Special Issue on Matching under Preferences

Dear Colleagues,

Matching problems with preferences occur in widespread applications such as the assignment of school-leavers to universities, junior doctors to hospitals, students to campus housing, children to schools, kidney transplant patients to donors and so on. The common thread is that individuals have preference lists over the possible outcomes and the task is to find a matching of the participants that is in some sense optimal with respect to these preferences. This special issue will focus on matching problems involving preferences from an algorithms and complexity standpoint.

The topics of relevance in this context can be categorised as follows:

• two-sided matchings involving agents on both sides (e.g., college admissions, resident allocation, job markets, school choice, etc.)
• two-sided matchings involving agents and items (e.g., house allocation, course allocation, project allocation, assigning papers to reviewers, school choice, etc.)
• one-sided matchings (e.g., roommates problem, kidney exchanges, etc.)
• matching with payments (e.g., assignment game, auctions, etc.)

Some of the papers appearing in this issue will be fully revised and extended versions of selected papers that appeared at the workshop MATCH-UP 2012 which took place in Budapest on 19-20 July 2012. However, submission to the special issue is not restricted to papers that appeared at this workshop, provided that they fit the scope of the special issue.

Dr. David Manlove
Dr. Péter Biró
Guest Editors