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Games, Volume 10, Issue 3 (September 2019) – 9 articles

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Cover Story (view full-size image) One distinguishing feature of modern electoral campaigns is a greater ability to target [...] Read more.
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Open AccessArticle
Computational Behavioral Models for Public Goods Games on Social Networks
Games 2019, 10(3), 35; https://doi.org/10.3390/g10030035 - 02 Sep 2019
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 2358
Abstract
Cooperation is a fundamental aspect of well-organized societies and public good games are a useful metaphor for modeling cooperative behavior in the presence of strong incentives to free ride. Usually, social agents interact to play a public good game through network structures. Here, [...] Read more.
Cooperation is a fundamental aspect of well-organized societies and public good games are a useful metaphor for modeling cooperative behavior in the presence of strong incentives to free ride. Usually, social agents interact to play a public good game through network structures. Here, we use social network structures and computational agent rules inspired by recent experimental work in order to develop models of agent behavior playing public goods games. The results of our numerical simulations based on a couple of simple models show that agents behave in a manner qualitatively similar to what has been observed experimentally. Computational models such as those presented here are very useful to interpret observed behavior and to enhance computationally the limited variation that is possible in the experimental domain. By assuming a priori reasonable individual behaviors, the easiness of running simulations could also facilitate exploration prior to any experimental work in order to vary and estimate a number of key parameters that would be very difficult, if not impossible, to change during the actual experiment. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Behavioral Game Theory: Theory and Experiments)
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Open AccessArticle
Generalized Backward Induction: Justification for a Folk Algorithm
Games 2019, 10(3), 34; https://doi.org/10.3390/g10030034 - 30 Aug 2019
Viewed by 2749
Abstract
I introduce axiomatically infinite sequential games that extend Kuhn’s classical framework. Infinite games allow for (a) imperfect information, (b) an infinite horizon, and (c) infinite action sets. A generalized backward induction (GBI) procedure is defined for all such games over the roots of [...] Read more.
I introduce axiomatically infinite sequential games that extend Kuhn’s classical framework. Infinite games allow for (a) imperfect information, (b) an infinite horizon, and (c) infinite action sets. A generalized backward induction (GBI) procedure is defined for all such games over the roots of subgames. A strategy profile that survives backward pruning is called a backward induction solution (BIS). The main result of this paper finds that, similar to finite games of perfect information, the sets of BIS and subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) coincide for both pure strategies and for behavioral strategies that satisfy the conditions of finite support and finite crossing. Additionally, I discuss five examples of well-known games and political economy models that can be solved with GBI but not classic backward induction (BI). The contributions of this paper include (a) the axiomatization of a class of infinite games, (b) the extension of backward induction to infinite games, and (c) the proof that BIS and SPEs are identical for infinite games. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Political Economy, Social Choice and Game Theory)
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Open AccessArticle
Team Production and Esteem: A Dual Selves Model with Belief-Dependent Preferences
Games 2019, 10(3), 33; https://doi.org/10.3390/g10030033 - 14 Aug 2019
Viewed by 2522
Abstract
We propose a dual selves model to integrate affective responses and belief-dependent emotions into game theory. We apply our model to team production and model a worker as being composed of a rational self, who chooses effort, and an emotional self, who expresses [...] Read more.
We propose a dual selves model to integrate affective responses and belief-dependent emotions into game theory. We apply our model to team production and model a worker as being composed of a rational self, who chooses effort, and an emotional self, who expresses esteem. Similar to psychological game theory, utilities depend on beliefs, but only indirectly. More concretely, emotions affect utilities, and the expression of emotions depends on updated beliefs. Modeling affective responses as actions chosen by the emotional self allows us to apply standard game-theoretic solution concepts. The model reveals that with incomplete information about abilities, workers only choose high effort if esteem is expressed based on interpersonal comparisons and if the preference for esteem is a status preference. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Advances in Behavioral Economics: Empathy and Happiness)
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Open AccessReview
Behavioural Isomorphism, Cognitive Economy and Recursive Thought in Non-Transitive Game Strategy
Games 2019, 10(3), 32; https://doi.org/10.3390/g10030032 - 07 Aug 2019
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 2686
Abstract
Game spaces in which an organism must repeatedly compete with an opponent for mutually exclusive outcomes are critical methodologies for understanding decision-making under pressure. In the non-transitive game rock, paper, scissors (RPS), the only technique that guarantees the lack of exploitation is to [...] Read more.
Game spaces in which an organism must repeatedly compete with an opponent for mutually exclusive outcomes are critical methodologies for understanding decision-making under pressure. In the non-transitive game rock, paper, scissors (RPS), the only technique that guarantees the lack of exploitation is to perform randomly in accordance with mixed-strategy. However, such behavior is thought to be outside bounded rationality and so decision-making can become deterministic, predictable, and ultimately exploitable. This review identifies similarities across economics, neuroscience, nonlinear dynamics, human, and animal cognition literatures, and provides a taxonomy of RPS strategy. RPS strategies are discussed in terms of (a) whether the relevant computations require sensitivity to item frequency, the cyclic relationships between responses, or the outcome of the previous trial, and (b) whether the strategy is framed around the self or other. The negative implication of this taxonomy is that despite the differences in cognitive economy and recursive thought, many of the identified strategies are behaviorally isomorphic. This makes it difficult to infer strategy from behavior. The positive implication is that this isomorphism can be used as a novel design feature in furthering our understanding of the attribution, agency, and acquisition of strategy in RPS and other game spaces. Full article
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Open AccessArticle
An Experimental Study of Self-Enforcing Coalitions
Games 2019, 10(3), 31; https://doi.org/10.3390/g10030031 - 01 Aug 2019
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 2681
Abstract
We study a model in which agents endowed with power compete for a divisible resource by forming coalitions with other agents. The coalition with the greatest power wins the resource and divides it among its members via proportional sharing. We conduct an economic [...] Read more.
We study a model in which agents endowed with power compete for a divisible resource by forming coalitions with other agents. The coalition with the greatest power wins the resource and divides it among its members via proportional sharing. We conduct an economic experiment using this model to investigate possible behavioral factors that may explain deviations from theoretical predictions. The main findings show that agents display rational behavior when forming coalitions, especially when they know that a large proportion of their opponents play myopic strategies from the outset. Over time, however, agents learn to behave more strategically and even more rationally, thus enabling agents to display more of the behavior predicted by the coalition formation model with farsighted agents. Full article
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Open AccessArticle
When Two Become One: How Group Mergers Affect Solidarity
Games 2019, 10(3), 30; https://doi.org/10.3390/g10030030 - 19 Jul 2019
Viewed by 2791
Abstract
Solidarity in teamwork situations is important for the success and longevity of teams. This paper studies how helping group members is affected when groups are randomly merged and increase in size. Group mergers put social norms that are prevailing in previously small groups [...] Read more.
Solidarity in teamwork situations is important for the success and longevity of teams. This paper studies how helping group members is affected when groups are randomly merged and increase in size. Group mergers put social norms that are prevailing in previously small groups to the test as new team members may not share the same norms and values. I present results from an experiment in which subjects interact in groups and face the decision to help a group member who is in need of help due to an exogenous shock. Subjects interact in small groups in the first part of the experiment and groups are randomly merged to form big groups in the second part of the experiment. Helping rates are higher in merged groups compared with big groups that stay in the same constellation throughout the experiment. Moreover, in merged groups, high helping norms are more influential compared with low helping norms. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Norm and Risk Attitudes)
Open AccessArticle
Electoral Competition with Strategic Disclosure
Games 2019, 10(3), 29; https://doi.org/10.3390/g10030029 - 06 Jul 2019
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 3125
Abstract
Recent developments in information and communication technologies allow candidates for office to engage in sophisticated messaging strategies to influence voter choice. We consider how access to different technologies influence the choice of policy platforms by candidates. We find that when candidates can target [...] Read more.
Recent developments in information and communication technologies allow candidates for office to engage in sophisticated messaging strategies to influence voter choice. We consider how access to different technologies influence the choice of policy platforms by candidates. We find that when candidates can target messages to specific voter groups, platforms are more likely to be inefficient. In particular, when candidates can run targeted campaigns, they commit to projects that benefit small groups even when the social cost of these projects outweigh their benefits. Our results are robust to negative advertising. Full article
Open AccessArticle
Is Your Privacy for Sale? An Experiment on the Willingness to Reveal Sensitive Information
Games 2019, 10(3), 28; https://doi.org/10.3390/g10030028 - 05 Jul 2019
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 4006
Abstract
We investigate whether individuals’ self-stated privacy behavior is correlated with their reservation price for the disclosure of personal and potentially sensitive information. Our incentivized experiment has a unique setting: Information about choices with real implications could be immediately disclosed to an audience of [...] Read more.
We investigate whether individuals’ self-stated privacy behavior is correlated with their reservation price for the disclosure of personal and potentially sensitive information. Our incentivized experiment has a unique setting: Information about choices with real implications could be immediately disclosed to an audience of fellow first semester students. Although we find a positive correlation between respondents’ willingness to accept (WTA) disclosure of their private information and their stated privacy behavior for some models, this correlation disappears when we change the specification of the privacy index. Independent of the privacy index chosen we find that the WTA is significantly influenced by individual responses to personal questions, as well as by different decisions to donate actual money, indicating that the willingness to protect private information depends on the delicacy of the information at stake. Full article
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Open AccessArticle
The Power of Requests in a Redistribution Game: An Experimental Study
Games 2019, 10(3), 27; https://doi.org/10.3390/g10030027 - 01 Jul 2019
Viewed by 3026
Abstract
In most situations of voluntary contribution people are willing to give at the beginning, however contribution rates decay over time. In a new setup we introduce non-enforceable sharing rules, as requests, in a repeated redistribution game (called tip pooling). Three experimental treatments differ [...] Read more.
In most situations of voluntary contribution people are willing to give at the beginning, however contribution rates decay over time. In a new setup we introduce non-enforceable sharing rules, as requests, in a repeated redistribution game (called tip pooling). Three experimental treatments differ by the requested amount of sharing of privately known random endowments (tips), with one player never receiving any endowment. Using a hurdle model, we find no significant difference in free riding between the three sharing rules, but strong differences in positive contributions which, however, are lower than the rules prescribe. Furthermore, the average positive contribution remains stable over time, while free riding tends to increase. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Norms and Games)
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