Special Issue "Experimental Studies of Social Dilemma Games"

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (31 July 2015).

Printed Edition Available!
A printed edition of this Special Issue is available here.

Special Issue Editor

Prof. Dr. Ananish Chaudhuri
Website
Guest Editor
Head of the Department of Economics, University of Auckland Business School, Room 660 Owen G Glenn Building Level 6, 12 Grafton Road, Auckland, New Zealand
Interests: public goods games; trust; coordination problems; corruption

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

I invite you to submit your research to a Special Issue of GAMES. This Special Issue will be devoted to experimental studies of social dilemma problems. We envisage a fairly broad scope for this Special Issue and we will consider all studies that used experimental methods to look at a variety of social dilemma problems, such as voluntary contribution mechanisms or common pool resource extraction problems. However, we do recognize that this is an increasingly crowded field and so, while we will seriously consider all submissions, some preference will be given to novel applications of the methodology. Such applications may include, but are not restricted to, field experiments or artifactual lab experiments on collective action problems, such as the management of common pool resources, endogenous formation of networks and social norms, neuro-economic studies of contributions and punishments, and studies that try to understand to what extent behavior in the lab translates to that in the field.

Prof. Dr. Ananish Chaudhuri
Guest Editor

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All papers will be peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access quarterly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1000 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • public goods
  • common pool resources
  • field experiments
  • lab experiments

Published Papers (11 papers)

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Editorial

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Open AccessEditorial
Recent Advances in Experimental Studies of Social Dilemma Games
Games 2016, 7(1), 7; https://doi.org/10.3390/g7010007 - 26 Feb 2016
Cited by 3
Abstract
I provide a broad overview of the findings reported in the articles submitted for this special volume on experimental studies of social dilemma problems. I start by providing a synopsis of where current research stands on this topic. Then I go on to [...] Read more.
I provide a broad overview of the findings reported in the articles submitted for this special volume on experimental studies of social dilemma problems. I start by providing a synopsis of where current research stands on this topic. Then I go on to discuss the specific papers and how those papers extend our knowledge in this area and add value to the current state of the art. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Experimental Studies of Social Dilemma Games) Printed Edition available

Research

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Open AccessArticle
Pledges of Commitment and Cooperation in Partnerships
Games 2016, 7(1), 4; https://doi.org/10.3390/g7010004 - 20 Jan 2016
Abstract
We use experimental methods to investigate whether pledges of commitment can improve cooperation in endogenously-formed partnerships facing a social dilemma. Treatments vary in terms of the individual’s: (1) opportunity to commit to their partner; (2) the cost of dissolving committed partnerships; and (3) [...] Read more.
We use experimental methods to investigate whether pledges of commitment can improve cooperation in endogenously-formed partnerships facing a social dilemma. Treatments vary in terms of the individual’s: (1) opportunity to commit to their partner; (2) the cost of dissolving committed partnerships; and (3) the distribution of these dissolution costs between partners. Our findings show that pledges of commitment alone can increase cooperation and welfare in committed partnerships. The introduction of relatively large and equally split costs yields similar gains. In contrast, when costs to dissolve committed partnerships fall solely on the individual choosing to break up, pledges of commitment fail to improve cooperation and welfare. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Experimental Studies of Social Dilemma Games) Printed Edition available
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Open AccessArticle
Partner Selection and the Division of Surplus: Evidence from Ultimatum and Dictator Experiments
Games 2016, 7(1), 3; https://doi.org/10.3390/g7010003 - 19 Jan 2016
Cited by 4
Abstract
We study ultimatum and dictator environments with one-way, unenforceable pre-play communication from the proposer to the recipient, semantically framed as a promise. After observing this promise regarding how much the proposer will offer if selected, in our treatment conditions, recipients choose whether or [...] Read more.
We study ultimatum and dictator environments with one-way, unenforceable pre-play communication from the proposer to the recipient, semantically framed as a promise. After observing this promise regarding how much the proposer will offer if selected, in our treatment conditions, recipients choose whether or not to select a particular proposer. We find that offers can increase in the ultimatum game both with non-competitive selection with a single potential proposer, and more so with competition, where the recipient chooses one of two potential proposers, as compared to the no selection baseline. Furthermore, the offer is rejected with higher probability if the promisemade by the selected proposer is higher than the eventual offer. Our dictator environment does not give the power to reject offers, thus selection power carries no benefits in the dictator game. Finally, independent of the game institution or proposer selection mechanism, promises provide credible signals for offers. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Experimental Studies of Social Dilemma Games) Printed Edition available
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Open AccessArticle
The Role of the Decision-Making Regime on Cooperation in a Workgroup Social Dilemma: An Examination of Cyberloafing
Games 2015, 6(4), 588-603; https://doi.org/10.3390/g6040588 - 05 Nov 2015
Cited by 6
Abstract
A burgeoning problem facing organizations is the loss of workgroup productivity due to cyberloafing. The current paper examines how changes in the decision-making rights about what workgroup members can do on the job affect cyberloafing and subsequent work productivity. We compare two different [...] Read more.
A burgeoning problem facing organizations is the loss of workgroup productivity due to cyberloafing. The current paper examines how changes in the decision-making rights about what workgroup members can do on the job affect cyberloafing and subsequent work productivity. We compare two different types of decision-making regimes: autocratic decision-making and group voting. Using a laboratory experiment to simulate a data-entry organization, we find that, while autocratic decision-making and group voting regimes both curtail cyberloafing (by over 50%), it is only in group voting that there is a substantive improvement (of 38%) in a cyberloafer’s subsequent work performance. Unlike autocratic decision-making, group voting leads to workgroups outperforming the control condition where cyberloafing could not be stopped. Additionally, only in the group voting regime did production levels of cyberloafers and non-loafers converge over time. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Experimental Studies of Social Dilemma Games) Printed Edition available
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Open AccessArticle
Reciprocity in Labor Market Relationships: Evidence from an Experiment across High-Income OECD Countries
Games 2015, 6(4), 473-494; https://doi.org/10.3390/g6040473 - 09 Oct 2015
Cited by 1
Abstract
We study differences in behavior across countries in a labor market context. To this end, we conducted a bilateral gift-exchange experiment comparing the behavior of subjects from five high-income OECD countries: Germany, Spain, Israel, Japan and the USA. We observe that in all [...] Read more.
We study differences in behavior across countries in a labor market context. To this end, we conducted a bilateral gift-exchange experiment comparing the behavior of subjects from five high-income OECD countries: Germany, Spain, Israel, Japan and the USA. We observe that in all countries, effort levels are increasing while rejection rates are decreasing in wage offers. However, we also find considerable differences in behavior across countries in both one-shot and repeated relationships, the most striking between Germany and Spain. We also discuss the influence of socio-economic indicators and the implications of our findings. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Experimental Studies of Social Dilemma Games) Printed Edition available
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Open AccessArticle
Framing and Feedback in Social Dilemmas with Partners and Strangers
Games 2015, 6(4), 394-412; https://doi.org/10.3390/g6040394 - 25 Sep 2015
Cited by 19
Abstract
We study framing effects in repeated social dilemmas by comparing payoff-equivalent Give- and Take-framed public goods games under varying matching mechanisms (Partners or Strangers) and levels of feedback (Aggregate or Individual). In the Give-framed game, players contribute to a public good, while in [...] Read more.
We study framing effects in repeated social dilemmas by comparing payoff-equivalent Give- and Take-framed public goods games under varying matching mechanisms (Partners or Strangers) and levels of feedback (Aggregate or Individual). In the Give-framed game, players contribute to a public good, while in the Take-framed game, players take from an existing public good. The results show Take framing and Individual-level feedback lead to more extreme behavior (free-riding and full cooperation), especially for Partners. These results suggest Take framing and Individual-level feedback increase the variability of cooperation. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Experimental Studies of Social Dilemma Games) Printed Edition available
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Open AccessArticle
Representing Others in a Public Good Game
Games 2015, 6(3), 381-393; https://doi.org/10.3390/g6030381 - 21 Sep 2015
Cited by 5
Abstract
In many important public good situations the decision-making power and authority is delegated to representatives who make binding decisions on behalf of a larger group. The purpose of this study is to compare contribution decisions made by individuals with contribution decisions made by [...] Read more.
In many important public good situations the decision-making power and authority is delegated to representatives who make binding decisions on behalf of a larger group. The purpose of this study is to compare contribution decisions made by individuals with contribution decisions made by group representatives. We present the results from a laboratory experiment that compares decisions made by individuals in inter-individual public good games with decisions made by representatives on behalf of their group in inter-group public good games. Our main finding is that contribution behavior differs between individuals and group representatives, but only for women. While men’s choices are equally self-interested as individuals and group representatives, women make less self-interested choices as group representatives. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Experimental Studies of Social Dilemma Games) Printed Edition available
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Open AccessArticle
Alleviation and Sanctions in Social Dilemma Games
Games 2015, 6(3), 368-380; https://doi.org/10.3390/g6030368 - 21 Sep 2015
Abstract
This paper reports an experiment which compares behaviour in two punishment regimes: (i) a standard public goods game with punishment in which subjects are given the opportunity to punish other group members (democratic punishment regime) and (ii) a public goods game environment where [...] Read more.
This paper reports an experiment which compares behaviour in two punishment regimes: (i) a standard public goods game with punishment in which subjects are given the opportunity to punish other group members (democratic punishment regime) and (ii) a public goods game environment where all group members exogenously experience an automatic reduction of their income (irrespective of their behaviour) and are given the opportunity to alleviate the automatic penalty (undemocratic punishment regime). We employ a within-subjects design where subjects experience both environments and control for order effects by alternating their sequence. Our findings indicate that average contributions and earnings in the undemocratic punishment environment are significantly lower relative to the standard public goods game with punishment. We also observe that in the undemocratic environment average contributions decay over time only when subjects have experienced the standard public goods game with punishment. As a result, alleviation is significantly less when subjects have experienced the standard public goods game with punishment compared to when they do not have such experience. However, the assignment of punishment is robust irrespective of the order in which the games are played. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Experimental Studies of Social Dilemma Games) Printed Edition available
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Open AccessArticle
Stable Sampling Equilibrium in Common Pool Resource Games
Games 2015, 6(3), 299-317; https://doi.org/10.3390/g6030299 - 31 Aug 2015
Cited by 10
Abstract
This paper reconsiders evidence from experimental common pool resource games from the perspective of a model of payoff sampling. Despite being parameter-free, the model is able to replicate some striking features of the data, including single-peaked frequency distributions, the persistent use of strictly [...] Read more.
This paper reconsiders evidence from experimental common pool resource games from the perspective of a model of payoff sampling. Despite being parameter-free, the model is able to replicate some striking features of the data, including single-peaked frequency distributions, the persistent use of strictly dominated actionsand stable heterogeneity in choices. These properties can also be accurately replicated using logit quantal response equilibrium (QRE), but only by tuning the free parameter separately for separate games. When the QRE parameter is constrained to be the same across games, sampling equilibrium provides a superior fit to the data. We argue that these findings are likely to generalize to other complex games with multiple players and strategies. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Experimental Studies of Social Dilemma Games) Printed Edition available
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Open AccessArticle
The Loser’s Bliss in Auctions with Price Externality
Games 2015, 6(3), 191-213; https://doi.org/10.3390/g6030191 - 03 Jul 2015
Cited by 1
Abstract
We consider auctions with price externality where all bidders derive utility from the winning price, such as charity auctions. In addition to the benefit to the winning bidder, all bidders obtain a benefit that is increasing in the winning price. Theory makes two [...] Read more.
We consider auctions with price externality where all bidders derive utility from the winning price, such as charity auctions. In addition to the benefit to the winning bidder, all bidders obtain a benefit that is increasing in the winning price. Theory makes two predictions in such settings: First, individual bids will be increasing in the multiplier on the winning price. Second, individual bids will not depend on the number of other bidders. Empirically, we find no evidence that increasing the multiplier increases individual bids in a systematic way, but we find that increasing the number of bidders does. An analysis of individual bidding functions reveals that bidders underweight the incentives to win and overweight the incentives to lose. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Experimental Studies of Social Dilemma Games) Printed Edition available
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Open AccessArticle
Students, Temporary Workers and Co-Op Workers: An Experimental Investigation on Social Preferences
Games 2015, 6(2), 79-123; https://doi.org/10.3390/g6020079 - 18 May 2015
Cited by 3
Abstract
We conduct an artefactual field experiment to compare the individual preferences and propensity to cooperate of three pools of subjects: Undergraduate students, temporary workers and permanent workers. We find that students are more selfish and contribute less than workers. Temporary and permanent contract [...] Read more.
We conduct an artefactual field experiment to compare the individual preferences and propensity to cooperate of three pools of subjects: Undergraduate students, temporary workers and permanent workers. We find that students are more selfish and contribute less than workers. Temporary and permanent contract workers have similar other-regarding preferences and display analogous contribution patterns in an anonymous Public Good Game. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Experimental Studies of Social Dilemma Games) Printed Edition available
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