framework and its relevance to contemporary philosophy of religion. The findings can be summarized as follows:

4.1. Beyond Refutation: Constructive Epistemology

Ibn Taymiyyah’s engagement with falsafa and kalām is not limited to polemical refutation. Rather, he articulates a constructive alternative rooted in the primacy of revelation, the functionality of reason, and the intuitive certainty of fiṭrah. His model offers an integrated vision of knowledge that avoids both rationalist reductionism and fideistic isolationism.

4.2. Fiṭrah as a Foundational Epistemic Faculty

The concept of fiṭrah emerges as a key epistemological anchor in Ibn Taymiyyah’s thought, functioning analogously to “properly basic beliefs” in Reformed Epistemology (Alston 1991). He treats fiṭrah as an innate, universal disposition toward recognizing divine truth, ethical intuition, and metaphysical order.

4.3. Recalibrating the Role of Reason

Ibn Taymiyyah redefines reason not as an autonomous judge over revelation but as a tool that, when rightly employed, affirms the truth of divine communication. His critique of Aristotelian logic demonstrates the limitations of deductive formalism when applied to religious truths without rejecting rational inquiry altogether.

4.4. Theological Core of Tawḥīd

The study reveals that Ibn Taymiyyah’s approach to tawḥīd—in its three dimensions of rubūbiyyah, ulūhiyyah, and asmāʾ wa ṣifāt—forms the core of his philosophical theology. This tripartite model not only preserves scriptural integrity but also aligns with rational and intuitive principles of coherence and moral realism. The affirmation of God’s lordship entails the existence of a purposeful moral order embedded in creation; the call to exclusive worship (ulūhiyyah) requires ethical submission to divine command; and the affirmation of divine names and attributes—such as justice, wisdom, and mercy—grounds moral values in a transcendent, objective source. Together, these dimensions establish a framework in which moral truths are not culturally constructed but divinely anchored.

4.5. Compatibility with Contemporary Discourse

Ibn Taymiyyah’s epistemology offers a coherent response to key questions in the contemporary philosophy of religion, including the justification of belief, the nature of religious knowledge, and the role of intuition and revelation. His model is compatible with certain streams of analytic philosophy, while remaining distinctively theocentric. Furthermore, by grounding knowledge in divine revelation, innate disposition (fiṭrah), and the moral attributes of God, the model undergirds a form of moral realism in which ethical values are not merely subjective or socially constructed, but anchored in the ontological reality of God’s justice, wisdom, and mercy.

4.6. Open Questions and Future Potential

While Ibn Taymiyyah’s framework is internally coherent, the study also identifies areas that invite further philosophical development—particularly regarding the objectivity and verifiability of fiṭrah (e.g., how it may be empirically distinguished from social conditioning), the selective rehabilitation of logic (e.g., integrating modern logical approaches such as modal logic, Bayesian epistemology, or defeasible reasoning into Islamic epistemology, while maintaining Ibn Taymiyyah’s insistence on contextual, linguistic, and revelatory grounding), and the cross-cultural engagement of Islamic epistemology with global philosophical traditions (e.g., comparative analysis with virtue epistemology, religious phenomenology, or epistemic contextualism).

5. Conclusions

This study has examined Ibn Taymiyyah’s critique of philosophical theology as a distinct epistemological intervention in the longstanding debate between reason and revelation. Rather than offering a merely polemical response to speculative thought, Ibn Taymiyyah develops a coherent and integrative framework grounded in the primacy of revelation (naql), the functionality of reason (ʿaql), and the epistemic centrality of innate disposition (fiṭrah). This triadic model provides a robust alternative to both rationalist metaphysics and fideistic theology, aligning closely with several themes in the contemporary philosophy of religion, including foundationalism, religious epistemology, and critiques of abstract metaphysics.

The findings suggest that Ibn Taymiyyah’s model anticipates modern discussions on properly basic beliefs and epistemic justification, particularly through his elevation of fiṭrah as a foundational cognitive faculty. His critique of Aristotelian logic, far from rejecting rational inquiry, recalibrates reason as a tool subordinated to divine revelation. At the core of his epistemology is a holistic vision of tawḥīd—affirming God’s lordship, the exclusive right to worship, and revealed names and attributes—in a way that is scripturally grounded, rationally coherent, and existentially compelling.

Beyond its theoretical value, Ibn Taymiyyah’s epistemology offers significant practical implications. In Islamic education, it provides a pedagogical framework that bridges classical theology and contemporary inquiry. Courses in Islamic theology, philosophy, and worldview studies can benefit from this integrated model, cultivating scholars who engage in modern challenges while remaining rooted in revelation. In daʿwah and interfaith contexts, his emphasis on shared human intuitions and rational coherence fosters meaningful dialogue without compromising theological integrity. Such a vision is particularly relevant today, where the search for a grounded, authentic, and rational faith tradition is more urgent than ever.

In sum, Ibn Taymiyyah’s epistemological legacy remains intellectually fertile and remarkably relevant. His synthesis of revelation, reason, and human nature offers a compelling foundation for contemporary Islamic philosophy of religion—one that invites further dialogue, development, and application across theological, educational, and philosophical domains.