Academic Freedom in US Higher Education: Rights Emergent from the Law and the Profession

Definition

The various definitions of academic freedom in the United States reflect the influence of social and political norms in its interpretation as both a professional and legal right. Yet, underlying these interpretations is the operational understanding, which includes both legal and professional considerations, that academic freedom is a widely recognized principle that grants professors the autonomy and authority to explore intellectual questions within their academic disciplines, conduct professional work, and express their views in the public sphere without undue interference or suppression. In other words, academic freedom is a foundational principle rooted in legal and institutional frameworks that safeguards professors’ ability to engage in intellectual inquiry, professional practice, and public discourse without undue interference. This principle extends beyond mere professional courtesy. It is recognized as essential to the functioning of higher education institutions and the broader democratic exchange of ideas. The public (including policymakers, industry leaders, media, and students) generally acknowledges academic freedom as an inherent protection that protects from unjustified interferences. By doing so, professors can participate in governance, disciplinary leadership, and extramural activities without the fear of retaliation or coercion. By insulating academic work from ideological, political, or economic constraints, academic freedom maintains the legitimacy and independence of scholarly inquiry in service to both knowledge advancement and the public good.

1. Introduction

Academic freedom has a multifaceted history shaped by cultural, institutional, and political factors. As a foundational work, Arthur Lovejoy, in the 1930 iteration of the Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, described the professional concept in the following manner: “Academic Freedom is the freedom of the teacher or research worker in higher institutions of learning to investigate and discuss the problems of his science and to express his conclusions, whether through publication or in the instruction of students, without interferences from political or ecclesiastical authority, or from the administrative officials of the institutions in which he is employed, unless his methods are found by qualified bodies of [one’s] own profession to be clearly incompetent or contrary to professional ethics” [1] (p. 384). Nonetheless, the idealized and fundamental bases of academic freedom have never been fully uncorrupted. Influences from outside forces, university administration, and even from the internal operations of the profession have led to an evolutionary change, including redefining the boundaries and drawing greater divides between the legal and professional conceptions of its meaning (see, e.g., [2,3]).

Given the nuances and shifting nature of academic freedom, this article takes a narrow focus to examine academic freedom in its past, current, and future forms in the US. I begin by contextualizing how US academic freedom was borne from global roots before focusing on how it has evolved as both a professional and legal right for American faculty, as well as how it has been interpreted by scholars across a range of perspectives. I then turn to showing the practical implications of academic freedom on the work of professors, highlighting how the courts have interpreted protections for academic freedom in US case law. Finally, because academic freedom in the US is currently in decline [4], as it is in many other countries [5,6,7], I conclude by examining the threats and challenges that may further weaken its protections both nationally and worldwide.

2. History

Seminal legal scholar Ralph Fuchs argues that contemporary understandings of academic freedom in the US rose from three moments in history. First, he attributes the early beginnings to the philosophy of intellectual freedom, which first emerged in Ancient Greece, reemerged in Europe, particularly during the Renaissance, and reached its full development in the Age of Reason [8]. So, while academic freedom has been a part of American higher education for only a little over a century, the concept can be traced back thousands of years to not only Ancient Greece, but also to scholars from China, India, Egypt, and Rome [9]. Nearly 2500 years ago, Plato offered perhaps the earliest written recordings in his concept of intellectual inquiry and academic freedom that underscored his vision for the utopian society of the academic community [10]. Centuries later, during the Middle Ages in Europe, the concept was revitalized by scholars who grew increasingly interested in secular thought and scientific discovery. Yet, while medieval universities embraced a form of academic freedom, it was largely towards the end of fostering debate and had minimal protections. Historian William Courtenay argues that, during this time, scholarly magistri enjoyed social status and ecclesiastical privilege that functioned as a sort of academic freedom, as it offered some protections against accusations of heresy, at least in comparison with the lower classes. Yet, unlike current forms of academic freedom, these potentially blasphemous or heretical ideas were allowed within universities due to their pedagogical purposes, as students would use them for debates [11]. Ultimately, “it was not status or the lack of conviction that protected masters from the penalties normally inflicted upon those thought to be heretical … the issue was whether a scholar knowingly and willingly maintained views contrary to the faith (which most did not), whether his views were disseminated outside the university, and, if so, whether or not he could rely on political protection” [11] (p. 181). In short, the medieval iterations of academic freedom offered limited protections to these early scholars.

The second foundational moment that Fuchs [8] identifies as shaping contemporary academic freedom in the US is the concept of autonomy for scholarly communities, which originated in European universities. Such autonomy can be seen in medieval European universities, which began as self-constituted communities of teachers and learners, although they were largely still under the authority of the church [8]. The church maintained varying levels of oversight of academic communities for centuries more, with the modern conception of academic freedom beginning in German universities in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, where the concept of akademische Freiheit took hold in their research-based approach to education. Within this concept, the Germans further declared more specific freedoms, including libertas philosophandi (freedom of philosophizing), Lehrfreiheit (freedom of teaching), and Lernfreiheit (freedom of learning) [10]. Yet, the German model of academic freedom was not without limits. In 1902, German professor Friedrich Paulsen sought to crystallize the German concept of academic freedom through his book, The German Universities and University Study. In the text, he is emphatic in the importance of the pursuit of knowledge discovery free from the constraints of authority, stating that “for the academic teacher and his hearers there can be no prescribed and no proscribed thoughts. There is only one rule for instruction: to justify the truth of one’s teaching by reason and the facts”, as cited in [8] (p. 435). At the same time, he insists that these freedoms should be restricted to professors of philosophy, and that professors of theology or of political or social science must be accountable to the church or the state institution, respectively [8]. Thus, while contemporary US conceptions of academic freedom are rooted in its treatment in nineteenth-century German universities, the Americans expanded, revised, and clarified the concept in novel ways.

Perhaps the most important change to earlier versions of academic freedom enacted by the Americans is also Fuchs’s [8] third foundational historical moment. Namely, the addition of freedoms enshrined in the Bill of Rights of the US Constitution, as interpreted and elaborated by the courts. While constitutional protections marked a significant shift in the concept of academic freedom in the US, their enactment by the courts was preceded by two key events. The first of these was the 1900 dismissal of Edward A. Ross, a professor at Stanford University. This dismissal stemmed from a conflict between Ross and Jane L. Stanford, the widow of the university’s founder, who exercised heavy control over the university. As part of this control, Mrs. Stanford had issued a prohibition against faculty at the university engaging in partisan political activity, and she believed Ross’s public speech on railroad monopolies and immigrant labor violated this prohibition [12]. While the details of the case are complex, the case’s effects on the trajectory of academic freedom largely stem from the reactions to the dismissal. Similar dismissals were not uncommon at the time [13], yet this case caused widespread public interest, which some scholars have argued was due largely to the arbitrary power Mrs. Stanford exerted over the university [12]. It also led to seven members of the Stanford faculty resigning in protest, one of whom was Arthur Lovejoy [14].

The resignation of Arthur Lovejoy ultimately resulted in the second key event that shaped US academic freedom prior to its constitutional backing: the establishment of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP). Several years after leaving Stanford, Lovejoy took a position with Johns Hopkins University, where he began work on establishing a professional association for faculty members. Working collaboratively with John Dewey, a nationally recognized professor of philosophy at Columbia University, Lovejoy conducted a series of organizing meetings that led to the establishment of the AAUP in 1915. Shortly after its founding, the AAUP issued the 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure [14]. One of the criticisms of the 1915 Declaration was that it adopted a negative stance on academic freedom through focusing on what institutions may not do, rather than on emphasizing what faculty may do [15]. The AAUP sought to address these criticisms through the subsequent issuing of the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure. Yet, this revised version did little to strengthen the protections of academic freedom due to two primary issues with the initial codification of the 1940 Statement. First, it did not cover expressive speech, such as symbolic clothing or similar emblems of protest, and rather only extended to verbal and written forms of speech [16]. Second, and as critics were quick to highlight, the document was only a suggestion for how faculty should be treated; it had no power to mandate institutional policies and carried no legal weight [17]. The principles advanced in these documents were thus considered to be an “example of a very soft law” [17] (p. 79).

It was not until court cases in the latter half of the twentieth century that the constitutional protections that Fuchs [8] highlight began to strengthen academic freedom’s power in the US. The first case, Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957) [18], emerged in the aftermath of McCarthyism and directly linked academic freedom to the First Amendment’s free speech clause. Paul Sweezy, a Marxist economist, public intellectual, and visiting lecturer at the University of New Hampshire, was investigated by the New Hampshire attorney general regarding his scholarly work and political beliefs. Refusing to answer questions on the grounds that they violated his academic freedom, Sweezy was jailed for contempt. The Supreme Court later ruled in his favor with a plurality opinion, recognizing the infringement of his First Amendment rights. Chief Justice Earl Warren underscored the importance of academic freedom, warning that “[s]cholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise, our civilization will stagnate and die” [18] (p. 250).

A decade later, Keyishian v. Board of Regents (1967) [19] reaffirmed academic freedom’s constitutional protection under the First Amendment. In this case, faculty and staff at the State University of New York challenged a state law requiring them to sign loyalty oaths affirming they were not members of the Communist Party or other subversive groups. They argued that these oaths imposed unconstitutional restrictions on free speech and academic freedom, limiting what professors could think, believe, and express. The Supreme Court ruled in their favor, declaring that “our nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom” [19] (p. 603). The significance of Keyishian extends beyond its explicit recognition of academic freedom as a fundamental protection for professors. It also raised broader concerns about the impact of governmental interference on education, warning that such intrusions could undermine citizens’ rights and fundamentally alter the conditions of higher education.

While the courts crafted recognition that academic freedom resided with faculty as a consideration to addressing First Amendment claims under the US Constitution, another level of academic freedom also emerged [4]. The courts articulated some degrees of academic autonomy residing with the college or what the literature has referenced as institutional academic freedom. That form of academic freedom grants recognition that colleges and universities retain autonomy to make academic decisions concerning areas such as curriculum, admissions, and student academic progress without undue governmental interference.

Largely, this form of academic freedom did not stem from professors’ expressive rights. Instead, the legal recognition of institutional academic freedom referenced the university’s collective authority to govern the academic enterprise. Notably, the US Supreme Court has recognized this deference through several foundational cases that dealt with a university’s exercise in admissions decisions, such as Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978) [20] and Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) [21]. At the time, the Supreme Court acknowledged the role of diversity in education as a compelling state interest and emphasized the right that universities have to exercise academic decisions that fall within constitutional frames of the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment. Justice Powell in Bakke and Justice O’Connor in Grutter both wrote in the Supreme Court’s decision that universities are qualified voices to make educational judgments, including those that shape the composition of their student bodies, within the constitutional limits and consistent with their mission to foster intellectual and social development.

Also, beyond admissions decisions, courts have also extended this deference to academic dismissals and evaluations of student academic performance. For instance, in Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz (1978) [22], the Supreme Court upheld a university’s decision to dismiss a medical student based on poor academic performance. The Supreme Court rejected the student’s assertion that a formal hearing was required under procedural due process. Similarly, in Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing (1985) [23], the Supreme Court declined to override a university’s academic judgment in dismissing a student who failed one of the standardized medical exams. The Supreme Court explained that it would not substitute its views for the “professional judgment” of academic faculty or the collective evaluation of the faculty unless there is evidence showing a substantial departure from accepted academic norms. In short, these judicial decisions illustrate that institutional academic freedom, via the collective action of the faculty, operates less as a defined constitutional right and more as a judicial presumption that educational institutions, via a form of academic deference, are best suited to govern their academic affairs, especially when the matters involve student academic performance.

Although courts invoke the concept of academic freedom in these contexts, they often fall short of articulating a consistent or principled doctrine to balance institutional autonomy against other constitutional claims. These references to academic freedom are frequently made in dicta or in support of institutional or university-based discretion. Significantly, this notion of institutional academic freedom operates without clear elements. As a result, institutional academic freedom generally rises as more of a norm of judicial deference and is not as recognized as assertions around a professor’s academic freedom as a special consideration under the First Amendment. Nonetheless, courts have endorsed the idea that a university’s academic decisions warrant special protections, particularly against judicial second-guessing.

Together, these cases offer foundational considerations to legal and theoretical perspectives on academic freedom in the US. Having established the historical foundations, I now turn to the theories and perspectives that have shaped scholarship about academic freedom in the US.

3. Scholarly Theories and Perspectives on Academic Freedom

While scholars such as Robert Quinn and Jesse Levine have argued that academic freedom is a human right under international law [24], in the US, academic freedom is typically understood as both a professional and legal concept. Professionally, it rests on the norms and responsibilities of the academy. Legally, and as we saw with Keyishian, it is a “special concern of the first amendment” [19] (p. 603). This dual status positions academic freedom at the intersection of constitutional law, higher education governance, and societal values. To better understand the role of academic freedom in the US, legal scholars have developed various analytical frameworks, each reflecting distinct assumptions about the roles of faculty, institutions, and the state. In this section, I discuss these frameworks as they exist within five schools of thought, all of which differ in how they draw upon authoritative sources—such as case law, the First Amendment, contracts, and institutional policies—and in their interpretive approaches, which include historical, legal, economic, and organizational perspectives. Specifically, these schools of thought include the Constitutional School, which frames academic freedom as a First Amendment right; the Professional and Legal Complement School, which integrates constitutional protections with professional norms; and the Socio-Historical, Market Effects, and Critical Theory Schools, which focus on the broader contextual and organizational dimensions of academic freedom. Together, these scholars offer normative statements about the ideals of academic freedom, and, at the same time, they describe the external forces that shape how academic freedom functions in the reality of contemporary university functions. This section briefly summarizes these schools of thought, highlighting their defining characteristics, doctrinal applications, and limitations.

3.1. Constitutional School

As its name suggests, the Constitutional School most closely follows the declaration in Keyishian about academic freedom being a special concern of the First Amendment. Given Fuchs’s [8] assertion on the importance of the constitution to academic freedom, it is perhaps unsurprising that he is one of the predominant scholars working within this school of thought. He is joined by other notable legal thinkers, including David Rabban, Peter Byrne, and Rebecca Goose Lynch. Together, these scholars and others like them rely on jurisprudence under the First Amendment to form their understanding of academic freedom. A critical distinction in the Constitutional School is that between individual and institutional academic freedom. While individual academic freedom encompasses professors’ expressions of scholarly expertise, the latter relates to university functions, such as hiring, admissions, and curriculum [25]. The Supreme Court has also recognized this difference, stating that “Academic freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students … but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous decision making” [23] (p. 226 n. 12).

Another distinction that the Constitutional School highlights is that between academic freedom and free speech, even though both are rooted in the First Amendment. Unlike general free speech, which is a right enjoyed by all US citizens regardless of profession, academic freedom specifically pertains to the unique role professors play in advancing society through their scholarly work. Nonetheless, “[t]he distinctive meaning of academic freedom is connected to the First Amendment because it fosters two central First Amendment values recognized by courts in a wide range of cases, including in cases arising at universities: the production and dissemination of knowledge, and the contribution of free expression to democratic citizenship” [26] (p. 8).

3.2. Professional and Legal Complement School

While the First Amendment grants citizens the right to express their views, it does not always align with the educational mission of fostering debate and dialogue in a respectful and constructive manner. To address this gap, the Professional and Legal Complement School integrates constitutional protections of academic freedom with professional norms and responsibilities. Scholars within this tradition, including Robert Post, Matthew Finkin, Robert O’Neil, and Lee Bollinger, emphasize that the legal dimensions of academic freedom must be understood within the context of higher education. Whereas a purely constitutional interpretation might frame academic freedom as broad faculty autonomy in research and teaching, scholars in the Professional and Legal Complement School argue that disciplinary norms inherently shape the boundaries of academic freedom. Robert Post has clarified this distinction through the concept of a marketplace of ideas. He argues that while free speech is grounded in the marketplace of ideas, where every individual is entitled to voice their opinion, academic freedom is a special privilege granted only to those within the scholarly profession who have undergone specialized training and agreed to adhere to disciplinary norms. Thus, while free speech applies to the voices of the public, academic freedom protects the production of knowledge from trained experts [27]. Or, as Post and Finkin also explain, “Academic freedom is not the freedom to speak or to teach just as one wishes. It is the freedom to pursue the scholarly profession, inside and outside the classroom, according to the norms and standards of that profession” [28] (p. 149).

Beyond disciplinary standards, this perspective also asserts that institutional autonomy is essential to academic freedom. Robert O’Neil [29], for instance, contends that academic freedom has become a foundational value in American higher education because institutions seek to protect and retain their faculty. Lee Bollinger shares O’Neil’s emphasis on institutional autonomy but further argues that academic freedom is grounded in the democratic role of higher education. According to Bollinger, understanding the special protections afforded to academic freedom requires recognizing the university’s critical function in sustaining a democratic society [30].

3.3. Socio-Historical School

Expanding on the contextual understanding of academic freedom within the Professional and Legal Complement School, the Socio-Historical School views academic freedom as inherently shaped by environmental factors. The scholars of the Socio-Historical School, such as Walter Metzger and Ellen Schrecker, argue that “academic freedom is, of necessity, a flexible concept” [31] (p. 315). In other words, academic freedom is not an isolated principle; rather, it evolves in response to the societal, political, and institutional contexts in which universities operate. Highlighting the impact of shifting environments, Metzger notes that “on such subjects [as academic freedom], the collective expressions of academic groups, especially if they seek improvement on a global scale, seem to pass from birth to eternal rest at the speed with which American foundations finance academic conferences with similar agendas” [32] (p. 3).

The impact of external forces becomes especially pronounced during periods of societal turmoil and political instability, such as what was seen in the McCarthy era. Recalling issues seen in both Sweezy and Keyishian, Schrecker [33] explains how faculty members during this time faced institutional retaliation for their political beliefs and affiliations. Specifically, she recounts how the University of California Board of Regents explicitly declared that “membership in the Communist Party is incompatible with membership in the faculty at a State University” [33] (p. 39), demonstrating how political pressures can dramatically restrict academic freedom. Many years after McCarthyism, Schrecker contended that cultural and political shifts continue to shape academic freedom, citing issues such as the “corporate-style restructuring of the academy” and the lingering effects of the “war on terror” [33] (p. 39). Similarly, Lewis [34] offered a socio-historical study on college administrators’ and professors’ reactions to the Communist attacks from 1947 to 1956. He observed that legislators acted on behalf of the social order to justify their tactics in dealing with Communist professors—even when those tactics challenged professors’ research. For example, when legislators interrogated faculty about their possible connections to the Communist Party, the legislators publicly justified their actions as inquiries into these faculty members’ professional competence to perform duties such as academic research. Yet, the government’s interrogations did not truly evaluate any faculty member’s capacity to make reasoned inquiries within their disciplinary area. The interrogations simply assumed that Communist affiliations made one ineligible to research and teach with independence. Across these examples, Schrecker underscores the core tenet of the Socio-Historical School: academic freedom is not a static or absolute right but one that is continuously influenced by broader societal forces.

3.4. Market Effects School

Similar to the Socio-Historical School, the Market Effects School emphasizes the effect that external forces have on shaping academic freedom. The scholars in this school, including Sheila Slaughter, Gary Rhodes, and Jennifer Washburn, differ from those in the Socio-Historical School in that they specifically attribute these influences to market dynamics and the ways in which academia has evolved to align with market-driven imperatives. Slaughter and Rhoades [35] explore this phenomenon in their work on academic capitalism. They argue that universities have gradually shifted from valuing knowledge as a public good to adopting an academic capitalist model, where the focus is on generating revenue through market-like activities such as grants, patents, and university–industry partnerships.

In this transition, knowledge becomes a private commodity rather than a public good, ultimately constraining academic freedom. For instance, when faculty members engage in industry consulting, they may face restrictions such as nondisclosure agreements, prepublication reviews, and the censorship of research findings. Slaughter and Rhoades highlight a case in which such an industry consulting went awry, and the corporation manipulated a faculty member’s research before the results were published, claiming they needed to mitigate potential damage to their reputation, or, as they put it, to “do damage control” [35] (p. 166). In this and similar cases, faculty autonomy in knowledge creation and dissemination is compromised by market pressures.

Expanding on this critique of academic capitalism, Jennifer Washburn [36] emphasizes the need for collective faculty action to counter the encroaching influence of commercialism on academic freedom. Citing two well-known instances where universities and pharmaceutical companies suppressed the academic research of Brown University professors David Kern and Martin B. Keller, she argues that conceptualizing academic freedom as an individual rather than a professional right has weakened efforts to resist market-driven constraints. That is, viewing academic freedom as an individual right overlooks the collective commitments articulated in the AAUP’s 1915 Declaration, which emphasize the responsibility of the academic community to uphold standards that ensure scholarship serves the public good. From a collective standpoint, academic freedom is not merely an individual right but “is tied to academic custom and practice, and to notions regarding the ideal environment for freedom of thought, inquiry, and teaching” [37] (p. 3).

These market effects have been well documented in the literature on academic freedom. For instance, the earlier discussion about the Stanford University incident with Professor Edward Ross and his negative remarks involving the railroad industry illustrates the conflict between academic freedom and market prioritization. Also, a controversy in late 1916 between the chancellor of the state university in Montana and an economics professor highlights industry control of the university operations. While analyzing the state’s tax structure, Professor Levine recognized problems with the current tax calculations: the assessments severely undervalued the mining industry’s tax obligation. As part of his study, Professor Louis Levine devised a new assessment model that would significantly increase the annual tax assessments on the mining industry. The mining industry did not respond favorably, so it pressured state officials to suppress Levine’s study and silence him. Based on archival data tracing this event from 1918 to 1919, the records identified the state government’s role as an active suppressor of the professor’s research expertise. Interestingly, the role of the principal mining company “was nowhere directly demonstrable”, yet as Gutfeld [38] quotes a secondary source, “‘Everywhere the hand of the [mining] [c]ompany left its nebulous mark, but nowhere its fingerprints.’ The vast power of the mining interests enabled them to coerce the administration of the state without using directly visible marks” [38] (p. 36).

Reflecting the Market Effects School’s overall view on how the market affects academic freedom, Washburn warns “If the university looks and behaves more and more like a for-profit commercial entity—and its commitment to producing and transmitting reliable public knowledge grows increasingly suspect in the public’s eye—then the societal justification for academic freedom will simply fall away, as will the public’s willingness to finance universities” [36] (para. 37).

3.5. Critical Theory School

Like many of the other schools of thought, the Critical Theory School emphasizes the boundaries of academic freedom beyond its legal foundations. Scholars in the Critical Theory School, such as Stanley Fish and Joan Wallach Scott, insist “on the difference between academic freedom—a protection of faculty rights based on disciplinary competence—and freedom of speech—the right to express one’s ideas, however true or false they may be” [39] (p. 1). Similar to the previously discussed perspectives, scholars in this school acknowledge that external forces shape academic freedom. However, they differ from the others in that they focus more explicitly on the role of disciplinary conventions and organizational structures in defining the scope of academic freedom.

Stanley Fish [40] writes extensively on the distinction between academic freedom and free speech in his book, Save the World on Your Own Time. As the title suggests, Fish argues that academic freedom does not shield professors’ political views in the classroom unless those views directly relate to the course content. For Fish, curriculum relevance is paramount; academic freedom does not grant faculty the unrestricted right to express opinions akin to First Amendment protections. Instead, it ensures that scholars can pursue research and teaching within their disciplinary fields without interference from external authorities, such as legislators or boards of trustees. He clarifies this point, stating that “Academic freedom has nothing to do with the expression of ideas. It is not a subset of the general freedom of Americans to say anything they like. Rather, academic freedom is the freedom of academics to study anything they like; the freedom, that is, to subject any body of materials, however unpromising it might seem, to academic interrogation and analysis” [40] (p. 87).

Joan Wallach Scott similarly underscores the distinction between free speech and academic freedom, emphasizing that while free speech does not require adherence to disciplinary standards, academic freedom is inherently tied to scholarly norms [39]. However, she diverges from Fish regarding the relationship between politics and scholarship. While Fish maintains that politics and academic inquiry are entirely separable, Scott argues that they are often deeply intertwined. She contends that academic work is frequently shaped by political or ethical commitments held by professors, making the separation between scholarship and political influence more theoretical than practical. As Scott explains, “Fish adheres to the idea that politics and scholarship are entirely separable entities. But the separation between them is easier in theory than in practice … They are the result of some kind of deeply held political or ethical commitment on the part of the professor. The tension between professorial commitments and academic responsibility is an ongoing one that the principle of academic freedom is meant to adjudicate” [41] (p. 477). Despite their differences, both Fish and Scott affirm the distinction between free speech and academic freedom and highlight the significance of disciplinary conventions in shaping faculty protections.

Collectively, these five schools of thought highlight the complexity of academic freedom in the US. Though it may initially appear to be a straightforward concept, academic freedom is continuously evolving, shaped by legal, political, organizational, and cultural forces. What remains unchanged, however, is its profound and pervasive impact on the everyday work of faculty members.

4. Academic Freedom and Professors’ Work

Outside scholarly discussions, academic freedom has expansive impacts on all aspects of faculty work. In the US, this work is composed of three primary areas: teaching, research and scholarship, and service as a citizen of the academy. A fourth related area, although not a direct responsibility of faculty, is the concept of tenure. Although academic freedom and tenure are different concepts, they are closely related to each other, and understanding one necessitates an understanding of the other. In this section, I begin by delineating between tenure and academic freedom before discussing how the latter affects the various responsibilities of faculty members in the US.

4.1. Tenure

Like academic freedom, tenure is associated with constitutional and contractual rights. Yet, while academic freedom applies equally to all faculty regardless of their employment status, institutional type, or sector—and thus protects lecturers at public community colleges in the same manner as full professors at private Ivy League universities—tenure is a special right granted only to those faculty members who have both secured a tenure-eligible position and subsequently met the requirements to earn tenure through their employing university. For those who earn tenure, they can expect continuous employment through the university that grants it unless they violate the terms of this employment in egregious ways (e.g., incompetence, insubordination, neglect of duty, or immoral conduct). Even in instances when the terms are violated, tenured faculty members are required to undergo due process before they can be disciplined or dismissed [42]. In this way, tenure is a means to an end rather than a blanket protection, as it enables faculty to complete their responsibilities in teaching, research, and service without the fear of retribution from their employer.

As such, and also unlike academic freedom, tenure varies based on institutional type, sector, and internal policies. In private universities, the terms of tenure are outlined in the faculty member’s employment contract and thus will vary between institutions. In public universities, the terms may be outlined in various forms, including statutes, regulations, or contracts. Tenure at public universities also confers a legal property right akin to other forms of property, which relates to the inability of the institution or the government to rescind it from a tenured faculty member without due process. The legal backing of tenure at public universities provides another layer of protection to faculty beyond that afforded by academic freedom.

While it is still the norm for US universities to offer tenure to their faculty, with recent data showing that 57% of degree-granting postsecondary institutions in America have tenure systems [43], some universities do not provide tenure to any of their faculty, regardless of their rank within the system. Yet, even among universities that do have tenure systems, tenure has been steadily decreasing in the US. The AAUP highlights how many tenure lines have changed to be filled by either contingent or part-time faculty since 1987, where 53% of faculty positions were either tenured or on the tenure track. As of 2021, that number dropped to 33% [44]. At the same time, state and federal legislation in the US is seeking to further weaken tenure. Legal challenges to tenure have been a persistent aspect of political conflicts in higher education for decades [45]. However, the recent surge in legislation targeting tenure by mandating post-tenure reviews marks a shift in these challenges, linking the reviews to ambiguous disciplinary actions. While post-tenure reviews themselves are not new or uncommon [46], the AAUP explains that “the possibility that reviews can result in termination raise concerns about [the policy’s] conformance with AAUP standards” [46] (p. 7). The erosion of tenure highlights the importance of robust academic freedom policies that enable faculty to complete their work in teaching, research, and service without undue influence or fear of retaliation.

4.2. Teaching

In the classroom, academic freedom provides faculty with the right to determine curricular materials, pedagogical approaches, and assessment procedures. However, that is not to say that faculty have complete control over the course. In the 1940 Statement on Academic Freedom, the AAUP (1940) stated that “[t]eachers are entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing their subject, but they should be careful not to introduce into their teaching controversial matter which has no relation to their subject” [47] (p. 14). Or, as Robert Post has remarked regarding the bounds of academic freedom, “If I am supposed to be teaching constitutional law, I can’t spend my classroom time talking about auto mechanics” [48]. As Post suggests, the extent of academic freedom in a professor’s teaching activities is determined by a two-part analysis: first, whether the professor’s expressions align with the university’s educational mission—either by being reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns or relevant to the course subject—and second, if they do not align, whether the expressions address a matter of public concern.

Beyond curricular and pedagogical decisions, academic freedom in the classroom also provides professors with the ability to oversee student conduct, as long as this oversight is aligned with the university’s educational mission. That is, when course content is directly related to a legitimate pedagogical concern, disputes between professors and students that challenge professors’ academic freedom tend to be decided in favor of the professor. This protection stems in part from a Supreme Court case from 1988, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, where the court ruled that academic freedom enables professors to regulate students’ expression when the issue at hand is reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns and the educational mission of the universities [49]. Although Hazelwood involved a secondary school, courts have applied the ruling to postsecondary contexts [50,51]. In Ward v. Polite (2012) [52], for example, a graduate student in a counseling program refused to work with gay clients, citing her religious beliefs. A review committee composed of faculty and students found her actions to conflict with disciplinary ethics and thus dismissed her from the program. Overturning a previous ruling in favor of the university, the court noted that “The Hazelwood test, it is true, arose in the context of speech by high school students, not speech by college or graduate students. But for the same reason this test works for students who have not yet entered high school … it works for students who have graduated from high school. The key word is student. Hazelwood respects the latitude educational institutions—at any level—must have to further legitimate curricular objectives” [52] (p. 8). The court further explained that “when a university lays out a program’s curriculum or class’s requirements for all to see, it is the rare day when a student can exercise a First Amendment veto over them” [52] (p. 9).

One of the areas where students have particularly challenged the academic freedom of professors in the classroom relates to the disputes between course content and their ideological or religious views. The AAUP foresaw this issue, stating that “[l]imitations of academic freedom because of religious or other aims of the institution should be clearly stated in writing at the time of the appointment” [47] (p. 14). Thus, professors should be aware at the time of their hiring if there are likely to be conflicts between their teaching and the educational mission of their employing university. Apart from these conditions, they should be free to teach as they see fit based on their disciplinary expertise. Supporting this freedom, US courts have sided with professors when the content was of legitimate pedagogical concern. For example, if a student in a biology course believes in creationism and not in evolution, the professor can still require that student to demonstrate knowledge about evolution in course assessments. Importantly, the dispute here relates to the course content, which is justified through scientific consensus, and is thus not treating the student unfairly based on their personal beliefs. Similarly, courts are inclined to uphold professors’ academic freedom when the topic at question is a matter of public concern. For instance, in Hardy v. Jefferson Community College (2001) [53], a professor taught a lesson on language and social constructivism as mechanisms of power that marginalize minoritized and oppressed groups. Although some students found the lesson uncomfortable or offensive, the courts ruled that it was relevant to the course content and addressed a matter of public concern, thus deserving protection under academic freedom.

Although courts have upheld professors’ rights to determine course content, challenges from the public to professors’ authority and accusations of biases and political indoctrination are not uncommon [54,55]. With growing political divides in the US, some faculty find themselves self-censoring in order to avoid such accusations or related disputes [56]. In a recent survey about perceptions of academic freedom in teaching, the majority of professors who responded indicated they needed supports for navigating challenges to academic freedom in their teaching, with the most commonly identified supports being “frameworks or direct support for engaging students constructively on sensitive issues” and “advocating for academic freedom”. Nonetheless, the majority of professors responding also indicated that they did not feel unsafe or uncomfortable discussing or teaching sensitive topics [57].

4.3. Research

Creating new knowledge is a cornerstone of many professors’ work, and the strongest support for professors’ academic freedom relates to their research and scholarly activities [58]. According to the AAUP, “[t]eachers are entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of the results, subject to the adequate performance of their other academic duties; but research for pecuniary return should be based upon an understanding with the authorities of the institution” [47] (p. 14).

As was discussed earlier, this freedom may be compromised when research involves external stakeholders. A well-known example of infringement on a professor’s academic freedom comes from the case of David Kern, a medical professor at Brown University in the 1990s. Through his research, Kern discovered a rare lung disease affecting workers at Microfibres, Inc., a manufacturing company and a donor to Brown’s affiliate hospital, where Kern also worked. After identifying multiple cases and linking them to the company’s nylon flocking factory, Kern sought to publish his findings. However, both Microfibres and Brown University attempted to block him, citing a confidentiality agreement. Despite pressure, Kern proceeded with his research presentation in 1997, leading to the abrupt closure of his clinic and the effective termination of his teaching and research at Brown [36]. This retaliation represents a clear infringement upon Kern’s academic freedom and provides a cautionary tale for how research can be affected by competing interests.

Academic freedom’s protections over research may also be questioned based on the nature of the research being conducted when this research includes disparaging remarks about the identities (e.g., race, gender, and sexual orientation) or beliefs (e.g., religion and political affiliation) of the subjects of the research. In Levin v. Harleston [59], Professor Michael Levin, a faculty member at a state university, published scholarly writings in various outlets, including The New York Times and academic journals, that contained “denigrating comments concerning the intelligence and social characteristics” of a racial group. Concerned that Levin’s biased views could alienate students, the university created an alternative section of his class for those who wished to transfer out of the section Levin was teaching. The trial court found that this action had the “intent and consequence of stigmatizing Professor Levin solely because of his expression of ideas”, and the federal appellate court ruled that the alternative section and the potential disciplinary measures violated his academic freedom by imposing a chilling effect on his First Amendment rights” [59]. In a more recent case, a psychiatry professor at a public university was disciplined and ultimately terminated in response to sharing his views on how to best treat children with gender dysphoria, which contradicted the views of many of his colleagues. Recalling the relationship between academic freedom and the First Amendment, the court ruled that university officials must stand trial in the ongoing case, explaining that “Defendants should have known that Josephson’s speech was protected and that retaliating against Josephson for his speech would violate his First Amendment rights” [60].

As these cases illustrate, the seemingly straightforward protections that academic freedom provides to research and scholarly activity can easily become complex when applied to the wide range of research topics, professors’ personal interpretations of their scholarship, and the effects of external stakeholders.

4.4. Service

The third and final primary component of professors’ work protected through academic freedom is their service work. Service responsibilities include internal obligations, such as serving on university, college, or departmental committees, or participating in other forms of shared governance, such as the faculty senate [61]. The AAUP describes academic freedom’s protection of service work by explaining the following:

“College and university teachers are citizens, members of a learned profession, and officers of an educational institution. When they speak or write as citizens, they should be free from institutional censorship or discipline, but their special position in the community imposes special obligations. As scholars and educational officers, they should remember that the public may judge their profession and their institution by their utterances. Hence, they should at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opinions of others, and should make every effort to indicate that they are not speaking for the institution”

[47] (p. 14)

The AAUP highlights the significance of professors’ external roles in the community over their internal responsibilities as academic citizens within the university, reflecting how academic freedom in relation to service is generally perceived differently from teaching or research, especially in legal contexts. While teaching and research are held by the courts as unique aspects of the academic profession and thus subject to specialized protections, serving as an academic citizen is seen as more closely related to the work of other public officials, such as county clerks and police officers, and therefore not afforded the same protections.

However, there are exceptions to service activities that have been recognized as being protected under academic freedom. Courts uphold professors’ academic freedom when their academic citizenship activities involve issues classified as “a matter of public concern” (e.g., political, social, or community interests) and when the information underlying their expression was not obtained through their role as a college faculty member [62,63,64]. For example, in Demers v. Austin, a federal appellate court ruled that David Demers, a professor at a public university, engaged in academic citizenship activities that were protected under academic freedom due to their being a matter of public concern. Demers proposed separating the communication studies and mass communication programs through a broad, research-based report rather than a personal grievance. His plan for this separation analyzed the historical evolution of mass communication programs, highlighting tensions between scholarly faculty and journalism practitioners. He warned of weakening ties with the journalism field due to a shift toward more academic faculty and proposed structural changes to strengthen the program. Because he was engaging with issues that the court deemed a matter of public concern, rather than a personal grievance, the courts ultimately ruled that his speech was protected [62]. This case further demonstrates that academic writing beyond traditional scholarship can sometimes be protected, as Demers’s report was part of his academic citizenship activities rather than his own research as a professor.

While the Demers case represents an instance when the courts ultimately ruled in favor of the professor over the university, there are many cases in which the university has been successful when professors claimed academic freedom infringement for citizenship activities. Given the wide-ranging nature of university service, it is perhaps unsurprising that these cases also cover many different topics. Some examples include disagreements over faculty hiring (e.g., hiring criteria, qualifications, and unfair practices [65,66,67]), academic unit structuring [68], the treatment of grants [69], interpretations of faculty handbook language [70], and issues within the classroom (e.g., teaching assignments, instructional quality, and cheating allegations [63,64,71,72]. In these cases, the courts viewed the service activities as personal grievances rather than as matters of public concern and thus did not grant the speech the same protections as in the Demers case.

As all these cases show, the current state of academic freedom in the US relies heavily upon legal authority to both shape its limits and enforce its protections. While academic freedom began as a “very soft law”, these cases show how it has evolved to have strong legal support in certain circumstances. At the same time, these cases reveal how these circumstances are far more limited than what the initial drafting of the principles of academic freedom might suggest. For example, while many of the non-legal writings on academic freedom present it as a broad protection of professors’ work, the courts have shown that it does not apply equally to research, teaching, and service. While research is granted protections in many instances, teaching must be aligned with the university’s educational mission, and service activities must be a matter of public concern. Similarly, when a dispute about academic freedom pits a professor against a university, the courts typically rule in favor of the university, which raises questions about whether academic freedom is primarily individual (i.e., belonging to professors) or institutional (i.e., belonging to universities). Even with these limitations, academic freedom is the cornerstone of academic work in the US, and thus, it is critical for it to be maintained in the face of emerging and future challenges.

5. The Future of Academic Freedom

Since its early beginnings, academic freedom across the globe has experienced periods of growth and decline. Internationally, the data suggest that state religiosity and militarism contribute to declines in academic freedom support [73]. Likewise, examining these fluxes, Lott [74] shows how academic freedom experienced waves of growth in both the mid-1940s and late 1970s and highlights how it has been in a period of ongoing decline since 2013. While American academic freedom has roots in both professional and legal foundations, they are increasingly differentiated, as the law [75], including new legislation [4], along with emergent technologies, challenges these conceptions [2].

In this section, I review some of the issues facing academic freedom today, including legislative threats, changes due to technological advances, and effects on equity and social change.

5.1. Legislation

Across the US, changes in legislation and policy have weakened academic freedom. This topic was highlighted in a recent international symposium, where leaders from universities across the world met to discuss the current state of academic freedom. One of the attendees, Liviu Matei, had a particularly dire warning for the US. Matei served as the provost of the Central European University (CEU) in 2017, which, at the time, resided in Hungary. After the Hungarian government passed a law that many believed was specifically targeted at the CEU [76], the CEU was forced to relocate to Austria. Matei explained that he sees similar actions occurring in the US, particularly through legislation passed in Florida [77]. Others have also connected Florida’s actions to Hungary, saying that Republican legislators were specifically modeling their efforts based on the tactics of Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán [78], or, as Matei concludes, “America is importing bad models” [77].

Professors across the US see similar threats to academic freedom, both through state legislation and beyond. In a 2024 survey of approximately 1100 US professors, 91% said they agreed that academic freedom is under threat [56]. These findings are echoed in a similar survey conducted jointly through the American Association of Colleges and Universities (AACU&U), the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago, and the AAUP. When asking professors to compare their current experiences with academic freedom to those from six or seven years ago, over a third perceived declines in academic freedom related to their teaching and intramural and extramural speech. This number dropped to just under a fifth for research and publishing [79], highlighting how academic freedom provides the strongest protections for research. Although these are relatively small proportions of the overall respondents, they nonetheless signal the decline in academic freedom over a short time.

Although these surveys did not analyze professor responses according to the states in which they worked, it is likely that such an analysis would have shown differential results, as the current state of academic freedom in the US is influenced by state law. As was highlighted in the international symposium, certain states, such as Florida, Texas, Indiana, and others, have passed legislation that substantially infringes upon the academic freedom of professors at universities in those locations. A recent legal analysis of such legislation calls to attention its effects on academic freedom, arguing that the enacted laws present a metaphoric vise-grip on higher education through weakening many facets of academic freedom and university autonomy, such as tenure, curricular control, and shared governance [4]. With the 2025 change in administration in the US, which includes a vice president who has deemed professors “the enemy” [80], it is likely that legislation seeking to dismantle academic freedom will continue to spread across the US in the coming years.

5.2. Technology

Advances in digital media and technology have fundamentally changed the way many professors engage with their work. Some professors use technology as a way to reach new audiences formally through academic repositories (e.g., Academia.edu and ResearchGate) or informally through social media (e.g., Bluesky and Instagram), while increased use of video conferencing platforms (e.g., Zoom and Microsoft Teams) since the pandemic has made it easier than ever for professors to connect with colleagues and interested audiences across the globe. In many cases, advances in technology have improved the academic profession, sharing knowledge more widely and facilitating dialectical discussion. Yet, the same advances that enable greater dialogue between academics and with the larger community also bring risks and potential harms to academic freedom in the forms of censorship [81], surveillance in the classroom and in communications [82], “cancel culture” [83], and even threats to professors’ health and safety [84].

The rise of artificial intelligence (AI) presents a particularly complex challenge with “ethical, legal, and philosophical dilemmas surrounding academic freedom, authorship, and originality” [85] (p. 1). These dilemmas are most frequently discussed in terms of forgery and plagiarism, both among student work [86] and academic research [87]. There are also serious concerns surrounding AI biases in the technology [88] and their effects on aspects of higher education beyond the classroom, such as decision-making processes in admissions and funding [85].

5.3. Equity and Social Change

Legislative threats to academic freedom further affect efforts to advance equity and social change. These issues have become inextricably connected in recent legislation that targets dismantling diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) programs. These legislative actions extend far beyond DEI initiatives to limit the protections of academic freedom for all aspects of professors’ work, ultimately eroding the openness and variety of perspectives that are crucial to a thriving academic environment. Showing the expansive reach of these legislative efforts, the AAUP has catalogued over 150 bills introduced across the US between 2021 and 2023 that targeted DEI efforts. They contend that the proliferation of such legislation constitutes a deliberate and systematic campaign by well-resourced right-wing think tanks—such as the Heritage Foundation, the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), and the Center for Renewing America (CRA)—to advance ideological frameworks that directly oppose those associated with the resurgence of the Black Lives Matter movement in the early 2020s and simultaneously attempting to dismantle academic freedom protections [89,90]. While many of these bills did not become law, a free expression think tank, PEN America, has shown how even proposed bills can affect higher education without being signed into law. In Wisconsin, for example, Republican legislators had failed to pass anti-DEI bills due to the state’s democratic governor, which ultimately led the Wisconsin State Assembly Speaker to vow that he would withhold hundreds of millions of dollars in state funding from the university system unless they canceled their DEI-related programming. Although this was only a threat with no legal backing, the University of Wisconsin system capitulated to the demands [91].

The bills that have been passed paint a troubling picture for both academic freedom and DEI efforts. Much of this legislation seeks to prevent professors from discussing DEI-related concepts, thus restricting both professors’ autonomy and efforts to educate students about DEI issues. Florida offers a prominent example through Florida Statutes Section 1000.05(4) [92], commonly known as the Individual Freedom Act (IFA), which includes substantive provisions designed to restrict instructional content that “espouses, promotes, advances, inculcates, or compels such student or employee to believe” concepts related to “race, color, national origin, or sex”. The constitutionality of the IFA was subsequently challenged by professors and students in Florida in Pernell v. Florida Board of Governors (2022) [93]. In this case, the professors argued that the IFA violated their First Amendment rights by chilling their ability to engage in scholarly discussions and inquiry, while the students contended that the law impeded their right to an uncensored education. The court agreed, determining that the IFA amounted to unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination and holding that the law infringed on professors’ First Amendment rights by banning specific viewpoints in classroom discussions. The court’s acknowledgment of the law’s chilling effect underscores the real legal and educational consequences of reshaping academic freedom to enforce ideological conformity, while the students’ involvement in this case shows the direct effects on learning that stem from efforts to restrict DEI programming. Although this example is limited to one state, similar legislation has appeared across the US and is likely to continue to expand under the current presidential administration [4].

6. Conclusions

Academic freedom in the United States is a well-recognized yet contested principle that grants faculty members autonomy in research, teaching, and extramural speech. Rooted in both professional norms and constitutional law, it has evolved through historical precedents, judicial rulings, and shifting societal expectations. While American legal foundations, such as Sweezy v. New Hampshire and Keyishian v. Board of Regents, recognized its societal need and crafted general guidance on its protection, academic freedom faces persistent and emerging challenges. These include legislative interventions that restrict faculty autonomy, market-driven pressures that commodify knowledge production, and technological advancements that introduce new ethical dilemmas.

Also, the tension between academic freedom as an individual right for faculty and an institutional prerogative for universities continues to shape contemporary debates. Moreover, political polarization and public skepticism toward higher education threaten to undermine the very conditions necessary for open intellectual inquiry. Compounding these effects, the erosion of tenure, increased surveillance, and the corporatization of universities all present obstacles that, if left unchecked, could significantly weaken academic freedom’s role in advancing science, fostering critical scholarship and democratic discourse, and maintaining intellectual integrity without undue influence.

Looking ahead, the preservation of academic freedom requires a re-examination of the rights and responsibilities that professors hold. It also requires college leaders to reaffirm and participate in shared governance to establish trustworthy and worthwhile norms that respect academic freedom but simultaneously remedy problematic professional behaviors. Further, it requires policymakers, including judicial decision makers, to value scholarly discourse and debate. As the academic landscape continues to evolve, the focus of the academic enterprise is to balance intellectual autonomy and institutional governance so that academic freedom remains a professional right with applications to its special concern under constitutional analyses.