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Games, Volume 10, Issue 3 (September 2019)

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Open AccessArticle
Team Production and Esteem: A Dual Selves Model with Belief-Dependent Preferences
Games 2019, 10(3), 33; https://doi.org/10.3390/g10030033
Received: 27 May 2019 / Revised: 20 July 2019 / Accepted: 10 August 2019 / Published: 14 August 2019
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Abstract
We propose a dual selves model to integrate affective responses and belief-dependent emotions into game theory. We apply our model to team production and model a worker as being composed of a rational self, who chooses effort, and an emotional self, who expresses [...] Read more.
We propose a dual selves model to integrate affective responses and belief-dependent emotions into game theory. We apply our model to team production and model a worker as being composed of a rational self, who chooses effort, and an emotional self, who expresses esteem. Similar to psychological game theory, utilities depend on beliefs, but only indirectly. More concretely, emotions affect utilities, and the expression of emotions depends on updated beliefs. Modeling affective responses as actions chosen by the emotional self allows us to apply standard game-theoretic solution concepts. The model reveals that with incomplete information about abilities, workers only choose high effort if esteem is expressed based on interpersonal comparisons and if the preference for esteem is a status preference. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Advances in Behavioral Economics: Empathy and Happiness)
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Open AccessReview
Behavioural Isomorphism, Cognitive Economy and Recursive Thought in Non-Transitive Game Strategy
Games 2019, 10(3), 32; https://doi.org/10.3390/g10030032
Received: 14 May 2019 / Revised: 30 July 2019 / Accepted: 2 August 2019 / Published: 7 August 2019
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Abstract
Game spaces in which an organism must repeatedly compete with an opponent for mutually exclusive outcomes are critical methodologies for understanding decision-making under pressure. In the non-transitive game rock, paper, scissors (RPS), the only technique that guarantees the lack of exploitation is to [...] Read more.
Game spaces in which an organism must repeatedly compete with an opponent for mutually exclusive outcomes are critical methodologies for understanding decision-making under pressure. In the non-transitive game rock, paper, scissors (RPS), the only technique that guarantees the lack of exploitation is to perform randomly in accordance with mixed-strategy. However, such behavior is thought to be outside bounded rationality and so decision-making can become deterministic, predictable, and ultimately exploitable. This review identifies similarities across economics, neuroscience, nonlinear dynamics, human, and animal cognition literatures, and provides a taxonomy of RPS strategy. RPS strategies are discussed in terms of (a) whether the relevant computations require sensitivity to item frequency, the cyclic relationships between responses, or the outcome of the previous trial, and (b) whether the strategy is framed around the self or other. The negative implication of this taxonomy is that despite the differences in cognitive economy and recursive thought, many of the identified strategies are behaviorally isomorphic. This makes it difficult to infer strategy from behavior. The positive implication is that this isomorphism can be used as a novel design feature in furthering our understanding of the attribution, agency, and acquisition of strategy in RPS and other game spaces. Full article
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Open AccessArticle
An Experimental Study of Self-Enforcing Coalitions
Games 2019, 10(3), 31; https://doi.org/10.3390/g10030031
Received: 3 July 2019 / Revised: 26 July 2019 / Accepted: 30 July 2019 / Published: 1 August 2019
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Abstract
We study a model in which agents endowed with power compete for a divisible resource by forming coalitions with other agents. The coalition with the greatest power wins the resource and divides it among its members via proportional sharing. We conduct an economic [...] Read more.
We study a model in which agents endowed with power compete for a divisible resource by forming coalitions with other agents. The coalition with the greatest power wins the resource and divides it among its members via proportional sharing. We conduct an economic experiment using this model to investigate possible behavioral factors that may explain deviations from theoretical predictions. The main findings show that agents display rational behavior when forming coalitions, especially when they know that a large proportion of their opponents play myopic strategies from the outset. Over time, however, agents learn to behave more strategically and even more rationally, thus enabling agents to display more of the behavior predicted by the coalition formation model with farsighted agents. Full article
Open AccessArticle
When Two Become One: How Group Mergers Affect Solidarity
Games 2019, 10(3), 30; https://doi.org/10.3390/g10030030
Received: 12 January 2019 / Revised: 5 July 2019 / Accepted: 9 July 2019 / Published: 19 July 2019
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Abstract
Solidarity in teamwork situations is important for the success and longevity of teams. This paper studies how helping group members is affected when groups are randomly merged and increase in size. Group mergers put social norms that are prevailing in previously small groups [...] Read more.
Solidarity in teamwork situations is important for the success and longevity of teams. This paper studies how helping group members is affected when groups are randomly merged and increase in size. Group mergers put social norms that are prevailing in previously small groups to the test as new team members may not share the same norms and values. I present results from an experiment in which subjects interact in groups and face the decision to help a group member who is in need of help due to an exogenous shock. Subjects interact in small groups in the first part of the experiment and groups are randomly merged to form big groups in the second part of the experiment. Helping rates are higher in merged groups compared with big groups that stay in the same constellation throughout the experiment. Moreover, in merged groups, high helping norms are more influential compared with low helping norms. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Norm and Risk Attitudes)
Open AccessArticle
Electoral Competition with Strategic Disclosure
Games 2019, 10(3), 29; https://doi.org/10.3390/g10030029
Received: 30 April 2019 / Revised: 27 June 2019 / Accepted: 28 June 2019 / Published: 6 July 2019
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Abstract
Recent developments in information and communication technologies allow candidates for office to engage in sophisticated messaging strategies to influence voter choice. We consider how access to different technologies influence the choice of policy platforms by candidates. We find that when candidates can target [...] Read more.
Recent developments in information and communication technologies allow candidates for office to engage in sophisticated messaging strategies to influence voter choice. We consider how access to different technologies influence the choice of policy platforms by candidates. We find that when candidates can target messages to specific voter groups, platforms are more likely to be inefficient. In particular, when candidates can run targeted campaigns, they commit to projects that benefit small groups even when the social cost of these projects outweigh their benefits. Our results are robust to negative advertising. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Political Games: Strategy, Persuasion, and Learning)
Open AccessArticle
Is Your Privacy for Sale? An Experiment on the Willingness to Reveal Sensitive Information
Games 2019, 10(3), 28; https://doi.org/10.3390/g10030028
Received: 6 May 2019 / Revised: 27 June 2019 / Accepted: 2 July 2019 / Published: 5 July 2019
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Abstract
We investigate whether individuals’ self-stated privacy behavior is correlated with their reservation price for the disclosure of personal and potentially sensitive information. Our incentivized experiment has a unique setting: Information about choices with real implications could be immediately disclosed to an audience of [...] Read more.
We investigate whether individuals’ self-stated privacy behavior is correlated with their reservation price for the disclosure of personal and potentially sensitive information. Our incentivized experiment has a unique setting: Information about choices with real implications could be immediately disclosed to an audience of fellow first semester students. Although we find a positive correlation between respondents’ willingness to accept (WTA) disclosure of their private information and their stated privacy behavior for some models, this correlation disappears when we change the specification of the privacy index. Independent of the privacy index chosen we find that the WTA is significantly influenced by individual responses to personal questions, as well as by different decisions to donate actual money, indicating that the willingness to protect private information depends on the delicacy of the information at stake. Full article
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Open AccessArticle
The Power of Requests in a Redistribution Game: An Experimental Study
Games 2019, 10(3), 27; https://doi.org/10.3390/g10030027
Received: 27 March 2019 / Revised: 15 May 2019 / Accepted: 11 June 2019 / Published: 1 July 2019
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Abstract
In most situations of voluntary contribution people are willing to give at the beginning, however contribution rates decay over time. In a new setup we introduce non-enforceable sharing rules, as requests, in a repeated redistribution game (called tip pooling). Three experimental treatments differ [...] Read more.
In most situations of voluntary contribution people are willing to give at the beginning, however contribution rates decay over time. In a new setup we introduce non-enforceable sharing rules, as requests, in a repeated redistribution game (called tip pooling). Three experimental treatments differ by the requested amount of sharing of privately known random endowments (tips), with one player never receiving any endowment. Using a hurdle model, we find no significant difference in free riding between the three sharing rules, but strong differences in positive contributions which, however, are lower than the rules prescribe. Furthermore, the average positive contribution remains stable over time, while free riding tends to increase. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Norms and Games)
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