Empirical Support for Perceptual Conceptualism
AbstractThe main objective of this paper is to show that perceptual conceptualism can be understood as an empirically meaningful position and, furthermore, that there is some degree of empirical support for its main theses. In order to do this, I will start by offering an empirical reading of the conceptualist position, and making three predictions from it. Then, I will consider recent experimental results from cognitive sciences that seem to point towards those predictions. I will conclude that, while the evidence offered by those experiments is far from decisive, it is enough not only to show that conceptualism is an empirically meaningful position but also that there is empirical support for it. View Full-Text
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Serrano, N.A. Empirical Support for Perceptual Conceptualism. Philosophies 2018, 3, 8.
Serrano NA. Empirical Support for Perceptual Conceptualism. Philosophies. 2018; 3(2):8.Chicago/Turabian Style
Serrano, Nicolás A. 2018. "Empirical Support for Perceptual Conceptualism." Philosophies 3, no. 2: 8.