Character Virtues: Toward a Functionalist Perspective on Character Virtue Science
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- Criterion validity—scores should predict flourishing (eudaimonic well-being), successful goal-pursuit, and observable virtue-relevant acts (e.g., generosity predicting helping) (Fowers, 2014).
- Convergent validity—scores should correlate with theoretically allied constructs (prosocial behavior, moral identity, individual differences in authentic functioning) and relate negatively to antithetical traits such as Machiavellianism (Fowers, 2014).
- Discriminant validity—scores should remain distinct from unrelated attributes (e.g., IQ, sex, race) because virtues are meant to transcend such categories (Fowers, 2008).
2. Character Types in Aristotelian Ethics
- A beastly character may impulsively lie without reflection, driven solely by immediate self-interest or fear, lacking the capacity to even recognize the moral significance of truth-telling.
- A vicious character deliberately chooses deception, rationalizing it as justified or beneficial without experiencing internal conflict or remorse.
- An incontinent character, although fully aware that honesty is morally right, succumbs to the temptation or fear of negative consequences and thus frequently lies, subsequently feeling guilt or regret.
- A continent character similarly experiences intense temptation or fear but consistently manages, through significant internal effort and self-control, to uphold truthfulness and do the right thing despite inner reluctance.
- A virtuous character, exemplifying moral excellence, naturally tells the truth even in difficult situations, not out of mere obligation or self-control, but because honesty genuinely aligns with their values and desires, making truthful action both effortless and fulfilling.
3. Why Motivation Matters: Critiques of Narrow Approaches
3.1. Trait-Based Approaches
- Virtuous vs. Continent: Both may donate regularly. However, the virtuous person gives out of genuine empathy, while the continent person might be motivated by a sense of moral duty but still struggles with reluctance or self-interest. Trait measures alone cannot capture this internal struggle.
- Vicious or Incontinent: A vicious person might not donate at all or might only do so strategically to pursue an unethical goal, while an incontinent person wants to donate but often fails to do so due to weakness of will.
3.2. Behavior-Based Approaches
3.3. Situation-Based Approaches
4. A Functionalist Framework for Assessing Character Virtues
4.1. Moving Beyond Traits, Behaviors and Situations
4.2. Functionalism and the Five Aristotelian Character Types
5. Functionalist Utility in Character Assessment
6. Next Steps: Operationalizing a Functionalist Approach to Virtue Measurement
- Defining Virtue-Specific Indicators—Virtues involve an alignment of moral cognition, affect, and desire or motivation. Measures should assess how an individual integrates moral beliefs and motivations across different situations rather than just their frequency or average level of enactment of moral behavior across situations.
- Integrating Multi-Method Approaches—As Fowers (2014) suggests, virtue measurement should combine self-report scales, behavioral observations, and experience sampling to capture how moral character functions in real-life contexts. Self-report measures should be developed that assess not just the behavioral frequency, but also the perceived efficacy, expected moral outcomes, and desirability of outcomes. Behavioral experiments can test moral decision-making in real-world dilemmas, distinguishing between individuals acting effortlessly (virtuous) versus those struggling with internal conflict (continent/incontinent). Experience sampling can capture the daily moral choices to measure behavior and their respective motivations and aims over time and in situ.
- Focusing on Moral Development—A functionalist perspective arguably allows for a more nuanced account of virtue development over time compared with treating and measuring them as static traits. This aligns with Aristotle’s emphasis on habituation and practical wisdom (phronesis) in moral character formation across the character types.
- Clarifying Normative Anchors—Future studies should state whose standards ground their virtue judgments. Three viable positions are: participant-as-judge—the actor weighs the moral meaning of her own behavior, well-suited to within-person coherence research. Observer-as-judge—peers or community members supply locally shared standards (e.g., cultural conceptions of generosity). Researcher-as-judge—investigators apply an explicit philosophical framework (here, neo-Aristotelian) to behavioral and motivational evidence. Making these anchors explicit prevents the common slippage in which descriptive indicators are mistaken for virtue itself. Fowers et al. (2021) showed that virtue science must either disengage, that is remain descriptively neutral, or “bite the bullet” by declaring its evaluative standard.
7. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Conflicts of Interest
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Bajwa, N.; Ng, V. Character Virtues: Toward a Functionalist Perspective on Character Virtue Science. Behav. Sci. 2025, 15, 638. https://doi.org/10.3390/bs15050638
Bajwa N, Ng V. Character Virtues: Toward a Functionalist Perspective on Character Virtue Science. Behavioral Sciences. 2025; 15(5):638. https://doi.org/10.3390/bs15050638
Chicago/Turabian StyleBajwa, Navrose, and Vincent Ng. 2025. "Character Virtues: Toward a Functionalist Perspective on Character Virtue Science" Behavioral Sciences 15, no. 5: 638. https://doi.org/10.3390/bs15050638
APA StyleBajwa, N., & Ng, V. (2025). Character Virtues: Toward a Functionalist Perspective on Character Virtue Science. Behavioral Sciences, 15(5), 638. https://doi.org/10.3390/bs15050638