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Open AccessArticle

Empirical Support for Perceptual Conceptualism

Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Instituto de Filosofía “Dr. Alejandro Korn”, Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET), Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA), Buenos Aires, C.P. 1870, Argentina
Philosophies 2018, 3(2), 8; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies3020008
Received: 7 February 2018 / Revised: 23 March 2018 / Accepted: 23 March 2018 / Published: 28 March 2018
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Philosophy of Cognitive Science: Selected Papers from WPCS 2017)
The main objective of this paper is to show that perceptual conceptualism can be understood as an empirically meaningful position and, furthermore, that there is some degree of empirical support for its main theses. In order to do this, I will start by offering an empirical reading of the conceptualist position, and making three predictions from it. Then, I will consider recent experimental results from cognitive sciences that seem to point towards those predictions. I will conclude that, while the evidence offered by those experiments is far from decisive, it is enough not only to show that conceptualism is an empirically meaningful position but also that there is empirical support for it. View Full-Text
Keywords: conceptual content; perception; perceptual experience; grounded cognition conceptual content; perception; perceptual experience; grounded cognition
MDPI and ACS Style

Serrano, N.A. Empirical Support for Perceptual Conceptualism. Philosophies 2018, 3, 8.

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