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Optimal Majority Rule in Referenda

by 1 and 2,3,4,*
Department of Theory, Party School of Haimen Committee of CPC (Haimen Administration Institute), Haimen 226100, China
1455 Boulevard de Maisonneuve Ouest, Department of Economics, Concordia University, Montreal, QC H3G 1M8, Canada
CIRANO, Montreal, QC H3A 2M8, Canada
CIREQ, Montreal, QC H3T 1N8, Canada
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Games 2019, 10(2), 25;
Received: 1 May 2019 / Revised: 27 May 2019 / Accepted: 29 May 2019 / Published: 3 June 2019
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Political Economy, Social Choice and Game Theory)
Adopting the group turnout model of Herrera and Mattozzi, J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 2010, 8, 838–871, we investigate direct democracy with supermajority rule and different preference intensities for two sides of a referendum: Reform versus status quo. Two parties spend money and effort to mobilize their voters. We characterize the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria. We investigate the optimal majority rule that maximizes voters’ welfare. Using an example, we show that the relationship between the optimal majority rule and the preference intensity is not monotonic—the optimal majority rule is initially decreasing and then increasing in the preference intensity of the status quo side. We also show that when the preference intensity of the status quo side is higher, the easiness to mobilize voters on the status quo side is lower, or the payoff that the reform party receives is higher, the optimal majority rule is more likely to be supermajority. View Full-Text
Keywords: referendum; majority rule; supermajority; mobilization; social welfare referendum; majority rule; supermajority; mobilization; social welfare
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MDPI and ACS Style

Cheng, Q.; Li, M. Optimal Majority Rule in Referenda. Games 2019, 10, 25.

AMA Style

Cheng Q, Li M. Optimal Majority Rule in Referenda. Games. 2019; 10(2):25.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Cheng, Qingqing, and Ming Li. 2019. "Optimal Majority Rule in Referenda" Games 10, no. 2: 25.

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