Special Issue "Evolutionary Ecology and Game Theory"

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (10 March 2019).

Special Issue Editor

Guest Editor
Dr. Jonathan Rowell

Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of North Carolina at Greensboro
Website | E-Mail
Interests: evolutionary game theory, behavioral ecology, differential equations, spatial structure, cooperation, sexual selection, epidemiology, resource competition, dispersal, signaling

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Evolutionary game theory is the study of changes in strategies or characteristic traits employed within a population or by a focal individual in response to the selection pressures imposed by both internal and external conditions. In its original biological context, evolutionary game theory applies to the distribution of morphological or behavioral phenotypes within a population when these traits are largely heritable; however, the theoretical framework is equally useful in describing behavioral modifications through learning or response conditioning. Selection pressures also may operate at multiple time scales and with contrasting effects, such as may occur with male mating preferences on behavioral and evolutionary time scales.

This Special Issue of Games is intended to highlight current developments within the field of evolutionary game theory and its applications to questions in evolutionary biology and behavioral ecology, as well as issues arising in psychology, sociology, economics, anthropology, and linguistics. Authors are encouraged to submit both theoretical and empirical studies that fit this general framework. Of particular interest are papers concerning resource exploitation in an environment changing at multiple levels of scale, migration and adaptive radiation in novel environments, territoriality, inter- and intra-sexual contests, the evolution of cooperation, group versus individual identification, division of labor and the development of parasitism, disease resistance, and the evolution of social norms and linguistic elements.

Dr. Jonathan Rowell
Guest Editor

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All papers will be peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access quarterly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1000 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • behavioral ecology
  • spatial structure
  • cooperation
  • sexual selection
  • division of labor
  • disease resistance
  • resource competition
  • adaptive radiation
  • group identification
  • cultural evolution

Published Papers (2 papers)

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Research

Open AccessArticle
Indirect Evolution and Aggregate-Taking Behavior in a Football League: Utility Maximization, Profit Maximization, and Success
Games 2019, 10(2), 22; https://doi.org/10.3390/g10020022
Received: 26 March 2019 / Revised: 26 April 2019 / Accepted: 7 May 2019 / Published: 11 May 2019
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Abstract
An evolutionary model of European football was applied to analyze a two-stage indirect evolution game in which teams choose their utility function in the first stage, and their optimal talent investments in the second stage. Given the second-stage optimal aggregate-taking strategy (ATS) of [...] Read more.
An evolutionary model of European football was applied to analyze a two-stage indirect evolution game in which teams choose their utility function in the first stage, and their optimal talent investments in the second stage. Given the second-stage optimal aggregate-taking strategy (ATS) of talent investment, it was shown that teams may choose a mix of profit or win maximization as their objective, where the former is of considerably higher relevance with linear weights for profits, and is more successful in the utility function. With linear weights for profit and win maximization, maximizing profits is the only evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of teams. The results change if quadratic weights for profits and wins are employed. With increasing talent productivity, win maximization dominates in the static and in the dynamic versions of the model. As a consequence, it is an open question whether the commercialization of football (and other sports) leagues will lead to more profit or win maximization. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Evolutionary Ecology and Game Theory)
Open AccessArticle
The Evolution of Cooperation in One-Dimensional Mobile Populations with Deterministic Dispersal
Games 2019, 10(1), 2; https://doi.org/10.3390/g10010002
Received: 23 October 2018 / Revised: 22 December 2018 / Accepted: 28 December 2018 / Published: 1 January 2019
PDF Full-text (506 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Abstract
I investigate how different dispersal patterns affect the evolution of cooperation in a spatially-structured population. I consider a finite fixed-size population of cooperators and free-riders residing on a one-dimensional lattice with periodic boundaries. Individuals interact via a multiplayer game, which is a version [...] Read more.
I investigate how different dispersal patterns affect the evolution of cooperation in a spatially-structured population. I consider a finite fixed-size population of cooperators and free-riders residing on a one-dimensional lattice with periodic boundaries. Individuals interact via a multiplayer game, which is a version of a public goods game, and the population evolves via a Moran process. Individuals try to improve their interactions by evaluating the current state of the environment and moving to locations with better payoffs. I ran stochastic simulations of the evolution of this Markov process and found that if individuals disperse deterministically to locations with the best payoffs, then cooperation can still be maintained even in the worst-case scenarios, albeit at reduced levels compared to the better-case scenarios. This contrasts with an earlier investigation of probabilistic dispersal patterns, which resulted in the breakdown of cooperation in sparse populations with small interaction neighborhoods, a high mobility rate, and a large dispersal range. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Evolutionary Ecology and Game Theory)
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