Reason and Revelation in Ibn Taymiyyah’s Critique of Philosophical Theology: A Contribution to Contemporary Islamic Philosophy of Religion
Round 1
Reviewer 1 Report
Comments and Suggestions for AuthorsThe author seeks to answer the following question: How does Ibn Taymiyyah conceptualize the relationship between reason and revelation, and to what extent does his epistemological model contribute to contemporary Islamic philosophy of religion?
In response to this question, the author notes that: Ibn Taymiyyah offers a model of theistic knowledge that is rooted in human nature, clarified by revelation, and supported—but not founded—by reason. This triadic structure—fitrah, naql, and ʿaql—ensures that the recognition of the Divine remains accessible, coherent, and grounded in both scriptural fidelity and existential experience.
Below are three suggestions for the author.
- Justin Barret's theory of HADD, has been used to argue that belief in God may be a false positive. The author may wish to refine his claim that Ibn Taymiyyah's model may be enriched by engaging contemporary empirical research in the cognitive science of religion. The author may instead draw on Clark, Kelly James. God and the brain: The rationality of belief. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2019.
- I strongly suggest the author engage with the work of Jamie Turner who has written extensively on Ibn Taymiyya. *Turner, Jamie B. "Ibn Taymiyya on theistic signs and knowledge of God." Religious Studies 58.3 (2022): 583-597. *Turner, Jamie B. "Ibn Taymiyya’s “Common-Sense” Philosophy." Pluralizing Philosophy’s Past: New Reflections in the History of Philosophy. Cham: Springer International Publishing, *Turner, Jamie B. "An Islamic account of reformed epistemology." Philosophy East and West 71.3 (2021): 767-792. 2023. 197-212. *Turner, Jamie B. "Taymiyyan Design Discourse: A New Islamic Approach to Design-Based Theism." Design Discourse in Abrahamic Traditions. Routledge, 2024. 91-109.
- The author may also need to better articulate Ibn Taymiyya's views. For exmaple, tak ethe follwing quote from page 8. 'He argues that definition, as conceived in Greek logic, presumes that essences can be rigidly captured through genus and differentia. However, Ibn Taymiyyah maintains that meanings arise from linguistic usage and context, not from metaphysical abstraction' There are many claims about Ibn Taymiyya in this quote, however, there are no references or quotes to support these claims. The following paper may be helpful: Rayan, Sobhi. "Ibn Taymiyya's Criticism of the Syllogism." (2011): 93-121.
I wonder if the author may seek to refine his research question – i.e., to what extent does Ibn Taymiyya's criticism of the syllogism contribute to contemporary Islamic philosophy of religion?
Author Response
Response to Reviewer 1
We thank Reviewer 1 for the constructive and insightful feedback, which has significantly contributed to improving the clarity, scholarly depth, and analytical rigor of the manuscript. Below, we respond point by point to each of the reviewer’s comments. For each comment, we specify the revision made and indicate where the corresponding change appears in the revised manuscript.
Reviewer 1 – Comment 1:
Justin Barrett's theory of HADD has been used to argue that belief in God may be a false positive. The author may wish to refine his claim that Ibn Taymiyyah's model may be enriched by engaging contemporary empirical research in the cognitive science of religion. The author may instead draw on Clark, Kelly James. God and the Brain: The Rationality of Belief. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2019.
Response:
Thank you for this valuable comment. In response, we have replaced the reference to Justin Barrett’s HADD theory with a discussion of Kelly James Clark’s God and the Brain (2019), which offers a more theologically congruent and philosophically robust framework that aligns well with Ibn Taymiyyah’s theocentric epistemology. This modification avoids the possible implications of belief as a false positive, and better supports the rational and intuitive foundations of Ibn Taymiyyah’s concept of fitrah.
The revised text appears on page 7-8, lines 327–338, in Section 3.1.
Reviewer 1 – Comment 2:
I strongly suggest the author engage with the work of Jamie Turner who has written extensively on Ibn Taymiyya.
Turner, Jamie B. "Ibn Taymiyya on theistic signs and knowledge of God." Religious Studies 58.3 (2022): 583–597.
Turner, Jamie B. "Ibn Taymiyya’s 'Common-Sense' Philosophy." In Pluralizing Philosophy’s Past, Springer, 2023.
Turner, Jamie B. "An Islamic account of reformed epistemology." Philosophy East and West 71.3 (2021): 767–792.
Turner, Jamie B. "Taymiyyan Design Discourse: A New Islamic Approach to Design-Based Theism." In Design Discourse in Abrahamic Traditions, Routledge, 2024.
Response:
Thank you for this valuable recommendation. In response, we have incorporated references to the recent works of Jamie B. Turner in two key sections of the paper. First, his contributions are acknowledged in the Literature Review (Section 1.4), where we highlight Turner’s analysis of Ibn Taymiyyah’s use of theistic signs, intuitive knowledge, and common-sense epistemology as foundational to belief in God. Second, his insights are further discussed in Section 3.7.1 (Reason and Revelation), where we note the alignment between Turner’s interpretation and Ibn Taymiyyah’s triadic epistemological model based on naql, ʿaql, and fitrah. These additions reinforce the philosophical significance of Ibn Taymiyyah’s epistemology and strengthen the paper’s engagement with contemporary Islamic philosophy of religion.
The revisions appear on:
Page 3, lines 106–111 (Section 1.4)
Page 12, lines 516–525 (Section 3.2)
Reviewer 1 – Comment 3:
The author may also need to better articulate Ibn Taymiyya's views. For example, take the following quote from page 8: “He argues that definition, as conceived in Greek logic, presumes that essences can be rigidly captured through genus and differentia. However, Ibn Taymiyyah maintains that meanings arise from linguistic usage and context, not from metaphysical abstraction.” There are many claims about Ibn Taymiyya in this quote, however, there are no references or quotes to support these claims. The following paper may be helpful: Rayan, Sobhi. "Ibn Taymiyya's Criticism of the Syllogism." (2011): 93–121.
Response:
We thank the reviewer for this valuable observation. In response, we revised the relevant paragraph in Section 3.4 to include a direct quotation from Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā (vol. 9, p. 44), where Ibn Taymiyyah critiques the claim that non-self-evident concepts can only be known through definitions based on genus and differentia. His argument highlights the logical inconsistency of such claims, exposing their reliance on either circularity or infinite regress. The revised text clarifies that Ibn Taymiyyah views real understanding as grounded in familiarity, linguistic usage, and experiential context, rather than in formal definitions. We also incorporated a secondary reference to Sobhi Rayan (2011), who supports this interpretation and situates Ibn Taymiyyah’s critique within his broader epistemological realism. These additions provide stronger textual and analytical grounding for the claims presented.
The revised text appears on:
page 8, lines 365–373, in Section 3.1.
page 8, lines 374–378, in Section 3.1.
In addition, Rayan’s study is now cited in the Literature Review (Section 1.4, page 3, lines 99–105) to highlight scholarly engagement with Ibn Taymiyyah’s logical critique.
Reviewer 1 – Comment 4:
I wonder if the author may seek to refine his research question – i.e., to what extent does Ibn Taymiyya's criticism of the syllogism contribute to contemporary Islamic philosophy of religion?
Response:
We thank the reviewer for this thoughtful suggestion regarding the possible refinement of the central research question to focus on Ibn Taymiyyah’s critique of syllogism. While we agree that this critique is a significant part of his epistemological project, our study adopts a broader scope that centers on his triadic epistemology—based on revelation (naql), reason (ʿaql), and innate disposition (fitrah). Within this framework, the critique of Aristotelian syllogism is treated not as an isolated issue, but as one manifestation of a more comprehensive philosophical reorientation.
Accordingly, we have maintained the original wording of the research question but added clarifying language in Section 3 to indicate that Ibn Taymiyyah’s logical critique contributes to his broader rejection of rationalist metaphysics. We hope this preserves the integrity of the paper’s central inquiry while respectfully acknowledging the reviewer’s suggestion. The revised text appears on page 8, lines 360–389, in Section 3.1.
We are grateful once again to Reviewer 1 for the thoughtful comments and helpful suggestions. We believe that the revisions made in response have strengthened the manuscript substantially, and we hope that the improved version meets the expectations of the editorial team and reviewers.
Reviewer 2 Report
Comments and Suggestions for AuthorsOverall I found "Reason and Revelation in Ibn Taymiyyah's Critique of Philosophical Theology" to be a very well written, clear, and solidly argued piece of scholarship. The originality of the article lies in bringing Ibn Taymiyya's unique religious epistemological framework into conversation with contemporary discussions concerning the justification of religious belief, theological knowledge, and other central topics in contemporary philosophy of religion. The article also draws a connection between Ibn Taymiyya's notion of the fitra, or innate normative human disposition, and recent findings in the cognitive science of religion having to do with the innate and intuitive sense of the existence of God and the purposeful design of the universe. These connections show the pertinence of Ibn Taymiyya's religious epistemology to contemporary questions and the ability of his framework to provide a robust and persuasive answer to a number of these fundamental questions. Herein lie the primary strength and originality of the article.
As mentioned, the article is also very well written in terms of language, grammar, and style. The transliteration of Arabic terms is correct throughout, with one exception (mutaẓawwar instead of muzawwar -- presumably) and the fact that the word fitrah throughout needs a dot under the t (fiṭrah ).
I do believe, however, that the article can be substantially strengthened by expanding on the most original and interesting findings. Often these are simply gestured at in a rather cursory manner, merely stated rather than explicated and demonstrated. I have marked these various spots in the attached PDF in anonymized comments in the margins. Given that the article is on the shorter side (7.5K words), I think that the authors can easily address these shortcomings within 1 to 1.5K additional words.
Finally, while the sources cited are "appropriate and relevant to this research," I find that they are rather thinly sown. Most of the references given are to original works of Ibn Taymiyya, and while a few of the other secondary references listed in the bibliography show up from time to time, I was surprised not to see more frequent and thorough citations of the literature. For example, the work of Plantinga is mentioned but not cited. And this seems to have happened on a number of other occasions as well. This will not be hard to fix, but I do think that doing so would substantially improve the article from the standpoint of its scholarly apparatus.
There are also a few occasions where terms and concepts are referred to later in the text that have not come up previously and that are not adequately explained. I have marked these instances as well.
Overall, this is a fine, important, and well-written piece of scholarship that renders a valuable service in not only summarizing existing scholarly findings on the nature and scope of Ibn Taymiyya's religious epistemological project but also in bringing Ibn Taymiyya into the current era by showing the relevance of his ideas for contemporary religious debates -- and not just among Muslims. The shortcomings I have pointed to above can be fairly easily addressed, and once they are, I would have no reservations in recommending strongly the publication of the article.
Comments for author File: 
Comments.pdf
Author Response
We would like to express our deepest appreciation for your generous, detailed, and insightful comments on our manuscript, "Reason and Revelation in Ibn Taymiyyah's Critique of Philosophical Theology." Your constructive critique has played a vital role in enhancing both the clarity and scholarly rigor of the article. We are especially grateful for your recognition of the manuscript’s originality and its relevance to contemporary debates in philosophy of religion.
In the following responses, we have addressed each of your comments systematically—both the general feedback and the marginal annotations—to ensure that your suggestions are fully and carefully incorporated. We are confident that the revised version reflects significant improvements thanks to your invaluable feedback.
Comment 1 from Reviewer Report:
Comment:
Overall I found "Reason and Revelation in Ibn Taymiyyah's Critique of Philosophical Theology" to be a very well written, clear, and solidly argued piece of scholarship. The originality of the article lies in bringing Ibn Taymiyya's unique religious epistemological framework into conversation with contemporary discussions concerning the justification of religious belief, theological knowledge, and other central topics in contemporary philosophy of religion. The article also draws a connection between Ibn Taymiyya's notion of the fitra, or innate normative human disposition, and recent findings in the cognitive science of religion having to do with the innate and intuitive sense of the existence of God and the purposeful design of the universe. These connections show the pertinence of Ibn Taymiyya's religious epistemology to contemporary questions and the ability of his framework to provide a robust and persuasive answer to a number of these fundamental questions. Herein lie the primary strength and originality of the article.
Response:
Thank you for your generous and thoughtful feedback. I am deeply grateful for your recognition of the article’s clarity, structure, and scholarly contribution. I especially appreciate your highlighting of the article’s originality in engaging Ibn Taymiyyah’s epistemology with contemporary discussions on belief justification, theological knowledge, and the cognitive foundations of religious belief.
The link between Ibn Taymiyyah’s conception of fiṭrah and findings in the cognitive science of religion was intended to illustrate the enduring relevance of classical Islamic epistemology. Your encouraging remarks have affirmed this aim, and I have made additional refinements to strengthen these conceptual bridges and ensure they are presented with greater clarity and depth in the revised manuscript.
Comment 2 from Reviewer Report:
Comment:
As mentioned, the article is also very well written in terms of language, grammar, and style. The transliteration of Arabic terms is correct throughout, with one exception (mutaẓawwar instead of muzawwar -- presumably) and the fact that the word fitrah throughout needs a dot under the t (fiṭrah ).
Response:
Thank you for this careful and precise observation. You are absolutely right regarding both points. First, the correct term is indeed mutaẓawwar (with a "ṭ" and dotted "ẓ"), meaning “imagined” or “conceived,” which is frequently used by Ibn Taymiyyah in contrast to ḥaqīqī (real). We have corrected this in the revised text and, for accessibility, rendered it in English as “perceived or imagined contradiction”.
Secondly, we have revised the transliteration of fitrah throughout the manuscript to fiṭrah, following standard academic conventions for Arabic phonemes. We appreciate your attention to these details, which has helped enhance the accuracy and consistency of the manuscript.
Comment 3 from Reviewer Report:
Comment:
I do believe, however, that the article can be substantially strengthened by expanding on the most original and interesting findings. Often these are simply gestured at in a rather cursory manner, merely stated rather than explicated and demonstrated. I have marked these various spots in the attached PDF in anonymized comments in the margins. Given that the article is on the shorter side (7.5K words), I think that the authors can easily address these shortcomings within 1 to 1.5K additional words.
Response:
Thank you for this insightful and constructive recommendation. We fully agree that several of the article’s more original insights would benefit from further development. In response, we have substantially expanded the relevant sections of the manuscript to explicate and demonstrate the key arguments more fully. Specifically, we have added detailed elaborations on the epistemological role of fiṭrah, the philosophical implications of Ibn Taymiyyah’s critique of Aristotelian logic, the foundations of his moral realism, and the practical applications of his epistemology in educational and interfaith contexts.
These additions respond directly to the points you highlighted in the PDF comments. The revised manuscript now falls within the recommended expanded word count (approximately 9300 words) and offers greater analytical depth and clarity. We are sincerely grateful for this suggestion, which has significantly enhanced the manuscript’s scholarly rigor and coherence.
Comment 4 from Reviewer Report:
Comment:
Finally, while the sources cited are "appropriate and relevant to this research," I find that they are rather thinly sown. Most of the references given are to original works of Ibn Taymiyya, and while a few of the other secondary references listed in the bibliography show up from time to time, I was surprised not to see more frequent and thorough citations of the literature. For example, the work of Plantinga is mentioned but not cited. And this seems to have happened on a number of other occasions as well. This will not be hard to fix, but I do think that doing so would substantially improve the article from the standpoint of its scholarly apparatus.
Response:
Thank you for this valuable and constructive comment. We fully agree that strengthening the integration of secondary literature would significantly enhance the scholarly depth of the article. In response, we have carefully reviewed the manuscript and substantially expanded the use of relevant secondary sources. This includes more consistent and explicit citations of key works by Alvin Plantinga (1983; 2000), William Alston (1991), Kelly James Clark (2019), Jamie B. Turner (2021–2024), and others.
In addition, we have integrated new sources into both the main discussion and the bibliography to ensure a richer and more balanced engagement with contemporary literature. These include classical and modern works on Islamic epistemology, cognitive science of religion, and analytic philosophy of religion. We have also ensured that all secondary sources cited in the discussion are now properly reflected in the reference list. We sincerely appreciate your observation, which has led to a meaningful improvement in the scholarly apparatus of the paper.
Comment 5 from Reviewer Report:
Comment:
There are also a few occasions where terms and concepts are referred to later in the text that have not come up previously and that are not adequately explained. I have marked these instances as well.
Response:
Thank you for this important and helpful comment. We have carefully reviewed all terms and concepts introduced throughout the manuscript—especially those flagged in your annotated PDF—and have made the necessary revisions to ensure clarity and accessibility. In several instances, we have either defined the term upon its first appearance (e.g., fiṭrah, taʿāruḍ, ulūhiyyah, etc.) or removed the term altogether where it was not essential to the argument (e.g., taʿlīl sharʿī, uṣūl al-dīn).
Additionally, we have adopted a more consistent approach to translating key Arabic terms, ensuring that each one is accompanied by an English gloss and contextual explanation where needed. These adjustments aim to make the article more accessible to readers from diverse academic backgrounds without compromising conceptual accuracy. We appreciate your attention to this matter, which has contributed meaningfully to the clarity and coherence of the manuscript.
Comment 6 from Reviewer Report:
Comment:
Overall, this is a fine, important, and well-written piece of scholarship that renders a valuable service in not only summarizing existing scholarly findings on the nature and scope of Ibn Taymiyya's religious epistemological project but also in bringing Ibn Taymiyya into the current era by showing the relevance of his ideas for contemporary religious debates -- and not just among Muslims. The shortcomings I have pointed to above can be fairly easily addressed, and once they are, I would have no reservations in recommending strongly the publication of the article.
Response:
We are deeply grateful for your generous overall assessment of the manuscript and for your recognition of its contribution to both the historical understanding and contemporary relevance of Ibn Taymiyyah’s religious epistemology. Your comments have affirmed the core aims of the article, and your constructive feedback has been instrumental in helping us refine and strengthen our argument.
We have addressed all the shortcomings you identified—both in your general remarks and in the detailed comments on the PDF—and we believe the revised version is significantly improved as a result. We sincerely appreciate your careful engagement with the manuscript and your encouraging support for its publication.
Comment A1 Response:
Commented [A1]: What work is this? Who is the author? Also, the title seems to be incomplete or incorrectly cited.
Response
Thank you for catching this omission. We have now specified the author, M. Hidayat, and corrected the citation of the article titled Reconsidering between Reason and Revelation in Islamic Legal Philosophy, published in Al-Risalah (2024). The full bibliographic entry has also been added to the references section. We appreciate your attention to citation precision.
The revised text appears on page 2, lines 75–85, in Section 1.4.
Comment A2 Response:
Commented [A2]: This should most likely be “muzawwar” (no “t” and no dot under the z).
Response
Thank you for your comment regarding the transliteration of the term taʿāruḍ mutaẓawwar. Upon review, we confirm that the correct term intended here is indeed mutaẓawwar—derived from the Arabic root ظ-و-ر (ẓ-w-r), meaning “conceived” or “imagined.” It is frequently used by Ibn Taymiyyah to denote a perceived or imagined contradiction, as opposed to a real or actual contradiction (taʿāruḍ ḥaqīqī).
However, to ensure clarity for all readers and avoid possible confusion, we have revised the main text to use the English expression “perceived or imagined contradiction” in place of the transliteration. The original Arabic terminology has been retained in a footnote for readers who may wish to consult the primary sources. We believe this change enhances accessibility without compromising conceptual accuracy.
The revised text appears on page 6, lines 251–258, in Section 3.1.
Comment A3 Response:
Commented [A3]: This has already been cited.
Response
Thank you for pointing this out. We have removed the repeated quotation from Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā and replaced it with a concise reference, as the core idea had already been established earlier. This revision helps avoid redundancy and improves the flow of the discussion.
The revised text appears on page 7, lines 295–298, in Section 3.1.
Comment A4 Response:
Commented [A4]: Not clear the relationship between fitra and “intent.”
Response
Thank you for this helpful observation. We agree that the inclusion of “sound intent” in this triad was ambiguous and not clearly linked to the epistemological role of fiṭrah. We have revised the sentence to refer instead to “innate disposition (fiṭrah), sound reason, and authentic revelation” as the mutually reinforcing sources of truth, which better reflects Ibn Taymiyyah’s model and maintains conceptual clarity.
The revised text appears on page 7, lines 299–303, in Section 3.1.
Comment A5 Response:
Commented [A5]: “arises” (subject is singular: belief)
Response
Thank you for your attentive observation regarding the verb agreement in the sentence:
"Similarly, Ibn Taymiyyah maintains that belief in God and the truthfulness of the Prophet arise from the proper functioning of the fitrah..."
We have carefully revised the sentence to ensure grammatical correctness and subject-verb agreement. The corrected sentence now reads:
"Similarly, Ibn Taymiyyah asserts that belief in God and in the truthfulness of the Prophet arises from the proper functioning of the fitrah..."
This revision reflects the fact that the subject—though mentioning two objects of belief—refers to a unified epistemic commitment and is therefore treated as a singular concept grammatically. We appreciate your attention to detail, which has helped improve the precision of the text.
The revised text appears on page 7, lines 304–312, in Section 3.1.
Comment A6 Response:
Commented [A6]: Is this translating “nuẓẓār”?
Response
Thank you for raising this important point regarding the translation of “nuẓẓār.” Yes, the phrase “Muslim dialecticians” is intended as a translation of the Arabic term nuẓẓār, referring to scholars engaged in speculative theology and rational inquiry, particularly in the context of disputation and critique of Greek logic.
We hope this revision adequately clarifies the intended meaning.
The revised text appears on page 8, lines 378–383, in Section 3.1.
Comment A7 Response:
Commented [A7]: Not clear through the article so far what is entailed by this “prophetic method.”
Response
Thank you for your insightful comment regarding the term “prophetic method” in the table. You are correct that this concept was not explicitly defined or elaborated in the body of the article, which may lead to ambiguity.
To address this, we have revised the table and removed the phrase “prophetic method” to maintain conceptual clarity and consistency with the main text. The revised table now reads:
Methodology
Deductive syllogism and metaphysical speculation | Textual coherence, fitrah, empirical reason
We believe this revision improves the precision of the comparison and ensures that all elements of the table are directly supported by the article’s content.
The revised text appears on page 9, in Table 1.
Comment A8 Response:
Commented [A8]: There hasn’t been any discussion of signs up to this point. Reader may wonder what this refers to.
Response
Thank you for pointing this out. We agree that the concept of “signs” (āyāt) had not been explicitly discussed in the preceding sections, and its sudden appearance in the table may cause ambiguity. To maintain clarity and coherence, we have removed the term “signs” from the table and retained the terms that were previously developed and discussed—namely fitrah, revelation, and reason.
The revised text appears on page 9, in Table 1.
Comment A9 Response:
Commented [A9]: Like what? The article would gain considerably in depth by going into these developments and drawing out the parallels specifically.
Response
Thank you for this insightful suggestion. We agree that the reference to “later developments in pragmatic and linguistic philosophy” would benefit from further elaboration. In response, we have expanded the relevant paragraph to draw specific parallels between Ibn Taymiyyah’s epistemological approach and key themes in modern Western philosophy. In particular, we highlight how his critique of abstract, decontextualized metaphysical reasoning resonates with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the embeddedness of meaning in language use, as well as how his emphasis on lived experience and the integration of fitrah, reason, and revelation parallels the pragmatic tradition as developed by William James and John Dewey. These additions aim to enrich the article’s philosophical depth and demonstrate the contemporary relevance of Ibn Taymiyyah’s thought in broader epistemological discourse.
The revised text appears on page 9, lines 399–415, in Section 3.1.
Comment A10 Response:
Commented [A10]: I assume this is translating lawazim. If so, I would suggest “concomitants” or “necessary concomitants.”
Response
Thank you for this precise linguistic observation. You are correct that the term “lawāzim” is better rendered as “necessary concomitants,” as it more accurately conveys the ontological relationship Ibn Taymiyyah intends—namely, that the recognition of God is a built-in, inseparable component of human nature. We have accordingly revised the translation to read: “It is among the necessary concomitants of their creation,” which we believe better reflects the original meaning.
The revised text appears on page 10, lines 423–427, in Section 3.1.
Comment A11 Response:
Commented [A11]: Again, several references have been made to this “prophetic method” so far without ever detailing what it consists of.
Response
Thank you for your helpful observation. We agree that the term “prophetic method” was introduced without adequate clarification. To avoid ambiguity and enhance conceptual clarity, we have removed this term from the discussion altogether, including from the comparative table and the present paragraph. We now refer instead to the Qur’anic mode of reasoning, which is more precisely described and better aligned with the textual analysis provided in the paper.
The revised text appears on page 11, lines 428–434, in Section 3.1.
Comment A12 Response:
Commented [A12]: At the beginning of the article, this third element is referred to as “attributes” only. “Names and attributes” is more accurate and should be used consistently.
Response
Thank you for this careful observation. We agree that “names and attributes” is a more accurate and comprehensive rendering of the third dimension of tawḥīd. In response, we have revised the earlier occurrences of “attributes” to read “names and attributes,” ensuring terminological consistency throughout the article.
The revised text appears on page 10, lines 453–458, in Section 3.1.
Comment A13 Response:
Commented [A13]: It would help to expand and make explicit in what ways cognition and moral instinct act as signs of the existence of God for Ibn Taymiyya.
Response
Thank you for this insightful comment. In response, we have expanded the discussion to clarify how Ibn Taymiyyah views cognition and moral instinct as inner signs (āyāt al-anfus) pointing to the existence of God. Cognition—particularly the human capacity for conceptual thought, causality, and abstract reasoning—is seen as an innate faculty designed to recognize order, purpose, and dependency in the self and the world. Moral instinct, likewise, reflects a divinely implanted compass that inclines the human soul toward justice, mercy, and accountability—values that presuppose a moral source beyond the self. These dimensions, in Ibn Taymiyyah’s view, serve as internal evidences that awaken the fitrah and support the recognition of the Creator.
The revised text appears on page 11, lines 463–474, in Section 3.1.
Comment A14 Response:
Commented [A14]: What makes these “rational” indicators? Wouldn’t prophetic miracles counts as empirical signs?
Response
Thank you for this perceptive comment. You are absolutely right that prophetic miracles are, in the first instance, empirical signs—perceptible phenomena witnessed by contemporaries. However, within Ibn Taymiyyah’s framework, their epistemic function goes beyond sensory perception: they serve as empirical events whose occurrence rationally entails the truthfulness of the prophet’s claim, thereby functioning as indicators whose evidential value is realized through reason. To clarify this dual nature, we have revised the phrase to read: “empirical signs with rational evidentiary force,” which we believe more accurately captures their epistemological role.
The revised text appears on page 11, lines 477–478, in Section 3.1.
Comment A15 Response:
Commented [A15]: These themes have not yet been broached, with the result that the treatment here is too perfunctory. The reader does not know what is meant by tahrif and ta‘til and thus cannot appreciate Ibn Taymiyya’s approach to the topic. This can be remedied by providing a simple example: God’s hand, settling on the throne, etc. – showing what tahrif and ta‘til would look like with respect to such verses and how Ibn Taymiyya seeks to affirm them while nonetheless avoiding tashbih.
Response
We appreciate this insightful and constructive comment. In response, we have revised the relevant paragraph to expand on the key concepts of taḥrīf (distortion), taʿṭīl (negation), and tashbīh (anthropomorphism) in Ibn Taymiyyah’s theological approach. We have added specific examples from Qur’anic verses—such as the divine hand (yad) and settling upon the Throne (istiwāʾ)—to clarify how Ibn Taymiyyah affirms these attributes while avoiding metaphorical reinterpretation or anthropomorphic implications. This addition not only addresses the reviewer’s concern but also enhances the accessibility and clarity of Ibn Taymiyyah’s methodology for readers unfamiliar with these theological debates.
The revised text appears on page 11, lines 506–513, in Section 3.1.
Comment A16 Response:
Commented [A16]: How so? This needs to be explained and demonstrated to the reader, not simply stated.
Response
Thank you for this insightful comment. We agree that the statement regarding the harmony between scriptural affirmations of God’s names and attributes and sound reason required further clarification. In response, we have revised the paragraph to explain that, according to Ibn Taymiyyah, reason affirms that perfection is a necessary attribute of any being worthy of worship. Attributes such as knowledge, power, and mercy are not only affirmed in revelation but are also rationally necessary for conceiving a perfect Creator. Ibn Taymiyyah contends that denying these attributes leads to an incoherent and irrational conception of the Divine. We have added this explanatory discussion to demonstrate how scriptural affirmations fulfill, rather than contradict, the demands of sound reason.
The revised text appears on page 12, lines 521–534, in Section 3.1.
Comment A17 Response:
Commented [A17]: I don’t believe the term Shari’a has been used yet in this article and the meaning of it here may not be clear to the reader (as it is not a reference to fiqh). Perhaps switch with “revelation-based”?
Response
Thank you for this helpful observation. We agree that the term Sharīʿah in this context may lead to ambiguity, as it has not been previously defined and might be interpreted narrowly as referring to Islamic legal rulings. In response, we have revised the phrase to “revelation-based principles,” which more accurately reflects the intended meaning—namely, theological and epistemological foundations derived from the Qur’an and Sunnah. This change enhances clarity and ensures consistency with the article’s overall focus on revelation as a source of religious knowledge.
The revised text appears on page 12, lines 535–536, in Section 3.1.
Comment A18 Response:
Commented [A18]: If we understand “community tradition” as something like the Sunna, then one can argue that Ibn Taymiyya’s epistemology actually incorporates all four of these possible sources. In fact, maybe this should be incorporated into the article from earlier on: the triad can become a “quadrad” of four sources: revelation, reason, fitra, and sunna / communal practice and understanding of the Salaf based on what the Companions were taught by the Prophet.
Response
Thank you very much for this thoughtful suggestion. We agree that the Sunnah and the understanding of the Salaf play a foundational role in Ibn Taymiyyah’s epistemology. However, in Ibn Taymiyyah’s framework, these are not treated as independent or supplementary sources of knowledge, but rather as integral components of revelation (naql). For Ibn Taymiyyah, revelation encompasses not only the Qur’an, but also the authentic Sunnah and its authoritative interpretation by the Prophet’s Companions and the early generations of Muslims. This understanding is reflected in his consistent emphasis on returning to the textual foundations as transmitted and understood by the Salaf. While we appreciate the proposal to reframe the triadic model as a “quadrad,” we have opted to retain the triadic structure in the article to preserve terminological clarity, while clarifying that revelation (naql) subsumes both the Sunnah and the Salaf’s understanding. This point has now been made more explicit in the revised introduction and relevant sections of the discussion.
The revised text appears on page 2, lines 68–71, in the introduction.
Comment A19 Response:
Commented [A19]: The t in fitrah needs a dot underneath throughout the article.
Response
Thank you for this correction. We appreciate your attention to detail. We have revised the transliteration of fitrah throughout the article to fiṭrah, in accordance with standard academic conventions for rendering Arabic phonemes.
Comment A20 Response:
Commented [A20]: namely, . . . ?
Response
Thank you for your helpful comment. We agree that the reference to “contemporary advances in logic and epistemology” required clarification. In response, we have revised the sentence to specify that such advances include the emergence of symbolic and mathematical logic, modal logic, and developments in formal epistemology such as Bayesian reasoning and probabilistic models of belief justification. These frameworks differ substantially from Aristotelian logic and offer alternative approaches to inference and belief assessment. We have incorporated this clarification into the revised text to ensure greater precision and contextual clarity.
The revised text appears on page 19-20, lines 648–657, in Section 3.2.
Comment A21 Response:
Commented [A21]: I don’t believe this term has been used before (or if so, then maybe only once towards the beginning). Use “logic” instead.
Response
Thank you for your helpful comment. We have replaced the term manṭiq with “logic” in the sentence to maintain consistency and ensure clarity for a broader readership. While manṭiq reflects the traditional Arabic terminology, the term “logic” better aligns with the terminology used throughout the paper and avoids potential ambiguity for readers unfamiliar with the original term. We appreciate your attention to terminological precision.
The revised text appears on page 15, lines 660–661, in Section 3.2.
Comment A22 Response:
Commented [A22]: Such as . . . ?
Response
Thank you for your insightful comment. We have revised the sentence to include specific examples of modern thinkers—such as Alvin Plantinga (1983; 2000), William Alston (1991), and Kelly James Clark (2019)—whose works resonate with Ibn Taymiyyah’s emphasis on properly basic beliefs, intuitive knowledge, and epistemic modesty. These scholars, particularly within the Reformed Epistemology tradition, advocate for the rational legitimacy of non-inferential theistic belief and affirm the foundational role of cognitive disposition in religious knowledge. This clarification strengthens the comparative dimension of the paragraph and highlights the contemporary relevance of Ibn Taymiyyah’s epistemological model.
The revised text appears on page 15, lines 668–673, in Section 3.2.
Comment A23 Response:
Commented [A23]: This term has not been used before. Please explain and show its relevance.
Response
Thank you for your valuable observation. Upon review, we have removed the term taʿlīl sharʿī from this sentence, as its inclusion—while potentially relevant to broader discussions of Islamic legal theory—was not essential to the epistemological focus of the paragraph. The remaining terms (fiṭrah and naql) more directly reflect the core concepts addressed in this section. We appreciate your suggestion to maintain terminological clarity and precision.
The revised text appears on page 15, lines 674–675, in Section 3.2.
Comment A24 Response:
Commented [A24]: The moral dimension of this tripartite model has not been made sufficiently clear. How does the model undergird a moral realism?
Response
Thank you for your perceptive comment. We have revised the paragraph to clarify how Ibn Taymiyyah’s tripartite model of tawḥīd undergirds a form of moral realism. Specifically, the affirmation of divine lordship (rubūbiyyah) presupposes a morally ordered universe; exclusive worship (ulūhiyyah) entails ethical submission to divine commands; and the affirmation of God’s names and attributes—such as justice, wisdom, and mercy—provides a metaphysical foundation for objective moral values. These aspects collectively support a theocentric moral realism rooted in revelation and affirmed by reason and fitrah.
The revised text appears on page 17, lines 769–778, in the results.
Comment A25 Response:
Commented [A25]: such as . . . ?
Response
Thank you for your constructive comment. We have expanded the sentence to include specific examples of future philosophical development. Regarding the selective rehabilitation of logic, we refer to the possibility of engaging with contemporary logical frameworks—such as modal logic, Bayesian reasoning, or defeasible logic—which offer alternatives to the Aristotelian syllogism and may be more compatible with Ibn Taymiyyah’s emphasis on contextual, empirical, and revelatory reasoning. These forms of logic allow for nuanced probabilistic or condition-sensitive reasoning and can be evaluated for their usefulness in theological and ethical discourse within an Islamic framework. This approach preserves Ibn Taymiyyah’s critique of formal abstraction while exploring tools that may enhance clarity without compromising scriptural integrity.
The revised text appears on page 17, lines 780–787, in the results.
Comment A26 Response:
Commented [A26]: This term is likely to be unfamiliar to the reader.
Response
Thank you for your helpful comment. In light of your observation, we have revised the sentence to remove the term uṣūl al-dīn and replaced it with a more accessible and broadly recognizable phrasing—“Islamic theology, philosophy, and worldview studies.” This revision maintains the intended meaning while improving clarity for a general academic audience.
Once again, we sincerely thank you for your thoughtful and encouraging review. Your comments have contributed meaningfully to the intellectual refinement of the manuscript and have helped us situate Ibn Taymiyyah’s thought more clearly within both classical and contemporary epistemological discourse. We hope the revisions we have made successfully reflect the scholarly spirit of your feedback and contribute to advancing the broader conversation on Islamic philosophy of religion.
Author Response File: 
Author Response.docx
Reviewer 3 Report
Comments and Suggestions for Authors- The abstract effectively fulfils its purpose, providing a clear and engaging overview of the paper’s in-depth examination of Ibn Taymiyyah’s epistemological concepts.
- Reduce the keywords to only the five most representative: Ibn Taymiyyah; Islamic epistemology; Reason and revelation; Fitrah; Reformed epistemology
- The paper’s scope is well defined, focusing on Ibn Taymiyyah’s major works, such as Dar al-Ta’arud. It aims to explore his epistemological model, emphasizing the primacy of scripture, the coherence of reason, and the concept of fitrah.
- (1.4 Literature review):- include citations for the source: “The Ontological Capture…”
- (1.5 Central research question):- incorporate the research questions into the introduction section.
- Consolidate all subtopics in section 2 into a single subtopic to maintain the flow of the discussion.
- Section 3 contains an excessive number of small subtopics, disrupting the discussion on Ibn Taymiyyah’s thought. Review this section to ensure the content is focused by selecting only relevant subtopics and condensing them into 1-2 main subtopics. Adjust the titles of these new subtopics to fit the discussion.
- The conclusion claims that Ibn Taymiyyah’s epistemological thought has practical value for application in education and interfaith dialogue. It would be beneficial to discuss this claim in the main text of the article, utilising Ibn Taymiyyah’s theory in contemporary contexts. The author heavily relies on El-Tobgui’s research to present Ibn Taymiyyah’s approach. Including a critical review of El-Tobgui’s work, highlighting its shortcomings, would enhance the discussion. This effort is currently missing.
- Overall, the paper effectively outlines its objectives. However, the execution falls short, as the organisation of the content does not adequately address these objectives. The author relies heavily on El-Tobgui’s analysis and lacks a critical perspectives when discussing Ibn Taymiyyah’s approach. Additionally, the paper does not sufficiently highlight the uniqueness of Ibn Taymiyyah’s scholarship in contemporary context.
Author Response
Response to Reviewer 2
We extend our sincere gratitude to Reviewer 2 for the thoughtful, detailed, and constructive feedback offered on our manuscript. The reviewer’s comments have greatly contributed to refining both the conceptual depth and structural clarity of the paper. In the responses below, we address each of the reviewer’s observations point by point. For each comment, we indicate the revision made, specify the corresponding location in the revised manuscript, and explain how the revision improves the coherence, precision, and scholarly contribution of the article. We hope these revisions meet the expectations of the reviewer and contribute to the strength and clarity of the final version.
Reviewer 2 – Comment 1:
The abstract effectively fulfils its purpose, providing a clear and engaging overview of the paper’s in-depth examination of Ibn Taymiyyah’s epistemological concepts.
Response:
We thank the reviewer for this positive evaluation of the abstract. No changes were made to the structure of the abstract, as it was already considered clear and engaging. However, minor refinements were made to improve language flow and enhance alignment with the revised structure of the main text.
The revised text appears on page 1, lines 5–19, in Section: Abstract.
Reviewer 2 – Comment 2:
Reduce the keywords to only the five most representative: Ibn Taymiyyah; Islamic epistemology; Reason and revelation; Fitrah; Reformed epistemology
Response:
We appreciate the reviewer’s helpful suggestion. In response, we have revised the list of keywords to include only the five most representative terms, as recommended. This change improves the focus and discoverability of the article by emphasizing the core concepts explored in the manuscript.
The revised text appears on page 1, lines 20–21, in Section: Keywords.
Reviewer 2 – Comment 3:
The paper’s scope is well defined, focusing on Ibn Taymiyyah’s major works, such as Darʾ al-Taʿāruḍ. It aims to explore his epistemological model, emphasizing the primacy of scripture, the coherence of reason, and the concept of fitrah.
Response:
We are grateful to the reviewer for this encouraging remark. We appreciate the recognition of the clarity and focus of the paper’s scope. In the revised manuscript, we have preserved this focus while refining transitions between sections to reinforce the thematic unity around Ibn Taymiyyah’s epistemological framework. These improvements further support the coherence of the overall structure.
Reviewer 2 – Comment 4:
(1.4 Literature review): include citations for the source: “The Ontological Capture…”
Response:
We thank the reviewer for identifying the missing citation. In response, we have inserted a new paragraph in the final part of the literature review section referencing the relevant source: “The Ontological Capture of the Divine: Genealogies of God in Modern Thought.” This source is now properly cited and its contribution briefly contextualized to support the paper’s positioning of Ibn Taymiyyah’s critique within broader philosophical-theological debates on the conceptualization of the divine. This addition strengthens the background discussion and further justifies the relevance of the study.
The revised text appears on page 3, lines 112–116, in Section 1.4.
Reviewer 2 – Comment 5:
(1.5 Central research question): incorporate the research questions into the introduction section.
Response:
We thank the reviewer for this precise and insightful observation. In response, we have revised the final paragraph of Section 1.3 Aims and Scope of the Study to explicitly incorporate the central research question that guides the study. This revision enhances the structural coherence of the introduction and provides the reader with a clear statement of the inquiry from the outset. Additionally, we have retained a shortened version of Section 1.5 Central Research Question to maintain navigability and emphasis on the question’s centrality throughout the manuscript.
The revised text appears on:
page 2, lines 68–73, in Section 1.3.
page 3, lines 123–128, in Section 1.5.
Reviewer 2 – Comment 6:
Consolidate all subtopics in section 2 into a single subtopic to maintain the flow of the discussion.
Response:
We thank the reviewer for this insightful structural recommendation. In response, we have thoroughly revised Section 2 by consolidating the previous subheadings—2.1 through 2.4.4—into a unified section now titled “2. Methodology and Analytical Framework.” This restructuring integrates the methodological approach, primary textual sources, conceptual orientation, and epistemological foundations of the study into a coherent narrative without internal subheadings. Transitional language has been carefully added to maintain clarity and thematic continuity across the section. This change improves the flow of the discussion, reduces fragmentation, and enhances the readability and cohesion of the overall argument.
The revised text appears on page 2-4, lines 130–191, in Section 2.
Reviewer 2 – Comment 7:
Section 3 contains an excessive number of small subtopics, disrupting the discussion on Ibn Taymiyyah’s thought. Review this section to ensure the content is focused by selecting only relevant subtopics and condensing them into 1–2 main subtopics. Adjust the titles of these new subtopics to fit the discussion.
Response:
We sincerely thank the reviewer for this constructive suggestion regarding the structure of Section 3. In response, we have revised the entire section by consolidating its content into two thematically focused sub-sections:
3.1 Ibn Taymiyyah’s Epistemological Model: Foundations and Framework
3.2 Contemporary Relevance and Philosophical Engagements
This restructuring reduces fragmentation, enhances the logical flow of ideas, and aligns the presentation more closely with the central argument of the paper. It allows the discussion to remain focused on the epistemological significance of Ibn Taymiyyah’s thought while integrating thematic elements such as revelation, reason, fitrah, tawḥīd, and logic into a unified analytical framework. The second subsection addresses contemporary relevance, cross-disciplinary connections, and future research directions. We believe this new structure significantly improves the coherence and readability of the manuscript.
The revised text appears on page 5-15, lines 192–649, in Section 3.
Reviewer 2 – Comment 8:
The conclusion claims that Ibn Taymiyyah’s epistemological thought has practical value for application in education and interfaith dialogue. It would be beneficial to discuss this claim in the main text of the article, utilising Ibn Taymiyyah’s theory in contemporary contexts. The author heavily relies on El-Tobgui’s research to present Ibn Taymiyyah’s approach. Including a critical review of El-Tobgui’s work, highlighting its shortcomings, would enhance the discussion. This effort is currently missing.
Response:
We sincerely appreciate this thoughtful and constructive comment. In response, a new section has been added to the second half of Section 3.2: Contemporary Relevance and Philosophical Engagements to address the practical applicability of Ibn Taymiyyah’s epistemological model in the fields of Islamic education and interfaith dialogue. This addition elaborates how the triadic framework of naql, ʿaql, and fitrah can inform curriculum development in theology and provide a principled yet dialogically open epistemology for interreligious engagement.
Furthermore, a critical review of Wael El-Tobgui’s seminal work Ibn Taymiyya on Reason and Revelation (2020) has been incorporated into the same section. While acknowledging the scholarly value of El-Tobgui’s philological and contextual contributions, the manuscript now highlights certain limitations in his study—particularly its underdeveloped philosophical engagement and its tendency to present Ibn Taymiyyah’s project primarily as theological revivalism. This review helps position the current study as both a continuation and a philosophical extension of El-Tobgui’s important work.
The revised text appears on:
page 13, lines 566–565, in Section 3.2.
page 13, lines 566–577, in Section 3.2.
Reviewer 2 – Comment 9:
Overall, the paper effectively outlines its objectives. However, the execution falls short, as the organisation of the content does not adequately address these objectives. The author relies heavily on El-Tobgui’s analysis and lacks a critical perspectives when discussing Ibn Taymiyyah’s approach. Additionally, the paper does not sufficiently highlight the uniqueness of Ibn Taymiyyah’s scholarship in contemporary context.
Response:
Thank you for this thoughtful and constructive comment. In response, the revised manuscript includes the following improvements:
Reinforced Coherence Between Objectives and Execution:
The structure of the paper has been revised, particularly in Section 3, to more directly align the discussion with the research objectives stated in the introduction. Subtopics have been consolidated to enhance argumentative flow and focus. The revised text appears on page 5-15, lines 192–649, in Section 3.
Critical Engagement with El-Tobgui’s Work:
While El-Tobgui’s Ibn Taymiyya on Reason and Revelation remains a foundational academic reference, the revised text now includes a critical assessment of its scope and limitations. This includes highlighting the work’s philological strength while noting its limited philosophical engagement with contemporary debates. The revised text appears on page 13, lines 566–577, in Section 3.2.
Highlighting the Uniqueness of Ibn Taymiyyah’s Epistemology in Contemporary Context:
A new analytical subsection has been added in Section 3.2, demonstrating how Ibn Taymiyyah’s triadic epistemology—based on naql, ʿaql, and fitrah—offers a distinctive and underexplored contribution to modern debates in philosophy of religion, religious education, and interfaith dialogue. Relevant contemporary works have been cited to frame his approach within ongoing discussions on epistemic justification, cognitive science of religion, and properly basic beliefs. The revised text appears on page 13, lines 553–565, in Section 3.2.
These additions collectively reinforce the originality of the paper and clarify Ibn Taymiyyah’s philosophical significance beyond textual interpretation.
We appreciate Reviewer 2’s insightful critique and valuable suggestions, which have enabled us to enhance the structure, scholarly rigor, and contemporary relevance of our study. Through the incorporation of critical perspectives, structural consolidation, and clearer articulation of the uniqueness of Ibn Taymiyyah’s epistemological model, we believe the manuscript now presents a more coherent and robust contribution to the field of Islamic philosophy of religion. We trust that these revisions satisfactorily address the reviewer’s concerns and improve the quality and clarity of the article for publication.
Round 2
Reviewer 1 Report
Comments and Suggestions for AuthorsIt is good to see the author/s respond constructively to my previous feedback. I have two major suggestions:
- To take the time and better explain Ibn Taymiyyah's critique of Aristotle's approach to logic - in particular definitions. The key claim Ibn Taymiyyah is critiquing is that 'definition
a requisite for reaching a concept'. Explain what the Aristotelian view is and then outline Ibn Taymiyyah's critiques - there are multiple. Rayan does this very well: https://ajis.org/index.php/ajiss/article/download/371/2097 - Ibn Taymiyyah's critique seems intended to make space for epistemic pluralism with regard to knowledge, in particular to make space for fitrah & perhaps revelation. In many ways this parallels Plantinga's critique of classical foundationalism to make way for Reformed Epistemology: https://iep.utm.edu/ref-epis/#H5 It is worth pointing out & reflecting on the deep resonances here - i.e., there is a standard for rationality that is being questioned, so as to accommodate a more basic approach.
Author Response
Response to Reviewer 1
We would like to express our sincere appreciation for your thoughtful and constructive feedback on our manuscript. Your comments have prompted significant and meaningful revisions, particularly to section 3.3, which explores Ibn Taymiyyah’s critique of Aristotelian definition. Your guidance not only helped us sharpen the philosophical clarity of our arguments but also encouraged a deeper engagement with contemporary epistemological frameworks. Below, we detail our responses to your two comments, outlining the specific revisions made and the intellectual rationale behind them.
Reviewer 1 – Comment 1:
Thank you for your valuable comment and your suggestion to elaborate on Ibn Taymiyyah’s critique of the Aristotelian concept of definition. We have carefully revised section 3.3 “Ibn Taymiyyah’s Critique of Aristotelian Definition (al-Ḥadd) and Its Epistemological Consequences” in light of your observation.
In this revised section, we have explicitly clarified the Aristotelian position, namely that definition is a prerequisite for attaining conceptual knowledge—a view that regards definition (al-ḥadd) as central to understanding quiddities (māhiyyāt) via genus and differentia. We then systematically outlined Ibn Taymiyyah’s multi-layered critiques of this view, including:
- The logical circularity and regress involved in defining non-self-evident terms.
- The fact that empirical and linguistic knowledge often precedes and bypasses formal definitions.
- The observation that definitions across sciences are unstable, contested, and often unnecessary.
- The epistemological distinction between mental conceptions and extra-mental realities, which undermines the metaphysical assumptions embedded in Aristotelian logic.
To further strengthen this section, we engaged directly with Sobhi Rayan’s article (“Ibn Taymiyya’s Criticism of Aristotelian Definition,” AJISS, 2010), as you helpfully recommended. Rayan’s comprehensive analysis provided a valuable framework for structuring and supporting our presentation of Ibn Taymiyyah’s arguments, especially regarding the rejection of metaphysical universals and the preference for an epistemology grounded in fitrah, empirical observation, and linguistic realism.
We have included both in-text citation and a full bibliographic reference to Rayan’s article in the revised manuscript.
The revised text appears on page 15, lines 650–691, in Section 3.3.
Thank you again for this insightful suggestion, which has significantly enhanced the clarity and philosophical depth of the discussion.
Reviewer 1 – Comment 2:
We greatly appreciate your insightful observation regarding the epistemic pluralism that underlies Ibn Taymiyyah’s critique of Aristotelian logic, particularly with respect to fitrah and revelation. Your suggestion to explicitly connect this to Alvin Plantinga’s critique of classical foundationalism and the emergence of Reformed Epistemology has significantly enriched our analysis.
In response, we have expanded the final part of section 3.3 to highlight the deep structural resonances between Ibn Taymiyyah’s model and Plantinga’s project. Both thinkers challenge the dominant epistemological standard of their time—be it Aristotelian syllogism or Enlightenment foundationalism—in order to legitimize non-inferential, properly basic beliefs rooted in an intuitive, divinely-oriented epistemic faculty.
We now emphasize that Ibn Taymiyyah’s affirmation of fitrah as an innate disposition toward recognizing divine truths performs a function analogous to Plantinga’s account of properly basic beliefs formed by cognitive faculties functioning properly in an appropriate epistemic environment. This connection is not merely analogical but reveals a shared concern with reconfiguring rationality to account for the legitimacy of revelation, intuition, and moral awareness within a theistic framework.
Accordingly, the revised discussion integrates:
- An explicit comparison with Plantinga’s Reformed Epistemology as discussed in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry you recommended.
- A reflection on how both thinkers dismantle restrictive rationalist criteria in favor of a more inclusive, theologically grounded understanding of knowledge.
- The observation that fitrah in Ibn Taymiyyah’s model functions not only as a moral guide but also as a cognitive foundation for religious belief—analogous to the sensus divinitatis in Plantinga’s work.
We believe that this philosophical cross-reading enhances the contemporary relevance of Ibn Taymiyyah’s epistemology and aligns well with your call to foreground the broader implications for rationality and normativity in religious belief.
The revised text appears on page 15, lines 650–691, in Section 3.3.
Thank you once again for this enriching and generative comment.
Once again, we are grateful for your careful reading of our manuscript and for your insightful suggestions, which have helped us enhance both the historical precision and philosophical depth of our analysis. By incorporating your recommendations, we believe the revised section now presents a more nuanced account of Ibn Taymiyyah’s epistemology—one that situates his critique of Aristotelian logic within a broader and more relevant philosophical discourse. We trust that these revisions address your concerns effectively and contribute to the overall strength of the manuscript.
Author Response File: Author Response.docx
Round 3
Reviewer 1 Report
Comments and Suggestions for AuthorsNo Further suggestions
