Table of Contents
Games, Volume 10, Issue 2 (June 2019)
- Issues are regarded as officially published after their release is announced to the table of contents alert mailing list.
- You may sign up for e-mail alerts to receive table of contents of newly released issues.
- PDF is the official format for papers published in both, html and pdf forms. To view the papers in pdf format, click on the "PDF Full-text" link, and use the free Adobe Reader to open them.
Cover Story (view full-size image) Many collective action problems suffer from inefficient equilibrium outcomes if players are [...] Read more. Many collective action problems suffer from inefficient equilibrium outcomes if players are narrowly self-interested. We revisit such situations assuming that players may instead have altruistic concerns for each other. For a new class of mechanisms -a corner case of which is the standard linear public goods mechanism- we show that equilibrium outcomes generically feature an extremal giving structure. That is, as long as all players’ altruism is below a certain threshold, they continue to give nothing in equilibrium; however, if it is above, they make a full contribution thereby realizing the efficient outcome even under non-perfect altruism. For given preferences, we use this result to find mechanisms within the considered class that optimally stimulate full spending and thereby hope to contribute to finding better tools that address collective action problems in the future. View this paper