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Games, Volume 10, Issue 3

September 2019 - 9 articles

Cover Story: One distinguishing feature of modern electoral campaigns is a greater ability to target advertisements to narrow groups of voters. We consider whether the ability to narrowly target advertisements causes candidates to target in policy choices as well. We model an election as a game between two office-motivated candidates. We consider an environment where there is no incentive to target policies to interest groups if voters are fully informed about their platform. We then assume that platforms are not fully observable and allow candidates to send simple messages to voters. We consider alternative message technologies. We find that a sufficiently sophisticated messaging technology causes candidates to inefficiently target policies. Our results are robust to negative advertising, where one candidate can reveal parts of their opponent's platform, and limits on the ability to target policies. View this paper.
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Articles (9)

  • Article
  • Open Access
8 Citations
7,458 Views
14 Pages

2 September 2019

Cooperation is a fundamental aspect of well-organized societies and public good games are a useful metaphor for modeling cooperative behavior in the presence of strong incentives to free ride. Usually, social agents interact to play a public good gam...

  • Article
  • Open Access
5 Citations
9,353 Views
25 Pages

30 August 2019

I introduce axiomatically infinite sequential games that extend Kuhn’s classical framework. Infinite games allow for (a) imperfect information, (b) an infinite horizon, and (c) infinite action sets. A generalized backward induction (GBI) procedure is...

  • Article
  • Open Access
1 Citations
5,277 Views
20 Pages

14 August 2019

We propose a dual selves model to integrate affective responses and belief-dependent emotions into game theory. We apply our model to team production and model a worker as being composed of a rational self, who chooses effort, and an emotional self,...

  • Review
  • Open Access
13 Citations
6,982 Views
14 Pages

7 August 2019

Game spaces in which an organism must repeatedly compete with an opponent for mutually exclusive outcomes are critical methodologies for understanding decision-making under pressure. In the non-transitive game rock, paper, scissors (RPS), the only te...

  • Article
  • Open Access
4 Citations
6,690 Views
17 Pages

Electoral Competition with Strategic Disclosure

  • Jacopo Bizzotto and
  • Benjamin Solow

6 July 2019

Recent developments in information and communication technologies allow candidates for office to engage in sophisticated messaging strategies to influence voter choice. We consider how access to different technologies influence the choice of policy p...

  • Article
  • Open Access
10 Citations
8,842 Views
15 Pages

Is Your Privacy for Sale? An Experiment on the Willingness to Reveal Sensitive Information

  • Janis Cloos,
  • Björn Frank,
  • Lukas Kampenhuber,
  • Stephany Karam,
  • Nhat Luong,
  • Daniel Möller,
  • Maria Monge-Larrain,
  • Nguyen Tan Dat,
  • Marco Nilgen and
  • Christoph Rössler

5 July 2019

We investigate whether individuals’ self-stated privacy behavior is correlated with their reservation price for the disclosure of personal and potentially sensitive information. Our incentivized experiment has a unique setting: Information abou...

  • Article
  • Open Access
1 Citations
6,353 Views
18 Pages

The Power of Requests in a Redistribution Game: An Experimental Study

  • Riccardo Pedersini,
  • Rosemarie Nagel and
  • Marc Le Menestrel

1 July 2019

In most situations of voluntary contribution people are willing to give at the beginning, however contribution rates decay over time. In a new setup we introduce non-enforceable sharing rules, as requests, in a repeated redistribution game (called ti...

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Games - ISSN 2073-4336