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15 pages, 259 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Undetachable Concepts in Non-Human Animals

by Laura Danón

Philosophies 2018, 3(2), 14; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies3020014 - 3 May 2018

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 3354

In this paper, I would like to explore the idea that some non-human animals may be incapable of detaching or separating some of their concepts both from other concepts and from the larger thought contents that they are part of. This, in turn, [...] Read more.

In this paper, I would like to explore the idea that some non-human animals may be incapable of detaching or separating some of their concepts both from other concepts and from the larger thought contents that they are part of. This, in turn, will make it impossible for them to recombine these undetachable concepts with others in every admissible way. I will begin by distinguishing three different ways in which one concept may be undetachable from others, and I will show how each of them leads to specific restrictions in the kinds of conceptual re-combinations that they admit. Finally, I will try to provide some theoretical reasons, as well as some empirical evidence, to give at least initial support to the hypothesis that some non-human animals actually suffer from the limitations previously identified. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Philosophy of Cognitive Science: Selected Papers from WPCS 2017)

13 pages, 264 KiB

Open AccessArticle

A Defense of an Amodal Number System

by Abel Wajnerman Paz

Philosophies 2018, 3(2), 13; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies3020013 - 24 Apr 2018

Cited by 3 | Viewed by 3147

Abstract

It has been argued that the approximate number system (ANS) constitutes a problem for the grounded approach to cognition because it implies that some conceptual tasks are performed by non-perceptual systems. The ANS is considered non-perceptual mainly because it processes stimuli from different [...] Read more.

It has been argued that the approximate number system (ANS) constitutes a problem for the grounded approach to cognition because it implies that some conceptual tasks are performed by non-perceptual systems. The ANS is considered non-perceptual mainly because it processes stimuli from different modalities. Jones (2015) has recently argued that this system has many features (such as being modular) which are characteristic of sensory systems. Additionally, he affirms that traditional sensory systems also process inputs from different modalities. This suggests that the ANS is a perceptual system and therefore it is not problematic for the grounded view. In this paper, I defend the amodal approach to the ANS against these two arguments. In the first place, perceptual systems do not possess the properties attributed to the ANS and therefore these properties do not imply that the ANS is perceptual. In the second place, I will propose that a sensory system only needs to be dedicated to process modality-specific information, which is consistent with responding to inputs from different modalities. I argue that the cross-modal responses exhibited by traditional sensory systems are consistent with modality-specific information whereas some responses exhibited by the ANS are not. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Philosophy of Cognitive Science: Selected Papers from WPCS 2017)

16 pages, 276 KiB

Open AccessArticle

(Mind)-Reading Maps

by Fernanda Velázquez Coccia

Philosophies 2018, 3(2), 12; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies3020012 - 17 Apr 2018

Viewed by 3092

Abstract

In a two-system theory for mind-reading, a flexible system (FS) enables full-blown mind-reading, and an efficient system (ES) enables early mind-reading. Efficient processing differs from flexible processing in terms of restrictions on the kind of input it can take and the kinds of [...] Read more.

In a two-system theory for mind-reading, a flexible system (FS) enables full-blown mind-reading, and an efficient system (ES) enables early mind-reading. Efficient processing differs from flexible processing in terms of restrictions on the kind of input it can take and the kinds of mental states it can ascribe (output). Thus, systems are not continuous and each relies on different representations: the FS on beliefs and other propositional attitudes, and the ES on belief-like states or registrations. There is a conceptual problem in distinguishing the representations each system operates with. They contend that they can solve this problem by appealing to a characterization of registrations based on signature limits, but this does not work. I suggest a solution to this problem. The difference between registration and belief becomes clearer if each vehicle turns out to be different. I offer some reasons in support of this proposal related to the performance of spontaneous-response false belief tasks. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Philosophy of Cognitive Science: Selected Papers from WPCS 2017)

15 pages, 14264 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Cajal’s Law of Dynamic Polarization: Mechanism and Design

by Sergio Daniel Barberis

Philosophies 2018, 3(2), 11; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies3020011 - 16 Apr 2018

Cited by 3 | Viewed by 11038

Abstract

Santiago Ramón y Cajal, the primary architect of the neuron doctrine and the law of dynamic polarization, is considered to be the founder of modern neuroscience. At the same time, many philosophers, historians, and neuroscientists agree that modern neuroscience embodies a mechanistic perspective [...] Read more.

Santiago Ramón y Cajal, the primary architect of the neuron doctrine and the law of dynamic polarization, is considered to be the founder of modern neuroscience. At the same time, many philosophers, historians, and neuroscientists agree that modern neuroscience embodies a mechanistic perspective on the explanation of the nervous system. In this paper, I review the extant mechanistic interpretation of Cajal’s contribution to modern neuroscience. Then, I argue that the extant mechanistic interpretation fails to capture the explanatory import of Cajal’s law of dynamic polarization. My claim is that the definitive formulation of Cajal’s law of dynamic polarization, despite its mechanistic inaccuracies, embodies a non-mechanistic pattern of reasoning (i.e., design explanation) that is an integral component of modern neuroscience. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Philosophy of Cognitive Science: Selected Papers from WPCS 2017)

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13 pages, 37372 KiB

Open AccessArticle

How to Make Correct Predictions in False Belief Tasks without Attributing False Beliefs: An Analysis of Alternative Inferences and How to Avoid Them

by Ricardo Augusto Perera and Sofia Inês Albornoz Stein

Philosophies 2018, 3(2), 10; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies3020010 - 10 Apr 2018

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 5349

Abstract

The use of new paradigms of false belief tasks (FBT) allowed to reduce the age of children who pass the test from the previous 4 years in the standard version to only 15 months or even a striking 6 months in the nonverbal [...] Read more.

The use of new paradigms of false belief tasks (FBT) allowed to reduce the age of children who pass the test from the previous 4 years in the standard version to only 15 months or even a striking 6 months in the nonverbal modification. These results are often taken as evidence that infants already possess an—at least implicit—theory of mind (ToM). We criticize this inferential leap on the grounds that inferring a ToM from the predictive success on a false belief task requires to assume as premise that a belief reasoning is a necessary condition for correct action prediction. It is argued that the FBT does not satisfactorily constrain the predictive means, leaving room for the use of belief-independent inferences (that can rely on the attribution of non-representational mental states or the consideration of behavioral patterns that dispense any reference to other minds). These heuristics, when applied to the FBT, can achieve the same predictive success of a belief-based inference because information provided by the test stimulus allows the recognition of particular situations that can be subsumed by their ‘laws’. Instead of solving this issue by designing a single experimentum crucis that would render unfeasible the use of non-representational inferences, we suggest the application of a set of tests in which, although individually they can support inferences dissociated from a ToM, only an inference that makes use of false beliefs is able to correctly predict all the outcomes. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Philosophy of Cognitive Science: Selected Papers from WPCS 2017)

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12 pages, 272 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Empirical Support for Perceptual Conceptualism

by Nicolás Alejandro Serrano

Philosophies 2018, 3(2), 8; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies3020008 - 28 Mar 2018

Viewed by 3658

Abstract

The main objective of this paper is to show that perceptual conceptualism can be understood as an empirically meaningful position and, furthermore, that there is some degree of empirical support for its main theses. In order to do this, I will start by [...] Read more.

The main objective of this paper is to show that perceptual conceptualism can be understood as an empirically meaningful position and, furthermore, that there is some degree of empirical support for its main theses. In order to do this, I will start by offering an empirical reading of the conceptualist position, and making three predictions from it. Then, I will consider recent experimental results from cognitive sciences that seem to point towards those predictions. I will conclude that, while the evidence offered by those experiments is far from decisive, it is enough not only to show that conceptualism is an empirically meaningful position but also that there is empirical support for it. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Philosophy of Cognitive Science: Selected Papers from WPCS 2017)

13 pages, 244 KiB

Open AccessArticle

The Modal—Amodal Distinction in the Debate on Conceptual Format

by Sabrina Haimovici

Philosophies 2018, 3(2), 7; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies3020007 - 28 Mar 2018

Cited by 12 | Viewed by 6266

Abstract

In this paper, I review the main criteria offered for distinguishing the modal and amodal approaches to conceptual format: the type of input to which the representations respond, the relation they bear to perceptual states, and the specific neural systems to which they [...] Read more.

In this paper, I review the main criteria offered for distinguishing the modal and amodal approaches to conceptual format: the type of input to which the representations respond, the relation they bear to perceptual states, and the specific neural systems to which they belong. I evaluate different interpretations of them and argue that they all face difficulties. I further show that they lead to cross-classifications of certain types of representations, using approximate number representations as an example. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Philosophy of Cognitive Science: Selected Papers from WPCS 2017)

8 pages, 211 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Empathy and Vicarious Experience. Congruence or Identical Emotion?

by Patricia C. Brunsteins

Philosophies 2018, 3(2), 6; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies3020006 - 22 Mar 2018

Cited by 2 | Viewed by 7924

Abstract

Feeling empathy is something that happens, an experience we can remember once we have had it, or an experience we would like to have. I consider empathy, from an integral point of view (i.e., cognitive and emotive aspects are part of empathy), as [...] Read more.

Feeling empathy is something that happens, an experience we can remember once we have had it, or an experience we would like to have. I consider empathy, from an integral point of view (i.e., cognitive and emotive aspects are part of empathy), as the capacity of putting oneself in the place of others. Although, by this time, my general characterization of empathy will not be discussed, I will focus on one question about empathy for which there is still no agreement: whether the emotion of the person experiencing empathy must be identical or not to the emotion felt by the person being empathized with. The aim of this work is, firstly, to reduce the four possibilities about the relationship between the empathizer’s emotion and the emotion felt by the person who is the target of empathy to two exhaustive and exclusive views: (1) the idea of identity of emotions between the empathizer and the target and (2) the point of view of the congruence of emotions between the empathizer and the target, both being cases of personal emotional experiences. Secondly, I suggest that these possibilities may make up an exclusive disjunctive argument, showing that problems with the first part of the argument or the premise would lead us to accept the second part: to feel empathy we do not need to feel exactly the same emotion that the object of empathy feels. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Philosophy of Cognitive Science: Selected Papers from WPCS 2017)

20 pages, 254 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Towards Cognitive Moral Quasi-Realism

by Eduardo García-Ramírez

Philosophies 2018, 3(1), 5; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies3010005 - 6 Mar 2018

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 3663

Abstract

There is a long-standing discussion concerning the nature of moral discourse. Multiple views range from realism—according to which moral discourse is closer to scientific discourse than to fictional discourse—to anti-realism—according to which moral discourse is rather closer to fictional discourse. In this paper, [...] Read more.

There is a long-standing discussion concerning the nature of moral discourse. Multiple views range from realism—according to which moral discourse is closer to scientific discourse than to fictional discourse—to anti-realism—according to which moral discourse is rather closer to fictional discourse. In this paper, I want to motivate a novel anti-realist account. On this view, there are no moral properties or truths, neither mind-independent nor mind-dependent ones (i.e., anti-realism). However, moral cognition results from the use of higher order cognitive abilities with enough resources to grant moral discourse with all the features of a realist talk (i.e., cognitive quasi-realism). I defend this view based on empirical evidence on human moral development and by showing that the resulting account can meet the demands of robust moral realism. The paper concludes by placing the proposed view within the metaethical landscape by comparing it against other forms of anti-realism, most significantly against expressivism. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Philosophy of Cognitive Science: Selected Papers from WPCS 2017)

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