Cooperation, Trust, and Reciprocity: Theory and Evidence from the Field of Behavioral Economics

A Special Issue of Behavioral Sciences (ISSN 2076-328X) belonging to the section "Behavioral Economics".

Deadline for manuscript submissions: 15 March 2027 | Viewed by 3703

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Guest Editor
Center for Economic Research, Shandong University, Jinan 250100, China
Interests: information economics; experimental economics; behavioral economics; industrial economics
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Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Cooperation, trust, and reciprocity are fundamental pillars of social organization and behavioral exchange, essential for the functioning of relationships, institutions, markets, and governance systems. Their presence facilitates mutually beneficial outcomes, reduces transaction costs, and enables collective action. Yet, despite their fundamental importance, conspicuous gaps remain in our understanding of the precise psychological mechanisms governing these behaviors. Classical theories, often predicated on strict self-interest, frequently fail to predict or explain the observed variance in these behaviors across individuals and contexts. This necessitates a deeper behavioral inquiry. Investigation of the relevant cognitive foundations—how individuals perceive cooperative opportunities, assess trustworthiness, and internalize norms of reciprocity—is paramount. Furthermore, elucidating the precise behavioral mechanisms through which these dispositions translate into action, including the roles of social preferences, heuristics, and learning, remains a challenge. Moreover, these behaviors are highly sensitive to contextual determinants. Factors such as communication channels, cultural norms, emotional factors, incentive structures, and the shadow of the future exert powerful, yet incompletely understood, influences on the emergence and sustainability of cooperation, trust, and reciprocity among individual interactions.

This Special Issue calls for contributions that significantly advance our understanding of the behavioral mechanisms that promote cooperation, trust, and reciprocity. We welcome rigorous theoretical or empirical research, as well as comprehensive literature reviews, from the field of behavioral economics. Theoretical submissions may include the development of novel behavioral models, explorations of the evolutionary underpinnings of cooperative behavior, or innovative applications of established theories to new domains such as digital platforms. For empirical research, we encourage a broad spectrum of methodological approaches, encompassing laboratory and field experiments, neuroeconomic studies, and empirical analyses using observational or survey data. We are particularly interested in manuscripts that investigate specific, high-impact themes within this domain. These include, but are not limited to, (1) the psychological and social mechanisms governing the formation and breakdown of trust and reciprocity; (2) the dynamic behavioral processes driving the evolution of cooperation and trust within social structures; and (3) the role of institutions and social norms in shaping cooperative outcomes. Submissions offering thorough syntheses of the existing literature on focused topics central to these overarching themes are also welcome.

Prof. Dr. Jie Zheng
Guest Editor

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Keywords

  • cooperation
  • trust
  • reciprocity
  • social preferences
  • social dilemmas
  • collective action
  • altruism and spite
  • guilt and shame
  • experimental methods
  • behavioral economics
  • neuroeconomics
  • public goods provision
  • gift exchange

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Published Papers (5 papers)

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Research

32 pages, 1017 KB  
Article
Improving Trust in Declaration-Based Exchange: Experimental Evidence on Competition and Contract Enforcement
by Siqi Wang, Wenkai Yang, Rui Wang, Yuli Ding and Bin Xu
Behav. Sci. 2026, 16(8), 1356; https://doi.org/10.3390/bs16081356 - 7 Aug 2026
Viewed by 395
Abstract
This paper studies how trust can be supported in exchange environments where potential responders make prior declarations about future return behavior. While prior work has separately examined communication, competition, or contract enforcement, how these mechanisms interact remains underexplored. We modify the standard trust [...] Read more.
This paper studies how trust can be supported in exchange environments where potential responders make prior declarations about future return behavior. While prior work has separately examined communication, competition, or contract enforcement, how these mechanisms interact remains underexplored. We modify the standard trust game by introducing two potential responders who declare their intended returns before one is selected, before experimentally varying responder-side competition and contract enforcement in a 2 × 2 design. The results reveal an asymmetric relationship: competition significantly increases trust and realized trustworthiness, whereas contract enforcement alone does not generate a statistically significant increase in trust. However, when competition is combined with enforcement, the effect is substantially amplified, producing the highest levels of trust and trustworthiness. Mechanism evidence shows that competition drives higher declarations and selection incentives, while enforcement eliminates the declaration-fulfillment gap, making competitive declarations credible. These findings suggest that competition and enforcement are complements rather than substitutes—a result with implications for the design of online platforms and other markets where trust depends on prior declarations. Full article
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29 pages, 1464 KB  
Article
Leader-Selection Mechanisms and Matching Protocols in Public Goods Games: Evidence from the Laboratory
by Dongsheng Chen, Jing Liu, Wenhao Zhang and Jie Zheng
Behav. Sci. 2026, 16(8), 1333; https://doi.org/10.3390/bs16081333 - 3 Aug 2026
Viewed by 340
Abstract
Using a controlled online laboratory experiment, we investigate how leader-selection rules influence public goods provision under fixed matching and random rematching. In our design, a leader is a first mover who chooses a contribution before the other group members, and this contribution is [...] Read more.
Using a controlled online laboratory experiment, we investigate how leader-selection rules influence public goods provision under fixed matching and random rematching. In our design, a leader is a first mover who chooses a contribution before the other group members, and this contribution is revealed to the later mover(s) before they make their own decisions. In leaderless groups, all group members choose their contributions simultaneously, so no member observes another member’s contribution before deciding. Leadership does not produce a uniform increase in contributions. Among the mechanisms examined, delegated leadership by a randomly selected candidate (DL-RC) exhibited the lowest overall mean contribution, particularly under random rematching; however, the primary analyses did not establish a statistically significant general mechanism effect. Within VL-RC, the accepted one-leader branch exhibited higher observed contributions than the refusal-contingent leaderless branch; within DL-RC, the accepted one-leader branch exhibited higher observed contributions than the refusal-contingent three-first-mover branch. Because these realized branches are generated by candidates’ acceptance decisions, the comparisons are conditional and do not identify causal effects of acceptance, refusal, leader absence, or the number of first movers. Across leader-present states, later-mover contributions were positively associated with the observed mean contribution of the first mover(s). Fixed matching yielded a higher observed mean contribution than random rematching, but the pooled difference was not statistically significant; the clearest differences in matching protocols arose in DL-RC. Full article
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21 pages, 1022 KB  
Article
Trust in Context: A Three-Factor Experimental Study
by Jiayin Guo and Jun Liu
Behav. Sci. 2026, 16(6), 1001; https://doi.org/10.3390/bs16061001 - 15 Jun 2026
Viewed by 517
Abstract
Existing studies on trust are mainly based on rational choice theory or the relational logic of the “differential mode of association,” while neglecting the contextuality of trust and the interaction of multiple factors. This study used a within-subjects situational experiment involving 252 participants, [...] Read more.
Existing studies on trust are mainly based on rational choice theory or the relational logic of the “differential mode of association,” while neglecting the contextuality of trust and the interaction of multiple factors. This study used a within-subjects situational experiment involving 252 participants, manipulating three variables: relationship type (kin, acquaintance, general other), entrusted matter (loans of 2000 yuan, 20,000 yuan, and 200,000 yuan), and trustee attributes (high ability and integrity vs. low ability and integrity). The Friedman test and Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) were used to examine the effects of these three factors on trust intention and the mechanisms of their interaction. The results indicate that trust intention is influenced by relationship type, the importance of the entrusted matter, and trustee attributes, with significant interactions among the three. This indicates that trust is a contextual outcome shaped by multiple interacting factors rather than a linear result. This study provides contextualized evidence that relationship type, entrusted matter, and trustee attributes jointly shape trust intention. Full article
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15 pages, 434 KB  
Article
When and How Ingratiation Boosts Coworker-Directed Cooperative Behavior
by Yun Chen and Min Cui
Behav. Sci. 2026, 16(6), 978; https://doi.org/10.3390/bs16060978 - 12 Jun 2026
Viewed by 511
Abstract
Drawing on moral cleansing theory, this study adopts an actor-centered perspective to examine how ingratiation relates to employees’ moral rumination and subsequent coworker-directed cooperative behavior, thereby offering insights to help organizations to understand and guide such behaviors. Using a multi-wave survey design, this [...] Read more.
Drawing on moral cleansing theory, this study adopts an actor-centered perspective to examine how ingratiation relates to employees’ moral rumination and subsequent coworker-directed cooperative behavior, thereby offering insights to help organizations to understand and guide such behaviors. Using a multi-wave survey design, this study collected data from 272 employees to examine a theoretical model investigating how employee ingratiation influences coworker-directed cooperative behavior through moral rumination, while also examining the moderating role of employee moral identity. The results indicate that employee ingratiation positively influences moral rumination, which in turn enhances coworker-directed cooperative behavior. Furthermore, the indirect effect of ingratiation on coworker-directed cooperative behavior via moral rumination is strengthened among employees with high moral identity. This study advances the literature by shifting the focus from targets and observers to actors themselves, examining how ingratiation shapes actors’ own moral perception and subsequent behavior. It further contributes by introducing moral rumination as a mediating mechanism and exploring the moderating effect of moral identity, as well as offering new insights into ingratiation in organizational contexts. Full article
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15 pages, 2245 KB  
Article
Income Inequality and Self-Serving Belief in Burden-Sharing: An Experimental Study
by Lan Zhou and Xianghong Wang
Behav. Sci. 2025, 15(12), 1689; https://doi.org/10.3390/bs15121689 - 5 Dec 2025
Viewed by 780
Abstract
Public goods games under asymmetric endowments have been widely discussed in the literature; however, few studies have addressed how inequality influences normative beliefs and the subsequent burden-sharing behaviors. To address this gap, we conducted two online survey experiments in both hypothetical and real-income [...] Read more.
Public goods games under asymmetric endowments have been widely discussed in the literature; however, few studies have addressed how inequality influences normative beliefs and the subsequent burden-sharing behaviors. To address this gap, we conducted two online survey experiments in both hypothetical and real-income scenarios, focusing on the mediation effects of self-serving bias and other-regarding preferences. The findings showed that while unequal endowment status induced self-serving personal beliefs and burden-sharing behaviors, it also enhanced reciprocity and offset self-serving bias in a real-income scenario. Only high-endowment status significantly influenced beliefs and behaviors. This study reveals a trade-off between self-serving bias and reciprocity in social cooperation, offering new insights for fairness beliefs. Full article
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