Review Reports - We (Nosotras) the People: Women, Equality, and Parity in Latin American and Caribbean Constitutionalism

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

The article “We (Nosotras) the People: Women, Equality, and Parity in Latin American and Caribbean Constitutionalism” examines Latin American and Caribbean constitutionalism through a gender lens, offering a comparative analysis of 20 jurisdictions. Its contribution lies in the field of feminist constitutional scholarship, as it seeks to enrich comparative understandings of how constitutional systems across the region address gender equality and parity. The proposed analytical framework, structured around six dimensions of analysis, has the potential to offer valuable insights into the uneven constitutionalization of gender-related issues across different jurisdictions.

Precisely because of this potential, the reviewer believes that several aspects of the manuscript could be further developed. The article provides a rich descriptive overview of constitutional provisions and reforms but it engages only to a limited extent with the broader implications of its findings. As a result, the analytical potential of the comparative framework remains only partially realized. In the following paragraphs the reviewer will further explain their position and provide some cues for improval.

The theoretical engagement with constitutionalism and feminism appears limited. While the article references feminist constitutional scholarship, the discussion remains relatively brief and does not fully explore how feminist critiques of constitutionalism inform the analytical framework, especially in relation to the context of Latin America and Caribbean countries. In this sense, the reviewer would encourage the author to engage with scholars such as Rubio Marín, Giménez, Undurraga to discuss the constitutional construction of citizenship, equality, and the gendered assumptions embedded in constitutional orders and give more insight in relation to the context of Latin america.

The analytical section introduces six variables through which constitutional texts are examined. This is very interesting, however, the process through which these variables were selected is not mentioned nor justified. For example, It is not clear whether the proposed framework emerges from existing feminist constitutional debates or from an independent analytical choice by the author. Methodological choices should be discussed and justified. It could be argued that the author left out from their analysis other aspects usually debated in feminist scholarship such as reproductive rights, and family relations. Of course the scope of the analysis can be narrowed, but making these choices more transparent and clear would strengthen the credibility of the analysis.

The article tends to treat sex and gender as largely overlapping categories without sufficiently problematizing their relationship, it uses indeed the terms as synonymous. Given the extensive scholarly debates on the distinction between biological sex, gender identity, and gendered social structures, a more explicit conceptual position is relevant to the analysis and can have also constitutional implications that are completely neglected in this way. In relation to this, the text briefly raises questions concerning the gender binary but does not pursue them further; the reviewer would suggest discussing this more in details in relation to feminist literature that nowadays articulates critical views of the gender binary structure of the law and also constitutional developments that challenges these assumptions.

A significant portion of the article is devoted to identifying and cataloguing constitutional provisions. While this mapping exercise is interesting and useful, the discussion sometimes reads as a textual inventory rather than an actual constitutional analysis or legal comparison. Greater attention could be devoted to interpreting the normative significance of the provisions, their constitutional functions, and the broader constitutional visions of gender equality that they reflect. On a more general note it may be useful to integrate constitutional provisions more directly into the text of the article rather than mentioning them exclusively in the table.

The impression is that the comparison appears relatively formalistic, focusing primarily on constitutional texts without even mentioning the broader constitutional/social context. For example, greater attention could be devoted to the political and historical conditions in which the constitutional provisions emerged, the trajectories of constitutional reform, and the different models of constitutionalism operating across jurisdictions.

More generally, the main concern is that the analytical sections sometimes remain too close to the constitutional texts themselves. The article is transparent about these limitations. Nevertheless, acknowledging them does not entirely resolve the underlying issue that much of the analysis remains descriptive rather than explanatory/critical. The manuscript would benefit from a more sustained engagement with the broader theoretical and comparative significance of its findings.

Author Response

Dear Reviewer,

We sincerely thank you for the careful and constructive assessment of our manuscript. Your criticisms have contributed decisively to increasing its theoretical, methodological, and analytical depth. We have substantially revised the manuscript rather than limiting the revision to isolated additions. In particular, we strengthened the feminist constitutional framework, made the selection and scope of the six indicators explicit, distinguished sex, gender, gender identity, and sexual orientation, incorporated historical and political trajectories into the comparison, and rewrote the Discussion and Conclusions so that the comparative mapping is used to develop an explanatory four-layer model of constitutional equality.

Line references below correspond to the line numbering displayed in the revised manuscript submitted with this response. Word does not assign line numbers to text inside tables; where relevant, tables are identified by number and by the line on which the table heading appears.

Comment 1

The theoretical engagement with constitutionalism and feminism is too limited. The manuscript should engage more fully with feminist constitutional scholarship, including Rubio-Marín, Pou Giménez, and Undurraga, and should relate those debates more directly to Latin American constitutionalism.

Response: We fully agree that the original version did not make the feminist constitutional foundations of the comparison sufficiently explicit. The revised manuscript now explains how critiques of the supposedly universal constitutional subject, the public/private divide, social reproduction, and the gendered organization of political authority inform both the research design and the interpretation of the results. We have also incorporated the scholarship of Ruth Rubio-Marín and the Latin American constitutional literature collected by Francisca Pou Giménez, Ruth Rubio-Marín, and Verónica Undurraga Valdés, together with regional scholarship by Nélida Archenti and María Inés Tula, Mariana Caminotti and Flavia Freidenberg, Nilda Garay Montañez, Flavia Freidenberg and Karolina Gilas, and Yanira Zúñiga Añazco. These works have allowed us to engage more directly with Latin American debates on constituent processes, feminist mobilization, electoral reform, quotas, parity, and women’s political representation.

The revision further connects this theoretical framework to the regional material. Section 4 now links formal political citizenship, the sexual contract, electoral quotas, and parity to distinct constitutional functions, while Sections 5.1–5.5 interpret the country findings in light of constituent processes, reform trajectories, feminist mobilization, and different techniques of constitutionalization.

Location in the revised manuscript: Materials and Methods, lines 101–153 and 211–241; Section 4.1, lines 347–430; Sections-5.2 lines 606-627; References, especially lines 1196-1201 and 1245–1259.

Comment 2

The manuscript does not explain or justify how the six variables were selected. The relationship between the framework and feminist constitutional debates should be made transparent, and the exclusion of other issues such as reproductive rights and family relations should be justified.

Response: We have responded by substantially expanding the Materials and Methods section. The revised text now explains why each of the six dimensions was selected and identifies the specific constitutional technique captured by each one: symbolic construction of the political subject; foundational status of equality; formal equality; anti-discrimination design; substantive-equality techniques; and parity/power sharing.

We also clarify that the six indicators do not constitute a general index of gender justice. Care, family responsibilities, economic dependence, and sexual and reproductive autonomy are expressly retained as interpretive controls that expose the limits of the coded dimensions, but they are not converted into additional cross-country indicators. This allows the study to remain replicable and textually comparable while acknowledging central feminist concerns that exceed the chosen coding framework. The revised manuscript also states its limitations concerning implementation, case law, and reforms after the cutoff date.

Location in the revised manuscript: Materials and Methods, lines101–249, with the detailed operationalization of the indicators at lines 175–207 and the scope and limitations at lines 211–249; Table 1, heading at line 249.

Comment 3

The article treats sex and gender as overlapping or synonymous categories and does not sufficiently address the gender binary, gender identity, or constitutional developments that challenge binary assumptions.

Response: We agree that conceptual precision was necessary. The revised manuscript now states expressly that sex and gender are not used as synonyms. It defines sex, gender, gender identity, and sexual orientation as distinct analytical and legal categories and codes them separately according to the terminology actually used in each constitutional text. The comparative analysis was rewritten accordingly, especially in the anti-discrimination section.

We have also made the limits of a binary framework more explicit. The discussion of constitutional language recognizes that neutral drafting may avoid unnecessary binary repetition and may protect persons who do not identify within binary categories. The sections on parity and political representation likewise stress that women–men parity is the legal technique coded in the relevant constitutions, not an exhaustive definition of the political community, and that numerical parity does not resolve intersectional exclusion or determine which women gain access to power. Because the article is specifically focused on constitutional equality between women and men, it does not claim to provide an exhaustive theory of all gender identities; the revised methodology now makes that scope transparent.

Location in the revised manuscript: Materials and Methods, lines; 154–174; Section 5.3, lines 724–743; Table 2, heading at line 960.)

Comment 4

A significant part of the manuscript reads as a catalogue or textual inventory of constitutional provisions. The analysis should devote greater attention to normative significance and constitutional function, and constitutional provisions should be integrated more directly into the text rather than appearing mainly in tables.

Response: This was one of the central changes in the revision. We retained the comparative tables as a transparent coding device, but rewrote the substantive sections so that constitutional provisions are discussed within the argument rather than merely listed. The revised text now distinguishes the constitutional functions performed by each type of clause and repeatedly separates textual presence, normative function, legal scope, and implementation.

For example, the revised manuscript explains why foundational equality differs from an individual equality right; why express women–men equality has both legal and symbolic significance; why open and closed anti-discrimination lists perform different interpretive functions; why positive action is only one technique of substantive equality; and why parity is analytically distinct from quotas and from substantive equality because it concerns the composition of decision-making authority.

Location in the revised manuscript: Section 5.1 distinguishes the systemic function of equality as a foundational constitutional value from the individual-protective function of an equality right (lines 577–590). Section 5.2 examines the legal and symbolic significance of expressly formulating women–men equality (lines 636–645). Section 5.3 analyses the function of anti-discrimination guarantees and the interpretive consequences of different clause designs, including the distinction between enumerated grounds and open or closed lists (lines 689–700 and 776–799). Section 5.4 explains the transition from status equality to transformative equality and differentiates among the constitutional techniques through which substantive equality may be pursued (lines 807–824 and 860–901). Section 5.5 distinguishes the corrective logic of quotas from the power-sharing function of constitutional parity and related rules (lines 932–959). The Discussion then integrates these findings into the four-layer model and develops their transversal significance beyond the country-by-country mapping (lines 970–1042).

Comment 5

The comparison is overly formalistic because it focuses on constitutional texts without sufficiently considering the political and historical conditions in which the provisions emerged, trajectories of constitutional reform, or different models of constitutionalism.

Response: We have incorporated a diachronic and contextual dimension throughout the findings. The revised manuscript distinguishes new constituent settlements from later constitutional amendments and shows that similar equality techniques can arise through different political and institutional pathways. The cases of Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba, and Nicaragua are now discussed as distinct genealogies of foundational equality; Paraguay and Bolivia are used to illustrate the role of women’s mobilization in constitution-making; Ecuador and Bolivia are placed within the broader cycle of new Latin American constitutionalism; Argentina and Mexico illustrate how older constitutional texts can acquire substantially different equality architectures through amendment; and the parity section distinguishes constituent and reform trajectories across the six coded jurisdictions.

At the same time, we preserved the methodological boundary of the article: political history is used to interpret constitutional change, but the coded dependent material remains the constitutional text. This avoids converting the article into a general political-history comparison while responding to the concern that textual similarity should not be mistaken for a common constitutional genealogy.

Location in the revised manuscript: Section 5.1, lines 547–582; Section 5.2, lines 646–667; Section 5.3, lines 756–765; Section 5.4, lines 834–844; Section 5.5, lines 911–931; Discussion, lines 1020–1028.

Comment 6

The manuscript remains too descriptive rather than explanatory or critical. It would benefit from sustained engagement with the broader theoretical and comparative significance of the findings.

Response: We took this concern as a request to rethink the architecture of the manuscript. The revised Discussion is now organized around four transversal findings rather than a repetition of country data: the relationship between universalism and visibility; the constitutional design of anti-discrimination protection; the transition from status equality to transformative equality; and the constitutionalization of parity as power-sharing equality. These findings are integrated into a four-layer model of increasing constitutional depth: symbolic inclusion, status equality, transformative equality, and power-sharing equality.

The revised Discussion also makes explicit that the model is cumulative in normative ambition but not linear in constitutional history, and that it is not a ranking of countries or a proxy for implementation. The Conclusions were rewritten to distinguish the empirical map from the article’s theoretical contribution and to frame the central question in terms of the transformation of the constitutional political subject, representation, and democratic authority.

Location in the revised manuscript: Discussion, lines 970–1060; Conclusions, lines 1061–1135; Introduction, lines 68–81; Materials and Methods, lines 116–153.

Closing note. We are very grateful for the review. Its central criticism—that a valuable comparative map needed a more explicit feminist constitutional framework and a more explanatory use of the findings—has decisively shaped the revised manuscript. We believe the article is substantially stronger as a result.

Reviewer 2 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

The article's proposal is interesting and important. It is highly relevant to highlight the innovations and significance of Latin America's constitutionalism on gender issues in recent years. That said, the article lacks doctrinal references, especially from Latin America. Given the author's qualitative approach, it would be essential to identify a normative benchmark for comparison and assessment. The author assumes readers will accept the conclusions without providing a standard. Some examples are:

What is substantive equality? Some of the dimensions the author assesses are part of a concept of substantive equality, but the author treats them as conceptually separate. For example, in Nancy Fraser's approach redistribution, recognition, and participation are essential dimensions of equality. The author treats the final 2 but ignores clauses that can impact in redistribution or "material" equality. In Sandra Fredman´s approach, there are 4 dimensions of substantive equality, including a transformative dimension that the author equates with substantive equality. Because the literature is so rich, we need to know which conception the author is using to evaluate the scope of constitutional clauses.

We also need to know what the author understands as "transformative constitutionalism" in order to understand how "the transition from status to transformation" can occur. This is important also because the author anticipates the consequences for equality of the "sexual contract" (that makes us to think in the public-private spheres division) but does not return to this point later. So the question remains: is it possible to talk about a transformative (structurally) constitutionalism only by way of "formal" equality clauses?

Another problem is that the author acknowledges the problem of "binary reification" and intersectionality but, when addressing the political subject, considers only women/men and parity as half of the people. In my opinion this limits the discussion of transformative constitutionalism (and shortcuts its possibilities beyond the sexual division of societies and even anthropocentrism).

Finally, even if the corpus of analysis is limited to constitutional clauses, a particularity of Latin American constitutionalism is the incorporation of international human rights treaties into the "constitutional block" and judicial review of conventionality. That means that clauses of International Treaties have the same hierarchy of clauses in the constitution. A good example is Argentina, one of the countries with less gender equality´s clauses in the author´s analysis but one in wich article 75.22 considers CEDAW a binding treaty, and art. 75.23 considers women as a group with special protection.

Author Response

Dear Reviewer,

We sincerely thank you for your detailed and conceptually demanding review. Your comments have contributed decisively to the depth of the revised article. In particular, they led us to make the normative architecture of the comparison explicit, to define more carefully what we mean by substantive and transformative equality, to clarify the scope and limits of the women–men parity framework, and to incorporate the constitutional status of international human-rights treaties as a contextual variable rather than leaving it outside the analysis.

Comment 1

The article lacks sufficient doctrinal references, particularly from Latin America, and the qualitative comparison needs an explicit normative benchmark. The reviewer asks what conception of substantive equality is being used and notes that redistribution, recognition, participation, and transformative approaches can be conceptualized in different ways.

Response: We agree with the underlying concern that the article required an explicit benchmark rather than an implicit evaluative standard. In response, we have made the article’s own analytical benchmark fully explicit instead of adopting one external theory as a hidden yardstick. The revised manuscript now defines four interconnected layers of constitutional depth—symbolic inclusion, status equality, transformative equality, and power-sharing equality—and explains how the six indicators operationalize those layers at the level of constitutional text.

Substantive equality is now defined operationally rather than treated as a single formula. The revised methodology identifies multiple constitutional techniques—positive or affirmative action, obstacle-removal duties, equality of opportunity or treatment, real and effective equality, specialized mechanisms, and sectoral measures—and expressly states that these techniques are not normatively equivalent. The substantive-equality section also clarifies that social rights, care arrangements, labor regulation, reproductive autonomy, fiscal capacity, and institutional enforcement remain relevant contextual factors for broader claims about transformative effect.

We have also expanded the doctrinal basis of the article, including feminist constitutional scholarship by Rubio-Marín and the Latin American scholarship collected by Pou Giménez, Rubio-Marín, and Undurraga Valdés, as well as regional literature on quotas, parity, constituent processes, and political representation. Rather than importing Fraser or Fredman as the sole governing template, we made explicit the normative benchmark actually applied by the article and operationalized it through the four-layer model. This responds to the reviewer’s concern while preserving the fit between the theoretical framework and the text-focused comparative design.

Location in the revised manuscript: Introduction, lines 77–81; Materials and Methods, lines 101–217, with detailed substantive-equality coding at lines 185–198; Section 5.4, lines 800–905; Discussion, lines 970–1046; References, especially lines 1245–1259.

Comment 2

The manuscript should clarify what it means by “transformative constitutionalism” and by the transition from status to transformation. The reviewer also notes that the sexual contract and the public/private divide are introduced but not sufficiently carried through the analysis, raising the question whether formal equality clauses alone can support a structurally transformative account.

Response: This comment led us to sharpen the terminology. The revised article does not use “transformative constitutionalism” as a general characterization of the jurisdictions studied. Instead, it defines “transformative equality” as one layer of the analytical model: the point at which constitutional provisions move beyond equal status or identical treatment and authorize or require public intervention in structurally unequal starting conditions. This avoids attributing a transformative character to an entire constitutional system merely because it contains an equality clause.

We also carried the sexual-contract and public/private critique into the analytical framework and substantive analysis as an interpretive controle. The methodology now states expressly that care, family responsibilities, economic dependence, and sexual and reproductive autonomy are used to test the limits of conclusions drawn from the six indicators. Section 4 connects formal citizenship to the sexual contract and the gendered public/private division; Section 5.4 returns to social rights, care, economic dependence, reproductive responsibilities, and material conditions of rights. The revised text therefore explicitly rejects the proposition that formal equality alone can establish transformative equality.

Location in the revised manuscript: Materials and Methods, lines 116–127 and 137–153 (feminist critique informing the analytical framework and definition of the four layers), lines 185–198 (operationalization of substantive equality), and lines 211–217 (sexual contract/public–private divide as interpretive controls); Section 4.1, lines 357–381 and 397–429 (formal citizenship, the public/private divide, and the transition from equal status to the organization of political power); Section 5.4, lines 807–824 and 885–905 (definition of substantive/transformative equality and return to care, economic dependence, reproductive responsibilities, and material conditions); Discussion, lines 971–988, 1010–1019, and 1043–1050 (integration of transformative equality into the four-layer model and its distinction from formal status equality).

Comment 3

The article recognizes binary reification and intersectionality but still constructs the political subject mainly through women/men and parity as half of the people. This may limit the transformative possibilities of the analysis beyond the sexual division of society.

Response: We have responded by clarifying both the analytical scope and its limitations. The revised methodology explicitly distinguishes sex, gender, gender identity, and sexual orientation and codes them separately. The article also explains that neutral constitutional language may avoid binary repetition and protect persons who do not identify within binary categories.

At the same time, we retain women–men equality and parity as the specific object of this study because the research question concerns the constitutional inclusion of women and the legal techniques through which women’s exclusion from the political subject and public power has been addressed. The women–men distinction is therefore treated as the constitutional technique adopted by the relevant texts and as the object of the present comparison, not as an exhaustive definition of the constitutional political subject.

The revised article also makes the limits of a purely binary and numerical understanding of parity more explicit. The analysis stresses that parity does not determine which women gain access to decision-making power and that race, ethnicity, indigeneity, class, disability, age, territorial inequality, migration status, and sexuality intersect with sex in shaping political participation. The Discussion consequently treats intersectionality as essential to evaluating power-sharing equality and identifies the question of which women enter power, whose interests are heard, and whether differently situated women exercise equal political agency as an area requiring further research. A broader analysis of non-binary constitutional subjecthood would require a different corpus and coding framework and therefore lies beyond the scope of the present study.

Location in the revised manuscript: Materials and Methods, lines 154–174 (separate definition and coding of sex, gender, gender identity, and sexual orientation); Section 3, lines 314–322 (neutral and inclusive constitutional language beyond binary drafting); Section 4.2, lines 503–511 and 524–540 (intersectional limits of women–men parity and distinction between numerical parity and effective power-sharing); Discussion, lines 1000–1009 and 1051–1060 (non-interchangeability of protected grounds and intersectionality as a limit and future research question); Conclusions, lines 1095–1103 (analytical distinction between sex, gender, gender identity, and sexual orientation).

Comment 4

The comparison should account for the distinctive Latin American incorporation of international human-rights treaties into the constitutional block and for conventionality review. Argentina is an important example because CEDAW has constitutional hierarchy under Article 75(22), while Article 75(23) provides special protection for women.

Response: We fully agree, and this suggestion produced one of the most substantial additions to the revised manuscript. The methodology now explains why international and regional human-rights instruments are not coded as a seventh primary indicator—the unit of analysis remains the constitutional text—but also why their domestic constitutional or quasi-constitutional status must be recorded in the Latin American context. The revised text distinguishes binding treaty law from political declarations and programmes of action, explains the specific legal position of CEDAW, and now expressly notes the contextual relevance of the Inter-American doctrine of conventionality control in States Parties subject to the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

We added a new Appendix B comparing all twenty jurisdictions in relation to the constitutional treatment of international human-rights treaties, the existence of a bloque de constitucionalidad or equivalent constitutional parameter, and CEDAW status. Argentina is expressly discussed in both the main text and Appendix B: Article 75(22) is identified as granting constitutional hierarchy to CEDAW, while Article 75(23) is incorporated into the analysis of positive measures and real equality. This addition also supports the broader methodological conclusion that a relatively sparse general equality clause may operate within a much stronger constitutional architecture.

Location in the revised manuscript: Materials and Methods, lines 218–241, especially conventionality control at lines 237–241; Section 5.2, lines 668–677; Section 5.4, lines 834–844; Appendix B, heading at lines 1145–1147; Conclusions, lines 1085–1094.

Closing note. We are especially grateful for the conceptual precision of this review. It led us to make explicit what had previously remained implicit: the normative benchmark of the comparison, the limits of the category of transformative equality, the relationship between the sexual contract and substantive equality, and the constitutional relevance of the international human-rights framework. These revisions have substantially improved the article.

Round 2

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

I am satisfied on how the authors addressed the comment

Reviewer 2 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

I think the author has made significant improvements to the article, and it is ready for publication if the journal's editors agree.