Table of Contents
Games, Volume 10, Issue 3 (September 2019) – 9 articles
- Issues are regarded as officially published after their release is announced to the table of contents alert mailing list.
- You may sign up for e-mail alerts to receive table of contents of newly released issues.
- PDF is the official format for papers published in both, html and pdf forms. To view the papers in pdf format, click on the "PDF Full-text" link, and use the free Adobe Reader to open them.
Cover Story (view full-size image) One distinguishing feature of modern electoral campaigns is a greater ability to target [...] Read more. One distinguishing feature of modern electoral campaigns is a greater ability to target advertisements to narrow groups of voters. We consider whether the ability to narrowly target advertisements causes candidates to target in policy choices as well. We model an election as a game between two office-motivated candidates. We consider an environment where there is no incentive to target policies to interest groups if voters are fully informed about their platform. We then assume that platforms are not fully observable and allow candidates to send simple messages to voters. We consider alternative message technologies. We find that a sufficiently sophisticated messaging technology causes candidates to inefficiently target policies. Our results are robust to negative advertising, where one candidate can reveal parts of their opponent's platform, and limits on the ability to target policies. View this paper.