Security Analysis of Symmetric and Asymmetric Cryptographic Implementations

A special issue of Symmetry (ISSN 2073-8994). This special issue belongs to the section "Computer".

Deadline for manuscript submissions: 15 November 2025 | Viewed by 614

Special Issue Editor


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Guest Editor
Department of Information Security, School of Control and Computer Engineering, North China Electric Power University, Beijing, China
Interests: hardware security

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

The security of cryptographic algorithms (both symmetric and asymmetric) has been the focus of cryptanalysts around the world. However, it is not enough to only consider the security of cryptographic algorithms. In practice, cryptographic algorithms should be implemented into electronic chips, and different styles of side-channel cryptanalysis may pose a serious threat on the security of cryptographic implementations. In fact, the security analysis of cryptographic implementations is one important research direction for cryptographic engineering community. Thus, the security analysis of both symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic implementations is an active research area of crucial importance that requires great attentions and investigations.

The Special Issue, “Security Analysis of Symmetric and Asymmetric Cryptographic Implementations” aims to provide researchers from cryptographic engineering community an location to share their latest research outcomes in the security analysis of both symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic implementations. Firstly, considering that post-quantum cryptographic algorithms are designed to meet security requirement in quantum computing scenario, we should focus on the security of post-quantum cryptographic implementations. Secondly, considering that the size of electronic chips becomes smaller and smaller, we should also focus on the security of lightweight block cipher implementations and some efficient stream cipher implementations. Finally, for a long period of time, there lacks theoretical explanations about the security of cryptographic implementations in face of side-channel cryptanalysis. In light of this, we should focus on building theoretical model that can accurately and efficiently reflect the security of cryptographic implementations in face of different styles of side-channel cryptanalysis.

Based on the above considerations, we welcome submissions on topics including, but not limited to, the following:

  • Side-channel cryptanalysis on lightweight block cipher implementations
  • Side-channel cryptanalysis on efficient stream cipher implementations
  • Countermeasures designed for block cipher and stream cipher implementations
  • Side-channel cryptanalysis on post-quantum cryptographic implementations
  • Countermeasures designed for post-quantum cryptographic implementations
  • Leakage assessment for various types of post-quantum cryptographic implementations
  • Theoretical models for the security evaluation of symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic implementations

All submissions will be subjected to a rigorous peer-review process to ensure their quality and originality. Accepted papers will be published online and will be accessible to all readers.

Dr. Hailong Zhang
Guest Editor

Manuscript Submission Information

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Keywords

  • side-channel cryptanalysis
  • post-quantum cryptography
  • lightweight cryptography
  • cryptographic implementation
  • countermeasures
  • leakage assessment
  • theoretical model
  • security evaluation

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Published Papers (1 paper)

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Research

23 pages, 9447 KB  
Article
Multi-Modal Side-Channel Analysis Based on Isometric Compression and Combined Clustering
by Xiaoyong Kou, Wei Yang, Lunbo Li and Gongxuan Zhang
Symmetry 2025, 17(9), 1483; https://doi.org/10.3390/sym17091483 - 8 Sep 2025
Viewed by 268
Abstract
Side-channel analysis (SCA) poses a persistent threat to cryptographic hardware by exploiting unintended physical leakages. To address the limitations of traditional single-modality SCA methods, we propose a novel multi-modal side-channel analysis framework that targets the recovery of encryption keys by leveraging the imperfections [...] Read more.
Side-channel analysis (SCA) poses a persistent threat to cryptographic hardware by exploiting unintended physical leakages. To address the limitations of traditional single-modality SCA methods, we propose a novel multi-modal side-channel analysis framework that targets the recovery of encryption keys by leveraging the imperfections inherent in hardware implementations. The core objective is to extract and classify information-rich segments from power and electromagnetic (EM) signals in order to recover secret keys without profiling or labeling. Our approach introduces a unified pipeline combining joint peak-based segmentation, isometric compression of variable-length trace segments, and multi-modal feature fusion. A key component of the framework is unsupervised clustering, which serves to automatically classify trace segments corresponding to different cryptographic operations (e.g., different key-dependent leakage classes), thereby enabling key byte hypothesis testing and full key reconstruction. Experimental results on an FPGA-based AES-128 implementation demonstrate that our method achieves up to 99.2% clustering accuracy and successfully recovers the entire encryption key using as few as 1–3 traces. Moreover, the proposed approach significantly reduces sample complexity and maintains resilience in low signal-to-noise conditions. These results highlight the practicality of our technique for side-channel vulnerability assessment and its potential to inform the design of more robust cryptographic hardware. Full article
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