Sharing a River with Downstream Externalities
AbstractWe consider the problem of efficient emission abatement in a multi polluter setting, where agents are located along a river in which net emissions accumulate and induce negative externalities to downstream riparians. Assuming a cooperative transferable utility game, we seek welfare distributions that satisfy all agents’ participation constraints and, in addition, a fairness constraint implying that no coalition of agents should be better off than it were if all non-members of the coalition would not pollute the river at all. We show that the downstream incremental distribution, as introduced by Ambec and Sprumont (2002), is the only welfare distribution satisfying both constraints. In addition, we show that this result holds true for numerous extensions of our model. View Full-Text
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Steinmann, S.; Winkler, R. Sharing a River with Downstream Externalities. Games 2019, 10, 23.
Steinmann S, Winkler R. Sharing a River with Downstream Externalities. Games. 2019; 10(2):23.Chicago/Turabian Style
Steinmann, Sarina; Winkler, Ralph. 2019. "Sharing a River with Downstream Externalities." Games 10, no. 2: 23.
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