Beyond Self-Certification: Evaluating the Constraints and Opportunities of Participatory Guarantee Systems in Latin America

Abstract

Participatory Guarantee Systems (PGS) have emerged in Latin America as an alternative to conventional market-driven certification, offering a community-based framework to validate sustainable agricultural and social practices. Rooted in collective responsibility and dialogue between producers, consumers, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and state institutions, PGS aim to empower smallholders by reducing certification costs and strengthening agroecological transitions. This review examines their development across diverse Latin American contexts, highlighting both their innovative potential and the persistent challenges that limit their scalability and formal recognition. A literature-based approach combined with a stakeholder analysis was employed, integrating case studies from Brazil, Peru, Mexico, Bolivia, and other countries. To systematize findings, SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) and TOWS (Threats, Opportunities, Weaknesses, Strengths) frameworks were applied, assessing strengths and weaknesses from the perspective of producers and consumers and formulating strategies to enhance resilience and legitimacy. Results show that PGS foster social capital, technical learning, and access to local markets; however, they are constrained by high time commitments, reliance on voluntary labour, uneven participation, and limited consumer awareness. The analysis indicates that the most promising pathway is a combination of growth strategies, including leveraging short supply chains, community-based fairs, and digital platforms, with recovery strategies centred on consumer education and producer capacity building. More conservative strategies remain crucial in specific contexts: redistributing workloads, introducing compensation for administrative tasks, and strengthening conflict mediation can help preserve system viability when engagement or resources are scarce. Defence strategies, aimed at reinforcing autonomy and reducing dependence on external actors, are better conceived as long-term goals under current conditions.

1. Introduction

The debate on food certification systems has gained increasing relevance worldwide, as it reflects the tensions between standardized market-driven models and more inclusive, voluntary approaches [1]. In recent years, Latin America has become a reference point for innovative approaches to food certification that challenge the dominance of conventional, market-driven models [2,3]. In this scenario, models adapted to local needs continue to develop in an attempt to build sustainable alternative food markets [4]. Participatory Guarantee Systems (PGS) represent one of the most notable of these alternatives, and they are officially recognized in many Latin American countries (Figure 1) [5,6,7]. The official recognition by the state of this system in many Latin American countries represents a major departure from the agri-food systems in Europe and North America, where third-party organic certification is the only legally accepted system, limiting the potential development of self-certified community-scale enterprises [8,9,10].

Figure 1. Map of PGS organizations officially recognized by the state.

The spread of PGS across the region illustrates both their promise and their fragility [11]. Built on collective responsibility and direct involvement of producers, consumers, and community organizations, PGS aim to validate sustainable practices through dialogue and mutual trust rather than distant, costly audits [12]. On the one hand, they create opportunities to strengthen local food networks, empower small-scale farmers, and promote agroecological transitions [13,14]. On the other hand, their informal and decentralized structure raises persistent questions about formal recognition [15], consistency, and the ability to interact with broader markets beyond local or national boundaries [16].

PGS also have potential in terms of political inclusiveness as they pay attention to farmers’ and consumers’ experiences and needs in the elaboration of standards [17].

In practice, PGS can be viewed as a central hub (Figure 2), representing the unification of producers and consumers based on a vision of co-creation, participation, and active citizenship [18,19]. However, in addition to the system’s main players, there are external actors such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations/movements [20]. The last actor, the state, influences national food policies and the system’s recognition [21].

Figure 2. PGS’s stakeholders are divided into main actors (producers and consumers) and external actors (social movements, NGOs, and the state). The construction of the entire system is based on the direct interaction between the different actors.

PGS have been employed for decades now in the governance of organic food production [17,22]. Nevertheless, despite their growing relevance, research has not yet sufficiently explored how these systems operate in practice or the extent to which they support sustainability across its social, environmental, and economic dimensions.

The objective of this review is to highlight the balance between the innovative potential of PGS and the practical obstacles they continue to face, revealing the PGS in all their positive aspects and structural problems, laying the foundations for a deeper understanding of the steps to be taken to improve it. It seeks to clarify the extent to which PGS can evolve beyond community self-certification and become a credible and enduring mechanism for linking producers, consumers, and institutions in the pursuit of sustainable international food systems, an evolution that requires proactive interventions in the system itself. To address this, the review analyses the development of PGS in Latin America, showing possible improvement strategies based on the common points found in the case studies. Nevertheless, despite belonging to the same continent, each case reflects unique contexts and demonstrates that agroecological principles are rooted in the adaptability of solutions to specific conditions, in contrast with standardization [23].

2. Research Method and Approach

This review adopts a three-step methodological approach to examine the PGS certification framework (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Graphical presentation of the three-phases (P1, P2, P3) methodological approach used to examine the PGS certification in Latin America.

First, a literature-based exploration was conducted, focusing on the state of the art and drawing upon case studies carried out in Latin America over the past years. External actors (such as state institutions, social movements, and NGOs) were considered in order to frame the broader institutional and social context. But more attention was directed toward the core actors of the system, producers and consumers, as they constitute the driving forces of PGS’s functioning and legitimacy.

The SCOPUS database was used for the literature search. The keywords used were “PGS”, “Latin America”, “organic”, “agroecology”, and “certification”. The bibliography contains 52 citations, but greater emphasis was placed on the articles of case studies that showcase the role of key actors. Specifically for the case studies of producers and consumers, we chose articles published in the last 10 years to ensure the most realistic relevance possible to current events. While for the description of the external actors, given the low amount of information available, there has been no temporal selection of the articles, and a grey bibliography was also used to obtain more specific information.

Of all the references in this article, 35 articles specifically address the issue of PGS in Latin America. Among these, 12 are country-specific articles, while 14 are cross-country studies. Government documents were also consulted in addition to academic material for the description of state recognition (Table 1).

Table 1. Summary of articles used to describe the countries covered by the review, with the number of articles corresponding to each of the stakeholders.

Countries	N° Specific Articles	N° Government Docs	N° Cross-Country Included	N° Total per Country
Argentina	1 [11]	0	1 [22]	2
Bolivia	-	1 [24]	2 [22,25]	3
Brazil	4 [20,26,27,28]	1 [29]	1 [22]	6
Chile	1 [7]	1 [30]	2 [22,25]	4
Colombia	1 [16]	-	1 [22]	2
Costa Rica	-	1 [31]	2 [22,25]	3
Ecuador	1 [30]	-	1 [22]	2
Mexico	3 [14,17,21]	1 [32]	2 [22,25]	6
Paraguay	-	1 [33]	1 [22]	2
Peru	1 [34]	1 [35]	1 [22]	3
Uruguay	-	1 [36]	1 [22]	2
Total	12	8	15	35

A further subdivision, in addition to the previous one, concerns stakeholders. In fact, for each of the actors in the system, a count was made of how many documents provide data or information about them (Table 2). The result is that studies have been conducted more on producers than on consumers and the role of NGOs. As regards the analysis of the state, a distinction must be made: the calculation takes into account government documents and does not differentiate between “specific” and “cross-country”, and much of the data has been selected from the same papers. Therefore, it can be said that, to date, there is more material on producers than on all other actors in the system.

Table 2. Cross-counting between countries and stakeholders of the number of articles considered for review.

Countries	N° Producers Articles	N° Consumers Articles	N° NGOs Articles	N° State Articles
Argentina	1	-	-	1
Bolivia	1	1	1	2
Brazil	3	1	3	2
Chile	1	2	1	2
Colombia	1	-	1	1
Costa Rica	-	1	1	2
Ecuador	1	-	-	2
Mexico	1	1	1	2
Paraguay	-	-	-	1
Peru	2	1	1	2
Uruguay	-	-	-	1
Total	11	7	7	18

The analysis of the available bibliography and the description of the actors in the system is preparatory to the start of the second phase of the results: the analysis of the system in its complexity. In the second phase, the review adopts a more analytical perspective. Building on the descriptive mapping of stakeholders, the analysis concentrates on assessing both the strengths and weaknesses of the system from the standpoint of producers and consumers. To do this, we chose to conduct a SWOT analysis [37] that addressed the system’s core actors, while also taking into account interactions with external stakeholders. Therefore, the matrix was structured by evaluating points from the perspective of the producer (P), the consumer (C), and the points common to both core players (P+C).

Strengths (S) and weaknesses (W), which represent the internal factors of a system, are then compared with external factors, opportunities (O) and threats (T) [38,39], so as to create intervention strategies according to the TOWS methodology [40]. Specifically, the enhancement strategies are divided into four alternatives:

• SO: leverage internal strengths to exploit external opportunities; these are growth-oriented and proactive strategies;
• ST: use strengths to mitigate or avoid external threats; these are defensive strategies;
• WO: address internal weaknesses by taking advantage of external opportunities; these are recovery or improvement strategies; and
• WT: minimize weaknesses to protect against external threats; these are conservative or survival-oriented strategies.

This dual framework between SWOT and TOWS analyses provides a structured basis to identify realistic intervention strategies for addressing the shortcomings of PGS while enhancing their potential benefits [41].

3. PGS Stakeholders

This first results chapter will describe the actors involved in the PGS, dividing them into core actors and external actors, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of each PGS actor based on the analysis of cases studies. This initial analysis will allow construction of the SWOT table in the next chapter.

3.1. Core Actors

3.1.1. Producers

Agricultural producers are not passive recipients of certification, but are the central actors responsible for ensuring the credibility and effectiveness of the system, promoting social innovation apart from field experience [42].

For the description of producers in this section, the most interesting articles with the most quantitative and qualitative data were selected. Among these, the case study of OPAC-Orgânicos Sul de Minas in Brazil and the two cases of Red de Agricultura Ecológica del Perú (RAE-PGS) and the PGS coordinated by Asociación Nacional de Productores Ecológicos (ANPE) in Peru were chosen.

The case of OPAC-Orgânicos Sul de Minas (in Brazil an OPAC is a recognized group that collectively manage PGS to certify organic production) illustrates how farmers’ participation is both the foundation and the challenge of these initiatives. Worldwide, Brazil is considered a point of reference in PGS, and currently there are 27 OPACs distributed throughout the country. These 27 OPACs include 7877 certified organic farmers, 85% of whom are smallholders [43]. This article examines the role of PGS using survey data and social network analysis, highlighting how PGS not only lower certification costs for smallholders but also strengthen social capital by fostering trust, cooperation, and knowledge exchange. As anticipated, a first key contribution of producers lies in their direct involvement in the certification process: farmers are required to carry out peer visits, through which they evaluate one another’s compliance with organic standards. These visits, followed by verification procedures and the deliberations of evaluation committees, distribute responsibility evenly among members and reinforce the horizontal governance structure of the OPAC. Such practices, while reducing certification costs, also foster technical learning. Survey data confirm this: 80% of respondents stated that the elaboration of production codes for certification occurs “always”, while the introduction of more sustainable cropping methods was considered frequent or systematic by over 90% of participants.

Economic benefits for producers, though evident, appear less pronounced. While 46.7% of respondents indicated that participation “most times” increased their income and 40% reported that it “always” opened new markets, the overall scores for economic variables were lower than those related to technical or organizational improvements. This suggests that producers perceive PGS more as a space for capacity building, collective organization, and credibility building than as a direct driver of income growth. Similarly, the commitment of producers to attend coordination meetings, elaborate and review the production methods, read the documents, and participate in the visits demonstrates their willingness to invest time voluntarily, but also reveals a structural fragility since most OPAC activities rely on unpaid work. In fact, excessive extra work outside the field leads to problems of absenteeism in the long term.

Social capital is another dimension shaped by producers’ involvement. Trust networks among OPAC-Orgânicos Sul de Minas members proved to be the densest and most connected. However, this relational capital did not fully translate into joint initiatives. The collaborative network for projects and concrete actions was thinner, with participation strongly correlated with female membership rates, highlighting the role of women farmers as drivers of collective engagement: out of all of OPAC’s farmers, 64% (4984) are men and 36% (2829) are women.

Moreover, the geographical dispersion of members, sometimes up to 300 km between some associations, creates logistical barriers that weaken day-to-day collaboration. However, an interesting fact is that geographical proximity sometimes amplified conflicts: associations located closer to one another reported higher probabilities of tensions whereas more distant members tended to avoid open disputes.

Nonetheless, producers face persistent challenges. Problems such as absenteeism, administrative inefficiencies, and limited communication were reported, though with relatively low intensity. These difficulties lead to the vulnerability of participatory systems where engagement is unevenly distributed, and coordination depends heavily on voluntary contributions.

Similar aspects have been analyzed in the Peruvian context, specifically with the case studies of the Red de Agricultura Ecológica del Perú (RAE-PGS) and the PGS coordinated by Asociación Nacional de Productores Ecológicos (ANPE) [26].

In this case, one of the most consistent advantages for producers is the reduction in certification costs. Both Peruvian PGS initiatives provide an alternative to third-party certification, which remains largely inaccessible to smallholders due to high fees and bureaucratic complexity in the country. By actively participating in peer reviews, farm visits, and collective decision-making, farmers ensure compliance while simultaneously lowering barriers to market entry. In the RAE-PGS case, producers highlighted that participation significantly improved their access to local and regional organic markets, which they considered otherwise unattainable.

Beyond market access, PGS foster capacity building and technical learning. Producers in both systems emphasized how peer evaluations allowed them to exchange practices related to soil management, pest control, and crop diversification. These interactions created spaces of mutual trust and knowledge-sharing that strengthened farmers’ autonomy. Particularly in the ANPE case, producers linked PGS participation to broader goals of food sovereignty and the recovery of traditional agroecological knowledge, embedding certification within a larger cultural and political project.

Nonetheless, producers also reported clear limitations. Time commitment was described as a major constraint, since PGS activities require farmers to dedicate days away from production to participate in farm visits, workshops, and assemblies. In both cases, the burden of documentation and organizational tasks fell unevenly on certain members, leading to imbalances in participation and responsibility. Furthermore, the voluntary nature of most contributions created sustainability challenges: farmers acknowledged that the systems depended heavily on personal motivation and unpaid labour, which risked generating fatigue and declining engagement over time.

Another difficulty was linked to external recognition. While farmers valued the social legitimacy of PGS within their communities, they also pointed out the limited acceptance of PGS labels in larger urban markets and by state authorities. This restricted the economic potential of their certification efforts, particularly for those wishing to scale up beyond local markets. In addition, internal tensions emerged when producers had different expectations some seeking primarily economic benefits, others prioritizing political and social objectives such as strengthening collective identity and advocacy.

Together, the cases in Brazil and Peru show how producers are not passive recipients, but central drivers of change. Their active role not only reduces certification costs, making access to organic markets more democratic, but also strengthens social capital through mutual trust and knowledge exchange. However, significant challenges remain, including unremunerated time commitment, internal disparities, and limited external recognition.

3.1.2. Consumers

The role of consumers is a central element that theoretically distinguishes PGS from other organic certification models. As presented in the introduction, PGS are designed to foster direct participation of consumers in verification, decision-making, and organizational activities, creating a system based on trust, social networks, and knowledge exchange. By engaging directly, consumers can access high-quality organic products while experiencing a sense of co-ownership of the food system [34,44]. In some countries, such as Bolivia and Costa Rica, consumer participation in PGS inspection and certification committees is even legally required. This contributes to highlighting their crucial role also to other countries, such as Chile, which only recognizes PGS and the role of producers [21].

In order to illustrate not only the theory behind PGS but also the actual conditions faced by consumers, two articles have been selected. The first one reports on an example in Brazil where consumer involvement is effective, while the other study presents a cross-country analysis of Bolivia, Chile, Mexico and other Latin American countries, where consumer awareness and involvement result lower.

The experience of the Ecovida Agroecology Network in Southern Brazil exemplifies the correct dynamics between producers and consumers organizations [45]. Ecovida Agroecology Network is a Brazilian network of family farmers, consumers, and grassroots organizations working together to strengthen agroecology and sustainable local food systems. It promotes ecological farming, community-based certification, and social justice by connecting rural and urban producers. Between 2006 and 2016, the number of certified producers grew by 144%, but also the network expanded from 343 farming families in 1999 to 4500 families and 20 consumer organizations in 2016. Ecovida’s model demonstrates how bringing producers and consumers closer strengthens trust, extends stakeholder inclusion beyond rural areas, and enhances the social and economic impact of PGS.

Despite the potential shown by the Ecovida model, research shows that consumer participation remains limited: the study across PGS markets in Mexico, Chile, and Bolivia reveal significant gaps in awareness and engagement [27]. For instance, less than 5% of Bolivian consumers surveyed had ever heard of PGS. Even in countries with institutionalized PGS, many national authorities lack complete data on the number of consumers involved. While efforts have been made in Brazil and Mexico to increase awareness through fairs and social media, other countries (including Chile, Costa Rica, Paraguay, and Uruguay) still have insufficient programmes to promote PGS-certified products. This indicates that motivating consumers to become active stakeholders remains a considerable challenge.

Nevertheless, the potential of consumers in PGS is closely tied to trust. Even when awareness and direct participation are low, studies show that consumers place high trust in the organic quality of products, relying primarily on personal relationships with producers rather than on the certification system itself. Formal certification, however, continues to play an important role in reinforcing this trust. The article, in fact, features some additional challenges to the system, including the potential confusion surrounding PGS certification, which has been used not only for organic products but also for geographical indications and conventional agricultural goods. Furthermore, the lack of comprehensive marketing and sales data limits the ability to assess consumer perception and the economic impact of PGS. With the exception of Brazil and Chile, most PGS-certified products are aimed solely at domestic markets, restricting their broader visibility.

In conclusion, while consumers have not yet fully assumed the active role envisioned in PGS theory, their purchasing decisions and high levels of trust, rooted in direct relationships with producers and supported by formal certification systems, provide a strong foundation for the continued development of these systems. Bridging the awareness gap and leveraging existing trust represent crucial steps toward building a more participatory and sustainable food system.

3.2. External Actors

3.2.1. State

The role of the state in PGS in Latin America is crucial to understand their development and the diversity across countries. There is a subtle tension between the horizontal and community-based nature of PGS, grounded in trust and mutual control and their integration into state certification frameworks which tends to transform them into bureaucratic instruments. It is also true that without legal recognition, PGS initiatives are fragile. In Ecuador, Participatory Guarantee Systems (PGS) were officially recognized and legalized by the state in 2013. This recognition was established through the national authority AGROCALIDAD (Agencia de Regulación y Control Fito y Zoosanitario) [21].

In this chapter, we conducted documentary research on government platforms and state-of-the-art bibliographic material to understand which Latin American countries have official regulations which recognize them at the state level.

In Brazil, PGS are fully recognized by the Ministry of Agriculture (MAPA) through the OPACs (Organizações Participativas de Avaliação da Conformidade), considered one of the three official certification channels, alongside third-party certifiers and certification for direct sales [25]. This model is often cited as a benchmark for integration, since PGS have the same legal standing as other certification systems and can access the national organic seal. For this country there is no specific state fee: costs are mainly internal to the functioning of OPACs, which must guarantee transparency and collective verification processes.

Bolivia represents a different case. The Servicio Nacional de Sanidad Agropecuaria e Inocuidad Alimentaria (SENASAG) not only recognizes PGS but incorporates them into the National System for the Control of Ecological Production [29]. A distinctive feature is the administrative fee required to register PGS initiatives, calculated through SENASAG’s official liquidation system. This makes Bolivia one of the few countries where the economic burden involves a direct state contribution, in addition to internal operating costs. The amount (around 4998 BOB every five years according to the most recent tariff) illustrates a high degree of institutionalization and public control but also raises questions about accessibility for small-scale farmers.

Mexico and Peru occupy an intermediate position. In Mexico, the Certificación Orgánica Participativa (SCOP) is recognized by SENASICA and registration procedures do not involve a state fee; costs remain internal to the organizations, which must prove their capacity to manage and ensure transparency [24]. Peru has followed a similar path: since 2020, SENASA has incorporated PGS into organic regulations and in 2022 updated labelling rules to explicitly mention them [32]. Again, there are no direct fees to the state, but legal recognition provides clarity and legitimacy.

Costa Rica, Paraguay, and Uruguay also recognize PGS, though with specific limits. In Costa Rica, the national organic law includes participatory certification, without evidence of state-imposed fees [35]. Paraguay’s SENAVE issued Resolution 670/2013 establishing the legal framework for PGS, including registration forms, though no explicit costs are reported [31]. Also in Ecuador, PGS were officially recognized and legalized by the state in 2013 and the recognition was established through the national authority AGROCALIDAD (Agencia de Regulación y Control Fito y Zoosanitario) [21]. In Uruguay, Decree 175/022 formally recognizes participatory certification but restricts its validity to domestic markets: PGS-certified products cannot access export markets which require equivalence with third-party systems [33].

Chile presents a special case: Law 20.089 and its regulation allow ecological farmers’ organizations to register as certifying entities with the Servicio Agrícola y Ganadero (SAG) [36]. Although the law does not explicitly name PGS, it opens a legal pathway for participatory models at the local scale.

At the state of the art, therefore, there are eight countries that have legally recognized PGS (Table 3).

Table 3. Summary table of countries that have legally recognized PGSs and the specific competent authorities.

Countries	Year of Recognition	Competent Authority
Bolivia	2006	SENASAG—Servicio Nacional de Sanidad Agropecuaria e Inocuidad Alimentaría
Brazil	2007	CPOR—Coordinación de Producción Organica
Chile	2016	SAG—Servicio Agrícola y Ganadero
Costa Rica	2017	ARAO—Acreditación y Registro en Producción Organica
Ecuador	2013	AGROCALIDAD—Agencia de Regulación y Control Fito y Zoosanitario
Mexico	2006	SENASICA—Servicio Nacional De Sanidad, Inocuidad Y Calidad Agroalimentaria
Paraguay	2008	SENAVE—Servicio Nacional de Calidad y Sanidad Vegetal y de Semillas
Peru	2006	SENASA—Servicio Nacional de Sanidad Agraria
Uruguay	2008	MGAP—Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Pesca; Dirección General de Servicios Agrícolas

Comparing countries highlights key differences. Brazil and Bolivia both chose strong institutionalization though with opposite logics: Brazil emphasizes self-management within OPACs, while Bolivia imposes direct state control and fees. Mexico and Peru have opted for legal legitimacy without economic burdens, leaving greater flexibility to grassroots organizations. Paraguay and Uruguay provide recognition but with limited impact: in Paraguay, the system is formal but barely visible, while Uruguay confines PGS strictly to domestic markets. Costa Rica and Chile, finally, offer more nuanced recognition, where the legal basis exists but practical implementation depends largely on the organizational capacity of local networks.

In short, Latin American states range from full integration to partial or restricted recognition of PGS, with major differences in the degree of public control, the presence of administrative fees, and the market reach allowed. This mosaic reflects both the institutional diversity of the region and the ongoing debate on how to reconcile social participation, quality assurance, and economic accessibility for small-scale producers and consumers.

3.2.2. NGOs and Civil Society Organizations

Far from being simple participants, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and social movements are typically involved in PGS [20]. In many cases, they not only participate but represent the very engines driving this innovative certification model. Organizations like the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM), Movimento Agroecológico de Latinoamerica (MAELA), or La Via Campesina (LVC) represent a reference point in promoting the concepts of agroecology [46] and “alternative” productive or certification systems [47]. Also, NGOs serve as the facilitators in the creation and implementation of PGS, both locally and regionally, acting as the crucial connective tissue that often makes the entire system possible.

Their contribution is deeply practical because they are key providers of technical support and training, working directly with smallholder farmers, offering guidance on agroecological practices, and helping them understand the principles and protocols of the PGS [26]. This capacity-building role is vital, as it empowers farmers to meet the standards without relying on external, expensive consultants. By building this knowledge base, NGOs help sustain the system from the inside out.

Furthermore, civil society organizations are essential for network building and political advocacy. They connect producers with consumers, local markets, and even government bodies. They also act as powerful advocates, lobbying for the formal recognition of PGS as a valid and legal alternative to conventional certification. In countries like Brazil, this advocacy has been crucial in legally integrating PGS into the national regulatory framework for organic products [30].

Finally, NGOs act as the ethical guardians of the system. In a model based on social trust, they are independent third parties that ensure the integrity of the process. They participate in the guarantee committees, mediate disputes, and ensure the system remains fair and free from commercial distortions.

As in the previous stakeholders sections, two case studies, in Lima and Apurímac, will be analyzed to provide a powerful illustration of the roles of NGOs [26]. According to the authors, NGOs like the Red de Agroecología (RAE) were not just involved, they were the central architects of the PGS model in Peru providing the initial capital and organizational structure needed to launch the PGS. They brought farmers and consumers together. By effectively creating the very networks of trust that the system relies on for technical support in organic farming and the documentation processes required by the PGS, NGOs explained their key role in the training of small farmers. This support allowed farmers to independently meet the certification standards and strengthened their long-term economic viability. The research also found that NGOs were key in connecting producers to alternative market channels such as local farmers’ markets and direct-to-consumer sales. Furthermore, by raising consumer awareness about the social and environmental benefits of PGS products, they helped create a loyal demand base that offers farmers a fair and sustainable price.

However, the strong reliance on external actors, especially NGOs, provides valuable support but also creates vulnerabilities if institutional contributions shift or funding declines. It is therefore necessary to analyze the role of NGOs also from the point of view of the sustainability of the system itself, focusing also on the weaknesses and critical issues that such an influential role can cause to the system.

In conclusion, the role of NGOs in Latin American PGS is not peripheral; it is a fundamental gear of the system. They are the promoters, facilitators, and guarantors of a model that prioritizes equity, trust, and sustainability, proving that a more just food system is not only possible but is already thriving.

4. Potential and Limits of PGS Certification: SWOT and TOWS Analysis

Once the roles of the various system actors have been understood and the existing state-of-the-art literature/material from various Latin American countries have been analyzed (Table 1 and Table 2), it is possible to summarize the findings within a single model, providing a general overview of the PGS. To this aim, we chose to conduct a SWOT analysis that addressed the system’s core actors, while also taking into account interactions with external stakeholders (Figure 4). To build the table, we consulted with experts in the agricultural certification sector and NGOs working in the field. In order to make the work real and practicable, case studies were taken into consideration that concern the countries where PGS are legally recognized (Table 3), each with its own peculiarities. Therefore, an attempt was made to bring together items shared by most of the examples given in Latin America, with a particular focus on Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru because of the major data availability. In particular, for all the elements of the SWOT, the number and specific articles describing these characteristics were reported in the description below.

Figure 4. SWOT analysis about PGS certification considering elements from all the system’s actors. The coloured elements represent the key ones used in the TOWS analysis to formulate the four strategies.

The PGS model’s primary strengths are rooted in its community-centric approach. From the perspective of producers, the model fosters capacity building and technical learning (SP1) [13,19,34] among farmers through peer-to-peer exchanges, often with the support of NGOs. This social and technical dimension is complemented by a rich economic advantage: the system is highly accessible by offering significantly lower certification costs (SP2) [6,7,19] compared to conventional third-party audits, which are not accessible for many producers. The very foundation of PGS is built on mutual trust and shared responsibility (SP3) [19,21,28], creating a resilient network. For both producers and consumers, a key strength is the sense of empowerment and co-ownership (SPC1) [19,21], as they are the primary decision-makers. This structure also facilitates a short supply chain model (SPC2) [21,25], which gives local producers direct access to high-value regional markets going towards consumer demand. For consumers the advantage is that in some countries, their role is institutionally recognized (SC1) [11,22,24,29,31,32,33,35,36,46]. The system provides direct access to high-quality organic food (SC2) [25] at affordable prices to the peri-urban and rural population.

Despite its strengths, the system has several internal weaknesses. A major challenge for producers is the significant time investment (WP1) [6,7,14,16] required for non-field activities, such as inspections, bureaucracy, and meetings. If we add natural/geographical barriers (WP2) [14,16], this can lead to unequal engagement (WP3) [14,16], as the workload often falls on a few dedicated members. Furthermore, while the technical knowledge gained is high, the economic benefits (WP4) [7,21] are not always proportional, which can be a point of frustration. For both producers and consumers, a core weakness is the reliance on personal relationships (WPC1) [6,9,18,45] over the certification itself, which can lead to limited data availability (WPC2) [6,18] and an overall lack of institutional credibility outside of the immediate network. For consumers specifically, a lack of awareness and engagement (WC1) [14,25] is a persistent problem and there is often confusion (WC2) [25] about what the PGS label actually guarantees.

The external environment presents several opportunities for PGS growth. For producers, the system can enable the development of skills beyond farming (OP1) [13,19,34], such as project management, digital marketing, and advocacy. It also offers a chance to link production to broader social and political movements (OP2) [14,19,21,47], such as food sovereignty. For both producers and consumers, there is a growing global demand for trustworthy food (OPC1) [21,25], which PGS is uniquely positioned to meet. The system can also leverage a gender focus (OPC2) [25,27] to strengthen women’s leadership and encourage co-responsibility (OPC3) [14,21,27] to form new community networks. For consumers, there is an opportunity to increase their involvement through targeted awareness campaigns (OC1) [14,25] and to see the system gain wider recognition through policy integration (OC2) [11,22,24,29,31,32,33,35,36,46].

The sustainability of the PGS model faces several external threats. A significant threat for producers is the dependence on unpaid work contributions (TP1) [6,7,14,16,21], which is not a sustainable long-term model. This can lead to uneven benefits (TP2) [14,16,21] and even the risk of conflicts (TP3) [14,21] among members. For both producers and consumers, the model faces competition from third-party certification (TPC1) [8,21], which is a more globally recognized standard and avoids the direct participation of the consumers. The dependence on NGOs (TPC2) [6,7,14,21,28] for initial support is a threat if funding or organizational capacity is withdrawn, but also for the bureaucracy/organizational phases and to create awareness campaigns. Furthermore, the risk of state-imposed top-down frameworks (TPC3) [22] could undermine the very participatory nature of the system. For consumers, there is a risk of disengagement (TC1) [21,25] if the system fails to scale or if the level of commitment required (TC2) [21,25] becomes too high.

Based on the points listed, it was then decided to select those highlighted in different colours (Figure 4) to create the TOWS analysis and produce the growth (SO), defence (ST), recovery (WO), and survival (WT) strategies, combining the internal and external factors (Figure 5).

Figure 5. TOWS analysis built on the key elements found in the SWOT analysis matrix.

The development of the TOWS matrix allowed us to translate the elements identified in the SWOT analysis into concrete strategies, selecting only a few points deemed particularly significant [48] (Figure 5).

The SO (Growth) strategy represents the most proactive scenario, aimed at maximizing strengths while simultaneously exploiting external opportunities. In this sense, the combination of the availability of high-quality organic food and the spread of short supply chains among local and regional markets (SPC2 and SP2) with the growing social demand for reliable products (OPC1) reinforces the idea that PGS can position themselves as privileged models for responding to the demand for transparency and sustainability. This growth perspective strengthens the bond with consumers and helps legitimize PGS as credible tools to provide high quality food at an affordable price for all consumers who want to approach a healthy and sustainable diet.

From a practical point of view PGS farmers can strengthen their visibility by leveraging local and regional markets through more frequent community-based initiatives, such as PGS-branded agroecological fairs and seasonal events. In urban and peri-urban areas specifically, digital tools for sales and communication (e-commerce platforms, apps, and social media) can further expand outreach and attract new consumers, building stronger connections with local communities.

The ST (Defence) strategy, on the other hand, aims to protect the system from the impact of external threats thanks to internal strengths. Specifically, the empowerment and co-ownership of key stakeholders (SPC1) serve as a safeguard against two specific risks: dependence on NGO-led capacity-building and awareness-raising programmes (TPC2) and potential top-down biases imposed by state regulatory frameworks (TPC3).

Within this defensive logic, strengthening the autonomous capacity for self-governance and collective decision-making among producers and consumers becomes essential to preserve the participatory nature of the system, preventing it from becoming a mere bureaucratic extension of institutional models or remaining tied to the presence of external actors.

The WO (Recovery) strategy focuses on the possibility of overcoming certain internal weaknesses by leveraging opportunities. In particular, low consumer awareness and confusion about the purpose of certification (WC1 and WC2) can be addressed by developing skills that extend beyond agricultural activity (OP1) and through awareness-raising campaigns conducted with the support of NGOs (OC1). In this sense, the ability to clearly communicate the principles of PGS, linking them to values, such as food sovereignty and active participation in socioeconomic policies, appears key to transforming a weakness into a strength and broadening the system’s social base. Furthermore, the development of extra-agricultural skills for producers can be a way to reduce the direct dependence of PGS on NGOs, thus increasing the sustainability of the system not only towards consumers but also towards the producers themselves.

Finally, the WT (Survival) strategy takes on a more conservative nature, aimed at mitigating risks arising from the combination of weaknesses and threats. The high time requirement for non-agricultural activities (WP1), inequalities among producers (WP3), and reliance on volunteer labour (TP1), combined with the risk of conflicting priorities (TP3) and participant disinvolvement (TP2), risk compromising the long-term sustainability of PGS. In this context, survival strategies are not so much aimed at expansion as at ensuring the system remains viable and resilient. This involves rethinking the balance of workloads, promoting more equitable inclusion mechanisms, and developing tools for mediation and internal conflict management. This is why, based on the experiences of case studies and the opinions of industry experts, it was decided that those already prominent as “leaders” should be entrusted with carrying out some of the bureaucratic or institutional duties, receiving in exchange monetary compensation from a common fund established by all PGS participants. This approach might conflict with the very principles of the PGS, but if these tasks were effectively limited to bureaucratic and institutional duties, while community decisions would still be taken through participation in ordinary assemblies, then the WT strategy could be useful and applicable.

5. Discussion

The TOWS analysis highlights how PGS maintain significant potential for growth and innovation. This depends not only on the quality of agroecological practices, but above all on the capacity to reinforce participatory dynamics and build social and political legitimacy. Among the enhancement strategies identified, the combination of SO (Growth) and WO (Recovery) appears the most promising in the current context. The SO pathway provides a proactive means of strengthening visibility and legitimacy by leveraging short supply chains [49], regional markets, and digital platforms to connect with new consumers, particularly in urban and peri-urban contexts [50]. At the same time, the WO strategy addresses structural weaknesses such as low consumer awareness and limited recognition of PGS principles. Evidence from other geographical regions also shows that environmental values, institutional support, and trust strongly shape the adoption of participatory certification [51]. In this sense, consumer education and producer skill development become essential to consolidate the social base of the system. In addition, it is important to acknowledge that certain structural challenges require systemic solutions supported by existing legal frameworks in Latin America in order to safeguard the health and accessibility of organic products.

The WT (Survival) strategy, though more conservative, remains a pertinent and actionable approach in contexts of uncertainty. In critical moments, it can serve as a pragmatic tool to balance workloads, mediate conflicts, and preserve the resilience of the system even under adverse conditions. However, it carries the risk of deviating from foundational principles, as adaptive strategies may diverge from original values to ensure organizational survival [28]. Nevertheless, such strategies can provide useful safeguards in the medium term, as studies highlight the importance of adaptive capacity in maintaining operational effectiveness and organizational stability during periods of stress. This approach allows the system to remain functional and responsive, while temporary compromises are made to safeguard long-term continuity. Meanwhile, the ST (Defence) strategy is better conceived as a long-term perspective: strengthening autonomy and reducing dependency on external actors are crucial goals, but current high levels of co-dependence with NGOs make this strategy less immediately feasible as a primary pathway.

Overall, it was possible to highlight the system’s limitations and potential, proposing guidelines for improvement in different contexts. However, this review encountered several methodological and practical difficulties. First, the research has been geographically limited, but still among Latin America countries parameters such as regulatory frameworks, institutional contexts, and market conditions differ substantially. This makes it difficult to draw broad generalizations or to establish valid cross-regional comparisons [52]. Second, there is a lack of comparable case studies: methodologies and evaluation criteria vary widely, with many studies relying on qualitative approaches or localized surveys, which complicates the possibility of meta-analysis. Third, PGS models are themselves heterogeneous, differing in governance structures, levels of formal recognition, and scale of operations. This diversity enriches the debate but challenges attempts to standardize findings. We recommend that future research on PGS should adopt cross-regional comparative designs and mixed-method approaches to capture contextual diversity and evaluate performance consistently. Collaboration with PGS practitioners and the development of participatory digital tools can further strengthen data quality and support scalable, context-sensitive innovations.

6. Conclusions

In conclusion, the development of PGS in Latin America demonstrates that each case reflects unique social, institutional, and environmental conditions. The relative importance of the strategies depends on the specific challenges and capacities of each PGS initiative. Although it was decided to give greater weight, in general, to two of the strategies, none are inherently less valuable than the others. SO and WO strategies may take precedence where immediate growth, visibility, and social consolidation are feasible whereas WT strategies provide essential resilience in moments of stress and ST strategies represent a long-term vision for enhancing autonomy and reducing dependence on external actors. Ultimately, these findings underscore the importance of context-sensitive, adaptive decision-making, highlighting that participatory and agroecological systems thrive when strategies are tailored to local realities rather than imposed uniformly.