Is There Something of Divinity Regarding R. M. Hare’s Account of Reason?

Abstract

This article delves deeply into the moral rationalism advocated by R. M. Hare. Traditionally, the ultimate normativity of morality has been attributed to divine characteristics such as the abstract concepts of universality, transcendence, necessity, and ultimate authority, but Hare explicitly rejects any theological premises and seeks to base moral obligations on a pure structure of linguistic and rational consistency. However, this paper proposes that Hare’s secular rational system inevitably reproduces the functional structure of the divine moral order at its internal logical level. To demonstrate this, the key conceptual attributes involved in “divine normativity” are separated first, and an analytical framework is constructed. At the same time, this paper analyzes how the normative requirements, such as universality and prescriptiveness in the Hare system, relate to the attributes of divine norms. The results show that although Hare appears to maintain thorough secularism on the surface, the moral rationalism emphasis on consistency and universal applicability functionally reproduces a normative structure similar to divine commands. This finding reveals a profound philosophical paradox: even stripped of metaphysical assumptions, human attempts to pursue an objective moral order still tend to appeal to transcendent structures in an implicit way. This paper offers a critical examination of Hare’s theory, affirming both his ambition in the construction of secular moral thought and revealing the underlying tension within it that cannot completely break away from the framework of theological tradition.

1. Introduction

The extent to which secular moral reasoning unintentionally replicates normative attributes traditionally reserved for divinity warrants renewed examination. R. M. Hare (1919–2002), a prominent figure in 20th-century analytic ethics, endeavored to construct an ethical framework grounded in rational processes while rigorously excluding metaphysical and theological premises. However, a closer analysis of the three pillars of his prescriptivism—universality, normative necessity, and prescriptive authority—raises a thought-provoking question: Does Hare’s ostensibly “secular” account of reason, at a structural level, subtly reproduce the theological paradigm he explicitly rejected? In classical philosophical and theological traditions, “divinity” is not merely a metaphysical designation but rather a set of normative ideals encompassing universality, transcendence, necessity, and supreme moral authority (Herdt 2008). These attributes are not confined to doctrine but are deeply embedded in the ideological foundations of ethical life. If Hare’s rational framework indeed operates on the basis of such structural features, then the seemingly rigid boundary between secular ethics and theistic morality may be far more permeable and fragile than Hare acknowledges.

Accordingly, even though Hare explicitly disavows any appeal to theological foundations, this paper argues that his ethical system “unconsciously” reconstructs, at a functional level, the contours of divine moral legislation. This claim is not intended to accuse Hare of covert religious intentions nor to undermine his commitment to secularism; rather, it aims to demonstrate how the ambition of universal rational determinism is conceptually entangled with core paradigms historically marked as “divine” (Kant 1996; Korsgaard 1996). This paper proceeds by first establishing an analytical framework that delineates the key conceptual attributes of “divinity” in moral reasoning. It then introduces and elaborates three interpretive principles—PPR, PIT, and PSA—through which Hare’s ethical program is reassessed. Finally, it responds to three potential objections: the risk of overextending theological interpretation, the distinction between logical and metaphysical necessity, and the consistency challenge posed by secular transcendence. Drawing upon a cross-dialogue of Hare’s three major works—R. M. Hare (1952, 1963, 1981)—alongside contemporary theoretical critiques, this paper seeks to illuminate a fundamental tension: that within a framework claiming allegiance to pure reason, the echo of divine attributes may not be incidental but structurally inescapable. The ensuing argument will systematically explore the complex entanglement between “secularization” and the “divine model” in Hare’s ethical system.

2. The Conceptual Conditions of Reason, Divinity, and Normativity

Before engaging with Hare’s ethical theory, it is essential to clarify the meaning of “divine normativity”. In classical moral philosophy and theological traditions, the concept of divinity typically encompasses the following key attributes: First, universality—divine will or commandments apply equally to all rational beings, irrespective of cultural or individual differences; second, transcendence—divine norms exist beyond the empirical realm, serving as ultimate referents independent of time and space; third, necessity—God’s will is absolutely necessary and beyond doubt; and fourth, ultimate authority—God functions as the supreme legislator and moral arbiter, establishing and sustaining the moral order. As Kant (1996) emphasized in the Critique of Practical Reason, universal validity and supreme legislative power are foundational features of both reason and divinity; Aquinas ([1274] 1981) likewise argues that divine law possesses the qualities of absolute universality and ultimate authority. Accordingly, divine normativity should not be viewed as a narrow theistic proposition but rather as a form of normativity—a structural feature of unconditional, universal moral legislation (Herdt 2008; Adams 2002).

By contrast, the philosophical understanding of reason has undergone divergent interpretations. Kant asserts the legislative role of reason, requiring individuals to act according to universally valid norms; Hume, in contrast, contends that reason is merely the servant of passions, subordinated to emotional inclinations. This conflict is echoed in modern secular ethics, where the core theological concern resurfaces: if reason itself assumes the role of the supreme moral legislator, its functional identity appears indistinguishable from that traditionally attributed to God. As Bachman (2018) observes, Korsgaardian moral rationalism demonstrates that insofar as a rational subject universalizes its principles through self-legislation, those principles acquire an absolute normative force—thereby constructing an almost divine framework of authority within a secular context. Thus, there exists a potential logical paradox in attempts to articulate a fully secular account of moral reason: although Hare explicitly seeks to “strip away the background of theism”, his framework may nonetheless conceptually trace the contours of divinity. That is, his secular ethical system may have functionally and unconsciously reproduced the basic architecture of divine legislation—fulfilling the function of unconditional moral normativity without invoking any supernatural referent.

To explore this possibility, we introduce a conceptual distinction among reason, divinity, and normativity: reason refers to the human capacity, as moral agents, to formulate norms through logical consistency and generalizable thinking; divinity refers to the source of norms that are universal, transcendent, and supremely authoritative; normativity denotes the binding and obligatory nature of moral norms upon conduct. This paper focuses on whether the “prescriptive rationalism” described by Hare replicates divine elements in its normative architecture. Specifically, if Hare’s conception of reason entails unconditional universality, self-legislation, and authority, then it structurally aligns with the defining features of divine normativity.

To this end, we propose three interpretive principles for a deeper examination of Hare’s system. The first is the Prescriptive Rationality Principle (PRP): according to Hare, moral judgment is essentially prescriptive—it issues directives to agents rather than describing empirical facts. Crucially, this authority does not derive from any external or arbitrary power but from the logical features of moral language itself. Every moral utterance implicitly contains a universalizable demand: that agents act in ways that could be willed as universal laws. This principle implies that moral judgments must be universally binding (“universal law”), thereby requiring reason to instantiate consistency and generalizability in form—a requirement that is itself prescriptive. In this way, reason assumes the role of an “objective legislator”, even within an atheistic framework, relying on structural analogs of “absolute law” to ensure coherence.

The second is the Implicit Transcendence Principle (ITP): although Hare rejects transcendent entities and emphasizes the internal logic of moral reasoning, “transcendence” nonetheless emerges procedurally within his system. On a critical level, the moral agent must “go beyond” their own perspective and assess actions from the standpoint of all relevant rational beings. This transcendence does not imply a divine entity but rather denotes a procedural universalization (R. M. Hare 1981). Hare insists that agents place themselves in the positions of all affected individuals to arrive at universally reasonable judgments. Functionally, this resembles the acceptance of a “conceptual existence” that transcends the self, as it requires individuals to relinquish parochial biases in favor of universal rationality. Yet because this transcendence arises from the structure of reason itself, not supernatural revelation, we refer to it as “implicit” transcendence.

The third is the Intrinsic Legislative and Authority Principle (ILAP): Hare’s rationalism grounds moral obligation in the subject’s process of self-legislation. The legitimacy of moral norms does not rest on external authorities but rather on whether the subject autonomously derives and assumes those norms in accordance with rational consistency. The subject is simultaneously legislator and arbiter, and the moral laws thus generated are binding upon the self. Pauer-Studer’s (2018) analysis of Korsgaard’s constructivism supports this view: within her framework, the rational agent legislates through universalization, such that moral norms are not external commands but internal rules embedded in rational deliberation. Each rational actor is, therefore, obliged to unconditionally obey the principles it legislates for itself—functionally embodying an “absolute command” role traditionally reserved for divinity. Hence, even without invoking God, the structural demand for rational self-discipline and consistency bestows reason with an almost sacred authority. While Hare emphasizes the autonomy of rational legislation, his system nonetheless requires each rational subject to undertake an “unconditional commitment” to the outcomes of their actions. Functionally, this assigns to reason a role akin to divinity: as the supreme authority, reason itself legitimizes moral prescriptions.

Through these three principles, Hare’s ethical system can be examined as a framework that not only prescribes universalizable moral imperatives but also implicitly echoes divine structures—namely, in the logical necessity of moral directives, the transcendent perspective of rational agents, and the intrinsic legislative authority grounded in reason itself.

3. The Structure of Moral Reasoning: Determinacy, Universality, and Secular Transcendence

R.M. Hare’s moral rationalism seeks to divest itself entirely of metaphysical and theological presuppositions, grounding moral obligations within the consistent structure of reason and language itself (R. M. Hare 1952, 1963). Central to this project is the insistence that moral judgments are inherently prescriptive and universalizable, devoid of reliance on external authorities. First, Hare emphasizes the prescriptivity of moral discourse: a moral statement functions not as a description of facts but as a ‘command’ directed by an agent towards both themselves and others. This prescriptive force originates from the logical rules governing language rather than from the contingent volitions of any individual. In The Language of Morals, for example, Hare states that asking oneself, “Shall I do A in a situation like this?” is essentially asking, “Am I willing to prescribe universally that A should be done in situations like this?” (cf. R. M. Hare 1952). This formulation underscores that inherent within any moral judgment is the requirement of universalizability—the stipulation that the action in question must be justifiable as a standard applicable to all rational agents. The principle of universalizability is, thus, conceived not as an external imposition but as an intrinsic component of the logical structure of moral judgment. As Capps and Rivers (2018) explained Kant’s concept of “universal law”, Kant’s position—that authentic legal and moral authority must derive solely from “universal law under free will”—exhibits significant structural and functional congruence with Hare’s principle of universalizability. According to Hare, a principle incapable of withstanding the test of universalization inherently fails to satisfy the demands of rational consistency, thereby disqualifying it as a valid moral directive.

Nonetheless, this very insistence on universality harbors a profound structural tension. While Hare ostensibly repudiates metaphysical entanglements, the universalizability principle effectively compels agents to transcend their individual perspectives, evaluating actions from a standpoint acceptable to all rational subjects. That is to say, in the process of moral judgment, the moral subject must operate under the assumption that all rational beings would concur with their assessment, irrespective of particularistic interests. This stipulation, articulated in R. M. Hare (1963, 1981), necessitates that the moral agent adopt an “as if” stance, imaginatively occupying the position of all affected parties to consider their perspectives and interests (R. M. Hare 1981). For example, Hare explicitly posits that critical moral thinking requires the agent to adopt ‘an impartial point of view’, affording equal weight to the equivalent preferences of all stakeholders (‘from an impartial point of view, which treats Jones’ and Smith’s equal preferences as of equal weight’) (R. M. Hare 1981, p. 123). This assertion underscores that rationality mandates the adoption of an impartial, neutral standpoint, functionally analogous to the traditional concept of viewing the world sub specie aeternitatis or from a divine perspective. As analyzed by Schaab (2023), numerous ‘original’ moral obligations (e.g., ‘do not enslave others’) are conceived not as commands issued by any particular subject but as independent, legitimate normative facts binding upon all. This conception of obligation as an inherent constraint justified by reason itself illustrates how secular ethics can ascribe universal and absolute validity to moral laws independently of divine authorization. Consequently, Hare’s framework for moral reasoning exhibits significant structural parallels with divine moral authority; divine legislation similarly posits its decrees as possessing universal, unconditional binding force upon all individuals, embodying absolute necessity and supreme authority. Despite Hare’s theoretical commitment to a secular standpoint and his critique of divine command theory’s motivational basis, his universalizability requirement compels agents to transcend their subjective viewpoints experientially, adopting a judgment perspective akin to an ‘objective first person’. This engenders an inherent philosophical tension within Hare’s system: the subject is simultaneously required to legislate autonomously and mandated to adhere to a set of unconditional, universal commands. To a certain extent, rational autonomy and obedience converge as two facets of the same act: the individual must establish moral laws via autonomous reasoning, yet once established, these laws exert unconditional binding force upon that same individual. Within Hare’s model, therefore, individual autonomy and rational obedience are not fundamentally antithetical but represent two dimensions of a single normative action: the subject self-legislates the norm and subsequently submits unconditionally to the demands of its logical consistency. This dual requirement demonstrates a striking structural isomorphism with the roles of ‘lawgiver’ and ‘recipient of command’ within theistic ethics: although the subject professes independence from supernatural authority, they effectively adhere to universal norms dictated by their own reason.

Beyond universalizability, Hare’s moral rationalism is characterized by its insistence on logical necessity, manifested as an emphatic requirement for consistency. Hare argues that a moral prescription is not merely a recommendation but a norm demanding logical consistency: acceptance of a principle necessitates its consistent application across all relevantly similar situations. As MacIntyre (1971) cautioned, elevating logical consistency to the paramount normative authority risks endowing reason with a ‘quasi-religious’ status. In essence, Hare’s concern extends beyond mere formal consistency; through the principle of universalizability, he elevates logical requirements to the level of substantive moral obligations, ensuring that every rational judgment is not only formally coherent but also embodies substantive universal commitments. Functionally, therefore, logical necessity within Hare’s system assumes a role analogous to that of religious law: it demands the rational subject’s complete submission to the norms of consistency, failing which the very legitimacy of their moral discourse is compromised. This establishes a profound resonance between Hare’s moral rationalism and traditional theistic ethics: reason itself assumes the mantle of God, acting as the supreme legislator and arbiter. While ostensibly secular in its grounding, the system fundamentally replicates the normative structure and effect of divine law.

4. Hare’s Secular Commitment and the Persistence of Theological Structure

Although Hare is methodologically committed to maintaining a secular framework, significant theological residues persist within his rationalist ethical system. This section examines such residues in three parts: first, how Hare grounds moral obligations in logical necessity; second, the paradox between rational autonomy and moral obedience; and third, the way Hare’s procedural transcendence continues to reproduce a sacred normative structure.

4.1. Normative Order in Secular Reason: The Interweaving of Logical and Normative Necessity

Hare explicitly rejects all metaphysical and theological premises, seeking instead to ground moral obligations in the internal consistency of language and logic (R. M. Hare 1952, 1963). However, upon closer analysis, the logical necessity that Hare advocates contains an additional layer of normative obligation that transcends mere formal reasoning. He argues that once a moral principle is accepted, it must be applied consistently across all relevant circumstances; thus, the principle of generalization is not merely a demand for logical coherence but a requirement that individuals assume corresponding moral obligations. This fusion of logical and normative imperatives sets Hare apart from figures like Stevenson (1944), who distinguishes logical norms from emotive attitudes, and from thinkers such as MacIntyre (1981). For Hare, logical consistency acquires moral significance: if a rational agent accepts a principle, they must regard it as binding for everyone (Rickabaugh 2023). As such, logical necessity in Hare’s system functions with quasi-moral authority, demanding not only rational coherence but also unconditional universal implementation in action.

It is important to emphasize that the transcendence advocated by Hare remains strictly secular: it arises from the internal structure of human reason, not from the revealed authority of any transcendent being. In Moral Thinking, Hare insists that an agent transcends their individual perspective due to procedural requirements inherent in language and rational deliberation—not because of any metaphysical appeal beyond empirical experience. Nevertheless, as J. Hare (2015) astutely observes, once moral obligations are rendered universal, legitimate, and unconditional, they functionally reproduce the normative features of divine moral commands. Duncan’s (2018) reevaluation of Kant’s “religion of reason” reaches a similar conclusion: although Kant bases moral imperatives in pure reason, their unconditional form constitutes a transcendent and absolute imperative, functionally indistinguishable from divine commands. Whether moral obligation arises from divine will or rational necessity, the core structure of objective normativity—universality, necessity, and supreme authority—appears inescapable. Thus, even though Hare eliminates metaphysical premises, the rational system he constructs still maintains a structural isomorphism with sacred moral legislation in terms of normative effect.

4.2. Autonomy and Obedience: The Paradox of Rational Freedom and Divine Legislation

Hare emphasizes that moral agents must formulate norms autonomously and rationally, free from submission to external authorities or traditional dogmas. He contends that genuine moral freedom requires actors to determine their obligations through rational scrutiny. As he writes, “One of the most important components of moral freedom is the freedom to form one’s own views on moral issues, even if it means changing our language” (R. M. Hare 1963). This position suggests that each moral agent is a self-legislator, guided by reason rather than by inherited authority. However, this insistence on autonomy leads to an ironic conclusion: the very normative requirements that rational agents adopt obligate them to unconditional obedience.

Baggett’s (2023) study highlights that if moral commands are conceived as directly derived from God, then attempts by moral agents to rationally justify their behavior may be seen as questioning divine authority—thus exposing a structural tension between rational autonomy and divine command. In Hare’s system, the universalization principle is not optional; once a moral principle is accepted, the agent is bound by its universal applicability. Through the work of White (1971) and Worsnip (2016), it becomes evident that in Hare’s model, rational autonomy and rational obedience are two sides of the same coin. That is, while individuals appear to independently construct moral laws, those very laws impose binding constraints through the internal logic of reason itself. As Korsgaard (1996) notes, when a moral agent legislates through reason, they simultaneously assume the obligation to comply with universal norms. This unity of self-legislation and self-obedience is foundational to normativity. Thus, Hare’s rationalism, while denying the transcendent lawgiver, functionally reintroduces divine law by binding moral agents to an unconditional structure. Ultimately, the role of reason as self-legislator assumes a divine-like function: it serves simultaneously as the source, enforcer, and interpreter of moral law.

4.3. Procedural Transcendence and the Inevitability of the Divine Structure

As previously noted, Hare insists in Moral Thinking that the transcendence involved in moral reasoning is procedural, not metaphysical. He argues that the demand for universal and consistent norms arises from the internal logic of language and rational deliberation rather than from any appeal to transcendent beings. However, J. Hare (2015) argues that even when theological premises are bracketed, defining moral obligations as universal and unconditional inevitably reproduces the functional structure of divine moral commands. In other words, once procedural transcendence is fully elaborated, it leads inexorably to the imposition of unconditional moral obligations on the agent.

This points to a deeper philosophical insight: regardless of whether moral obligation is grounded in divine will or rational necessity, the normative core—universality, necessity, and supreme authority—appears to be unavoidable in any system that aspires to objective moral justification. In the pursuit of “rational self-sufficiency”, contemporary secular ethics often borrow quasi-religious language—such as the absoluteness of duty—to articulate the authority of moral norms, thereby exposing the persistent tension between rational normativity and transcendental value (McPherson and Plunkett 2021). The specter of transcendence does not stem from specific religious doctrines but from reason’s own pursuit of objective normativity.

Thus, even though Hare is firmly committed to a secular ethical framework, his rational system cannot escape reproducing the structural logic of sacred normative order within religious moral traditions. When reason attempts to “legislate universal moral obligations”, it inevitably assumes the roles of legislator, judge, and guarantor—roles historically assigned to sacred authority (Adams 2002). From this perspective, Hare’s secularism is merely superficial. At the level of normative structure, his rationalism replicates the ideals of sacred ethics. This structural and persistent reproduction of the divine framework is the central concern of this paper: to uncover the internal tension at the heart of Hare’s rationalist ethics.

5. Objections and Responses: A Critical Examination

The preceding analysis inevitably invites dissenting perspectives. For comprehensiveness, this section critically examines three principal objections, addressing each in turn. This process serves not only to reinforce the study’s conclusions but also to delineate the specific standpoint of our analytical approach.

5.1. Objection 1: Hare’s Explicit Secular Stance Precludes Theological Interpretation

This objection contends that Hare’s explicit and repeated commitment to secularism suffices to preclude any interpretation linking his system to theological characteristics. Hare, for instance, consistently emphasizes that moral obligations derive solely from linguistic consistency and the universal demands of reason, explicitly dissociating them from any notion of transcendence (R. M. Hare 1952, 1963). Consequently, critics maintain that imposing a theological reading onto Hare’s system is unwarranted.

• Response:

While acknowledging Hare’s undeniable personal secular intentions and self-identification, this analysis focuses not on his subjective beliefs but on the objective structural characteristics manifested within his theoretical framework. As scholars like Rønnow-Rasmussen (2015), Herdt (2008), and Lemos (1994) have observed, numerous secular ethical theories aiming to establish an unconditional moral foundation often inadvertently reconstruct normative structures reminiscent of transcendent frameworks found in religious traditions. Kratt (2023) further emphasizes that contemporary secular ethics, despite jettisoning theological premises, frequently “inherit the universalist ideal”, vesting ultimate moral authority in pure reason. The tendency for even staunchly atheistic ethicists, despite championing rational autonomy, to rely on “inviolable absolute standards” to bolster normative force lends credence to the argument for a deep structural convergence between certain secular ethical frameworks and theological paradigms (Cimino and Smith 2007). In essence, the purported demarcation between the secular and the transcendent may prove more superficial than substantial. The moment a theory posits absolutely universal obligations, it arguably engages with patterns structurally akin to transcendence. Even a resolutely secular philosopher such as Kant arguably did not entirely circumvent theological elements; in his Critique of Practical Reason (Gregor [1788] 1997), the postulates of God and the soul’s immortality serve to fulfill the logical demands of his moral system. Thus, Hare’s secular self-proclamations do not render his system immune to exhibiting structural resonances with divine normative patterns. The tension highlighted in this analysis is not an external imposition but rather an internal logic revealed through an examination of the system’s own principles.

5.2. Objection 2: Logical Necessity Is Fundamentally Distinct from Theological Necessity

Critics posit that the necessity operative in Hare’s system is purely a logical requirement for consistency, fundamentally differing from the necessity rooted in divine will found in theology. The former originates from linguistic and rational rules, whereas the latter derives from divine volition or ontological attributes; these two forms of necessity, it is argued, should not be conflated.

• Response:

This objection correctly identifies a distinction regarding formal origins. However, our analysis centers on the functional and effectual similarities. Within Hare’s framework, logical necessity assumes a normative function transcending mere formal reasoning; it evolves from a condition of logical conformity into a quasi-moral obligation incumbent upon the agent. That is, the requirement for logical consistency appears to acquire a quasi-moral binding force, demanding not only consistent thought but also action aligned with universal commitment. In its normative function—as an unconditional and universally valid requirement—such logical necessity closely parallels theological necessity. As Adams (2002) highlights, when reason itself is accorded supreme normative authority, its function approximates that of divine law. Furthermore, Hare’s exhortation for agents to evaluate moral issues from the standpoint of universal rationality—judging from the perspective of any rational being—this requirement for a comprehensive, impartial stance resonates structurally with the model often associated with a theological (‘omniscient’) perspective. In summary, while distinct in formal origin, logical necessity and theological necessity exhibit significant convergence in their normative roles and structural effects: both mandate the subject’s unconditional submission to universally valid moral laws. Acknowledging this functional proximity does not conflate conceptual distinctions but rather illuminates an implicit consistency within Hare’s system, where the core normative model displays remarkable stability irrespective of its declared origin.

5.3. Objection 3: Emphasis on Structural Similarity Constitutes Overinterpretation

A third objection adopts a more cautious stance, acknowledging potential similarities between Hare’s system and theological concepts but cautioning against overinterpreting these parallels. This perspective suggests that the mere use of terms like ‘universal’ and ‘objective’ within secular ethics does not necessarily signify a reversion to a religious paradigm; such interpretations might reflect an anachronistic reading (‘era misalignment’) of Hare’s theory.

• Response:

This critique serves as a valuable reminder of the need for methodological caution, specifically avoiding the dogmatic projection of religious concepts onto secular theories. However, the present analysis does not aim to infuse Hare’s system with theological content but rather strives for a faithful interpretation of its inherent discourse and structure. As scholars like Herdt (2008) have argued, identifying structural analogies between distinct theoretical systems need not be distortive; instead, it can serve as a method for deepening comprehension. This approach facilitates a confrontation with and assessment of potential inherent tensions within secular rationalism, challenging the facile assumption that secular moral theories can achieve complete independence from theological precursors while maintaining internal consistency. Moreover, as suggested by analyses like Jakobsen’s (2023) examination of divinity concepts (potentially referencing Christological critiques), even normative theories explicitly centered on divine legislation often infuse abstract commands with concrete theological content (e.g., “the example of Jesus”), suggesting a “translation” of content rather than a stark formal opposition between religious frameworks and secular reason. Candidly acknowledging this structural parallelism enables a more objective examination of both the strengths and limitations of Hare’s theory. The analogy drawn between Hare’s rationalism and theological structures is presented not as a misinterpretation of his philosophical project but as an insight into its historical positioning and potential philosophical constraints. In other words, it is through exploring such analogies that the possibility emerges more clearly: the very pursuit of a completely objective and universal system of moral norms may inherently introduce a form of “transcendence”, not as an external imposition by the analyst onto Hare, but potentially as a logical entailment of his own theoretical premises. As thinkers like Taylor (1989) and MacIntyre (1981) have shown, even ostensibly radical secular ethical theories may not entirely escape an implicit reliance on structures bearing resemblance to the transcendent. The patterns of normativity suggesting transcendence might be deeply embedded within the historical construction of the Western moral self.

6. Conclusions

This article has provided a comprehensive and critical examination of R. M. Hare’s secular account of reason and moral obligation. Hare, in keeping with the distinctive style of analytic philosophy, firmly rejects appeals to metaphysical or theological premises and seeks instead to ground moral obligations in the logical consistency of moral language (R. M. Hare 1952, 1963). However, as the preceding analysis has demonstrated, the structural requirements that Hare posits to ensure the consistency and universal applicability of reason ultimately reproduce key attributes of the divine moral order as understood in theological ethics. In other words, while Hare’s system remains secular in its outward expression, it reconstructs the normative framework of divine ethics at a structural level. This phenomenon reveals a profound philosophical paradox: even when religious or metaphysical assumptions are stripped away, the human pursuit of an objective moral order seems inevitably to reintroduce transcendent elements.

From this perspective, Hare’s ethical project simultaneously illustrates the potential of secular moral theory and exposes its inherent tension—one that appears inescapable. In attempting to construct a coherent and objective system of moral norms, the demands for universality, necessity, and supreme authority continually draw us back toward paradigms that closely resemble divine command theory. Hare’s rationalism ultimately suggests that the appeal to transcendence does not arise from residual theological beliefs but rather from the intrinsic logic of moral reasoning itself. This insight has significant implications for contemporary ethical theory: it serves as a reminder that, regardless of their surface-level secularism, all normative systems must eventually grapple with the god-like function that reason assumes in constructing and legitimizing moral norms.

In summary, Hare provides a rigorous foundation for secular ethics through his precise analysis of reason, but his work also reveals a critical caveat: any normative structure that claims absolute universality and unconditionality risks unintentionally reproducing the logic of sacred ethics. This is a point that contemporary philosophers must take seriously. In advocating for a morality grounded solely in reason, are we—perhaps inadvertently—relying on a transcendental normative structure? Hare’s enduring contribution lies in making this reflection unavoidable. His work compels us to reexamine the authority of reason itself and to confront the limitations and metaphysical implications embedded within its normative aspirations.