Special Issue "Game Theoretic Models in Natural Resource Economics"

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (15 July 2019).

Special Issue Editor

Dr. Hans-Peter Weikard
E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Department of Social Sciences, Wageningen University and Research Wageningen, The Netherlands
Interests: International Environmental Agreements, Natural Resource Economics

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

For this Special Issue on "Game Theoretic Models in Natural Resource Economics" we invite papers applying cooperative or non-cooperative game theory to problems of natural resource economics and management.

Very often, markets for natural resources lack important features of competitive Walrasian markets implying inefficient use of scarce resources. Market power (e.g., oligopolies and cartels in the mining sector), non-rivalry of consumption (e.g. biodiversity), spatial externalities (e.g., conservation forests), network externalities (e.g., river pollution), ill-defined property rights (e.g., fisheries in international waters) or weak enforcement (e.g., illegal resource extraction), are some examples where the strategic interaction of agents generates inefficient results. Appropriate institutional designs can mitigate the problems and improve resource use efficiency. Distributional concerns are important. Natural resources serve human needs and access to resources is key to securing livelihoods. Here issues of fairness arise. Moreover, with missing or malfunctioning markets the distribution of initial holdings will also impact efficiency. This Special Issue will gather novel game theoretic analyses that will help us shape fair and efficient institutions that govern natural resource use.    

Dr. Hans-Peter Weikard
Guest Editor

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All papers will be peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access quarterly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) will be partially funded by institutions through Knowledge Unlatched and partially funded by MDPI, resulting in no direct charge to authors by the end of 2018. Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • Axiomatic models of resource sharing
  • Contest games
  • Models of cooperation and conflict
  • Coalition formation
  • Asymmetric information
  • Illegal resource extraction and enforcement
  • Dynamic games of natural resource use
  • Location games, spatial game models

Published Papers (3 papers)

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Research

Open AccessArticle
The Two-Stage Game Approach to Coalition Formation: Where We Stand and Ways to Go
Games 2020, 11(1), 3; https://doi.org/10.3390/g11010003 - 01 Jan 2020
Abstract
Coalition formation is often analysed in an almost non-cooperative way, as a two-stage game that consists of a first stage comprising membership actions and a second stage with physical actions, such as the provision of a public good. We formalised this widely used [...] Read more.
Coalition formation is often analysed in an almost non-cooperative way, as a two-stage game that consists of a first stage comprising membership actions and a second stage with physical actions, such as the provision of a public good. We formalised this widely used approach for the case where actions are simultaneous in each stage. Herein, we give special attention to the case of a symmetric physical game. Various theoretical results, in particular, for cartel games, are provided. As they are crucial, recent results on the uniqueness of coalitional equilibria of Cournot-like physical games are reconsidered. Various concrete examples are included. Finally, we discuss research strategies to obtain results about equilibrium coalition structures with abstract physical games in terms of qualitative properties of their primitives. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theoretic Models in Natural Resource Economics)
Open AccessArticle
Stable International Environmental Agreements: Large Coalitions that Achieve Little
Games 2019, 10(4), 47; https://doi.org/10.3390/g10040047 - 08 Nov 2019
Abstract
A standard result of coalition formation games is that stable coalitions are very small if the coalition plays Nash vis-à-vis the rest of the world and if abatement costs are quadratic. It has been shown that larger coalitions and even the grand coalition [...] Read more.
A standard result of coalition formation games is that stable coalitions are very small if the coalition plays Nash vis-à-vis the rest of the world and if abatement costs are quadratic. It has been shown that larger coalitions and even the grand coalition are possible if the marginal abatement cost is concave. The paper confirms this result, but shows that abatement activities by large coalitions smaller than the grand coalition can be very small. This can be ‘repaired’ only by assuming that the marginal abatement cost curve changes its curvature extremely once the stable coalition has been reached. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theoretic Models in Natural Resource Economics)
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Open AccessArticle
Sharing a River with Downstream Externalities
Games 2019, 10(2), 23; https://doi.org/10.3390/g10020023 - 15 May 2019
Abstract
We consider the problem of efficient emission abatement in a multi polluter setting, where agents are located along a river in which net emissions accumulate and induce negative externalities to downstream riparians. Assuming a cooperative transferable utility game, we seek welfare distributions that [...] Read more.
We consider the problem of efficient emission abatement in a multi polluter setting, where agents are located along a river in which net emissions accumulate and induce negative externalities to downstream riparians. Assuming a cooperative transferable utility game, we seek welfare distributions that satisfy all agents’ participation constraints and, in addition, a fairness constraint implying that no coalition of agents should be better off than it were if all non-members of the coalition would not pollute the river at all. We show that the downstream incremental distribution, as introduced by Ambec and Sprumont (2002), is the only welfare distribution satisfying both constraints. In addition, we show that this result holds true for numerous extensions of our model. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theoretic Models in Natural Resource Economics)
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