Search Results (144)

This study develops a cooperative game-theoretic framework for financing global public goods in an economy with asymmetric member states and applies it to the case of United Nations funding. The analysis examines whether a personalized-pricing contribution structure can improve upon an empirically grounded non-cooperative benchmark derived from observed member-state contribution patterns. Moving from a Nash-equilibrium benchmark in which states act primarily in self-interest to a cooperative model, the proposed approach aligns each country’s financial contributions with the benefits it derives from United Nations activities. Using agent-based simulations calibrated to United Nations contribution data, this paper compares the benchmark allocation with the cooperative Trading equilibrium and shows that the proposed framework increases global utility, reduces free riding, and improves the efficiency of resource allocation. The findings suggest that this framework can serve as a normative benchmark for a more equitable financing arrangement for global public goods in the United Nations context. Further research is needed to evaluate the institutional and political feasibility of implementing such a model in practice. Full article

Background/Objectives: Free riding in healthcare occurs when actors benefit from health-related public goods, risk-pooling arrangements, common resources, or cooperative institutions while contributing less than is socially optimal. This review clarifies how free-rider dynamics differ across vaccination, health insurance and universal health coverage, antimicrobial resistance, organ donation and transplant allocation, and global health cooperation. Methods: A narrative review with conceptual synthesis was conducted. Searches of PubMed and Scopus were complemented by citation tracking and targeted inclusion of foundational economics, game theory, public-health ethics, and market-design sources. Sources were mapped by domain, actors, strategies, payoff structure, information conditions, time horizon, enforcement mechanism and policy relevance. Results: Across domains, free riding arises when private payoffs diverge from collective welfare, but the underlying game differs: threshold public-good and coordination games in vaccination, adverse-selection and participation games in insurance, common-pool-resource dilemmas in antimicrobial use, donor-registration and matching-market problems in transplantation, and repeated public-goods games in global health. The review identifies three policy functions: altering payoffs, altering information and beliefs, and changing the structure, repetition, or enforceability of the game. Conclusions: Game theory is most useful as a mechanism-based framework rather than a stand-alone policy prescription. Its policy value depends on empirical calibration, institutional context, ethical legitimacy, and attention to equity, incomplete information, behavioral responses, and enforcement capacity. The synthesis also emphasizes boundary conditions: game-theoretic prescriptions can fail when political economy, asymmetric power, implementation capacity, access barriers, or trust-related drivers are ignored. Full article

Public goods provision is vulnerable to free riding, making sustained cooperation a central challenge in economics. Fehr and Schmidt’s inequity-aversion model explains how fairness concerns can support cooperation, but it treats preferences as fixed. Motivated by Kimbrough and Vostroknutov’s norm-sensitivity framework, this paper develops a reduced-form dynamic framework in which observed norm violations erode normative commitment over time. As normative commitment declines, the model maps this change into Fehr–Schmidt-style fairness parameters: guilt weakens and envy rises. These parameters provide an interpretive representation of norm erosion, while behavior is generated through a tractable contribution-scaling rule. The framework is calibrated illustratively to the public goods experiment of Fischbacher and Gächter. The calibration is not causal evidence of preference change and does not directly identify inequity-aversion parameters. It shows that a context-dependent preference channel can reproduce the observed aggregate decline in cooperation and generate testable implications. When no free-rider exposure is present, cooperation does not decline within the model. The model also predicts a nonlinear relationship between population-level free-rider prevalence and cooperation. Finally, because the model imposes a lower bound on normative commitment, this institutional floor determines long-run cooperation. The findings should be interpreted as model-based hypotheses for future experimental and field research. Full article

This paper investigates the evolution of public cooperation within a four-strategy public goods game that incorporates both consistently and inconsistently moralistic exclusion mechanisms. Using replicator dynamics in an infinite well-mixed population, we demonstrate that the presence of Inconsistent Moralists (IMs), i.e., non-contributors who hypocritically exclude other defectors, fundamentally reshapes the dynamical structure of the multi-player social dilemma game. While the system admits no interior fixed point and the IM strategy itself is evolutionarily unstable, IM acts as a critical catalyst by destabilizing pure defection and redirecting evolutionary trajectories toward exclusion-based cooperation. Ultimately, these findings reveal that diverse enforcement strategies can qualitatively alter evolutionary outcomes by providing a previously overlooked indirect pathway for cooperation to emerge and persist in social dilemmas. Full article

City-scale augmented reality (AR) learning paths are outdoor, multi-stop educational routes delivered through mobile devices in public space. This paper examines the Art Nouveau Path, a mobile AR game (MARG) route in Aveiro, Portugal, as a deployable learning service. The focus is on implementation requirements and traceability rather than learning outcomes. The analysis combined profiling of eight points of interest (POIs) and 36 tasks, group-session logs from 118 sessions, and teacher-facing evidence from a validation workshop (T1-VAL, N = 30) and on-site observation (T2-OBS, N = 24). Open-text responses were segmented into meaning units and coded with an eight-determinant taxonomy, with good intercoder reliability (Krippendorff’s alpha = 0.83). Logs and the post-path questionnaire (S2-POST, N = 439) were used only to describe enactment feasibility and data integrity. The strongest determinants concerned onboarding and legibility, marker robustness and recovery, and curriculum alignment, together with safety and fallback needs. These signals were translated into 18 testable requirements linked to six transfer artefacts for enactment, maintenance, incident handling, and fallback. Overall, the study provides an implementation-oriented specification to support auditability, replication, and transfer in city-scale AR learning services. Full article

The digital divide between large enterprises and SMEs (Small and Medium-sized Enterprises) within industrial clusters poses a significant challenge to achieving collective digital transformation, exacerbated by the quasi-public goods, attributes of digital inclusion ecosystems, and the prevalence of free-riding behavior. This paper investigates whether platform enterprises, as core actors occupying structural holes in cluster networks, can foster the co-construction of a digitally inclusive ecosystem. We developed a complex network public goods game model, incorporating performance feedback into a modified Fermi learning to capture firms’ adaptive decision-making based on historical and social aspirations. The model simulates strategic interactions on both small-world and scale-free networks, characteristic of industrial clusters. Numerical simulations reveal that: (1) The core driver of co-construction is the investment return coefficient; (2) Performance feedback amplifies individual rationality, accelerating the formation or collapse of cooperation depending on the investment return coefficient; (3) Platform empowerment—specifically, selectively connecting and incentivizing cooperative firms—effectively promotes ecosystem co-construction, with this strategy proving most impactful when investment returns are moderate. Furthermore, while this selective empowerment strategy benefits the cluster overall, its effect on the platform’s own revenue is network-dependent, showing a more pronounced decline in small-world structures. This study provides a novel analytical framework for understanding strategic interactions in digital inclusion and offers practical insights for policymakers and platform leaders in orchestrating collaborative digital transformation. Full article

Emotional intelligence (EI), specifically the capacity to recognize and understand one’s own emotions and those of others, is pivotal for developing the interpersonal skills that foster effective collaboration. This is especially crucial for developing trust in others, which serves as the necessary foundation for functioning in our increasingly impersonal contemporary society. Although extensive research has been conducted on trust in adults, empirical evidence for children remains limited. Quantifying the extent to which trust exists in young children, whether it differs from trust in adults, and how it changes with age, gender, and various psychological and school culture factors is essential for understanding how educational environments can foster its development. In this article, we analyze trust among almost 3000 fourth-grade children from 135 schools, measured based on behaviors exhibited during a Public Goods Game. The results align with other studies, showing that trust is substantially higher towards the in-group (classmates) than the out-group. A notable gender effect was observed, with boys exhibiting significantly higher levels of trust than girls. Trust was also higher in municipal schools compared to state-subsidized private schools. Personality traits, measured via the Big Five model using the Pictorial Personality Traits Questionnaire for Children (PPTQ-C), also emerged as influential. Specifically, elevated levels of Agreeableness and Conscientiousness predicted increased trust in both in-groups and out-groups. Extraversion and Openness to Experience also played a role, although to a lesser extent. Full article

Public goods games under asymmetric endowments have been widely discussed in the literature; however, few studies have addressed how inequality influences normative beliefs and the subsequent burden-sharing behaviors. To address this gap, we conducted two online survey experiments in both hypothetical and real-income scenarios, focusing on the mediation effects of self-serving bias and other-regarding preferences. The findings showed that while unequal endowment status induced self-serving personal beliefs and burden-sharing behaviors, it also enhanced reciprocity and offset self-serving bias in a real-income scenario. Only high-endowment status significantly influenced beliefs and behaviors. This study reveals a trade-off between self-serving bias and reciprocity in social cooperation, offering new insights for fairness beliefs. Full article

Background: Prostate cancer is a major public health concern in Ghana, where most cases present late and mortality remains high. Community education is essential for improving awareness and early detection. Traditional health talks are widely used, but interactive approaches such as board games have received little evaluation. Aim: To compare the effectiveness of a Social Cognitive Theory–Socioecological Model-based literacy board game (S-S-LIBOG) with a traditional health talk in improving prostate cancer knowledge, attitudes, and perceptions. Methods: A quasi-experimental, two-arm interventional study was conducted in a semi-urban Ghanaian cohort. Participants (n = 197) were allocated to either the board game arm (n = 80) or the health talk arm (n = 61) after accounting for attrition. A structured questionnaire measured knowledge, attitudes, and perceptions (KAP) before and after intervention. Statistical analyses at 5% alpha level included chi-square tests, two-proportion Z-tests, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, and multivariate logistic regression. Results: Among participants, 29.4% were female, 64.5% male, and 6.1% other genders. Tertiary education was reported by 81.7%, secondary 9.6%, postgraduate 5.6%, and primary 3.0%. Ethnicities: Ewe 41.6%, Akan 26.9%, Northern 13.7%, Ga 6.6%, Guan 1.5%, others 9.6%. Rural dwellers: 29.9%. LIBOG improved ‘good knowledge level’ from 35.0% at baseline to 60.0% post-intervention, compared to 35.0% to 62.3% by the Health Talk (HT). S-S-LIBOG also narrowed gender, education, and lifestyle disparities in KAP, with males showing higher odds of positive attitude (OR = 4.16, p = 0.004) and perception (OR = 2.79, p = 0.047), and rural residents having increased odds of good knowledge (OR = 4.39, p = 0.041) post—its intervention. HT similarly equalized disparities, except for perception, which remained linked to education. The significant improvements in knowledge were (LIBOG: z = 2.85, p = 0.004; HT: z = 3.10, p = 0.002). Even though health talks achieved higher overall knowledge gains, no statistically significant difference in overall effectiveness was observed between the two methods (Wilcoxon W = 102.0, p = 0.107). Acceptability of the board game was high, with over 80% of participants reporting satisfaction. Conclusions: The S-S-LIBOG board game was not inferior to the traditional health talk, showing particular strengths in enhancing attitudes and perceptions. Its interactive and culturally adapted design makes it a feasible adjunct to conventional health education methods. Future studies should examine long-term impacts and application in more diverse populations. This study was retrospectively registered by the Pan African Clinical Trial Registry on 10 October 2025; with the Trial Registration number PACTR202510512711680. Full article

We propose a one-shot, non-cooperative mechanism that implements the core in a large class of public goods games. Players simultaneously choose conditional commitment functions, which are binding unilateral commitments that condition a player’s contribution on the contributions of others. We prove that the set of strong Nash equilibrium outcomes of this mechanism coincides exactly with the core of the underlying cooperative game. We further show that these core outcomes can be found via simple individual learning dynamics. Full article

We investigate power indices for simple games with precoalitions which distribute power among players in an external and an internal step. We extend an existing approach which uses the Public Good index both on the external level in the quotient game as well as on the internal level for measuring the leverage of players to threaten their peers through departing the precoalition. We replace the Public Good index in that model by five other efficient power indices, i.e., the Shapley–Shubik index, the Deegan–Packel index, the Johnston index and two indices based on null player free winning coalitions. Axiomatizations of the novel power indices with threat partitions are presented. We also propose a slight modification to the existing framework for threat power indices which guarantees that null players are always assigned zero power. Numerical results for all power indices combined with different threat partitions are presented and discussed. Full article

Given the continued relevance of perceived scarcity, understanding how a scarcity mindset influences human cooperation remains critical. However, previous research has yielded mixed results regarding this relationship. To clarify these inconsistencies, this study examined the impact of a scarcity mindset on cooperation within various social normative contexts. Participants were randomly assigned to either a scarcity or abundance mindset and engaged in a Public Goods Game under descriptive or injunctive normative conditions, each with high or low prosocial expectations. The results revealed that in both normative contexts, individuals with a scarcity mindset exhibited greater cooperation than those with an abundance mindset. Individuals also cooperated more under high prosocial norms compared to low ones. Importantly, the interaction effect revealed that while cooperation did not differ between the two mindsets under low prosocial norms, the scarcity mindset led to significantly greater cooperation under high prosocial norms. These findings provide new insights into the scarcity–cooperation dynamic and suggest that robust prosocial norms can amplify the cooperative tendencies associated with a scarcity mindset, highlighting the importance of leveraging social norms to enhance cooperation in resource-scarce situations. Full article

Human cooperation is ubiquitous and instinctive. We are among the most cooperative species on Earth. Still, research mostly focuses on why we cooperate, instead of understanding why some of us do not do so. The public goods game can be used to map human cooperation as well as to study free riding. We acquired data through an online, unincentivized questionnaire which prompted respondents to choose how much of an initial endowment to contribute to a common pool. The respondents contributed, on average, 54% of their initial endowment to the common pool. The usual categorization scheme of the elicited conditional contribution pattern discerns unconditional free riders who do not contribute irrespective of the contributions of others and calls everyone a conditional cooperator who correlates their contribution with that of the others. However, someone consistently offering less than the others should not be called a cooperator. Consequently, based on the conditional contribution patterns among our respondents, we suggest a recategorization of contribution patterns into the following categories: unconditional cooperator (1.5%), unconditional free rider (10.6%), perfect conditional cooperator (42.6%), hump-shaped contributor (0.7%), V-shaped contributor (0.4%), conditional cooperator (16.6%), conditional free rider (13.6%), conditional contributor (6.4%), negative conditional contributor (0%), and others (7.6%). We only call someone a cooperator if the respondent at least matches others’ contribution, and call everyone consistently offering less a free rider. Furthermore, we found no difference between the contributions of women and men. No correlation of contribution with age, educational attainment, and size of the residential settlement was found. Students’ contributions were not different from non-students’ contributions. We found a significant correlation of the contribution to the common pool with hypercompetitive orientation (negative correlation) and the self-assessed willingness to take risks in general (positive correlation). Full article

Media content is an important privately supplied public good. While it has been shown that contributions to a public good crowd out other contributions in many cases, the issue has not been thoroughly studied for media markets yet. We show that in a standard model of commercial media bias, qualities of media content are strategic complements, whereby investments into quality can crowd in further investments and engage competitors in a race to the top. Therefore, financially strong public service media can mitigate commercial media bias: the content of commercial media can be more in line with the preferences of the audience and less advertiser-friendly in a dual (mixed public and commercial) media system than in a purely commercial media market. Full article

We experimentally study how leadership selection mechanisms affect public goods provision. Introducing leadership does not raise contribution. Voluntary leadership performs the worst, primarily because the absence of leadership signals uncooperative play, and candidates free-ride on other leaders. Voluntary leadership from a randomly selected candidate is a promising endogenous leadership selection mechanism, primarily because assuming leadership by revealed preference signals cooperative play, the absence of leadership leaves the possibility of unlucky cooperative candidates, and sole leadership removes the leader’s free-riding incentives. Full article