Special Issue "Cooperative OR Games and Networks"

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (31 December 2018).

Special Issue Editors

Guest Editor
Prof. Dr. Herbert Hamers

Tilburg University, Tilburg, Netherlands
Website | E-Mail
Interests: OR games; Terroristic networks; Efficiency in healthcare
Guest Editor
Prof. Dr. Henk Norde

Tilburg University, Tilburg, Netherlands
Website | E-Mail
Interests: OR games; Minimum cost spanning tree games; Risk allocation

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

This Special Issue focuses on cooperative OR games that are related to networks. This research started decades ago, and is still evolving. Among others, it resulted in Minimum Spanning Tree games, Traveling Salesman games, Coloring games, Assignment games, Flow games, and Chinese Postman Games. The research in this field is devoted to theoretical game properties (e.g. balancedness, submodularity), existing theoretical game solutions (e.g. Shapley value, nucleolus) and context-specific solutions (e.g., Bird rule). In this call, we would like to invite original research papers to this Special Issue of Games ”Cooperative OR Games and Networks” that follows this established line of research. Please consider the keywords below as merely indicative.

Prof. Dr. Herbert Hamers
Prof. Dr. Henk Norde
Guest Editors

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All papers will be peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access quarterly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1000 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • Cooperative OR games
  • Networks
  • Balancedness
  • Submodularity
  • Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes
  • Shapley value
  • Nucleolus

Published Papers (1 paper)

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Research

Open AccessArticle
Routing-Proofness in Congestion-Prone Networks
Games 2019, 10(2), 17; https://doi.org/10.3390/g10020017
Received: 31 December 2018 / Revised: 8 March 2019 / Accepted: 25 March 2019 / Published: 3 April 2019
PDF Full-text (528 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Abstract
We consider the problem of sharing the cost of connecting a large number of atomless agents in a network. The centralized agency elicits the target nodes that agents want to connect, and charges agents based on their demands. We look for a cost-sharing [...] Read more.
We consider the problem of sharing the cost of connecting a large number of atomless agents in a network. The centralized agency elicits the target nodes that agents want to connect, and charges agents based on their demands. We look for a cost-sharing mechanism that satisfies three desirable properties: efficiency which charges agents based on the minimum total cost of connecting them in a network, stand-alone core stability which requires charging agents not more than the cost of connecting by themselves directly, and limit routing-proofness which prevents agents from profitable reporting as several agents connecting from A to C to B instead of A to B. We show that these three properties are not always compatible for any set of cost functions and demands. However, when these properties are compatible, a new egalitarian mechanism is shown to satisfy them. When the properties are not compatible, we find a rule that meets stand-alone core stability, limit routing-proofness and minimizes the budget deficit. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Cooperative OR Games and Networks)
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