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The Modal—Amodal Distinction in the Debate on Conceptual Format

Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Instituto de Filosofía “Dr. Alejandro Korn”, Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET), Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, C.P. 1406, Argentina
Philosophies 2018, 3(2), 7; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies3020007
Received: 10 February 2018 / Revised: 17 March 2018 / Accepted: 21 March 2018 / Published: 28 March 2018
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Philosophy of Cognitive Science: Selected Papers from WPCS 2017)
In this paper, I review the main criteria offered for distinguishing the modal and amodal approaches to conceptual format: the type of input to which the representations respond, the relation they bear to perceptual states, and the specific neural systems to which they belong. I evaluate different interpretations of them and argue that they all face difficulties. I further show that they lead to cross-classifications of certain types of representations, using approximate number representations as an example. View Full-Text
Keywords: mental representations; concepts; grounded cognition; sensorimotor systems; symbols; approximate number representations mental representations; concepts; grounded cognition; sensorimotor systems; symbols; approximate number representations
MDPI and ACS Style

Haimovici, S. The Modal—Amodal Distinction in the Debate on Conceptual Format. Philosophies 2018, 3, 7.

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