Special Issue "Game Theoretic Models in Natural Resource Economics"

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (15 July 2019).

Special Issue Editor

Guest Editor
Dr. Hans-Peter Weikard

Department of Social Sciences, Wageningen University and Research Wageningen, The Netherlands
Website | E-Mail
Interests: International Environmental Agreements, Natural Resource Economics

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

For this Special Issue on "Game Theoretic Models in Natural Resource Economics" we invite papers applying cooperative or non-cooperative game theory to problems of natural resource economics and management.

Very often, markets for natural resources lack important features of competitive Walrasian markets implying inefficient use of scarce resources. Market power (e.g., oligopolies and cartels in the mining sector), non-rivalry of consumption (e.g. biodiversity), spatial externalities (e.g., conservation forests), network externalities (e.g., river pollution), ill-defined property rights (e.g., fisheries in international waters) or weak enforcement (e.g., illegal resource extraction), are some examples where the strategic interaction of agents generates inefficient results. Appropriate institutional designs can mitigate the problems and improve resource use efficiency. Distributional concerns are important. Natural resources serve human needs and access to resources is key to securing livelihoods. Here issues of fairness arise. Moreover, with missing or malfunctioning markets the distribution of initial holdings will also impact efficiency. This Special Issue will gather novel game theoretic analyses that will help us shape fair and efficient institutions that govern natural resource use.    

Dr. Hans-Peter Weikard
Guest Editor

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All papers will be peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access quarterly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) will be partially funded by institutions through Knowledge Unlatched and partially funded by MDPI, resulting in no direct charge to authors by the end of 2018. Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • Axiomatic models of resource sharing
  • Contest games
  • Models of cooperation and conflict
  • Coalition formation
  • Asymmetric information
  • Illegal resource extraction and enforcement
  • Dynamic games of natural resource use
  • Location games, spatial game models

Published Papers (1 paper)

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Research

Open AccessArticle
Sharing a River with Downstream Externalities
Games 2019, 10(2), 23; https://doi.org/10.3390/g10020023
Received: 2 March 2019 / Revised: 8 May 2019 / Accepted: 10 May 2019 / Published: 15 May 2019
PDF Full-text (274 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Abstract
We consider the problem of efficient emission abatement in a multi polluter setting, where agents are located along a river in which net emissions accumulate and induce negative externalities to downstream riparians. Assuming a cooperative transferable utility game, we seek welfare distributions that [...] Read more.
We consider the problem of efficient emission abatement in a multi polluter setting, where agents are located along a river in which net emissions accumulate and induce negative externalities to downstream riparians. Assuming a cooperative transferable utility game, we seek welfare distributions that satisfy all agents’ participation constraints and, in addition, a fairness constraint implying that no coalition of agents should be better off than it were if all non-members of the coalition would not pollute the river at all. We show that the downstream incremental distribution, as introduced by Ambec and Sprumont (2002), is the only welfare distribution satisfying both constraints. In addition, we show that this result holds true for numerous extensions of our model. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theoretic Models in Natural Resource Economics)
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