Next Article in Journal
A Note on Pivotality
Next Article in Special Issue
Stable International Environmental Agreements: Large Coalitions that Achieve Little
Previous Article in Journal
Indirect Evolution and Aggregate-Taking Behavior in a Football League: Utility Maximization, Profit Maximization, and Success
 
 
Article

Sharing a River with Downstream Externalities

Department of Economics and Oeschger Centre for Climate Change Research, University of Bern, Schanzeneckstrasse 1, CH-3012 Bern, Switzerland
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Games 2019, 10(2), 23; https://doi.org/10.3390/g10020023
Received: 2 March 2019 / Revised: 8 May 2019 / Accepted: 10 May 2019 / Published: 15 May 2019
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theoretic Models in Natural Resource Economics)
We consider the problem of efficient emission abatement in a multi polluter setting, where agents are located along a river in which net emissions accumulate and induce negative externalities to downstream riparians. Assuming a cooperative transferable utility game, we seek welfare distributions that satisfy all agents’ participation constraints and, in addition, a fairness constraint implying that no coalition of agents should be better off than it were if all non-members of the coalition would not pollute the river at all. We show that the downstream incremental distribution, as introduced by Ambec and Sprumont (2002), is the only welfare distribution satisfying both constraints. In addition, we show that this result holds true for numerous extensions of our model. View Full-Text
Keywords: downstream externalities; downstream incremental distribution; optimal emission abatement; river pollution downstream externalities; downstream incremental distribution; optimal emission abatement; river pollution
Show Figures

Figure A1

MDPI and ACS Style

Steinmann, S.; Winkler, R. Sharing a River with Downstream Externalities. Games 2019, 10, 23. https://doi.org/10.3390/g10020023

AMA Style

Steinmann S, Winkler R. Sharing a River with Downstream Externalities. Games. 2019; 10(2):23. https://doi.org/10.3390/g10020023

Chicago/Turabian Style

Steinmann, Sarina, and Ralph Winkler. 2019. "Sharing a River with Downstream Externalities" Games 10, no. 2: 23. https://doi.org/10.3390/g10020023

Find Other Styles
Note that from the first issue of 2016, MDPI journals use article numbers instead of page numbers. See further details here.

Article Access Map by Country/Region

1
Back to TopTop