Varieties of Revelation, Varieties of Truth—A Comparative Ontological Study of Revelation through Music and Sciences

Abstract

Accounts of revelation and contemporary views of these are based on beliefs and historical citations. These accounts shall not be limited to the understanding and interpreting of historical and other events within writings but must present the possibility of an objective analysis of the nature of revelation as a phenomenon, an object of our sensory and mental conscious experiences. This paper approaches the act or phenomenon of revelation regardless of the revealer and its nature. Can we abstract the revealer and the revealed from revelation and have an ontological account of revelation solely focusing on the occurrence itself? The central part of the discussion is based on the object/property pair as ontological categories through which the means are analyzed. A comparative method is used where Scripture, musical writings, and mathematical/physical formulae (as potential means of revelation) are scrutinized. As a result, without any need to determine the revealer, revelation can be based on and described through pure properties (not tropes) in human experience, intellect, and understanding. The possibility of revelation beyond Scripture and Jesus Christ—following a type of liberal and general theory of revelation—presents itself in arts and sciences. The “true” of a musical work, when found and experienced during musical performances and scientific truths represented by the formulae, which describe the world and a meta domain, can be derived from the chains of signs and symbols as it is through Scripture. Human cognitive faculties present a universal natural limit to our direct experiencing of the transcendent, of the supernatural. A new dualist conception of logos as a metaphysical category marks the domain bridging the non-transcendent with the transcendent.

1. Introduction

The title of this essay could have simply been varieties of truth. However, the assumption that the varieties of truth may help us in an ontological discussion on revelation can be misleading. It is, therefore, necessary to establish the premises of our philosophical approach toward the ontology of revelation. Revelation is to be understood in its original literary form, apocalypse, the act or case (the occurrence) of uncovering, unveiling, revealing something which, per definition, must have previously been hidden. We shall abstain from psychology and anthropology from this discussion because research in these disciplines is based on empirical data. What we are seeking here can be found in a meta domain. Answers to questions and conclusions cannot be derived from empirical data from physics and sciences but may be found above or beyond physics; in meta-physics.

According to most past and current theories of (divine) revelation, the following model by Mavrodes is widely accepted:

m reveals a to n by means of (through, etc.) k.

(Mavrodes 1988, p. 88)

The first premise is that there is an entity we call the revealer (m). To approach the act of revelation or the occurrence of revelation directly (the part between m and n above), we must isolate it from its reason, its cause, its origin, divine or other. Within the occurrence of revelation, we will find two distinct entities: one is the means (k) of revelation, and the other is that which is revealed, the object of revelation (a). Most theories of (divine) revelation defend that m is identical to a; that is, m reveals itself, and in the case of divine revelation, God reveals himself. For a pure analysis of revelation (the act or occurrence within the above formula), first, I will propose an alternative to the nature of revelation, an ontological approach, solely ascribing properties to revelation without its object, the revealed, and without its subject, the revealer. Later, I will introduce an alternative conception of object, which will shift object into the realm of properties, and thereby the object will cease to be an object; there will be no need to consider the notion of the ontological category of object. The object of revelation (and as it will follow, not the object but pure properties that will lead to the composition of and understanding of an object) must take part and be placed in human cognition as pure sets of properties conceived as part of a revelatory experience. Thus, the nature of revelation will not be juxtaposed by its object, which, as is widely accepted, is the subject of revelation. Other theories propose that the object and the subject can be different. Positing that not the object but pure properties of revelation are to be taken into account and fixing the properties as unconditionals, we will be able to investigate the nature of revelation without going into the discussions of whether the object and the subject are or can be the same. A search for parallels and similarities in the ontology of revelation across domains—arts, sciences, and Scripture—is necessary.

2. Scripture and Its Alternatives in Revelation

Although Scripture as a theological term is and must be understood as generally divine, extensionally (beyond the scope of theology), we can include any revelatory series of signs and symbols (of syntactic and semantic nature) under the category of Scripture if we can establish rational premises to our claims. Scriptures are believed to be of divine origin, and their nature and their content are believed to be divine, their containers sacred. It is widely accepted that scriptures historically originate from oral traditions that were written down later; thus, the containers of sacred orations (believed to have divine origins or causes), the books, parchments, and such became held sacred. To avoid any confusion and debate on our approach to scriptures and their historic function and place in societies and cultures, I chose a pure (direct) approach to the act of revelation.

From an ontological perspective, remaining within the framework of philosophical traditions, we must first separate belief from truth to advance toward an understanding of whether any extension of Scripture in the form of chains of signs and symbols can be of divine origin and, as such, have revelatory properties or functions. In this paper, I omit the term holy and use sacred only to direct our attention toward the philosophical category of objects. In my understanding, holy is an attribute of persons, and sacred is a general attribute of objects.

We can say that an object does not change ontologically but can change epistemologically. Suppose ordinary objects in experience change ontologically; then they must become other objects because change, in this case, may follow from the changing of properties. In the case of ordinary objects, we do not meet fundamental problems of identity, whereas, for a different class of objects—living beings—this claim may lead to the problem of identity and identifiability because organic entities, humans, animals, plants change and evolve, which is due to changes in some or more of their properties. We can identify a person or an object after some or more of their properties change, such as an ageing person or a refurbished apartment. If we take this road, we may stumble upon the problem of authenticity and identifiability of scriptures, which we will see below. For the moment (following Aristotle), we accept that an object does not change ontologically if its essential properties remain the same and only accidental changes occur.

In our ontological investigations, we must look for (what Aristotle calls) essential properties of the object. If the object is a phenomenon, we must look for its qualities. Why not property but quality? Properties are universal; they belong to the ontology of an object or phenomenon without necessitating more knowledge beyond that. Qualities necessitate cognition and understanding of properties and their relation to objects or phenomena; as such, they can be generalized for a group of objects or phenomena. Properties, on the other hand, can be generalized without grouping the objects and phenomena to which they belong. In short, properties can be confined to ontology compared to qualities because qualities necessitate an epistemic approach to their understanding and use. Approaching the object epistemically, in experience, the more times we encounter it, the more experiences of it are contained in a set of memories, the more we can know about it, the more we can know of its parts and elements (its constitution or composition), and we can recognize these again and again, associating new knowledge with them each time, most of which are (logically and in some cases esthetically) coherent. Repeated encounters with the object increase our knowledge of it. It is not a lexical or object-historical body of knowledge but a personal, subject-historical knowledge that can be placed, if we wish (but not necessarily), into general historical, societal, and theoretical contexts. Analytical ontology can only succeed if it takes into account the aforementioned contexts, either in their micro-environment—the personal historicity of the recipient, knower, interpreter, i.e., within personal and interpersonal narratives—or in their macro-environment, within linguistic and historical relations of humankind.

3. Belief, Conviction, Knowledge

Scholars, researchers, and all human thinkers strive for knowledge through different means and from a variety of sources. Some knowledge may relate to myths and mysteries, some to facts and convictions, and in between, we can find our beliefs; those we mostly hold are tied to some knowledge or truth. We shall not jump to conclusions about knowledge unconditionally relating to truth. We may have truths based on facts or experiences; we may also have truths based on inferences. These may change over time depending on experiences or become restricted to contexts. Good examples are when knowledge did not refer to the heliocentric model of the universe but to other earlier models, when those with knowledge were sceptical toward Kepler’s theories regarding the elliptical orbits of planets; or Newton’s laws of mechanics are valid on macro levels, but invalid on quantum levels. We can determine that a firm correlation between knowledge and truth cannot be established for all cases of knowledge.

Analyzing the statement earlier that some knowledge may relate to convictions and facts, I must elaborate on what I understand by “conviction”. The concept is used mainly in relation to belief and not rarely as a synonym of belief; e.g., conviction is strong belief, etc. If one looks it up in dictionaries, the result will be a convoluted linguistic chaos, not without tautologies. One can observe instances where one is the referent of the other and vice versa. My understanding of “conviction”—coupled with knowledge rather than belief—aligns with Descartes’s, as he points out in a letter to Regius dated 24 May 1640. In this letter, he responds to Regius’s criticism of the Meditations:

I distinguish the two as follows: there is conviction [persuasio] when there remains some reason which might lead us to doubt, but knowledge [scientia] is conviction based on a reason so strong that it can never be shaken by any stronger reason.

(Cottingham et al. 1984, AT 3:65, CSMK 147)

Conviction may contain doubts if there exists such reason to support doubt. It gets closer to knowledge and further away from belief when reasons leading to doubts are consumed and suppressed by other, stronger reasons. This is when conviction can become knowledge. Next, he states that such knowledge is not possible but only if one has the knowledge of God. Accordingly, whatever knowledge we may have is a lesser type of God’s knowledge. Despite these remarks, we can clearly see that conviction remains closer to knowledge than to belief.

In Meditations, Descartes places doubt in connection with conviction but seems to leave doubt out of the framework he establishes for conviction:

During moments of certainty, it is as if my perception is guided by “a great light in the intellect” (Med. 4, AT 7:59, CSM 2:41). This rational illumination empowers me to “see utterly clearly with my mind’s eye”; my feelings of certainty are grounded—indeed, “I see a manifest contradiction” in denying the proposition of which I’m convinced.

(Ibid, Med. 3, AT 7:36, CSM 2:25)

In the second meditation, he goes on to write that

[…] I shall now expound for a second time the basis on which it seems to me that all human certainty can be founded. First of all, as soon as we think that we correctly perceive something, we are spontaneously convinced that it is true. Now if this conviction is so firm that it is impossible for us ever to have any reason for doubting what we are convinced of, then there are no further questions for us to ask: we have everything that we could reasonably want. […] For the supposition which we are making here is of a conviction so firm that it is quite incapable of being destroyed; and such a conviction is clearly the same as the most perfect certainty.

(Ibid, AT 7:144f, CSM 2:103)

One may initially think that truth does not play any role in his remarks, but rather (unshakable) conviction or justified belief does, and perhaps this may seem to be in accordance with the Platonic justified true belief analysis of knowledge. One may interpret that his understanding of conviction is closer to belief, perhaps even a type of belief. I argue for the contrary. Doubt has an essential role in his philosophy and our understanding of the world. Emphasizing the importance of an epistemic approach to conviction, all doubt is instrumental, but doubt itself will always remain what it is, merely doubt as an instrument which cannot be part of truth or knowledge. Conviction, thus, is a better apparatus than mere belief if we want to know and understand something. Understanding the world and ourselves is possible through different disciplines. Restricting understanding to those topics we discuss here, we shall find different types of understanding in the case of musical works, mathematical and physical formulae, and Scripture.

How shall we proceed with the argument that we can posit divine disclosure in arts and sciences outside the scope of Scripture? I propose a comparative approach. The examples I present below are a series of signs and symbols (chains of syntactic structures found in musical scores and mathematical and other scientific formulae, which may also have semantic properties), which, once understood, can be revelatory. Understanding (dealing with its object as relations or connections) stems from knowledge, which can be based on convictions. We can see the roots of this idea in ancient Greek philosophy, in episteme (better translated as understanding), which in later philosophies gave way to knowledge (with a modern conception of it) becoming the dominant subject of philosophical thought. The examples below stand for types of syntactic (and semantic) chains, which sometimes may lead to the revelation of something that is not found but which reveals itself through human actions (mental or physical). These can be either spatiotemporal or purely mental. To bridge the mental and spatiotemporal—which must have mental correlates—we can place these actions into a metaphysical domain, where revelation (as experienced and not mind-independent) may occur. For further analysis, I propose logos to mark this metaphysical domain, where (hypothetically) the transcendent and non-transcendent can be bridged.

4. Logos as an Ontological Category

Throughout history, there have been multiple sightings, experiences, and occurrences in multiple modes that relate to revelation. These were verified by many in multiple modes. If we need any proof, the burden of proof is not on the witnesses, the experiencers, but on us. To understand the nature of revelation and place it within the limits of rationality and reason, devoid of mysteries, myths, and similar, we must establish the grounds which can reflect truth, as happened with mythopoeic traditions through Herakleitos’ invention of the (philosophical) logos. Otherwise, what we regard as revelation and its means or channels, what we regard as the occurrence of revelation, will remain shrouded in mysteries, solely relying on eyewitness accounts, of which we have no way to verify their truth. If this remains the case, we have no other option but to resort to belief without reason. The resort to beliefs only, on the one side, may establish a firm domain of correlates of beliefs, which depend on further beliefs, which in essence can be seen as a favorable result, and this is also reflected in the framework of religions and theology, but on the other side, we can see the result as unfavorable, because if we cannot secure the correlation of beliefs with other beliefs within an uncontrolled framework, the danger of alien elements, that is, non-canonic elements, being introduced to the framework becomes unavoidable, and thus, there will be no more framework, but a multitude of frameworks.

Simply put, within the use of the internet, social media, and uncontrolled uncensored sources, we witness in our contemporary trends that anything, any information, any idea, any belief finds supporters and followers without fact-checking, without research, through blind faith. It seems to be a growing collective intellectual apathy: the closer the information of all types, the easier the sources become available, being within reach of all with a few clicks on the keyboard, the farther they become, the less people look for them. Within the simplicity of reaching information and the uncensored volumes of free ideas and thoughts, there reside uncensored volumes of controlled, manipulative ideas and thoughts. Any non-veridical idea or thought can be established or presented as fact, which is then supported by followers and believers. The censorship is thus left to the collective, which does not act according to reason and does not profit from the possibility of its freedom of attaining knowledge.

The metaphysical logos is perhaps, or can be considered a form of filter, censorship based on rationality, reason, understanding, knowledge, thorough analysis and scrutiny, which can secure the just framework, in our case, for revelation.

A group of certain existents, theoretical or physical, which tie the physical with the non-physical, the rational with the ineffable, the sublime with the divine, and perhaps the earthly with non-earthly, can be listed under the category of logos. The connection between the divine (according to Kant) and the ineffable can be placed on the premises that both demand that we have esthetic judgments of the sublime in nature through our experiences. “Sublime is what even to be able to think proves that the mind has a power surpassing any standard of sense” (Kant [1790] 1987, § 25, B84) [Emphasis original]. Although, in Kant’s remarks, the object of thought and experience is nature, the idea reflects the sublime nature of the mental powers of the experiencing subject. All written statements, products of this sublime mental power, that are (extensionally) based on Scripture can be grouped under the category of logos. Perhaps scriptures (in the plural, including non-Christian scriptures) themselves, together with these extensions, can be placed under the same category (of logos). We can defend the idea that there can be other extensions to Scripture that are non-textual; that is, they do not utilize spoken languages. These can be in artificial languages or sorts of languages. Regarding formal languages, because their reason for existence (their purpose) is different from those I present here and because they are artificial, in the sense that we create them for specific needs as solutions or answers to logical and other problems, we can omit them from this essay.

For the possibility of how logos could bridge opposing theoretical or philosophical traditions historically, we shall look at ancient Greek philosophical and Judeo-Christian traditions of thought. Without going into a detailed discourse on logos (broadly approached), we find logos within these traditions as a key concept in attempts to establish a bridge between seemingly opposing schools and traditions of thought.

Here are a few examples: the conventional logos is the word itself; the biblical logos is the “Word of the Lord”. In Christian theology, the concept is closely tied to the divinity of Christ. Although this double understanding of the word is reflected in the writings of Philo of Alexandria, “Rabbinism used its own term memra”, which “corresponded to the Greek logos” used to refer to actions “attributed to the divine majesty” (May 1946). In the Gospel of John, Jesus Christ is identified as the (incarnate) “Word”. Preceding this idea, 1 John 1:1 describes the pre-incarnate logos. Luke seems to refer to logos not as the identity of Jesus but his teachings. In the New Testament, the word is used with several meanings, such as verbal utterance, discourse, speech, instruction, and narrative (ibid.), most of which seem to have followed ancient philosophical traditions. The polysemy of logos in these traditions may have been the topic of long debates and discussions throughout history, but it will help us as follows.

Complex and intricate is the history of the use of logos with a multitude of meanings. Heraclitus used the term to signify the fundamental principle that governs the universe, an underlying order, the principle of order or reason behind the apparent chaos of existence. This foundational understanding laid the groundwork for logos’s subsequent evolution across different intellectual traditions. Plato regarded it as a transcendent principle, an eternal and unchanging reality that served as the basis for knowledge and understanding. Aristotle, on the other hand, explored logos as a rational principle inherent in human beings, emphasizing its role in logical reasoning and communication. In his writings, logos is identified as one of the three principles of rhetoric, a rhetorical concept understood as argument alongside ethos (credibility) and pathos (emotional appeal). It refers to the logical appeal made through evidence, reasoning, and the structure of an argument. According to this model, effective communication involves a balance of these three persuasive elements, with logos providing a solid foundation based on reason and logic. Philo of Alexandria incorporates the word into his Jewish philosophy with two meanings, namely, the spoken word (or discourse), logos prophorikos, and the word (remaining) within, logos endiathetos, which can be understood as the internal discourse, or perhaps as mind because he uses the words dianoia or nous interchangeably with logos endiathetos (Cf. Mühl 1962 (supra n.1) 17). These examples show a tendency for logos to be used in two distinct ways. One is metaphysical, the other semantic. The metaphysical use of logos can be dissociated from socio-cultural contexts, whereas the semantic use is purely socio-cultural.

The legacy of logos extends into contemporary discourse, influencing fields such as linguistics, semiotics, and communication theory. In linguistics, logos is associated with the study of language and its symbolic representation of meaning. In semiotics, the term is explored in the context of signs and symbols, highlighting its role in conveying meaning within various cultural contexts. If we combine these more modern conceptions of logos with the ancient ones, we can simplify the case by indicating that there are two distinct logoi. The two logoi are not two different understandings or meanings of one word, nor are two concepts dissolved into one. As used, they are the two distinct types of logos: one is metaphysical, the other semantic-cultural. We can consider the two different uses of logos tied to a categorical reason; that is, we can suppose that the logoi can be distinguished ontologically. We can therefore state that we have established the grounds for the possibility of two distinct ontologies of logos. We can conjoin the two in one in saying that logos has a twofold nature; on the one side, it belongs to the physical world, the world of meanings and collocations, and on the other, it belongs to the mental world, the world which resides or supervenes on the physical. Through this dualist view of logos, it may follow that if logos is considered an ontological category, it may keep its twofold nature. Two explanations remain valid for the category, one being semantic, the other phenomenal. According to the first fragment, since his speech and the logos are not identical, we can suppose that it is accessible to us in ways other than by spoken or written word.

Everything is governed or structured by the underlying logos, with people not being aware of it. This idea is preserved in the New Testament. But it does not only describe God as all governing all structuring embodied (incarnated) in Jesus but also all nature (the universe) with its logical, rational existence. This may all be described and even spoken out through discourse, our way of communicating. This idea is reflected in being involved with logos and, at the same time, being distanced from it (Marcus Aurelius 72 MA 4.46). According to fragments (31ff), logos can be seen as governing the cosmic sea, the fire (perhaps energy) that governs everything, all change and progress in the universe. At the same time, it may represent something mental, the rational existence of everything that obeys and follows the laws and laws of the universe. Hence, there is the possibility of the metaphysical category of Logos, with a capital L, which includes all meanings of logos.

Logos can also serve as a metaphorical gate through which we can understand the underlying order, reason, and structure inherent in the world around us; furthermore, it can be used to postulate other entities, realities beyond ours. What is common in the few examples above and many more not listed here is that logos is used as a metaphysical concept (perhaps a metaphor) to connect the rational, fact-based, real with the mythical, divine, and otherworldly. In each of these definitions and explanations, the different uses of logos hint at specific types of experiences and existences. We can establish groups of experiences according to type, content, and similar. But, through logos, we can also establish the demarcation of non-transcendent from the transcending, and as such, it can become universally binding, bridging. We shall see below how the metaphysical logos can be used in relation to musical sentences and mathematical/physical formulae in my attempt to bridge the gap between science, art, and divine revelation. For this, we must define the aforementioned in an epistemic, bare (rational) state as syntactic and semantic chains of signs and symbols.

5. Scripture as Syntactic and Semantic Chains of Signs and Symbols

The idea for this section stems from Heraclitus’s fragment DK B93. Sentences, propositions, and utterances can be misunderstood, misinterpreted. We can avoid debates of interpretations through a comparative approach based on samples of chains of signs and symbols that are not to be singled out but can only be exemplified. Many chains of syntactic and semantic entities can be considered divine but not sacred. The sanctity of what is considered sacred is based on beliefs, but divinity may not be. Divinity or being divine can be called an objective property, whereas sanctity or being sacred is always based on subjective judgments; it is perhaps an accidental property. Something of a divine nature (not sacred) can thus be the object of revelation. Divine revelation is then the divine object (of any sort, here undefined) being unveiled, uncovered. Something sacred acquires its attribute a posteriori, after experience, and cannot be about something about to be (become) or just being revealed. The sanctity (sacredness) of something is purely based on beliefs, judgments, and collective agreement. Perhaps the most conciliatory approach is to claim that the property of sanctity (or any other higher-order property) provides a reason for denoting the things that have it as sacred (or with any other matching higher-order attribute), but that this can only be a derived reason, which, in addition to the significance provided by non-derived reasons supplied by certain lower-order properties of the object, does not contribute to the importance of the assessment of the object in question as sacred (or with any other higher-order attribute). Syntactic chains of signs and symbols—when called divine—necessitate an ontological status different from that of sacred things, sacred objects of experiences, which are bound to certain contextualities. It can be argued that divinity is not bound to contextualities; as such, it can remain non-contextual; being divine is unconditional. Combining these thoughts, being divine can be called an absolute property; it is not a particular, nor is it accidental.

The divine, as an entity that induces fear without being fearful, necessitates experiencing the sublime, which is one of the types of esthetic judgments, according to Kant (see, On the dynamically sublime in nature Kant [1790] 1987, §28ff).

Only if he [a person] is conscious that his attitude is sincere and pleasing to God, will these effects of might serve to arouse in him the idea of God’s sublimity, insofar as he recognises in his own attitude a sublimity that conforms to God’s will, and is thereby elevated above any fear of such natural effects, which he does not regard as outbursts of God’s wrath. Even humility, as a strict judging of our own defects which, when we are conscious that our own attitudes are good, could otherwise easily be cloaked with the frailty of human nature [as an excuse], is a sublime mental attunement, namely, voluntary subjection of ourselves to the pain of self-reprimand so as gradually to eradicate the cause of these defects.

(Kant [1790] 1987, §28, B108)

Can Scripture, music, and physics/mathematics lead to our esthetic judgments of the sublime? In this essay, we will not discuss the possibility of other esthetic judgments, specifically of the beautiful, in our esthetic judgments.

If the content, the object of the Scripture, is divine, the revelatory nature of syntactic and semantic chains, thus, must be independent of their contextuality. Without committing ourselves to the divinity of music and mathematics/physics, we can claim that they are syntactic in their form and appearance as sorts of “texts”, but experiencing what these convey, describe, explain, or present may lead to inspiration, admiration, thoughts, and, in the case of pure sounds, to emotions, memories, and awe, perhaps to the experiencing of the sublime. Experiencing the sublime can occur through mathematics and physics when one has the necessary knowledge (expertise) for an understanding of what the formulae stand for.

Examples for syntactic and semantic chains of signs and symbols can be given through any sentence from a literary work, any formula in physics and mathematics, and any musical excerpt, any musical sentence.1 But for our ontological comparison, we must choose specific musical sentences and physical formulae comparable to examples from Scripture in terms of their impact on us. What induces the impact (in a sense causally) is the content hidden in these examples, which I called in an earlier essay “the true” (Ertüngealp 2024), and here in this essay I will call it logos.2 Our experiencing of these as their contents (logoi) are revealed in our encounters with them and can have equal or similar epistemic quality. Is this qualitative selection possible? And is this epistemic approach acceptable, whereas our aim is to identify or define the ontological nature of revelation? What the musical and mathematical syntactic chains seemingly do not have in common with examples from Scripture is that Scripture can be regarded as sacred, whereas a musical sentence and a physical formula generally do not. If we approach the case epistemically, the devout have the belief that Scripture is sacred, which narrows down the possibility of the Scripture’s sanctity to contextuality, broadly speaking to culture, era, and so on. Thus, we will have difficulty stating and proving that Scripture can universally be sacred. Because one culture may regard a sacred object of another culture as ordinary. Another culture’s sacred object cannot categorically demand our acceptance of the object’s sanctity. Members of a culture may approach an object deemed sacred by another culture with the same respect, awe, admiration, fear, etc., but they may also remain indifferent to it. It is possible to say that being sacred is not a universal property of Scripture—at least not without contextuality; therefore, it is not an ontological finding. Sanctity here is accidental because even within the same society or broader culture, past objects of sanctity may be stripped of their sacred status.

Choosing examples of similar qualities within the domains of Scripture, music, and mathematics (physics) based on ontological reasoning becomes thus difficult if we approach the case only epistemically. One has to delineate the choice of examples within a general culture, in our case, within the Western traditions of belief, music, and science. Otherwise, we may be forced to reach into different eras, cultures, and traditions that may not be compatible with each other regarding habits, belief systems, thought systems, etc. Such a comparison would also pose a further problem about the future. We have no means to compare past and current ideas and thoughts with potential future versions; thus, looking for examples of similar epistemic quality is futile. A solution to the problem as exposed is the ontological category of logos.

6. Revelatory Nature of Music and Mathematics as Syntactic and Semantic Chains of Signs and Symbols

The epistemic theory of Kant allows us to follow revelation in the form of knowing, where something hidden, a thing in itself, per Kant, becomes an object of our experience. It is irrelevant whether we speak about either the inner or the outer experience; it is but of utter importance that we can consider both simultaneously. Both can have semantic and phenomenal parts. The semantic can be phenomenal, and the phenomenal can be semantic when conveyed through language, music, and mathematics.

Sacred objects (in a narrower sense) are cared for and handled with caution not to damage or alter their physical nature and, through it, their non-physical content: Scripture and its contents. In a broader sense, we can apply this to all arts. Artworks are sacred for their beholders. As such, the sanctity of a musical sentence or a complete musical work can be universally agreed upon. No reasonable action will lead to attempts to change any part of any musical work, which would be artistic mutilation. What holds us off from altering a musical work is not only because with alterations it would lose its identity, become faulty, or contextually “damaged”, alter the content, but due to our approach to the musical work as something revered by us performers and listeners. It is “sacred” in the eyes and ears of its beholders. It is as “untouchable” as a painting or a sculpture. The revelatory nature of their content, something that belongs inherently to a given musical work of art, is beyond and above any syntactic and semantic structure. The true of a musical work leads to the description of the deepest recesses of our nature as revealed. The indescribable in music ties us to the divine through the true, the logos.

Observers meeting these artworks are justified to hold that the artworks belong to their creators without any alterations. Comparing this with Scripture, we can define two groups of those encountering Scripture: one group believes that Scripture was conveyed to humans by God as it is, without alterations, and complete; the other group defends having a type of knowledge, a conviction that Scripture is collected, edited, and altered throughout history.

Let us examine the possibility of the sanctity of mathematical/physical formulae. An example we can give here is from Heisenberg:

Δx Δp ≥ ħ/2

Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle in quantum physics reads out as “delta x times delta p is equal or greater than the reduced Planck constant (or H-bar) over two”. Reading and reciting this line of signs does not result in understanding if understanding is solely associated with conceptualism. Even just speaking out the physical equation necessitates the knowledge of concepts that are unknown to most people even today.

As a thought experience, suppose that a mediator with the necessary knowledge recites these lines to an audience thousands of years ago (and perhaps thousands of years in the future) when these concepts remain alien to people. We shall remember that ancient Greek thinkers had to improvise and create new concepts and words. So, as with any foreign language, the line being spoken remains unintelligible to all. What would the person of the times past and future think of the interpreter, the mediator? An immediate thought of the audience may be that the one who understands and can interpret as well as explain (orate) these magical signs must have a direct link with the source, whence these signs originate. The question remains from where or from whom. We know now that the sources are seemingly other humans. Notably, in similar cases, our history bears witness to other answers such as from God, a creator, a supreme being. Thus, the mediator may be called a prophet by the people of the past or future, someone who is presumed to have direct access to God and through him to (his) knowledge, or perhaps God himself incarnated. The mediator may claim that the information (that which is to be understood) in the equation, that is, what is represented by the symbols and what is described through the symbols, what is to be conveyed, originates from nature. All that appears in the line, which the mediator interprets and explains, whatever he narrates, is nature itself. Their initial (and naïve) understanding can be that the symbols, which the audience has never seen, are to be found in nature, whereas the mediator explains that the signs and symbols are not in nature as themselves, as forms, but represent things, similarly to cave “paintings”. The mediator also claims that the line describes nature, the universe, its workings, and the principles of its workings. He states that from the line, you can read how things work in the world (in the universe).

One member of the audience may say, “If this is the case, then the sequence must be of divine origin. Only a divine power can explain the world; people cannot”. The mediator can claim that the line is based on mathematics and physics, that humans invented mathematics, and that its application (in physics) provides a basis for describing how the world works. With similar arguments, he can try to convince his audience that it is all artificial and all is the product of human reason and creativity. He may dismiss the possibility that mathematics is not invented but discovered. Another member of the audience may ask, “If this all describes nature, are these principles not to be found in nature?” ”Yes”, is the response, “the line describes the principles of how nature works. Through artificial signs and sign systems”. “Why don’t we see them? Where can we find them within nature?” are the following questions. “Then”, says a third, “it is the work of God; from him shall come everything and all the principles of the operation of everything”. “Humans are also in nature; they are a part of it”, says the fourth. The mediator will fail to convince them to the contrary. “Look”, he says, “everything described in this line can be experienced, can be known. But not their origin. We can go only so far that we can place our understanding of the origin itself at most within our reason and rationality. It is our mind with its limitations where we can place the origin. Who can claim to have an experiential connection beyond that with God? How can God be known experientially? You are limited to your five senses (and some other senses without specialized sense organs, such as the direction of the head and similar)”. It is scientifically proven that we have more than five senses and your reason (see Buzsáki 2019 for a thorough discussion). The mediator goes on to say “you have your mental faculties: creativity, spontaneity, intellect, and many more to think and infer, to observe and deduct. But you cannot know anything beyond the limits of your sensibility and reason, nothing beyond your mental limits”.

Continuing the thought experiment, an unconvinced audience may ask the mediator to talk about the next line of signs and symbols, the musical one. Our example is the opening orchestral lines of W. A. Mozart’s Laudate Dominum (below in modern printed format; Figure 1):

When asked what it is about, the mediator may state that he does not know how to explain what it is about. He can explain what he sees and reads but not what they stand for. That needs to be experienced in another way. We can have a full understanding of the words in what comes immediately after this instrumental introduction, but up to that point, we cannot have an understanding of the sounds on their own, which these signs denote and instruct us to act. If we would read out the signs and symbols of the first violin part, they would not make any sense to an audience:

f, g, a, b flat, c, d, c, d, b flat c, b flat, a

“But”, says the mediator, “if you sound them differently, not reading them aloud but instantiate what the signs represent on an instrument, or even sing them, it might”. He then can take out an instrument and play the same first line according to the signs (symbols). Undoubtfully, people would listen in amazement. They may even be surprised to see the instrument and have difficulty relating it to anything. Seemingly, it adheres to the mediator and responds to his actions. The following questions may come to mind immediately after hearing the music: “What is this thing making such unusual and pleasing sounds”. “Who made it?” “Who found these sounds and how?” A simple response from the mediator–performer is, “Humans! In this case, a man called Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart. Humans made this thing called an instrument, a violin, for the purpose of making music, the totality of these magical sounds. Humans have selected sounds that affect them differently from the sounds of nature and speech”. Although these selected sounds may be similar to those of the ancient peoples’ and future peoples’, which they may utilize in their rituals, the difference is that the musical chain of symbols remains unintelligible to them compared to the acoustic phenomenon. Having difficulties relating the symbols to the physical sounds, they may ask how the signs were created. “By us, humans”, would the answer be again. We can say that there is a collective agreement on which signs are related to what actions and which ones represent what sounds.

To begin with, each sign (note) represents only one thing: the duration; how long it should last. Combined with other signs and symbols, they can represent specific sounds and other characteristics, such as loud or soft. These signs are collectively like guidelines for human actions, which shall produce sounds with a variety of properties. However, regarding the question of what musical sounds are about, whether they represent anything other than themselves, and, in general, what music is about, nobody can give a satisfactory answer. A perplexed audience may move toward the third example.

“The third example, the Scripture, represents itself”, the mediator says; “it is about itself and about what it conceptually contains. It is like music, with the difference that there are no concepts in music”. Although one may argue that conceptual music can be a song, it can be argued that without the words the song would still keep its expressive power, its nature to touch our emotions, like the introductory moments of Laudate Dominum above, whereas if we delete music from the song, we have a totally different experience. We would only have a chain of meanings and their relations to each other. The mediator may read aloud a line from the Scripture, using the language they have in common for their communication. What is conveyed and what it evokes is a manifold of understanding, emotions, and thoughts. The people of the past and future have their own interpretation of what they hear. Most of them have the belief that the mediator is telling something true, but doubt remains in the air (in the minds) of many. Why should they trust what he says? Nothing he said so far made much sense anyway, they may think. To end our thought experiment, the mediator may start to explain and bring other contexts and history into what was read. If convincing, some may consider accepting what is said as true; others may remain skeptical, especially those with their own prior belief of the supernatural, the divine, and the supreme.

In this brief thought experiment, we could see how chains of signs and symbols can affect people and lead to a variety of questions. The possibilities are not exhausted here. It presents a glimpse of what humans may have been experiencing throughout the ages. Even the best interpreters and knowers of what these chains stand for may have had and may have difficulties convincing the audience of these being purely human, artificial. The moment when these become part of conscious experience and the moment when the experiencer cannot describe the quality of the nature of the experience through spoken languages, we enter a domain beyond physics. Some speak of the ineffable in music, some of the beauty of scientific formulae.

Why we will not alter physical or mathematical formulae is due to other reasons than elaborated above: we can call a physical formula sacred, purely because it is the container of truths, truths about the world as we experience or understand it. For the time being, we ascribe these to human origins, not to the divine; the same may not be valid for truths they convey. Any change within will lead to their becoming ambiguous, faulty, false, or unintelligible; simply put, they will not relate to any truths or reality; they will become fallacies and, as such, discardable. A fallacy reflecting our understanding of the world and ourselves is a logical contradiction. Mathematical truths can be considered as universal. If we can claim that these truths reflect the world, the universe as we know and can know it, and if the containers of truths—the formulae—are means or channels of conveying universal truths, one may be tempted to propose that mathematical truths are a type of divine revelation. It is an ongoing debate whether mathematical truths and mathematics in general are invented or discovered. Perhaps the methods and theories are of human origin, but what they describe—we may call them truths and properties of nature—may be of another source, namely nature itself or beyond nature. As such, what binds mathematical and physical formulae to that which exists, or is postulated to be, to exist, can be called the true, the logos.

What the above examples have in common is that they all reveal something, either invented or discovered, created or instantiated, which must be understood, shall be intelligible, demanding rationality, and must relate to some kind of truth(s), which can be seen as particularizations of an absolute true. We do not establish our premises and reasoning on beliefs but on rationality to avoid limitations arising from geographical, cultural, linguistic, and other contexts. Rationality for us humans is universal; it cannot be limited to socio-cultural contexts. Therefore, it is a means to advance toward knowledge based on truths. In our reasonings, conviction replaces belief. Conviction must involve our subjective actions and will toward understanding, toward attaining knowledge based on realities and truth. Rationality transcends cultural and social limitations. So does music, so are mathematical truths.

7. Truth and “the True”—Logos

We witness different approaches and various theories of truth throughout the history of philosophy, and one may argue that truths cannot be universal but subjective, such that we can talk about my truths or our truths only. In general, truths have a conceptual nature; better said, they must relate to conceptuality. To abstain from philosophical debates on truth in this essay and avoid unnecessary objections to different theories of truth, we can place truth on the following premises: (a) truth cannot be conveyed; (b) truth is not believed, as truth can be understood, at least in principle; (c) truth is always about something.

While truth always relates to something, the true (logos) can be absolute and independent of something. The understanding of the concept that brings the reader closest to what I mean by this use of the word is that the true as an ontological state relates to the existence of truth within something prior to any human judgment. The true is thus unconditional. (We see a similar understanding of the divine and the true as both being unconditional, as relating to God, himself unconditional.) This something appears in our encounters with works of art as an independent mental structure and forms the conditions of the physical manifestation of the work of art. In my essay on the relation of truth and the musical works with reference to revelation, I used the term the true instead of logos, which I proposed with an understanding that it can be detached from conceptuality. Although in most traditions logos is directly related to conceptuality, language, and semantics, it can also replace conceptuality and become non-conceptually descriptive, a category.

We can apply the true to physics and mathematics which form the basis of all sciences and also of music among the arts. Logos (the true) can denote scientific truths and the true in music, i.e., the something which reveals itself when we encounter mathematical formulae as mental structures or musical works. Once understood, a formula reveals the truths of the world; truths that are inherent in the formula. A difference must be emphasized here that while the mechanism of reaching the true through mathematics and physics is a posteriori and necessitates understanding, which involves the active partaking of the intellect (as a mental faculty) through concepts, the musical “true” does not necessitate conceptuality. This is one reason I chose the true instead of logos in my earlier essay. We can see the parallels and similarities in our understanding of the two terms. Scripture is conceptual (semantic), while mathematics and music have their own semantic properties. The twofold nature of logos is again binding.

In the case of Scripture, we can advance similarly toward an encounter with this something. This something can again be the logos, the true of an entity, which is inherent, waiting to be revealed. Again, the difference to the other examples is the role of conceptuality in the act or case of revelation through Scripture. Without conceptuality, we have no means of experiencing the true (logos) through Scripture; we have no access to Scripture aside from the containers of Scripture, the objects, papyri, books, and such believed to be sacred. I recommend putting aside the epistemic approach due to the difficulties it poses, as elaborated above, although it is impossible to advance through ontology without any epistemic grounds. What I have in mind is better expressed in Spinoza’s words against those with an ill, irrational approach to Scripture:

It will be said that, although God’s law is inscribed in our hearts, Scripture is nevertheless the Word of God, and it is no more permissible to say of Scripture that it is mutilated and contaminated than to say this of God’s Word. In reply, I have to say that such objectors are carrying their piety too far, and are turning religion into superstition; indeed, instead of God’s Word they are beginning to worship likenesses and images, that is, paper and ink.

(Curley 1985, TTP, chap. 12, G III.159/S 145–6)

The syntactic chain of signs and symbols shall not be the object of worship similar to that performed by those with an irrational approach to Scripture. The meta-content behind or above these syntactic chains is what we shall consider the object in the analysis below. But as we shall see, we will have to deviate from object to property. I will propose that logos can only be about properties: pure properties and not objects. For this, I will use an ontological analysis of the object.

8. The Category of Object (Interludium)

The following discussion of musical works may shed light on the problems and my proposal mentioned above. In my arguments, the object is the metaphysical object, which can be expressed in the following pair: object/property.

Let us briefly examine the ontological pair object/property and relate it to musical works. We can proceed according to several ontological views. (1) From the point of view of linguistic statements, the pair overlaps the subject/predicate pair. In Aristotle’s Categories (Aristotle 1984, 1a20-4b19), our logical and linguistic statements, based on what he says about substance, can be that objects can only be referred to by subjects, while properties can be referred to by subjects as predicates. This is supported by Russell’s assertion that “predication is a relation involving a fundamental logical difference between its two terms. Predicates may themselves have predicates, but the predicates of predicates will be radically different from the predicates of substances” (Russell 1911, p. 23). But, according to the opponents of this view, the subject/predicate pair in a sentence is linguistically interchangeable so that one can perform the function of the other; i.e., the subject becomes the predicate, the predicate the subject. In such cases (in linguistic approaches), it makes no sense to replace the object/property pair with a subject/predicate pair (see Ramsey 1925, p. 416). We cannot equate musical utterances with linguistic statements because music is mostly non-conceptual, and in my philosophical arguments, I reflect only on non-textual, pure music. The linguistic approach (not significant for music) may be of relevance regarding the other examples, the mathematical/physical and the scriptural.

In our second (2) approach, it is possible to examine the relation of the pair to space and time. According to some analysts (following the Platonic theory of universals), the object is necessarily spatiotemporal, while the property is space- and time-independent. We can relate this to the general spatiotemporal nature of music, and specifically of musical works when they are instantiated, but also to the possibility of the existence of the musical work non-spatiotemporally. Objects (in the plural and understood as concrete objects) are always “somewhere”, while properties on their own are nowhere. According to this approach, we will analyze the assumption that the musical work can sometimes be nowhere and mostly anywhere, but not somewhere.

If we approach the ontological pair through experience and by locality (3), the experience of properties is possible at multiple times (instances) and in multiple places simultaneously, while the object can only be experienced in one place. With this conception of approach, a musical work, as something that can potentially appear in multiple places and at multiple times (even simultaneously), cannot be regarded an object, while its phenomenal nature can only be limited to one place and time period, which is valid only for those who experience it. Thus, music as a phenomenon can be accepted as a unique and unrepeatable object with epistemic limitations. In contrast, music can also be a set of properties considered valid in several places that relate to several objects of experience. Some argue (4) that some objects are concrete, others abstract. We can call properties abstract entities on their own. A musical work can be concrete when performed (instantiated) and becomes audible when it can be called an object in some form, but when it is not performed, it seems that it is neither an object nor a property. Or is it?

A musical work cannot be considered a property through common sense. But if it is not an object and when it is not the object of our experience, it can exist as a (fixed) set of properties. At the same time, a musical composition in the form of an acoustic phenomenon can also be understood as a mere set of properties in temporal existence, being experienced. With this approach, a musical work can also be accepted as a set of properties. This distinction sounds reasonable, but how do we explain that in experiencing an object as concrete, its properties are also experienced as concrete? The experienced properties that make the experienced object an “object” cannot be abstract if they also become the “object” of our experience. For example, the properties of a red ball, being red and round and spherical, are not abstract if they are associated with the ball, which is made such and thus (being a red ball) in our experience. The argument against this is that the properties of the red ball (red, round, etc.) belong to the ball as an object, making it what it is, but as properties, redness, roundness, and sphericity do not belong to the ball. This relates to Strawson’s statement (5) that the object belongs to sensory experience; the property, as explored in the previous sentence, does not (Strawson 1954, p. 235). This is in complete contrast to what we said earlier, that music when heard is a mere collection or series of properties. But there is another way of experiencing music, and it is not sensory. Music heard (and thus experienced) in inner hearing can be called not a set of properties, but, on the contrary, a mental something with a different nature. Nevertheless, this, in turn, may be the direct experiencing of a series of properties, which (according to another approach taken above) may collectively fall under the category of property as a single and unique (complex) property of a given work.

According to Leibniz’s theory of identity (6), “properties, one might think, are individuated by their properties, whereas objects are individuated by some further thing. If a property has all the same properties as another, then the two are identical. This is one way of marking the distinction. The Indiscernibility of Identicals is true of properties, but false of objects” (Laycock 2017). According to this approach, a musical work—once its set of properties is established—leads to the identifiability of itself whenever it is instantiated as a set of properties, that is, as a complex property, which is individuated by its (set of) properties. Our last approach to instantiation (7) suggests that objects cannot instantiated, but properties are (see Strawson 1959). Properties can only be experienced by instantiation. Based on our arguments so far, we can approach musical works ontologically as of two types: (i) when they are sounded, which, based on the instantiation argument, places the musical work in the category of property; we call this the acoustic or physical view; (ii) when they are not sounded, when they are not instantiated, which poses us with further ontological problems, which need to be discussed, we call this the non-physical view.

In these chains of thoughts object and property are metaphysical categories. Another general approach is that the object can be contrasted with its linguistic cognate, the subject; the subject cannot be contrasted with the object by a grammatical/logical approach but can be contrasted with the object by linguistic practice. Thus, I, you, he, she, we, etc., are subjects, and everything that is not I, you, he, she, we, etc., is an object. So, all objects are “it”. What separates the object from the subject is the possibility of experience or consciousness. That which has consciousness, that which experiences, is the subject, and all other things that do not have experiences nor consciousness are objects. There are two ways of understanding this. One is that (a) the object is that which simply has no consciousness or experience. So, the musical work in general is an object without consciousness or experiential faculties, regardless of any ontological consideration. It remains an object as long as we do not attribute experience and consciousness to it. And if it does not belong to the subject’s experience, then it does not exist. We may have to deal with sheet music and recordings and whether they, as objects, have properties similar to instantiated music (in another essay). The other is that (b) there may be things in our experience that are the objects of our experience. The object (in whatever form: internal or external, sensory or purely mental) is always the object of our experience. In this view, the object (object of our experience) can be another subject, but I myself, as a subject, can also be the object of my own experience. We can think of the musical work—a complex property defined by a set of properties—as the object of our experience.

The above ideas may sound counterintuitive, especially that the musical work is a mere set of properties in experience, and that it does not exist in a form independent of our experience, and furthermore, that it is defined by a complex property which is further defined by a set of properties unique to it. The set of properties is subsumed by the complex property. With a Meinongian approach, a musical work could be a non-existing object. According to those who follow Hume and Kant (and Frege), such an argument is either contradictory or logically faulty. However, Russell, Meinong, and Leibniz adopted the idea.

It can be said of a musical work that there are times when it seems to cease to exist. Even though we have heard it, and we know it, we also know that when it is not performed or not heard in inner hearing, we can say it is nowhere; it is not spatiotemporal. When the musical work is not instantiated anywhere and is not “heard” in anyone’s mind—and there can be such moments, e.g., a musical work that is very rarely played and unknown to most people—where is the musical work? The simple answer to this is, nowhere. But then we also know that it can “appear” at some point, either in the inner hearing, especially for those who already know the work, have heard it, and even performed it, or in the outer hearing when the work is performed again. Not incidental is the case of the composer who created the work and knows that it exists. In its ‘non-existent’ state, the musical work can be said to retain its properties that impose its identity and enable its identifiability. If we call it a non-existent object, it can be said to exist as a set of properties, but not in spacetime. The question is whether a musical work can be called a non-existent object or perhaps a non-existent set of properties. The former is intuitively more plausible than the latter. It is difficult to accept something as a non-existent property (or a non-existent set of properties) because, as we have read above, properties define both an object and themselves but apart from itself, there is nothing else that can define a property. However, if the arguments of the defenders of non-existent objects are rewritten from object to property, then the non-existent set of properties is plausible, provided that (i) we say that non-existent objects, e.g., Aphrodite, dragons, mermaids, fairies, the tree of life, the fountain of youth, and the like, are all knowable in terms of their properties and that we can only know their properties but have no empirical access to them as objects nor to their properties, then we can speak of these objects in terms of sets of their non-existent properties that define these non-existent objects. Therefore, the unacceptability of non-existent objects is not due to Humean or Kantian reasons but to a flaw in the definition of object/property. In short, a musical work, in its non-instantiated state and in its form not heard in inner hearing, is a non-existent set of properties and not a non-existent object.

Another question that arises in the case of the object is about its content. If our answer is “everything”, we are faced with the problem that if there is no counterpart to the category of object, then there is no point in defining everything as an object because we can simply speak of everything without distinction. If object (by the definition above) refers to everything, then “everything” itself falls under the category of object, which results in a self-reference within the category of object. If the counterpart of the category of the object is “nothing”, then we can speak of two cases in the context of nothing: “Nothing”, like everything, falls under the category of object, which is logically self-contradictory, but as an empty set it can fall under the set of objects. This, in turn, is a purely mathematical approach. Metaphysically, since it does not denote anything, “nothing” cannot fall under the category of objects, but then it is not intelligible. The following two questions can illustrate the former. “Why is there everything?” and “Why isn’t there nothing?” But, on the other hand, if we ask, “Why is there nothing”, then nothing becomes an existent; that is, it denotes an existent because the question presupposes that something “is”. The problem with the question “Why isn’t there nothing?” is that if something does not exist, we cannot know anything about it, and as such, “nothing” implies that we cannot talk of existents. But if the question implies that there can be nothing but nothing, it leads to a paradox.

If the category of object by its definition does not maximally cover everything, then its extension must be examined, as there may be things that are not objects. In the object/non-object distinction, it is possible to determine what can be classified as an object and what cannot be; e.g., a non-object can be a property. At this point, I do not consider it necessary to argue further about the object since the above is sufficient to establish that the musical work is not an object. In the extension of the object, however, we will meet a real musical object, one that can be called an ordinary object, that is, the musical score.

It is the score that has the sequence of the properties that defines a musical work as a musical work and that allows its recognition and its identity (identifiability). Moreover, when we say that a musical work is a non-existent object, we mean that it still contains instructions and rules for its reproduction, its performance, its instantiation. So, it is the score that contains the scriptural coding of the sequence, the set of properties of a given musical work (unlike the fundamental qualities that make an acoustic phenomenon musical or music). The score is not directly the container of properties but only an intermediary medium. In fact, it is the graphics in the score that describe the set of properties of the musical work, while the description itself is a descriptor. A general set of rules is needed to interpret the description, a system of notation generally accepted in the Western musical tradition. There are other sets of rules, depending on the type of music we are talking about. But generally speaking, behind any work of music (which is a set or a series of properties) there must be an object containing the descriptor of that set of properties, behind which there is a generally accepted set of rules for notation and realization; that is, in addition to the system of rules for notation, there are rules for interpreting and understanding the musical graphics, which also describes the rules for the performance of the musical work.

Thus, in the context of music, we arrive at the ontological object/property pair, that music is intensionally mere property and non-object, but it can also be defined as an object extensionally, which is the musical score, which is also the description of the rules for writing and rules for actions relating to a musical performance, and a descriptor of the properties of the musical work. In summary, under the umbrella concept of music are objects, properties, and non-objects that are not properties, that is, musical score, musical works as experienced, and musical works as not experienced.

9. The “Theory of the Musical Work as Properties” Applied to Scripture

We can apply our findings above to the Scripture as follows. Scriptures (in plural and general) are writings in common (spoken and some dead) languages, formulated according to linguistic rules. They consist of words that relate or fix concepts in a semantic domain. The Scripture’s ontology as a set of ordinary objects (objects that contain scriptures) has specific properties. We can call books, papyri, etc. ordinary objects, their common property being their inclusion (containment) of scriptures. The Scripture’s ontology as a semantic set of concepts, on the other hand, is an entirely different domain compared to its “containers”, similar to that of musical works, i.e., their instantiations and their scores. The mental experience can only be of properties in the case of music, but for scriptures, it can be both objective and attributive; that is, we will have thoughts that are not properties but relate to objects of sorts, and these thoughts may lead to our experience of pure sets of properties, which cannot be sensed through the senses; e.g., we can think of freedom, truth, or God, but we will never have sensory experiences of them. Yet, we can understand their nature only through their properties. As such, we can call God a set of properties as far as the limitation of our senses and the boundlessness of reason allow us to advance. Beyond that, it can be an existent, an object of our thoughts and, as such, of our mental experience. Approached this way, it is neither a purely logical entity nor a postulate but something else.

As I proposed at the beginning of this discussion, we shall not take into account God as self-revealing (see Hick 1967, p. 190) but focus on the act of revelation only, that we look at experiences and certain types of experiences. There may be experiential cases where revelation occurs within and outside divine contexts. As it may occur constantly in our everyday experiences, revelation may not be obvious, self-explanatory, and we could easily pass these occurrences as natural events, sometimes giving causal explanations. Encapsulating belief and omitting it from our discussion, we see this type of revelation as something experienced, described as revelation, not beyond our experience or our comprehension. Revelation must be intelligible; it cannot transcend rationality because experience cannot be unintelligible. Unintelligible experience of revelation (experience of something being revealed, uncovered without understanding) would be a contradiction. Such experience would contradict the meaning of apocalypse; something cannot remain shrouded after being unveiled (see Lightfoot 1889–1890 for a thorough discussion). Scripture reveals something within our experiences, within our mental and physical limits, within the boundaries of comprehension and understanding. Yet, we have the ability to think of a domain beyond physical experiences. Mathematics and physics reveal truths about nature that are inaccessible to us through sensory input but can be reached theoretically, through reasoning, by the use of intellect, imagination, and creativity, all mental faculties employed at extreme levels. The revelation that occurs is not beyond comprehension but can be beyond physical sensory experience.

A simple example is the acceptance of infinity (as existent), which is very hard to conceive. Music in auditory experience reveals such properties, which seem to be within our physical comprehension and sensory domain and still demand mental transcendence; transcendence, which is impossible due to our mental limitations, and as such, proceeds toward the demarcation zone or to the domain that marks the boundary of our existence and that beyond. In each case, we approach the possibility of transcendence without being able to advance; this is the metaphysical domain of logos.

10. Logos as Conclusions

The ideas and proposals above help us arrive at the following conclusions. In the case of a mathematical/physical formula, we witness an understanding of meanings. In each part of the formula, each symbol has a meaning and denotes something that relies on further truths, proven and factual. These meanings and levels of understandings need to be brought into a hierarchical mental structure for us to attain and appreciate them. In the case of a musical sentence (or complete work), we witness the meaning of understanding, that understanding is possible without concepts, which may result in the evocation of feelings, emotions, moods, memories, and thoughts. Again, we will find a layered structure of meanings starting from non-conceptual and moving toward conceptual, linguistic, self-historical, interpersonal, societal, and, in general, cultural. In Scripture, meaning and understanding are intertwined; we have a two-way impact of understandings and meaning(s), a hermeneutic dialog. We may even go so far as to propose that (according to philosophical hermeneutics, or modern hermeneutics, see Gadamer [1960] 2013) a hermeneutic dialog may be possible between the interpreter and the interpreted, and it may not necessitate two interlocutors. The interpreting subject can enter into the hermeneutic dialog through the interpreted object, which in turn becomes part of the interpreter with its truth and existence. Another way to describe this dialog is that the subject and object may become one within and through the dialog, which hearkens back to one of the forms of logos by Philo of Alexandria: logos endiathetos. Music and mathematics are hermeneutical in this way, considering that we are involved in a series of actions, which we call interpreting a musical work or mathematical formula, necessarily based on a prior understanding of them, where the process is a dialog with the object and ourselves simultaneously. The interpreted (the object of our hermeneutic dialog) is reflected upon itself, and through this hermeneutic cycle, the interpreter reflects upon oneself. The musical sentence, the mathematical formula, and the Scripture are not just things understood but means toward understanding ourselves.

We may recall one of the interpretations of logos as the discourse within by Philo of Alexandria. Some modern scholars think that the dualism in Philo’s use and understanding of logos can be described as allegorical. According to (Amir 1983, p. 71), Philo did not support the belief that God spoke to Moses but rather within Moses. Moses became thus the carrier and channel for the word of God. He received the divine message non-verbally through a type of revelation, logos endiathetos, which later found other channels to reach its greater audience. The contents of this revelation were transmitted to people through the services of Aaron, through the other type of logos, logos prophorikos. No one can dispute nor deny a person the duality and content of experience who have the type of experience described by Philo as logos endiathetos. The content of this experience can be revelatory, also divine, that is, the inspirer, the origin being God.

I propose that there is a maximally general ontological category of logos under which all revelation falls. Semantically, I can also claim that logos picks out this general category. When we transcribe or transform the dualist approach of Philo into an ontological category, the dual understanding of logos becomes clearer and can be accepted as valid.

Scripture relates to ontologies presumed and past. It is a postproduction of earlier events and existences within the framework of current experiences. All the experiences are either deemed (or believed to be) sacred or normatively agreed to have a divine nature. Musical writing always relates to future physical (acoustic) occurrences (but also mental events), of which only rules and properties are known but not the events themselves nor any future existences. Physical/mathematical formulae do not relate to time, neither past nor future; they are timeless truths. In each case, something is revealed, the experience of which is indescribable, ineffable, for which we have no words, only logos binding. Can we simply classify these revelations as purely empirical occurrences of which all aspects and properties can be scientifically and rationally explained? There are gaps between the mental and the physical. Scientists, psychologists, and philosophers are working on bridging this explanatory gap.

Before closing the essay, I briefly connect my ontological discussion of revelation (as a phenomenon or occurrence in our experience) to major contemporary views. Revelation in sciences and arts can be regarded as valid according to some theories, namely the general and special (particular) revelation models: the availability for an audience of all (past, current, and potential future) humans with the same cognitive and mental apparatus and mechanisms, as well as similar mental faculties. On the other hand, it is also valid for being available only to a specialized audience with the necessary means and knowledge (as in the case of composers, musical performers, scientists, and students of these disciplines). According to another philosophical approach to revelation, the examples presented above are manifestational, as are musical sentences (in writing) and physical formulae, but also non-manifestational through musical phenomena and meta meanings of mathematical and physical formulae. We can also observe propositional revelation when musical sentences and physical formulae are “revealed” because this act of revealing (not self-revealing) is accompanied by propositions. We can consider musical sentences as propositions; one may defend that all music is propositional, that is, all musical formulae, ideas, thoughts, melodies, themes, and sentences; in general, all musical structures are proposed in pure forms of sounds. Their nature as being propositional is understood thus. At the same time, “the true” within, the logos, reveals itself; it is not something found. It emerges from actions physical and mental.

11. Postludium

Scripture (as content) is a description of objects and phenomena, and also of properties. Formulae (in mathematics or physics) are reflections on material and non-material existents and also of theoretical entities. Pure music is a series of properties that can lead to physical instantiations of a chain of properties. What binds these different ontologies is logos, the something, “the true”, which resides at the boundary of human experience, where it is the condition and metaphysical space of revelation. A musical experience, a mathematical or physical equation, and a line or more from Scripture may lead to our experiencing of awe, marvel, and the sublime. It may lead to experiences that are ineffable. The revelatory nature of these experiences is open to all but possible only for those with the knowledge and will to access the logos, the “true” contained within.