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Games, Volume 10, Issue 2

June 2019 - 11 articles

Cover Story: Many collective action problems suffer from inefficient equilibrium outcomes if players are narrowly self-interested. We revisit such situations assuming that players may instead have altruistic concerns for each other. For a new class of mechanisms -a corner case of which is the standard linear public goods mechanism- we show that equilibrium outcomes generically feature an extremal giving structure. That is, as long as all players’ altruism is below a certain threshold, they continue to give nothing in equilibrium; however, if it is above, they make a full contribution thereby realizing the efficient outcome even under non-perfect altruism. For given preferences, we use this result to find mechanisms within the considered class that optimally stimulate full spending and thereby hope to contribute to finding better tools that address collective action problems in the future. View this paper
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Articles (11)

  • Article
  • Open Access
24 Citations
11,536 Views
14 Pages

Ransomware and Reputation

  • Anna Cartwright and
  • Edward Cartwright

10 June 2019

Ransomware is a particular form of cyber-attack in which a victim loses access to either his electronic device or files unless he pays a ransom to criminals. A criminal’s ability to make money from ransomware critically depends on victims belie...

  • Article
  • Open Access
5 Citations
6,261 Views
8 Pages

1 June 2019

This note provides simple derivations of the equilibrium conditions for different voting games with incomplete information. In the standard voting game à la Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), voters update their beliefs, and, conditional on their...

  • Article
  • Open Access
7 Citations
6,635 Views
12 Pages

11 May 2019

An evolutionary model of European football was applied to analyze a two-stage indirect evolution game in which teams choose their utility function in the first stage, and their optimal talent investments in the second stage. Given the second-stage op...

  • Article
  • Open Access
2 Citations
6,669 Views
11 Pages

7 May 2019

We propose a new family of mechanisms, whereby players may give more or less directly to one another. A cornerstone case is the regular linear public goods mechanism (LPGM), where all contribute into a single common group account, the total amount of...

  • Article
  • Open Access
2 Citations
7,307 Views
23 Pages

Voting in Three-Alternative Committees: An Experiment

  • Johanna M.M. Goertz and
  • Kirill Chernomaz

1 May 2019

We design an experiment to test how voters vote in a small committee election with three alternatives. Voters have common preferences that depend on an unknown state of nature. Each voter receives an imprecise private signal prior to the election and...

  • Article
  • Open Access
16 Citations
13,993 Views
34 Pages

Behavior in Strategic Settings: Evidence from a Million Rock-Paper-Scissors Games

  • Dimitris Batzilis,
  • Sonia Jaffe,
  • Steven Levitt,
  • John A. List and
  • Jeffrey Picel

10 April 2019

We make use of data from a Facebook application where hundreds of thousands of people played a simultaneous move, zero-sum game—rock-paper-scissors—with varying information to analyze whether play in strategic settings is consistent with...

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Games - ISSN 2073-4336